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Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia

Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia

Jim Seroka and Radoš Smiljković

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Foreword by Roger E. Kanet

Western analysis of communist political systems has undergone significant change during the course of the past quarter of a century. Most research on the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe published in the 1950s focused on such issues as the struggle for power within the political elite and the mechanisms of control employed by that elite to maintain its political dominance over a subject population. The totalitarian model, with its emphasis on strict organizational hierarchy and policy-making by command, underlay most of Western scholarly writing. During the intervening years the theoretical underpinnings, the methodological approaches, and the topics of concern for analysts of European communist systems have changed substantially. A modified "totalitarian" model now competes with a variety of other approaches to the study of communist systems, such as "institutional pluralism"; traditional "Kremlinological" methods of obtaining and analyzing data have been supplemented with a vast array of other research methods, including in many cases the use of quantitative research techniques; finally, the focus in research on Soviet and East European politics has shifted from the almost exclusive concern with elites and elite control over the masses to a broad range of political and policy-relevant topics. All of this is merely another way of saying that political analysis of European communist systems has begun to enter the mainstream of political science analysis.

This major shift in orientation of students of European communist systems has resulted from a variety of developments. At the beginning of the 1960s there was a growing concern about the limitations of the totalitarian model voiced by Robert C. Tucker, H. Gordon Skilling, and others, who argued that this approach eliminated any real study of communist politics (defined as competition in the policy process) and, more importantly, did not accord with reality. Within a relatively short period of time others began not

only to question the applicability of the totalitarian model, with all of its assumptions and limitations, but also to propose alternative approaches to the study of Soviet and East European politics. During the 1970s and 1980s a multiplicity of studies of both macro- and micro-politics in individual European communist countries have been published. These studies have added significantly to our understanding of the nature and operation of the political process in these countries.

In addition to the impact on Western research of dissatisfaction with the totalitarian model and the resulting search for alternative analytic approaches, the relative opening up of the communist states played a major role in the reorientation of Western academic studies. Since the 1950s Western scholars have been able—far more than in the immediate postwar period—to travel to the area, to conduct interviews and field research, and to gain access to various forms of data virtually inaccessible in earlier years.

In many respects *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia*, by Jim Seroka and Radoš Smiljković, is an apt example of the type of change to which I have referred. First of all, it does not focus on elite politics or elite-mass relations, but rather is concerned primarily with the structure and functioning of the Yugoslav political system. Secondly, it is based on a range of sources, most of which would have been unavailable thirty years ago. Finally, the fact that an American and a Yugoslav have coauthored the study is indicative of the expanded level of access and cooperation.

Despite the major changes that have occurred in Western studies of communist politics during the recent past, vast areas of potential importance for a more complete and accurate understanding of the political systems and processes of Eastern Europe remained virtually unexamined. Eastern Europe still tends to receive relatively less scholarly attention in the West—at least in the United States—than does the Soviet Union. Moreover, much of the research that is published tends to emphasize the macro-political level. Local politics—including political institutions and behavior at the subnational level—are dealt with by few scholars. Moreover, relatively little substantive research has been conducted on the actual functioning of political organizations in European communist states. The major strengths and contributions of this study by Seroka and Smiljković are precisely in these areas.

Seroka and Smiljković have produced a study that definitely fulfills the two objectives that they set for themselves. They provide much more precise and detailed information on the actual functioning of Yugoslav self-management than is found in other English-language studies of the subject. In addition, they provide extensive information on the actual organizational structure and the functioning of major political organizations in Yugoslavia—the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, the Trade Union Alliance, and the League of Socialist Youth. Of special interest is their treatment of relations among various administrative levels of these organizations—for example,

republic and federal—and the relationships among the organizations themselves. What emerges is a picture of a pluralist and competitive political system (within certain limitations) in which politics rather than mere administration plays a crucial role.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Foreword by Najdan Pašić

This book, which is a joint undertaking of Radoš Smiljković, a Yugoslav professor at the University of Belgrade, and Jim Seroka, an American professor from Southern Illinois University, deserves to attract the attention and interest of the broad-based scientific and informed public that is concerned with comparative political systems in general as well as those who follow the political system of Yugoslavia. This volume is the fruit of a multiyear research effort on the theory and practice of a self-managed political system. Both authors are well-known researchers on the political and social life of Yugoslavia. Smiljković has written many books about sociopolitical organizations in Yugoslavia, particularly the League of Communists, while Seroka has been one of the more serious researchers on the social system of Yugoslavia from the ranks of the American scientific community.

Among those who are engaged in the study of contemporary political systems, there is more or less a consensus that a fuller understanding of political reality in individual countries must begin with the normative foundation of the basic political institutions, and that the understanding of the process of political decision-making depends upon a deeper grasp of how the political parties and other related associations are organized and function. From such a vantage point the basic characteristics and essential differences among political systems can be viewed. Considering the Yugoslav case, these problems are particularly interesting because Yugoslavia, whose recent historical experiences are interpreted very differently, offers a unique example of the peaceful transition of a nation from a state-party monopoly to a new type of pluralism based on self-management in economic and other spheres of social life, and a transition from a centralized form of federalism that was established immediately after the war to a decentralized federalism that, in the opinion of many observers, has some of the features of a confederal system. The actual significance and scope of these changes can be assessed

only if the development and current role of the sociopolitical organizations, above all the League of Communists as the most influential and leading ideological and political force, assume a central position. Seroka and Smiljković's book has been prepared around this key theme about the place and role of sociopolitical organizations in a system of self-managing democracy, and because of that emphasis this scientific work is exceptionally valuable.

In the development of a scientific approach to the analysis of different political systems there have been many "limiting factors" that hinder the use of the comparative method and lessen the accuracy, comparability, and even the scientific value of some research. We need only to mention ideological barriers, the numerous semantic misunderstandings, the major differences in methodology, and the difficulty in applying conceptual frameworks in a cross-cultural setting. From this vantage point the long-term cooperation and coauthorship of these two professors of political sociology, who come from very different environments with different academic traditions and orientations, has brought forth a work that will certainly encourage and stimulate this kind of scientific cooperation. The book before us is undoubtedly comprehensible, persuasive, and interesting, both for the American as well as for the Yugoslav reader.

The book's preparation took considerable time because the authors did not limit themselves to general theoretical interpretations, but rather analyzed the actual political and self-managed life of society in the context of the activities of the sociopolitical organizations. The wealth of well-selected empirical data shows how deeply the authors went into the nature of the political system of self-management, and it shows the character of that system to the American reader in particular. This effort was essential to chart the founding bases and perspectives of the separate path to socialist development of Yugoslav society, and the authors successfully fulfilled their task by expressing the essence of the self-managed political system.

The political system of socialist self-management represents a form of democracy through which the working class, workers, and citizens become the actual decision-makers in their conditions of life and work. In such a system the sociopolitical organizations, like the political parties and other organizations in the West, have a very significant place and function. The pluralism of self-managed interests is a basic characteristic of the political system, as the authors demonstrate both in their theoretical and empirical analyses of the social role of the sociopolitical organizations. The authors also pay considerable attention to surveying the basic components of the Yugoslav conceptualization of pluralism in self-management so as to assist Western readers who may generally perceive pluralism only in terms of political party pluralism.

The authors comprehensively focus upon each of the major sociopolitical

organizations in Yugoslavia: the League of Communists, Socialist Alliance, Trade Union Alliance, League of Socialist Youth, and the Veterans' Association. They analyze these organizations not only from the perspective of their constitutionally defined roles, but they also critically point out deviations in practice. In fact, Seroka and Smiljković approach the basic components of the sociopolitical organizations on three levels—general/theoretical, political/systemic, and practical/political—and they rely on the wealth of political data on the development of Yugoslav society in the last ten years. The period selected is fortunate because during this time the sociopolitical organizations (among them the League of Communists) underwent a radical transition and evolved beyond the classical type of political organization that is seen in the West or in the East European socialist states.

As the authors note, the League of Communists experienced a major transformation from a political party that ruled in the name of the working class to the leading ideologically motivated directing social force that operates from within other organizations and other political and self-managed institutions. This role can be actualized only insofar as the League assists and aids the self-managed and political institutions to decide independently. The authors explain how this trend altered the social role of the League of Communists to lead in the struggle against bureaucratic forces.

The transformation of the League of Communists had a critical influence in strengthening the role of the other sociopolitical organizations, especially the Socialist Alliance and the Trade Unions. These organizations became an exceptionally important factor in the democratization of society on a self-managed foundation. They directly participated in the creation of social policy, particularly in self-managed decision-making. In elections for self-management bodies and assemblies, the organizations, particularly the Socialist Alliance, have become the determining force as is characteristic for political parties in other socialist countries and in the West.

According to the authors, the internal affairs of the political organizations have undergone radical change. The League of Communists, for example, has brought about a transformation of democratic centralism in the direction of strengthening the influence of the members and the local chapters. The authors also correctly draw attention to the new role and character of the Socialist Alliance, which has emerged as a broad-based democratic social organization as well as a front in which social groups negotiate and coordinate among themselves some of the more important social activities without undue interference from the state.

Through their examination of the Yugoslav sociopolitical organizations, the authors have been able to put into broader perspective the development and functioning of the entire political system. In addition to presenting the internal structure of each organization and describing its internal affairs, the

analysis also describes the recruitment and selection processes and the process of political decision-making at all levels.

Finally, this book includes data from other empirical research and contains a considerable amount of competently assembled and enormously useful statistical material. These features should increase the interest in and the usefulness of this exceptional publication.

University of Belgrade

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Preface

In *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia* we examine the philosophical bases and political behavior of the major political organizations in Yugoslavia. We use Yugoslav empirical research and data, results of Yugoslav public opinion polls and interviews, and descriptions of actual political events to illustrate, explain, and evaluate the political sociology of political organizations in Yugoslavia.

Scholars, policy makers, and even the general public recognize and acknowledge the importance of these organizations in Socialist states. In fact, it is a common premise that these groups, especially the Communist Party, are the determining factors in policy-making and general political life of these states. Surprisingly, however, very little is known about what these organizations do, how they do it, and why. In this book, we provide the following:

- (a) A comprehensive, social science-based examination of the behavior of political organizations in socialist states;
- (b) A systematic, empirically based treatment of how political organizations interact with one another;
- (c) A review of the process of change and reform of political organizations in one socialist state; and
- (d) An analysis of how socialist political organizations affect major political institutions, political participation, and the public policy process.

In general, *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia* is intended to give the reader sufficient information to understand more clearly a crucial aspect of political life in a socialist state; namely, the role and behavior of the mass-based political action movements. It is neither an apology for, nor an indictment of, these organizations. Rather, it is an objective evaluation and description of the role of political organizations in Yugoslav society, as viewed with modern social research methods. In short, this book gives data and

information, for the first time ever in English, on the contemporary behavior of the political organizations of a socialist state. We hope that it will help close many of the conceptual and informational gaps in our understanding of socialist political processes.

This book intends to fulfill two major objectives. The first is to increase Western understanding of Yugoslav self-management and the role of the political organizations in it. We define and discuss the concept of self-management in philosophical and operational terms, stressing its relationship to the political organizations in Yugoslavia.

The second objective is to provide a comprehensive political sociology of political organizations in Yugoslavia. This includes an evaluation of the behavior of particular political organizations and interactions among them. In addition, it includes a discussion and evaluation of the impact of political organizations on various features of the sociopolitical environment, including elections, legislation, and general public policy.

We have utilized a wide range of sources not available in English and never previously compiled in any language. The results of opinion polls which we used focus on the attitudes of the membership of the organizations and on the attitudes of the general public regarding the activity of specific political organizations. Other sources include documents relating to the ongoing evaluation of the work of specific political organizations, membership figures, data relating to the background and experience of the general membership and leadership, data derived from the research projects of the major scientific research organizations, related doctoral dissertations and masters theses, as well as personal observations and analyses of specific political events.

The League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance of Working People, the League of Trade Unions, and the Youth Organization receive detailed attention and analysis. Their individual and joint roles and behavior are scrutinized. As a policy focus, we concentrate on an in-depth examination of the interaction between political organizations and specific crucial features of Yugoslav political life. Particularly selected are the electoral process, national and republic legislative behavior, and local political processes.

The first chapter discusses the external and internal pressures leading to the development of Yugoslavia's unique system of "Socialist Self-Management Pluralist Democracy." It contains a statement of Yugoslavia's present and historical political environment. This section defines self-management and the special role the political organizations are encouraged to take in that system. Finally, the first chapter outlines and reviews the structure of Yugoslav politics and policy-making in order to help clarify the theoretical linkages among the political individual, the political organizations, and the political system.

Chapters two through five examine how the particular political organiza-

tions fulfill their distinct roles in the Yugoslav political system. The League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, the League of Trade Unions, and the Youth League figure in this review. For each organization, we outline the general purpose, organizational structure, administration and management, and probable directions for future change. An evaluation of the performance of each of the political organizations is also provided.

The third part of this book (chapters six through eight) directly investigates and evaluates the individual and joint behavior of the political organizations in regard to crucial aspects of Yugoslav contemporary society. This section also utilizes empirical sociological and political research findings in order to examine the role of the political organizations in the electoral system, national and republic legislatures, and local government policies and behavior. Particular attention is given to the role of the political organizations in the initiation, implementation, and evaluation of the public policy-making process.

1 The Legal, Historical, and Political Environments

Pluralism and Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia is a multinational federal community of approximately twenty-three million people. The federation consists of six republics and two provinces located in the Republic of Serbia. The republics are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, and the provinces of Serbia are Kosovo and Vojvodina. In a legal sense, each of the republics constitutes a nation, and each republic has its own dominant nationality which is recognized as one of the official nations of Yugoslavia. These nationalities are named after their home republic, with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose major nationality since 1971 has been called "Muslim-Yugoslav."

In addition to the six nations whose homelands lie within the territory of Yugoslavia, there are a number of national minorities in Yugoslavia. The largest minorities are the Albanians and Hungarians, followed by the Slovaks, Rumanians, Turks, Bulgarians, Italians, Czechs, and Gypsies. These nationalities constitute 12 percent of the total population of Yugoslavia.

Although eighty percent of the population consider Croatian-Serbian to be their maternal language, Yugoslavia is a multi-lingual community, and governmental, economic, social, and commercial activities must be conducted in more than one language. The official languages of the country are Serbian-Croatian, Macedonian, and Slovenian. Since 1971, however, Hungarian and Albanian have been used in official government communications, while other minority languages can be used as their adherents desire and circumstances permit. For example, although only 23,000 Rusines live in the country, this national minority has its own schools, radio programs, television programs, and press.

Yugoslavia is culturally a heterogeneous country. The Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islamic religions and cultural traditions have the largest num-

ber of followers, while Jews, Protestants, and several small denominational sects have some adherents as well. Various parts of Yugoslavia have experienced different historical traditions, including centuries'-long occupations by the Turkish Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Venice-Italy. The net result is that Yugoslavia's traditions are very diverse.

The economic profile of Yugoslavia is nearly as fragmented as her demographic, linguistic, and religious profiles. While the Yugoslav worker had a per capita income of nearly 3,300 dollars in 1982, disparities among the republics and provinces are acute. Slovenian workers, for example, enjoy a per capita income of nearly 3,800 dollars, while Kosovan workers register only 2,720 dollars, or seventy-two percent of the Slovenian worker's income. Per capita incomes vary even more widely, considering the much higher percentage of the population employed in Slovenia compared to Kosovo.

In the area of foreign policy, Yugoslavia belongs to the nonaligned movement, and is not a member of either of the two major blocs. It is not part of the Soviet system of economic, political, and military alliances even though it shares a Marxist-Leninist form of government with the Soviet Union. This commitment to nonalignment is very strong, as evidenced by the fact that Yugoslavia was one of the original four founders of the movement, and regularly schedules meetings and consultations with other nonaligned nations. One significant result of this independence is that it permits Yugoslavia to develop its own political and social institutions, and therefore to provide a model of a one-party communist state distinctly different from the Soviet Union.

The significance of all these points is to indicate that Yugoslavia lacks the general conditions, such as a common language, national tradition, shared religion, etc., usually identified with a modern national state. Latent divisions from within and/or pressures from without can endanger the Yugoslav nation-state so that domestic political stability rests upon the near-constant reassertion of the national social interest. Thus, Yugoslavia's political institutions need to be constantly adjusted and adapted to the needs of this highly pluralistic country. Her attempts at these endeavors can be useful examples for other nation states dealing with the problem of political fragmentation.

Brief Historical Sketch

Yugoslavia is a relatively young European state. It was formed only after the First World War from the independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro and from some of the remnants of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires. Although it lacks a long national history, its territory has been the scene of many of the great historical movements of Western civilization.

An important determining factor in Yugoslavia's history has been the fact that East meets West on its territory. Since the Greco-Roman civilizations, armies have crossed the territory of contemporary Yugoslavia on their way to

Europe or Asia. One current consequence of these military movements is the multireligious character of the state, which now contains large numbers of the three major Western religions.

From the fifteenth to the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the shifting border between the Turkish empire and the European Christian states was on the present territory of Yugoslavia. The conflictual border-state nature of that arrangement brought continual destruction and impeded economic and cultural developments in the area. Thus, Yugoslavia in the beginning of the twentieth century lacked the strong, historically tested cultural, economic, and social institutions which were vital in the national rebirth and regeneration of nation states like Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Poland.

A constant theme for most of Yugoslavia's nations and nationalities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been the preservation of national identity and the achievement of national independence. The Slovenes in the northwest struggled to retain their national identity against Austrian and Italian assimilation; Croats and Serbs fought absorption by the Hungarians; and the Serbs and Macedonians struggled against absorption by their Turkish rulers. In particular, Serbia engaged in a series of revolts and uprisings, and, by 1815, liberated itself from Ottoman rule.

The first world war changed the complexion of Yugoslav history. The Serbian-Austro-Hungarian conflict was the immediate cause of the war, and a considerable amount of fighting at that time occurred in what is now Yugoslavia. The Serbian and Montenegrin armies fought bitterly and with relative success against the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Bulgarian armies. In fact, the Serbian nation lost approximately thirty percent of its adult population, a greater proportion of its population than any other nation involved in the First World War. This experience of struggle helped form a national consciousness that transcended the traditional borders of Serbia and led to the creation of the Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes in 1918.

The euphoria following the establishment of the Yugoslav state was short-lived. Neither the government nor the leaders of each nationality had much experience in working together. All sides possessed expectations of the union that were unrealistic and could only be fulfilled at the expense of another national group. As a result, the monarchy evolved into a dictatorship whose rule was generally unpopular and ineffective.

Nazi Germany's, Fascist Italy's, Bulgaria's, and Hungary's coordinated invasion of Yugoslavia in World War II represented the most recent direct threat to the continued existence of the Yugoslav state and the national identity of her peoples. During the war and revolution, approximately 1,700,000 Yugoslavs lost their lives, a national sacrifice proportionately exceeded only by Poland and the Soviet Union. Many of those who died did so in a resistance struggle against the occupying forces, and Yugoslavia's resistance

was the largest such movement in all of Europe at that time. Many others, however, died in a civil war among the nationalities and major religious groups.

The experience of the war in Yugoslavia was especially bitter, and this experience underscored the need for the postwar government to develop institutions that respected but transcended nationality differences. Secular, Marxist-Leninist internationalism was the system that eventually triumphed.

During the war, national liberation committees formed in many regions of the country to resist the occupying forces and to help administer liberated areas. These committees were under the direction of the Yugoslav Communist Party, but, by necessity, the committees were largely autonomous, and they tended to grant considerable decision-making powers to the population. Cooperation among the liberation committees was institutionalized by the first Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) session in Bihac, Bosnia in 1942; and, in 1943, a new government, independent of the monarchy, was proclaimed. This government consisted of the union of liberation committees throughout the country, and Marshal Tito was named as its head. In 1943 and 1944, the new government under Tito gained the support of the Allied powers and became recognized as the successor government of Yugoslavia. At war's end, the Democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed.

Tito's break with the Soviet Union under Stalin in 1948 had a fundamental impact on the development of the political organizations and the system of self-management under which these organizations operate. This event signalled the initiation of Yugoslavia's distinctive system of political and social institutions, and it provided the catalyst for Yugoslavia's modern political organizations.

The Tito-Stalin break contributed immensely to the process of nation-building in Yugoslavia. The expulsion from the Cominform and the closing of trade with nearly all of Yugoslavia's major trading partners in 1949 forced Yugoslavia to rely much more heavily on internal resources, particularly the patriotism of the people. If nothing else, the Tito-Stalin conflict forced the Yugoslav people to become more self-reliant and more self-confident in their abilities to manage the future of their country. Traditional methods of totalitarian rule simply could not endure, and a greater degree of autonomy and power eventually had to be granted to the citizens. As a result, self-management expanded rapidly.

The present political system of self-management defines the environment in which the political organizations operate. It was strongly influenced, however, by two additional events. One event was the adoption of self-management in 1950, which redefined the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat and set Yugoslavia on a radically different path. The second was the Brioni Conference in 1966, which solidified the change to self-

management, reduced the role of the central state, and generally democratized political procedures.¹ Since Brioni, Yugoslavia's political institutions have adapted and changed, but the underlying logic and ideological orientation has remained constant.

The experience of World War II and the break with Cominform are largely responsible for the current framework and existence of the major political organizations of Yugoslavia. With the exception of the Trade Union Association, all the other major political organizations have their roots in the civil war and the revolution.

The Communist Party that won power after the war was a radically different organization from that which existed before the war. In 1940, the CPY could boast 12,000 members. By the war's end, it had grown to 145,000 members, even though it lost 50,000 members in the war itself. Over 80 percent of the prewar members died during the war, and the new party was much younger and larger, more broad-based, and considerably more experienced in the politics of governance than its predecessor.

World War II brought about the existence of a large, mass-based national front organization to oppose the occupying powers. This anti-fascist front organization, with roots throughout Yugoslavia, formed the provisional government of Yugoslavia, and consolidated the national liberation movement. After the war, this front organization continued, and is now known as the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ).

A youth arm of the Communist Party (*Savez Komunistička Omladina Jugoslavije*) also existed and provided considerable support to the Party during the difficult days of the occupation. This organization went through several transformations during the postwar period, including a separation from the Party. It is now known as the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia (SSOJ).

The current position of the Association of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (SSJ) was created largely by developments following the Stalin break and the Brioni conference. Unions existed before the war, but they were not consolidated into a single organization, nor did they participate as an organization during the war. The union federation today owes its significance and influence largely to the development of self-management.

Yugoslav Self-Management in Historical and Ideological Perspective

Any discussion of contemporary Yugoslav politics and society must introduce a description of the prevailing official ideology—self-management. At its most basic level, self-management involves the direct involvement of employees in the decision-making processes of society. The problem of definition, however, is compounded because the definition and description of self-

management has evolved considerably over time and thus varies by circumstance and by the time period selected.

The basic character of Yugoslav self-management has been shaped by three guiding principles. One is Marxist class conflict and the determining role of the Communist Party. The second is the recognition of national diversity and the desire to avoid interethnic conflict. The third is the need to struggle to maintain national independence. All three guiding principles have been instrumental in the formation of self-management and its adaptations to changing social realities.

In this section, we outline the historical development of Yugoslav self-management in order to provide a greater sense of the dynamics of the state ideology and the role of the political organizations within it. We also introduce and briefly describe the economic institutions through which self-management is conducted.

In the immediate postwar years, Yugoslavia leaned away from the AVNOJ principles and practices model, and a highly centralized, state-managed system similar to that of the Soviet Union was introduced. There were several reasons for this. One was the considerable influence of the Soviet Union. A second was the enormous material damage suffered during the war, which made more central coordination and planning essential. For example, 179 out of 210 hospitals in Yugoslavia had been completely destroyed in the course of the war, hardly any railway mileage remained undamaged, and the economy was at a virtual standstill. A third reason for the dominant role of the state apparatus in the economy was the then not unreasonable fear of a resurgent international or domestic fascist movement, as well as the continued operation of guerrilla organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Yugoslav regime.

Several actions, most of which were quite popular, underscored and reinforced the centralized character of the newly formed Yugoslav state. In 1946, laws were passed that confiscated and nationalized war profits, enemy properties, and the property held by foreigners who cooperated with the defeated enemy. In addition, a series of acts and emergency decrees nationalized large economic enterprises, multifamily housing, and large landholdings. Finally, the government implemented agrarian reforms that strictly limited individual agricultural holdings to ten hectares (twenty-five acres). The combined result from all these activities was that, by 1950, the preponderant majority of economic resources of the country were under the control of the central state government.

This period, entitled "State Socialism," also affected the relationship between the state, Party, and other political organizations. The government, although it controlled most economic resources, was in turn controlled by the Party. The Party also controlled all the other social organizations. Thus, Yugoslav socialism during this immediate postwar period had more in com-

mon with the Soviet model of the dictatorship of the proletariat than it has with today's system of self-management.

Although the system of state socialism was a temporary social and economic necessity, it soon developed into a major liability. It led to the bureaucratization of the government and Party; it encouraged inefficiency; it reduced individual and group initiative and drive; and, for many, it too closely resembled an alien system imported from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, state socialism would probably not have disintegrated as quickly were it not for the sudden breakup between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948.

Reasons for the break with Stalin are too numerous to mention here, but a major factor was the growing realization of the Yugoslav Communist Party that the Soviet model of governance was not appropriate for the Yugoslav situation. Another major factor was the strong independent spirit of the Party and its unwillingness to accept an inferior status in the world communist movement. Yugoslav social historians also contend that a major cause for the conflict was the emergence of early forms of self-management and corresponding dissatisfaction with the state-centralized model in Yugoslavia.²

Effects on Yugoslavia from the Cominform dispute were profound. Yugoslavia invested enormous energies to survive the blockade of the Cominform nations. Military tension on the borders was high, and war appeared imminent. The Yugoslav defense ministry recorded 896 border incidents in 1948 and 1949, and the foreign office sent 95 protest notes during this period. The Western allies were initially hesitant to accept the existence of the conflict, and they were unwilling to make loans to Yugoslavia under favorable credit conditions.

The net effect of the split was that Yugoslavia was forced to go it alone. It could not rely on outside forces; it could not afford to invest its energy in strong central controls; and it needed the support and active involvement of the populace. In this environment, the present system of self-management was encouraged and developed more rapidly than would be expected. As Eduard Kardelj, a leading Yugoslav political figure, stated, socialism that relied on mass support would inevitably take a form different from the bureaucratized, state-centralized model:

No kind of perfected bureaucratic machine can build socialism, no matter how genial its leadership. Socialism can only grow from the millions of efforts of the masses. . . . Accordingly, the development of socialism cannot advance by any other way than by the path of constant intensification of socialist democracy in the sense of ever greater management by the working masses.³

The speed at which self-management spread throughout the Yugoslav economy was unplanned and greater than expected. In November 1949 the President of the Trade Union Association, Đjuro Salaj, and the economic

minister, Boris Kidrić, sent a letter to 215 of the largest economic firms in Yugoslavia, requesting that they form the first workers' councils. Within a month, however, nearly 500 other firms sent requests to the government for permission to form their own workers' councils, and the number of additional requests continued to climb daily.

According to the original request from the Union-Government letter, the workers' councils would receive authority to make production plans, request improvement in production techniques, take measures to lower material consumption, raise the quality of production, enforce work discipline, and train workers. In addition, the elections to the workers' councils would be secret, and the director of the firm would be elected by the council and not appointed by the ministry.

At the beginning of the program, the concept of workers' councils was considered experimental, and all councils periodically sent representatives to Belgrade where they exchanged information with the union and the appropriate government ministry. In this experimental stage, the director could disagree with a decision of the council and call for an arbitrated decision from the government ministry. Workers could also replace the council if they disagreed with its actions.

The program was considered very successful, and, in 1950, self-management was officially introduced throughout Yugoslavia. On 27 June 1950, the Federal Assembly (that is, the federal parliament) passed the first law on worker's self-management, with Tito speaking strongly on its behalf.⁴

Several changes were made in the 1950 law, compared to the earlier experimental program. The workers' council under the new plan would elect an administrative committee to be the executive arm of the organization. This new plan regulated the number of council members, which ranged from 15 to 120 depending on the size of the organization. It prohibited the election of workers' councils in firms that employed less than thirty people, and it required small firms to consider the entire work force to be the membership of the council. Furthermore, the 1950 law initially excluded enterprises that were closely tied to national security like the postal service, communications, and railways. Finally, for the first time, those firms included in the law could allocate the distribution of part of the organization's profit.

While the 1950 law on self-management was designed for its desired impact on the economy, it soon became evident that it would have a substantial impact on the political system. In 1950 alone, as a direct result of the relaxation of state control over the economy, the number of civil servants in the government and paid employees in the political organizations were reduced by nearly 100,000 individuals. In addition, the line between economic decision-making and political decision-making grew less distinct, making political self-management more of an unintended early reality.

The 1950 law also left some questions unanswered. First, the position of

the director of the firm was unclear because the director was simultaneously responsible to the workers' council and to the government ministry that regulated the firm. Second, the means for determining the division of responsibility among the council, director, ministry, and executive committee were not firmly established. Third, procedures for the distribution of income within economic enterprises had not yet been resolved, and fourth, the role of the political organization in the firm had to be redefined to permit direct decision-making by non-Party members.

Initially, the impact of the 1950 law was quite limited. The influence of the state in the management of the economy was still pervasive. Often, workers' councils filled a formal rather than a decision-making role in organizations. Most workers were unskilled in modern industrial management, precedents were lacking, and, in some cases, there was distrust or apathy about the changes.

Considering the context of the time, the decisions to implement self-management in the workplace and reduce central planning were very risky. The international situation was tenuous, and twenty-three percent of the national income was devoted to defense. The economy had not yet fully recovered from the war, and most major civil projects had not yet been completed. Even more difficult, large numbers of peasants who lacked modern industrial skills were flooding into the cities and overloading housing and other essential services. Seventy percent of the population was illiterate, and the percentages were higher in some sections of Bosnia and Kosovo.

The early system of self-management, nevertheless, contributed to several positive changes in the economy. It abolished the strict controls at the governmental levels over pay scales. It contributed to the cessation of rationing for consumer goods and to the abolition of controls over the labor market. Finally, it weakened state influence in the collectivization of agriculture and contributed to its gradual disappearance.

Contemporary System of Yugoslav Self-Management in Economic Enterprises

Yugoslav self-management is a complex and long-term dynamic process. Its form and dimensions change over time and according to the political and economic environment in which it is practiced. Eduard Kardelj, a major theoretician and political leader in postwar Yugoslavia, stressed that self-management must always change and develop according to the needs of society. He also stressed that self-management must be expanded to more spheres of society and be deepened to become an ever-larger component in the decision-making process throughout society.⁵ Thus, from our perspective, a precise definition of Yugoslav self-management is constrained by the time and place in which the definition is given.

Although the character of economic self-management changes by time and place, some commonalities remain. For instance, the 1974 constitution is the charter for self-management in Yugoslavia. It provides the organizational plan of self-management in the factory and in other places where material goods or services are produced. In all economic fields and in all aspects of social life, self-management institutions are required to be organized. Figure 1.1 outlines the variety and interrelationships of these self-management bodies in a steel enterprise in Slovenia.

The foundation for self-managed decision-making is direct decision-making of the employees of the enterprise through a group meeting of all workers of the enterprises or through a referendum. All significant decisions of the enterprise, such as the work plan for the enterprise, its charter, its personnel policy, procedures for the distribution of income, allocation of investment funds, and merger or cooperative arrangements with other firms are expected to be initiated at mass meetings or referenda. If the enterprise charter approves, the meeting or referendum may also decide about less important issues. There are even firms where the mass meeting considers petty questions such as the purchase of a vacuum cleaner for cleaning a hallway, which unnecessarily burdens the group meeting and weakens the decision-making process.

Mass meetings of employees can also select members of the workers' council, as well as members of special commissions, for overseeing the most important functional areas such as finance and personnel, income distribution, and housing policy. The commissions report back to the collective membership, and they function, in many ways, as an oversight mechanism for the enterprise.

A very important decision of the collective membership is the selection of the workers' council. With the exception of the mass meeting or referendum, the workers' council is the most significant self-management institution in the enterprise. The responsibility and decision-making powers of the council will vary according to the charter of the enterprise, but its general responsibility is broad under the constitutional mandate. Among the most important decisions for which the workers' council is responsible are the following:

1. The organization of the entire work force of the firm, including the formulation of the short-term and long-term work plan with the determination of the accompanying procedures to put the plans into practice.
2. The financial affairs of the firm. In this context, it can also decide about the range of items and services to be produced and prices for these goods and services.
3. The distribution of income. The general policy is decided by the group meeting, but the council is required to organize the discussion and

- refine the recommendations. It also submits the financial plan and budget for approval by the collective.
4. Personnel questions. The council makes recommendations on the selection of the director, approves the selection of administrative officers for the firm, and approves the selection of other administrative staff.
 5. Communication with other self-management institutions in the commune or with other enterprises.

Workers' councils and their executive councils are generally quite representative of the firm in which they serve, and the links between these self-management institutions and the sociopolitical organizations, notably the League of Communists, are quite strong. In 1979, 24 percent of workers' councils members were women, 14 percent were youths (under age 28), and 39 percent were members of the Party. In the executive councils, 21 percent were women, 12 percent youths, and 39 percent were Party members.⁶ All occupational-educational skill categories are also well represented, particularly the skilled workers.⁷ In all, the workers' councils reflect relatively accurately the demographic and occupational distribution of the total work force.

The council has assistance in its duties from committees or commissions that are organized to discuss and make recommendations on specific enterprise problems. In the majority of enterprises, no agenda items come before the council that have not been first considered by the appropriate committee. The committees, like the workers' councils, have considerable Party involvement, with over 40 percent of total enterprise committee members holding Party membership. In addition, women compose 23 percent of all committee members, with relatively even representation across committees. Youths, however, hold only 11 percent of all committee positions.⁸

Finally, the council is responsible for its performance to no one but the total membership of the enterprise. Nevertheless, the sociopolitical organizations, particularly the trade unions, are expected to be in constant communication with the council and to serve as advisors for council business and as a control to prevent improper council behavior. The heavy Party representation at all levels of the enterprise governance structure also tends to promote more consistent behavior and forestall abuse.

In addition to the election of the council, the enterprise elects delegations to serve in the communal assembly (that is, local government), in various funding agencies (siz), and possibly in the republic assembly.

The administrative bodies of the enterprise, particularly the director and staff, carry out the decisions of the self-management institutions, which include the group meeting of employees, the workers' council, the worker control committee, and other commissions of the enterprise. The director and staff have two types of responsibilities. One is defined directly by statute, while the other derives from the director's obligations toward the council and

other self-management bodies. In the final analysis, the director is responsible for the legality of the work of all these self-management bodies.

In recent years the position of the director has tended to become a position in which a director assumes responsibility, but lacks the power to exercise his duties. While the severity of the problem varies from enterprise to enterprise, in many cases, directors find themselves unable to reconcile, within the appropriate legal framework, competing interests of the members with the needs for economic efficiency and heightened productivity. As a result, an increasing number of directors refuse reelection, director positions often remain unfilled, and less scrupulous directors evade or abuse the laws. For example, it was recently reported that at any given time over two hundred director posts are vacant in Belgrade alone.⁹

The enterprise exists under a large number of legal acts that determine the work and methods of operation for all the self-management bodies in the enterprise. In practice, the structure of the self-management bodies can vary according to the function and operations of the work organization involved. A college at a university, for example, has a very different structure from that of an industrial assembly operation. It has an elected council composed of three delegations: the full-time permanent employees (instructors and staff), the students, and the sociopolitical community (those who provide the funds). In addition, it periodically holds meetings of the instructors and other employees of the college, and it may elect a separate scientific-instructional council. Each group elects its own committees, and the parameters of its work are defined by the charter of the college and other rules and regulations.

Decision-making within economic and service enterprises tends to divide along two categories: technical and policy. Technical decisions, concerning matters such as schedules for machine maintenance and repairs are designated to be made by those who have the appropriate expertise on the basis of professional-technical standards. Policy decisions, on the other hand, are intended to be made by the collective membership, or their appropriate workers' councils (see figure 1.1).

As is obvious, the border between technical decision-making and policy is often unclear. Without outside influence, one side or another could dominate the work organizations and subvert the purposes of self-management. In Yugoslav terminology, domination of the policy process by technical bureaucrats is labelled "techno-bureaucratism," while the reverse is entitled "anarcho-liberalism." It is a function of the sociopolitical organizations in a firm to maintain the balance and prevent either abuse from occurring.

During the 1960s, it became apparent that the model of workers' control deteriorated in practice as the enterprise grew larger in size. Large organizations lost that sense of individual involvement essential to the proper functioning of self-management. Strikes by workers against directors and worker councils climbed from 28 in 1958 to 271 in 1964, and in the period between

Figure 1.1: Estimated degree of involvement in enterprise decision-making of potential decision-makers by type of decision

Decision	Decision-maker				
	Worker	Council	Political Organization	Director	Commune
Selection of director	Moderate	High	Moderate	None	None
Selection of staff	Some	Moderate	Some	High	None
Worker discipline	Moderate	Moderate	Some	High	None
Personnel policy	Moderate	High	Moderate	High	None
Pricing	Some	High	Moderate	High	None
Investment	Moderate	High	Some	Moderate	Moderate
Income distribution	Moderate	High	Moderate	Some	None
Housing allocation	Some	High	Moderate	None	None
Research and development	Some	High	None	High	None
Maintenance schedules	Some	Moderate	None	High	None
Interorganizational Cooperation	Some	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate

1964 and 1969 there were over 869 strikes involving nearly 78,000 workers.¹⁰ Research by social scientists indicated that workers were becoming increasingly alienated from their workers' councils;¹¹ that directors were perceived as possessing excessive influence;¹² and that certain categories of workers (often administrative-technical) were receiving a disproportionate amount of the benefits distributed by the enterprise.¹³

In 1971, basic reforms were instituted that reorganized large economic enterprises into a conglomeration of semiautonomous work units within the collective umbrella of a single organization. The intent was to return the enterprise to the worker through decentralization. The combined organization was entitled the "Complex Organization of Associated Work" (SOUR), and its smaller components were entitled the "Basic Organization of Associated Work" (OOUR). Each OOUR represented either a particular factory or work unit within a factory, or a particular function within a factory or other organization. Smaller organizations, of course, were not consolidated into SOURS and remained OOURS.

The typical OOUR in 1979 had slightly more than one hundred employees, while a corresponding SOUR was composed of several or more OOURS and a total membership averaging over four thousand. Each OOUR elects and maintains its own council, controls its own budget, makes its own work rules,

distributes its own income, and sends delegations to its SOUR, if appropriate.

In 1982, with slightly over 6,000,000 workers, Yugoslavia had recognized nearly 21,000 OOURS. At the same time, there were nearly 14,000 work organizations that were too small to be OOURS, and slightly more than 400 SOURS.

As can be seen by the above description, the Yugoslav system of economic self-management is, from an institutional perspective, complex and potentially subject to abuse. Directors can be incompetent, workers' councils can neglect their responsibilities, and group meetings can be ritualistic, poorly attended, or ignored. At the same time, ignorance or malfeasance of individuals within the institution, or the domination of individual or group interests can also jeopardize the smooth functioning of economic self-management within the Yugoslav firm or service enterprise.

Because of these possibilities, Yugoslav political leaders insist that some extra-institutional organization(s) oversee and direct the process of self-management and alter patterns of behavior that may threaten the system. The sociopolitical organizations fulfill that role.

Political Institutionalization of Self-Management

Since the early 1970s, self-management within Yugoslavia has extended its jurisdiction from economic decision-making to issues of wider social and political significance. The process through which social and political self-management is carried out has been labeled within the Yugoslav lexicon as the "delegate system." The institutions in which social and political self-management occur include functionally oriented units and territorially directed units of political and social policy-making. The functional units are entitled "self-managed interests of the community" (siz), and the territorial units include the neighborhoods (*mesna zajednica*), communes (*opština*), republics/provinces, and the federation. As was the case in economic self-management, the sociopolitical organizations fulfill a coordinative, directive, and overview role in political self-management.

The Delegate System

The fundamental procedure for implementing social and political self-management in Yugoslavia is entitled the "delegate system." It was introduced by the 1974 Federal Constitution, and currently remains the primary leadership-selection and decision-making process for all political institutions.

Procedurally, the delegate system is quite simple. It consists of a recognized group of citizens or workers selecting a delegation to express their interests and concerns. The delegation, in turn, selects a delegate to sit on the relevant political decision-making body. This body can also be consid-




Figure 1.2: Simplified schematic outline of the delegate system

ered a delegation that then selects a delegate to express the voting body’s interests or concerns at a higher decision-making level. The process can continue for several levels as illustrated by figure 1.2.

Conceptually, the delegate system is somewhat more complex than the schematic chart would suggest. Every delegate is simultaneously a member of the decision-making body to which he/she is appointed, a member of the delegation from which he/she has been selected, and a member of the primary group that chose the delegation. A delegate is, essentially, an agent who informs the delegation and primary voting group about discussion in the relevant decision-making body, and who also seeks and expresses the interests of the delegation and primary voting group to the decision-making body in which he/she serves. A delegate is not a representative because he/she is prohibited from voting or making decisions without the knowledge or approval of the delegation or primary voting group. In short, the delegate is the primary group’s agent whose most valued skill is communication, not independent judgment.

According to theory, however, the delegate does not blindly carry out the instructions of the primary voting group. He/she has a responsibility to reach a common agreement among a group of delegates, and to arrive at a consensual decision that summarizes and advances the general interests.¹⁴ The delegate then receives the approval of the primary voting group. As a result, decision-making and responsibility are collective activities, and the delegate is the system’s negotiating agent.

The involvement of people in the delegate process is enormous. In the

Table 1.1 Total delegates by type of institution

<i>Institution</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Year</i>
Organized neighborhoods	253,547	1980
Commune assemblies	50,208	1982
Policy boards (siz)	231,932	1981
Republic assemblies	1,431	1982
Provincial assemblies	435	1982
Federal assembly	308	1982
Workers' councils	614,171	1981

Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1983* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1983), pp. 79, 431, 432).

early 1980s, as indicated by table 1.1, well over one million people, or nearly 15 percent of the total work force, were delegates in economic or political institutions. Considering that rotation in office, circulation of functions, and short terms of office are the rule, the proportion of the population that has served, or will serve, as a delegate or a member of a delegation may eventually include everyone.

In practice, the delegate system has encountered some problems involving efficient decision-making and effective public policy-making. The system is inherently slow because the entire process of consultation and agreements cannot be advanced quickly without endangering consultations and expressions of all interests. At the national level, for example, complex issues are rarely decided promptly.¹⁵ Second, the system has the potential to permit politically skilled delegates or groups to hold hostage an entire agreement in order to promote their particular interest.¹⁶ Third, the communication process can become overwhelming and lead to information overload and paralysis. For example, delegates in a commune once received over five pounds of written materials with information on seventy-six agenda items for a single session of the communal assembly.¹⁷

Finally, the delegate system has a tendency to diffuse responsibility to such a point that no one feels responsible for effective implementation of a decision. In general, sources of strain and resistance become difficult to identify, and an entire policy program may suffer. The inability to enforce the policy of economic stabilization during 1982–84 is a good example of this tendency, and this issue became a major area of discussion during the 1982 congresses and post-congress meetings of all the sociopolitical organizations.

The delegate system does not function without direction. The sociopolitical organizations are entrusted to maintain and enhance the system, and they are eventually held responsible for any difficulties that may result. As a result, the sociopolitical organizations are integrally related to the political institutionalization process.

Territorially Based Self-Management Institutions

Political institutions in Yugoslavia diverge along two paths. One set of institutions exists to make decisions that affect citizens within a particular territorial entity; the other set of institutions relates to functional service or policy areas. The territorial units, in order of most basic to the highest level of organization, include the organized neighborhood (*mesna zajednica*), the commune (*opština*), autonomous provinces and republics, and the federation. Cities and special districts exist apart from these units, but have widely varying legal status and cannot be adequately compared or summarized here. Each territorial unit is governed on the basis of the delegate system, is organized differently, and fulfills distinctive functions and roles. The socio-political organizations have in common, however, the task of directing and overseeing the functioning of each territorial unit of government.

The Organized Neighborhood (Mesna Zajednica) There are over 11,000 neighborhood units in Yugoslavia. This territorial unit, somewhat similar in role and function to the U.S. township, averages slightly over 1,000 inhabitants, with a range from under 500 to over 7,000. Larger neighborhood units, located in cities and averaging over 4,000 population, represent 15 percent of the total recognized units. Rural areas are smaller in population (average under 1,000 population), geographically larger, often organized on the village level, and compose 70 percent of all organized neighborhoods.¹⁹

The functions of the neighborhood vary by need and circumstance. Wealthier, more urban neighborhoods may maintain day-care centers, parks and monuments, youth halls, reading rooms, and other service activities. Rural organized neighborhoods tend to become more involved in construction and civic improvement projects such as sidewalks, road paving, community water supplies, etc. Table 1.2 gives an indication of the type and prevalence of activities in which organized neighborhoods are engaged. As is apparent, some neighborhoods are intensively involved, while others appear to be nearly moribund. A second general conclusion is that construction activities receive much more attention than do social welfare functions.

The organized neighborhood institutional structure is relatively simple. The population meets as a community an average of twice a year in a town hall type meeting (*zbor birača*), and the residents can make suggestions for improvement, hear complaints, nominate members to various delegations, and nominate and elect the administrative board (*savet*) and the neighborhood court (*mirovna veća*).²⁰ Figure 1.3 provides the organizational scheme for the neighborhood.

Each neighborhood elects a delegation for liaison purposes with the communal assembly from which one delegate (or more) is sent to the communal assembly. When appropriate, the neighborhood may select a delegation to

Table 1.2 Activities engaged in by organized neighborhoods,
1980 (by type of neighborhood)

Activity	Neighborhood			
	Total	Urban	Rural	Mixed
<i>Construction</i>				
Road construction	2,112	228	1,445	439
Road repair	4,735	352	3,571	812
Bridge construction	2,185	91	1,745	349
Bridge repair	2,614	105	2,075	434
Park construction	1,025	277	481	267
Park repair	738	48	552	138
Traffic signals	1,148	178	907	363
Electrification	1,317	130	905	282
Water reservoir construction	843	40	614	189
Water lines construction	1,379	204	823	352
Sewage lines construction	544	212	166	166
<i>Social welfare projects</i>				
Day-care centers	205	72	64	69
Youth clubs	739	132	471	136
Libraries	199	36	124	39
Literacy courses	190	29	133	28
Recreation programs	4,988	857	3,176	955
Health	1,392	326	791	275
Total neighborhoods	11,222	1,767	7,814	1,641

Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice: Sastav i Aktivnost, 1980," *Statistički Bilten* 1317 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, September 1982): 10, 15.

serve on some of the functional policy boards (for example, primary education). It may also elect members to special ad hoc commissions, and over 70 percent maintain such commissions.²¹

The neighborhood board determines many of the major policy decisions in the period between community meetings. The board also may select an executive council whose duties concern the day-to-day management of neighborhood business and the supervision of any employees.²² Neither the board nor the council is empowered to raise or distribute funds without the permission and approval of the population of the neighborhood.

In 1977 the neighborhood boards met an average of seven times a year and considered annually over twenty-five agenda items.²³ Both the board and council, however, have less than widespread participation of women and youth in their membership. In 1980, women constituted 11 percent of the boards and councils. Youth (age twenty-seven or younger) composed 13 percent of these institutions.²⁴ Considerable variation, however, exists between




Figure 1.3: Decision-making and organizational chart of the organized neighborhood

urban and rural neighborhoods and among republics in the selection of female neighborhood council members. For the nation as a whole, urban neighborhoods averaged 20 percent female and rural districts 6 percent. In Slovenian urban neighborhoods, representation of women reached 27 percent, but in Macedonian rural areas, females barely exceeded 1 percent.²⁵ Youth percentages varied only from 10 to 14 percent for all subcategories. The figures for both gender and age indicate substantial improvements since the early 1970s, thereby indicating that some progress in enhancing the grass-roots basis of these institutions has been made. The general conclusion, nevertheless, is that much more needs to be done.

There is also some cause for concern when we examine the occupational distribution of neighborhood council members. Generally speaking, agriculture is well represented, and rural and mixed neighborhoods have a leadership structure that closely parallels the population structure. Administration and management-level personnel, in general, have as strong a representation as industrial workers and a stronger representation than their distribution in the population would warrant. In the nation as a whole, these two categories combined represent 17 percent of the membership, while industrial workers are 19 percent of the total. In urban areas, administrative-managerial person-

Table 1.3 Occupational distribution of neighborhood council members for Yugoslavia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, 1980 (by type of neighborhood and in percentages)

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Occupation</i>				
	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Industry</i>	<i>Commercial</i>	<i>Admin- istration</i>	<i>Professional- managerial</i>
Yugoslavia total	30	19	5	13	5
Urban	4	17	6	21	8
Rural	48	17	5	8	2
Mixed	13	29	6	16	6
Slovenia total	16	28	6	16	6
Urban	2	19	7	27	9
Rural	33	30	4	10	3
Mixed	11	30	6	18	7
Macedonia total	42	13	6	12	3
Urban	5	10	7	27	8
Rural	53	14	6	7	2
Mixed	15	9	8	28	8

Source: See table 1.2 (p. 29 in source).

nel have nearly double the representation of industrial workers and compose 30 percent of the total, and in Slovenian cities the percentage rises to 35 percent. Table 1.3 provides detailed information and illustrates the need for more political involvement at this level to promote worker involvement.

Referenda are used relatively rarely in most communities. The typical neighborhood schedules a referendum to receive approval to finance a public works project or to offer a new service once every five years. In 1976, there were 1,991 referenda attempted, of which three-quarters were approved by the voters. Over 87 percent of the neighborhoods, however, scheduled no referenda that year.²⁶

Political organizations are important to the functioning of the organized neighborhoods. The function of these organizations is primarily to facilitate decision-making, coordinate activities, enhance the delegate process, promote societal goals, and prevent abuses or the concentration of power. The League of Communists, Youth Federation, and Socialist Alliance all maintain chapters on the level of the neighborhood. In 1977, for example, 85 percent of neighborhoods had chapters of the League of Communists, 90 percent had youth chapters, and 97 percent had chapters of the Socialist Alliance.²⁷ While many organized neighborhoods did not have chapters of these political organizations, those lacking such support were concentrated in the largely rural, underdeveloped, and sparsely populated areas.

The Communal Organization (Opština) The next highest governmental level in Yugoslavia is the commune (*opština*). The commune is roughly equivalent in population and function to the U.S. county and, in Yugoslavia, it is the core political unit for purposes of political self-management and the delegate system. There are 527 communes in Yugoslavia with an average population of 30,000 and a population range from Lastovo with 962 to Niš's population in excess of 230,000.²⁸ Large cities, such as Belgrade, Ljubljana, Maribor, Novi Sad, Sarajevo, Skoplje, and Zagreb contain more than one commune. Belgrade, for example, has sixteen communes within its city boundaries.

Economic and social variation among communes is very large. Five communes have over 70 percent of their population directly involved in agricultural production, and 141 communes have less than 10 percent so engaged. Similarly, 19 communes have less than 10 percent of the labor force employed by industry and 5 communes have over 70 percent of the population so engaged. National income also varies among communes from a low of 9,000 dinars in Dragas (Kosovo), while Ljubljana Centar's (Slovenia) per capita national income is sixty-two times larger at 562,000 dinars.²⁹ Obviously, the problems, capabilities, and resources of commune governments will vary enormously as well.

The activities in which communes are involved are as varied as their socioeconomic profiles. By law, the responsibilities of the communes fall into three categories. The first is the economic function, in which the commune concerns itself with the general question of economic development within its boundaries. Although the commune does not have its own funds for economic development, it can initiate and coordinate such activities.

Communes can build an economic infrastructure such as roads, electrical distribution systems, and sewers to promote economic development, and underdeveloped communes receive special assistance from republic or federal funds for that purpose. In 1981, communes generally expended nearly 9,000 dinars per capita (approximately \$250 U.S.) in general budget expenditures, and there was wide variation in communal budget involvement across communes, with a range from 2,000 to 18,000 dinars per capita.

Social and economic growth and development in the commune follows a prescribed pattern and process, and is integrated into the commune's social plan. The implementation of the social plan is the responsibility of the commune, and its formulation depends upon agreements and involvement of major economic enterprises, organized neighborhoods, and political organizations within the commune.

A second major function for the commune is social development. This is directed toward improving the quality of life in the commune. Education, housing, health, social welfare functions and cultural and recreational opportunities are integrally related to this activity. The comparative analysis of developed and less-developed communes by republic reveals that there is

considerable variation among communes with respect to the promotion and development of these activities. Communal support for education in 1981, for example, varied from 6,299 dinars in Velenje, Slovenia to 967 in Petrovac, Serbia. Population/doctor ratios vary from 3,422 in Kalesija, Bosnia to 259 in Kotor, Montenegro, and student/teacher ratios from 26 in Dragas, Kosovo to 17 in Drniš, Croatia.³⁰

Legal protection for citizens is a third major function for the communes. The commune is the legal entity that is primarily obligated to provide services to national minorities, to protect minority rights, to ensure equality of opportunity for women and youths, and to provide for appropriate representation for workers and other social groups. The commune, in other words, has a duty to oversee and, when necessary, to intervene with the work units and organized neighborhoods whenever social goals are threatened. In Kosovo, for example, the communal officials bear the brunt of responsibility for the outbreaks of citizen conflicts between Serbs and Albanians, and it is their responsibility to find ways to repair the damage.

The governmental structure of the commune remains relatively constant across republics regardless of the level of socioeconomic development. Figure 1.4 provides a schematic chart illustrating the organizational structure. Basically, the commune's institutions are divided into judicial, legislative, and executive administrative bodies.

The court system divides itself into two branches, roughly equivalent to civil-economic and criminal jurisdictions. The civil—self-management courts and prosecution—are concerned primarily with problems and deviations in the self-management system; the criminal courts handle the more usual




Figure 1.4: Organizational structure of the commune

Table 1.4 Social and educational backgrounds of communal executive council members by republic, 1978 (in percentages)

Republic	Total	Women	Youth	Background Characteristic		
				University education	Middle plus	Middle education
Yugoslavia total	5,536	7	2	48	34	14
Bosnia-						
Herzegovina	1,161	8	5	42	40	65
Montenegro	164	4	4	65	23	10
Croatia	1,223	7	2	57	27	14
Macedonia	327	5	0	72	22	6
Slovenia	721	12	2	34	40	23
Serbia total	1,940	5	1	47	37	12
Serbia proper	1,339	4	1	47	34	13
Kosovo	202	1	4	46	44	9
Vojvodina	399	8	1	46	40	11

Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, “Skupštine Opštine Sastav, 1978,” *Statistički Bilten* 1110 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, December 1978): 7.

criminal, family, public nuisance cases, and cases referred to them by the self-management courts.³¹

An important institution is the communal executive council, which functions as a mini-cabinet for the commune. Its size averages about eleven members who serve two year terms subject to the approval and confidence of the communal assembly. Table 1.4 lists the occupational and social backgrounds of the executive councils in communes by republic in 1978.

Table 1.4 indicates that, on the whole, women and youths are significantly underrepresented on these councils. They average only 7 and 2 percent, respectively, of the total membership of the communal executive councils. Worker representation is also low, and does not approximate the third of the population who belong to this category. Council members tend to have university or advanced educational profiles. Data from Bosnia also demonstrate that communal executive councils are firmly linked to the political organizations, particularly the League of Communists, with 98 percent holding League membership.³²

The executive councils of the communes meet rather frequently, sometimes weekly or more often, but rarely less than once a month. These bodies also consider a wide range of issues and average about twenty-eight agenda items per month.³³ Table 1.5 presents data from Bosnia for 1978–79 that detail the distribution of types of issues considered by the communal executive councils. The data indicate that economic development and financial management questions accounted for nearly one-half of all the issues consid-

Table 1.5 Distribution of policy decisions of the communal executive council and chambers of the communal assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1 January 1978 to 30 June 1979 (in percentages)

Agenda Item	Decision-making body				
	Legislative chamber				
	Executive council	Associated work	Neighborhood	Social-political organization	All
Communal development	5	5	5	5	6
Economic questions	36	33	47	19	24
Education and culture	7	16	4	5	6
Health and security	5	7	5	2	4
Finance	14	13	12	9	13
Personnel	5	5	1	6	3
Civil defense and security	5	2	3	21	6
Other	23	19	23	33	37

Source: Republički Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak Bosne i Hercegovine 1981* (Sarajevo: Republički Zavod za Statistiku, 1981), p. 50.

ered by the executive council, thereby illustrating the importance of these issues to the communes.

The third and most important political institution in the commune is the communal assembly. It is the seat of formal power in the commune, and like all Yugoslav legislative bodies, it is selected on the delegate principle. Figure 1.5 provides an organizational chart for the communal assembly.

As can be seen from the chart, the communal assembly is designed to present the interests of three societal groups represented in the three chambers of the assembly; namely, the neighborhood (territorial interests), the work place (the workers' interests), and the political organizations (the general interests). Each chamber meets separately, or in combination with any one or both of the remaining chambers.

Table 1.5 provides some additional details about the relative activity of each chamber and of all the chambers combined. The chambers of associated work, chambers of the organized neighborhoods, and the combined assembly are more heavily involved in economic and financial decision-making than any other type of activity. The sociopolitical chambers, however,

are more concerned about general social issues and less involved in economic planning.

The communal assembly chambers meet approximately once a month, and sessions generally last several hours. Delegates usually have the right to question orally and in written form the members of the communal executive council. These questions are often directly mandated or initiated by the delegate's constituency at a voter's meeting and most often concern problems in communal service delivery.

Like all delegate bodies in Yugoslavia, incumbency is discouraged and rapid rotation of members is the rule. For instance, in the sixteen communes within Belgrade, only 29 percent of the delegates in 1982 had served a prior term in a communal assembly some time during the 1974-82 period. In addition, over 50 percent of the delegates had never been elected to any kind of electoral political post since 1948, and less than 10 percent had served more than two terms as a political representative at any governmental level since 1948.³⁴

Communal assembly delegates represent a wide range of backgrounds (see table 1.6). In 1982, nearly 45 percent of all communal delegates could be identified as workers, and, in Vojvodina, that percentage exceeds 54 percent. Two-thirds of all communal delegates have no college or university training,

Figure 1.5: Organizational structure of the communal assembly




Table 1.6 Social characteristics of commune assembly members by republic, 1982 (in percentages)

<i>Background</i>	<i>Republic/Province</i>								
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Bosnia</i>	<i>Monte- negro</i>	<i>Croatia</i>	<i>Mace- donia</i>	<i>Slove- nia</i>	<i>Serbia</i>	<i>Vojvo- dina</i>	<i>Kosovo</i>
Workers	44.4								
Agriculture	14.6	8.8	9.2	11.7	11.6	2.2	21.1	16.6	23.0
Industry	20.8	24.4	16.0	18.5	14.2	16.6	22.4	16.9	23.9
Commerce	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.5	4.7	2.6	5.3	4.3	3.9
Services	4.6	4.7	8.3	6.5	2.2	0.7	4.2	3.1	3.8
Managerial	25.4								
Low-Middle	12.9	14.6	17.7	12.0	12.3	9.6	12.8	13.7	11.5
Leaders	12.5	14.5	14.2	16.8	14.3	0.1	9.9	10.3	8.0
Women	17.8	17.9	13.1	16.6	15.3	—	16.5	14.2	25.2
Youth	11.5	14.4	7.8	10.0	7.8	—	10.0	10.4	15.6
Incumbents	20.7	22.0	31.8	14.3	20.7	40.2	21.3	23.3	18.9

Source: "Izbori za Skupštine Društveno-Političkih Zajednici u 1982," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* 27 (1983): 199–210.

and, in Vojvodina, that fraction increases to three-quarters.³⁵ Party membership is high, but only 18 percent of all delegates are women and 12 percent are youths.

Within the communes, the political organizations play a critical role. They compose one chamber of the communal assembly; they direct the elections and nominations process. They also manage the flow of information and coordinate communal policy with republic or national priorities. In addition, the communal organizations are responsible for the training and behavior of all executive officers and delegates, and they must constantly monitor and correct any deficiencies in the communal political processes. Chapter eight goes into considerable detail about the role and performance of the political organizations in the communal institutions.

Republic/Provincial Government The third and next highest territorial unit of government is the republic or province. The two provinces are Kosovo and Vojvodina, which are part of the Republic of Serbia. The provinces have their own governmental structure, which parallels the republic system to a great degree.

Republics engage in more public policy activity than any other unit of government. Each republic maintains its own economic plan, investment priorities, legal statutes, educational system, social welfare program, and


banking system. Republics originate and decide policy in most issues areas, with the exception of defense, international affairs, and currency valuation. Figure 1.6 provides the organizational chart for the typical republic's political institutions.

Paralleling the patterns found in the communes, the primary decision-making body in the republic is the republic assembly. Each assembly has three chambers, and the size of each republic's assembly chamber varies.³⁶ The republic assembly also parallels the communal experience by formally dividing into three major social interests: the territory, the workplace, and the political organizations.

Delegates to each chamber of the republic assembly are elected by different criteria. Members of the chamber of associated work are delegated from the communal chambers of associated work, delegates to the republic sociopolitical chamber are elected by the communal sociopolitical chambers, but delegates to the republic's communal chamber are elected by the entire communal assembly, acting as one body.

The delegates of the republic and provincial assemblies, as well as the members of the executive councils, are generally more professional, older, better educated, and more experienced than their communal counterparts (see table 1.7). In 1982, delegates with occupational backgrounds in management, administration, and the professions account for over half of all republic delegates, while workers form approximately one-quarter or less of the total membership.³⁷ Approximately two-thirds of all republic delegates have some university level education, compared to one-third in the commu-

Figure 1.6: Organizational framework of the republic



nal assembly. In addition, incumbency is more prevalent among republic assembly delegates than among communal delegates, but even so, less than half of all delegates in republic assemblies had prior experience as a delegate at any governmental level. In brief, while republic assemblies are more professionally manned than the communal assemblies, it would still be inappropriate to claim that these assemblies are composed of professional legislators.

The executive councils in the republics are very professional, compared to their colleagues in the communes and in the republic assemblies. In 1978, in Bosnia and Slovenia, nearly all council members had some university education. They were largely male, had few youth members, and were selected from the professional or administrative ranks.³⁸ A professional republic executive council is natural and expected, given the fact that many executive council members manage large bureaucracies and often head important government ministries. The republic executive councils, in other words, are not delegates, and are not expected to be subject to the same constraints and discipline as a delegate to the republic assemblies.

Within the republic institutions, the political organizations are extremely important. They are expected to initiate policy questions, formulate alternatives, oversee implementation of policy, and provide policy evaluation. In addition, they supervise the selection and election of delegates, monitor delegate performance, and directly present their viewpoints in the republic assembly. Chapter six examines and evaluates this process in depth.

Table 1.7 Background characteristics of republic assembly delegates by republic, 1982 (in percentages)

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Background characteristic</i>				
	<i>Women</i>	<i>Youth</i>	<i>Workers</i>	<i>Incumbents</i>	<i>Advanced education</i>
Bosnia-					
Herzegovina	23.1	9.1	24.6	31.6	59
Montenegro	12.7	6.1	25.4	38.2	68
Croatia	12.9	7.0	9.3	—	67
Macedonia	12.0	3.6	11.2	33.2	66
Slovenia	—	—	—	—	—
Serbia	27.6	14.1	37.3	60.0	48
Kosovo	24.2	8.9	21.0	24.2	56
Vojvodina	29.8	14.7	45.7	32.2	34

Source: See table 1.6.




Figure 1.7: Institutional structure of the federation

The Federation Policy culminates at the level of the Federation. The Federation has sole responsibility for currency questions, interrepublic cooperation, interrepublic trade and commerce, defense, and all international questions. Most of its activities, however, are centered on the problems associated with the economic, political, and social coordination and integration of the republics and provinces.

The structure of the federal governmental institutions is similar to that of the republics. The structure is headed by a president who is a member of the collective presidency and serves only one year. The presidency, composed of representatives from each republic and province, makes decisions on a collective basis on the principle of unanimity. It currently divides its workload among four councils and three commissions. The councils are foreign affairs, national defense, state security, and economics. The commissions are for pardons and amnesty, decorations and honors, petitions and conflict.

The federal executive council is the government and is composed of a prime minister and cabinet appointed by the Federal Assembly. Generally, the council serves four years, but performance is evaluated by the Assembly every two years and the council can be disbanded, following a vote of no confidence in the Assembly.³⁹ The current Federal Executive Council has thirty-one members and includes such ministries as Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs, etc.⁴⁰

Yugoslavia's Federal Assembly has two chambers; the Federal Chamber and

the Chamber of Republics and Provinces. Delegates to the Federal Chamber are selected by the communal assemblies, while the republic/provincial assemblies select delegations to the Chamber of Republics and Provinces.

Each chamber of the Federal Assembly specializes in different areas. Budget questions, for example, are an important area of expertise for the Federal Chamber, while issues such as currency reform, which involves republic agreements, receive more attention in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces. Chapter seven provides considerably more details.

Delegates to the Federal Assembly are more experienced, older, and more educated than at lower levels in the federal hierarchy. In general, Federal Assembly members are well-experienced, professional legislative delegates. In the term beginning in 1982, 18 percent of the delegates are women, 2 percent are twenty-seven years old or younger, and 51 percent are over fifty years of age. Thirteen percent of the delegates are workers, while 83 percent belong to the professional-managerial groups and 85 percent had some university-level educational experience.⁴¹

The political organizations generally have analogous responsibilities on the federal level to their counterparts in the republics. One important difference, however, is that, on the federal level, the organizations lack direct access to the legislature to influence policy. Because of the absence of a federal-level sociopolitical chamber, the political organizations must work less directly on the decision-making process.

In summary, Yugoslavia has developed a wide range of political institutions within the framework of political self-management. Each institution fulfills a distinctively different role for society, but several similarities exist. One common thread throughout the process is the delegate system; another is the directive, evaluative, and formulative roles for the political organizations. Later chapters will explore in detail how the political organizations, singly and combined, define their roles in the institutional process, and how well they perform them.

Policy Boards (SIZ)

Many social activities in Yugoslavia are not directly managed by the territorially based political institutions discussed above. On the local level, areas such as education, technical training, child and family services, manpower, physical fitness, health, and culture are largely funded and regulated by separate policy institutions called "self-managed interests of the community" (*Samoupravne Interesne Zajednice*), referred to here as "policy boards" or "sizs."⁴² On the regional (multicommune) levels, sizs are typically established for activities such as manpower planning, environmental protection, electrical distribution, and technical education. On the republic level, higher education, pensions, cinemaphotography, and major highway arteries are regulated and financed by republic policy boards.

The *sizs* are designed to fill several important objectives. One is to permit those who are most interested in funding a particular activity to have some control over that activity. A second is to relieve the territorially based delegates of the burdens and costs associated with detailed technical programs. A third objective is to encourage public involvement and economies of scale in technical areas demanding professional and technical competencies.⁴³

Like all territorial political units, the *sizs* use the delegate system. In these cases, however, delegates are selected on a number of different principles, depending upon the territorial level, activity, and republic involved. For example, family and child services *siz* delegates in Croatia are divided structurally into two categories: producers and consumers. Policy boards for this activity exist in many organized neighborhoods, the majority of communes, all large cities, many multicomune regions, and on the level of the republic. Consumer delegates represent organizations that provide funding for the service, and they are selected from neighborhoods, *OOURLS* and other work organizations and institutions. Producer delegates represent those who provide family and child care, and are selected from work organizations that directly provide such services (for example, day-care centers) or organizations that provide more sophisticated services like counseling.⁴⁴ Consumer and Producer delegates together constitute the assembly of the policy board and can consider and decide policy questions.

When important funding or taxing decisions must be considered, republics such as Croatia, Bosnia, and Slovenia consider the *siz* assembly as a chamber of the communal or republic assembly. Thus, when the *siz* assembly and an additional chamber in the territorial assembly can agree, policy is formulated that has the force of a communal ordinance or republic statute. During 1978–79 in Bosnian communes, seventeen percent of all communal agenda items were *siz*-communal chamber enactments.⁴⁵

The backgrounds of delegates to the policy boards reflect the nature of the policy being considered. Some boards, such as the republic cinematographic boards, are relatively professional and reflect the narrow expertise needed at that level. Others, such as the child welfare boards or physical fitness boards, have relatively large representation by women and youths, respectively (see table 1.8).

The role of the political organizations with respect to the policy boards is analogous to their behavior and activities at the territorial delegate assemblies. The organizations oversee and manage the delegate selection process, initiate agenda items, coordinate policy discussions, and evaluate current performance. Unlike the activity of the organizations in the republic and communal assemblies, the corresponding *siz* assemblies rarely have delegates chosen by the political organizations. Whenever the organizations have the right to delegate selection, their delegation size is relatively low. The Croatian republic *siz* for preschool children, for example, has only

Table 1.8 Selected policy board composition, 1981 (in percentages)

<i>Policy boards</i>	<i>Background characteristic</i>				
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Youth</i>	<i>Advanced education</i>	<i>Workers</i>
Yugoslavia total	179,480	23	9	30	41
Single chamber	82,976	18	8	25	45
Consumer chamber	67,891	25	10	26	47
Producer chamber	28,613	35	8	52	18
Housing board	15,389	18	6	26	41
Single chamber	12,955	18	6	26	41
Consumer chamber	1,696	18	6	27	40
Producer chamber	738	21	8	23	53
Education board	28,670	32	10	44	31
Single chamber	3,155	26	7	47	27
Consumer chamber	17,284	28	13	29	41
Producer chamber	8,231	42	5	75	5
Physical fitness board	17,370	10	14	23	42
Single chamber	8,699	9	14	29	42
Consumer chamber	5,874	12	14	24	50
Producer chamber	2,797	9	12	39	29
Child welfare board	28,399	39	9	24	43
Single chamber	13,424	33	9	17	50
Consumer chamber	10,887	39	8	25	43
Producer chamber	4,088	56	9	45	20

Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Samoupravne Interesne Zajednice, Sastav, 1981," *Statistički Bilten* 1324 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, October 1982): 16–18.

three out of eighty-four delegates appointed by the Trade Union Association.⁴⁶

A second major difference in the role and behavior of the political organizations in SIZ's compared to the territorial assembly is the limitation on organizational intervention into professional-technical issues. The political organizations can set goals, but they do not determine or control the policy definition of those goals. In 1984, in Serbia, the republic SIZ for higher education was mandated by the organizations to prepare a plan to consolidate higher educational programs throughout the republic. The organizations, however, did not control and, in some cases, did not like specific details of the consolidation plan.⁴⁷

Summary

Contemporary Yugoslavia has established a wide range of interlocking political institutions and political processes. Many of these institutions and procedures either do not exist in other socialist or Western nation-states, or do not

perform similarly to Yugoslavia's. That is to say, the political organizations in Yugoslavia have roles, duties, and responsibilities different from those in other states.

First, industrial decision-making in Yugoslavia is very decentralized from a Soviet perspective, while it is very undisciplined from a Western perspective. Workers' councils, strict legal limits to managerial and governmental authority, OOURS and SOURS, SIZS, and the delegate system have few counterparts in Western nation-states, and they are completely alien to the Soviet/East European experience.

Second, political federalism is a reality in Yugoslavia when compared to the Soviet Union. Authority is dispersed across governmental levels, ranging from the federation to the neighborhood. It is also dispersed within specific territorial units as well. Again, the Soviet model of socialism does not permit analogous political behavior.

From a Western perspective, Yugoslav political institutions have some counterparts, but the Yugoslav distrust of executive or administrative authority and the diffusion of power within governmental levels may appear unusually extreme. In short, Yugoslav institutions almost appear to be designed to prevent an easy answer to the question, "Who governs?"

The delegate system in Yugoslavia represents another point of departure from both Western democratic and current systems in socialist countries. Current Yugoslav distrust of political professionalism and the relatively low regard for experts are unique. Formal limitations on delegate authority resemble the Soviet experience, while the freedom of action experienced by those groups that elect Yugoslav delegates appear to resemble the pluralism of the U.S. system. The Yugoslav approach, therefore, is a truly different type.

Self-management, the official ideology of the Yugoslav state, is another different process. In this case, self-management is a combination of a Marxist concern for worker power combined with a Western concern for democratic means to achieve that power. As a result, Yugoslav self-management is delicate and needs constant attention and adjustments to prevent the occurrence of anarchy and totalitarianism.

All the Yugoslav institutions, processes, and the self-management ideology have been consciously designed to foster political stability in a nation-state that has a low threshold for conflict and instability. Yugoslavia is divided by nationality, religion, language, economics, and social perspectives. Many of these divisions overlap and weaken unity in the plural society. Therefore, self-management, the delegate system, and the decentralization of political institutions are all designed to reduce the impact of the major overlapping cleavages by creating new, cross-cutting cleavages through decentralization, or by reducing the probability of conflict by consensual and collective decision-making.

As is evident by the above discussion, Yugoslavia's system of self-

management is a decentralized, federal, highly participative political environment and needs constant adjustment and attention. The fact that Yugoslavia has had four constitutions in a period of less than four decades and is discussing the need to draft a fifth constitution demonstrates the delicacy of the system. The political organization's primary duty, therefore, is to provide equilibrium by suggesting changes when appropriate, providing discipline when necessary, intervening in political affairs when instability threatens, and articulating the general interest in a divisive nation of overlapping cleavages.

Succeeding chapters examine how the political organizations provide stability and maintain the system. Specifically, they analyze the role, structure, and behavior of the League of Communists, Socialist Alliance, Trade Union Association, and League of Youth. Later chapters examine how these organizations interact with specific political institutions, such as the commune and republic and national legislatures. The concluding chapters present case studies of policy formulation and political organization involvement with the policy process.

2 The League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Introduction

Self-management, pluralism, decentralism, the delegate system, an absence of state planning, all affect the policy processes and political institutions of the Yugoslav state, and they have also helped to shape and provide a distinctive color to the political organizations. These distinctive traits have had the most profound impact within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Although the League maintains a commitment to Marxism and subscribes to such Leninist principles as democratic centralism, both its theoretical position in society and its behavior radically differ from that found among the Communist parties in other Marxist-Leninist states.¹

In this chapter, we discuss the role of the League of Communists in Yugoslav society, and we relate this role to the distinguishing character of the Yugoslav polity. We also outline the organizational structure of the SKJ, and we describe the membership, leadership, and organizational, administrative, and management issues currently facing the League. Finally, we review the evaluation of the current behavior of the League, and we identify and discuss those issues that are of greatest present concern to this organization.

Role and Purpose of the SKJ

Social Change, Self-Management, and the League

Any discussion of the role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia should take into consideration the fact that the Party's role has evolved over time, and has been strongly affected by the adoption of the ideology of self-management.² According to Yugoslav theorists, the changes in the League, including changes in organizational priorities, activities, goals, and objectives, are made in response to, or in anticipation of, social and economic changes.

Eduard Kardelj, one of the major political theorists and political leaders in postwar Yugoslavia, made this point very clearly:

For a revolutionary vanguard such as the League of Communists, no situations are permanent, nor are there any unalterable forms and methods of struggle. The situation itself dictates the appropriate means and methods of struggle. The success of the League of Communists' action directly hinges on whether the key elements in each particular situation which we have are correctly identified, whether we have properly assessed the balance of forces in society and correctly judged the place Communists should hold in this balance of forces. Similarly, the success depends on whether Communists are in close touch with the working class and whether they are capable of mobilizing them for action.³

Unlike many other Marxist-Leninist ruling parties that also lay claim to pragmatism with respect to operational activities, the Yugoslav League of Communists bases its perception of objective reality upon the tenets and objectives of self-management. Self-management is expected not only to direct League activities, but also to place an important constraint on the possibility of abuse of power.

The temporally induced changes in the social goals and objectives of the League of Communists are affected by changes in the economic structure within Yugoslav society. Economic structural shifts not only affect the national goals and objectives, but also regional and even commune-level definitions of SKJ roles and activities.⁴ Thus, the SKJ organization not only adapts its goals over time, but its goals are made appropriate to local situations within a particular time period.

Changes and variation in group dynamics have an even more direct impact upon the definition of the societal role for the League of Communists. Social change creates new groups, new interests, and new problems that need to be addressed. All of these new inputs are expected to affect the League of Communists and its role, program, and platform.⁵ These impacts are magnified even further by self-management, which requires rapid accommodations and shifts in priorities and policies, as well as the acceptance of a pluralism of viewpoints.⁶

The most significant theoretical relationship between social and economic changes and the role of the SKJ rests on the reciprocal moderating impact exercised by self-management. On the one hand, self-management theory encourages the League to facilitate the development of particular groups and economic interests, such as technical and highly skilled workers. On the other hand, it helps to channel the behavioral orientation of the League to work with these new groups and, most important, to work with these groups in a nondictatorial manner.⁷ Thus, the application of self-management is expected to act as a brake on Party tendencies toward statism and to assist the

democratization of Party behavior.⁸ Self-management, in other words, can strongly affect how the League visualizes its role in society and how it defines its responses to societal needs.

There are two basic components to the social role of the League of Communists. One is its ideological role, and the other is its action or program objectives. Both are important to the League, and both must be reviewed in order to appraise and evaluate the actions of the League.

The ideological component of the social role of the League of Communists is integrally linked to the ideology of socialist self-management as the Yugoslav expression of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The League's position is to interpret, foster, and protect self-management. In other words, the major ideological duty of the League is to determine what action may be necessary to guide Yugoslavia in the direction of a self-management society.

Contrary to the experience of many East European nations, the SKJ ideological component should be interpreted antidogmatically and pragmatically. Solutions and policies are expected to be temporary and to be extended, abandoned, or improved at a later date. This point is illustrated by the willingness to experiment with new institutions, to abandon older institutions, and to revise and rewrite such basic documents as the Federal Constitution. A concrete example can be found in the treatment of agriculture, which was initially collectivized, but was later replaced by cooperatives and individual farm holders with the free market determining prices and production. Again, Eduard Kardelj speaks to this point:

Communists are not doctrinarians or dogmatists, nor are they a sect, but are rather a movement that seeks to speak as directly as possible on behalf of the interests of the working class and all working people. In given conditions—and these conditions are the transition of revolutionary rule by the working class to a uniform system of socialist social self-management—this movement is at the same time a necessary factor that should reconcile the most progressive human thought with the historical role and interests of the working class, with the interests that are the socio-historical spearhead of the processes of eliminating the class society. . . . So long as the League of Communists is the most essential element in realizing the socioeconomic interests of the working class, it will be objectively capable of performing such a vanguard role.⁹

The broad ideological role of the SKJ is expected to affect the behavior and activities of individual members of the League of Communists, as well as the quality of interactions between Party members and nonmembers. It is also expected to encourage members and nonmembers to search for new innovative procedures, institutions, and processes to realize the goal. Thus, unlike many other ruling Communist Party nation-states where innovation is rare

and externally imposed, considerable variation in practices and procedures occurs and is encouraged in Yugoslavia without direct intervention of higher-level authorities.

From the perspective of the broad-based ideological role in self-management, the League of Communists sets objectives, identifies problems, evaluates current behavior, and defines overall social objectives. This appraisal is codified every four years during the Party Congress, and each Party unit evaluates its performance on the criteria used in the Congress platform.

In addition to the ideological role, platform, and program, the Yugoslav Communist Party member is expected to fulfill the expectations of the League in his behavior and actions. The League members not only must subscribe to the goals of the organization, but they must work to implement them in the decision-making process. In other words, the Party member must be involved in decision-making in other organizations and institutions in society. This involvement ranges from the workplace and neighborhood to the National Assembly. The member is also expected to be committed to carrying out the objectives of the platform and programs in these institutions and to accomplish them through institutional participation and persuasion. In practice, this may mean such activities in the workplace as support for the distribution of apartments to workers, or for the allocation of credit to those workers who need it most.

The commitment of the League member to the Party objectives also encourages member involvement with the other political organizations in the country. League members are expected to be active in the Socialist Alliance, trade unions, and youth organizations according to their situation in society. They are also expected to promote the platform and program of the League within these groups, and, above all, to encourage the development of self-management relationships.

In summary, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, by its ideological disposition and support for self-management, tends to perceive itself as a guiding and directive organization which encourages self-management socialism and discourages the use of bureaucratic force or direct administration of society. The League, as Tito notes in the passage below, is expected to rely much more heavily on persuasion, example, and assistance to other organizations and institutions than on its control of the state bureaucracy and governmental levers of power:

We are not a Party which imposes itself upon society and wants to command it. We are a Party which obeys and must obey the pulsebeat of the people, which must feel what the people wish, but which must, as the leading ideological and political force, also look farther. It must take part in everyday practice. Communists cannot concern themselves solely with ideology, they must also concern themselves with practice, they

must check all this in terms of deeds. The League of Communists was earlier, for example, divorced from production. Many tried to paralyze the League. Today the League of Communists must be more active in factories, there where resources are created, where goods are produced. Here, too, it must not command but rather help so that all decisions and all that is formulated in the Program, all that must be done in the factory, in the enterprise, is carried out as well as possible.¹⁰

*Historical Evolution of the
League of Communists in Yugoslav Society*

Since the founding of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after World War I, the Party has undergone three major qualitative shifts and one major quantitative adaptation to its social role. These shifts corresponded to the major political-historical changes in society, with the transition from one historical period to another altering or transforming the Party's relationship with its members, other organizations, and the public. They also correspond to changes in the methods and content of its activity, as well as to its relationship to society and the political institutions.¹¹ The major periods are from 1919 to 1945, 1945 to 1952, and 1952 to the present. The post-1966 period can be characterized as an intensification and expansion of the trends begun in 1952.

The early decades of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were characterized by the overwhelming need to seize control of the government and to bring about the formation of a Soviet state on Yugoslav territory. The Party, at that time, had 60,000 members, and membership was concentrated largely in the more industrialized regions.¹² Throughout most of the period, the CPY was illegal, its activities closely monitored by the police, and its publications banned. Its character was shaped by these circumstances, and it developed as a conspiratorial organization composed of dedicated revolutionaries. At the beginning of the war, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could only claim a membership of approximately 12,000, with 30,000 supporters in the affiliated youth organization.¹³

The armed insurrection against the occupation during World War II intensified the conspiratorial and revolutionary perspectives of the CPY, and it strengthened the organization's efforts to overthrow the government. At the same time, however, the Party widened its popular base from industrial workers to include peasants, tradesmen, and others, and it expanded its membership into all regions of the country. By the end of the war, two-thirds of the original Party members had died, but the Party increased in size to over 140,000 members, primarily from peasant backgrounds.¹⁴ In 1945, the Party had gained control of the government, and it functioned as the only cohesive and organized nonmilitary force in society. Its primary goal, in other words, had been achieved.

During the second stage of the Party's existence, the SKJ followed the example of the Soviet Union and created a strong state apparatus controlled by the Party, with a goal to modernize and industrialize the nation as rapidly as possible. The essence of the role of the Party at that time consisted of the right and responsibility to decide directly about any and all questions of social and economic development. At its Congresses, the Party directly formed the long-range objectives of the state, and between the congresses, the Central Committee decided how to implement and enforce the policies that were adopted by the Congress. Power was divided among the members of the ruling Politburo by sector (i.e., economic, education, foreign affairs, trade and commerce, etc.), and these individuals became the corresponding cabinet ministers in the government. Direct leadership was exercised similarly at all levels, down to the factory and the neighborhood.

Decisions during the immediate postwar period were made at the highest levels of the Party and transmitted to the government, which then confirmed their legality. Other organizations functioned primarily as transmission belts for the Party, to mobilize their members in support of the Party and to explain the state-Party decisions to their members. In practice, this meant that the Party leadership determined where factories, schools, roads, etc., would be built, who would staff and manage these institutions, and which products and how many of these products would be produced.

During the second historical period, the Party grew quickly, and more than doubled in size from 1946 to 1950. This growth, however, was also mirrored by the growth of the bureaucracies in the Party and state. Total membership climbed from 258,000 in 1946 to 607,000 in 1950 (235 percent increase). The number of workers in the Party jumped 266 percent from 71,000 to 189,000, but bureaucratic growth exceeded all other social categories, rising from 26,000 to 115,000 (432 percent increase).¹⁵ The growth of the power of the bureaucratic sector was troubling, and helped lead to such decisions as the introduction of economic self-management in 1950 and the decision to separate state and Party functions at the regional level in that year.¹⁶

The third major transformation began with the Sixth Party Congress in 1952, and was symbolized by the change of the name from the "Communist Party of Yugoslavia" to the "League of Communists of Yugoslavia." Those changes in role, methods, and objectives which occurred, however, developed gradually, and were not ratified into law until the 1963 Constitution. This Constitution firmly broke the personal union between the government and the Party, and it introduced self-management as the guiding principle for the development of the state and Party.¹⁷ The Brioni Plenum in July 1966 confirmed the irreversible trends toward social self-management, and the Ninth Congress of the SKJ in 1969 brought forth a radically altered Party.

In the period before the Brioni Conference, the League had become

Table 2.1 "In your opinion, does the SKJ have the same, greater, or less reputation in comparison with the reputation that it had in the early postwar years?"
(*N* = 2,634) (in percentages)

	<i>Opinion</i>				
	<i>Same</i>	<i>Greater</i>	<i>Less</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>No answer</i>
Republic					
Yugoslavia total	11.6	39.4	19.1	28.3	1.4
Slovenia	10.5	31.2	19.4	36.8	2.1
Croatia	14.3	34.6	19.6	29.6	1.9
Vojvodina	16.2	30.7	25.4	26.6	1.1
Serbia Proper	8.5	51.2	17.3	22.0	1.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	10.6	37.2	29.5	21.5	1.2
Montenegro	10.8	35.7	13.1	39.3	0.5
Macedonia	14.2	40.4	14.3	29.6	1.4
Kosovo	8.9	56.2	7.8	25.6	1.5
Occupation profile					
Highly skilled workers	11.7	48.6	19.5	18.7	1.5
Unskilled workers	9.3	39.3	9.9	39.3	2.2
Highly educated workers	14.7	39.9	30.5	14.1	0.8
Clerks	8.7	53.5	19.7	18.0	0.0
Private peasants	8.3	39.4	7.7	42.5	2.1
Private tradesmen	17.9	53.6	7.1	21.4	0.0
Retirees and disabled	14.0	36.9	19.0	27.9	2.2
Students	16.0	31.0	27.0	24.0	2.0
Political involvement profile					
Members of the SKJ	15.8	47.9	28.6	7.0	0.7
Noninvolved	8.1	31.8	11.3	46.9	1.9
Active in workplace organization	13.4	49.2	21.8	15.0	0.6
Active in social organization	11.8	32.4	30.8	23.0	2.0
Officials in social organization	14.8	49.2	28.2	7.3	0.5
Higher elected officials	16.9	38.5	32.4	10.7	1.5

Source: Firdus Džinić, *Jugoslovensko Javno Mnenje i VIII Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1965), pp. 75–81.

concerned about the depth of the transformation in its social role and the perceptions of the public toward its actions and behavior. A series of empirical studies was commissioned to determine the depth of the changes within the Party and the thoroughness of the Party commitment to self-management. These studies indicated that, in general, most citizens were familiar with the Party changes and their intent,¹⁸ that the reputation¹⁹ and influence²⁰ of the Party was strong, and that the influence of the Party persisted even in rural areas which had encountered serious opposition to Communist rule during the war.²¹ Table 2.1 lists the results of a national poll of citizens that asked nonmembers to compare their estimation of the reputation of the League in 1964 with the reputation of the Party in the early postwar years. The table indicates strong general approval of the change in the Party's role after 1952 for most republics and provinces, nearly all occupational groups, all nationality groups, and many of the lower level Party and non-Party officials. The only strong reservations were expressed by the groups most negatively impacted by the change; namely, bureaucrats, higher-level officials, and residents of geographic areas (for example, Bosnia) who had received unusually strong political-economic rewards for their extraordinary wartime resistance efforts.

Positive popular evaluations of the League did not necessarily indicate willingness to join the SKJ, and expressions of support for the Party's role in self-management did not always indicate that the SKJ had completely changed the habits it had learned in the prior period. A national study conducted in 1964 found that over two-thirds (67.8 percent) of a sample of 2,140 non-Party members did not want to be Party members, and that the percentages climbed to 77 percent among private tradesmen, 81 percent among homemakers, 78 percent among farmers who tilled their own land, and 89 percent among regular churchgoers. On the other hand, personal affinity toward League membership was much stronger in Montenegro (47 percent) and Serbia Proper (43 percent) than in the other republics, and was higher among the younger generation (44 percent), highly educated (61 percent), students (74 percent), workers (44 percent), and farmers employed by agricultural enterprises (46 percent).²² Kilibarda's study of Party members in rural Serbia noted that the League had generally accepted the principles of self-management, but it also noted the persistence of tendencies for League members to forestall action until ordered by the top leadership, and for members to fail to include nonmembers in discussions and decision-making.²³

In spite of the problems and difficulties, comparisons with the Party in the pre-1952 period and pre-Brioni period reveal considerable change. The role and behavior of the 1965 League of Communists differed significantly from the pre-1952 Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The League had undergone a transformation in its role and behavior.

The Brioni Conference in July 1966 marked a watershed in the development of the League's contemporary societal role, and it solidified the SKJ's

Table 2.2 "In your opinion, does the SKJ today have the same, greater, or less reputation in comparison with the reputation that it had before the Brioni Plenum?" ($N = 2,500$) (in percentages)

	<i>Opinion</i>				
	<i>Same</i>	<i>Greater</i>	<i>Less</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>No answer</i>
Republic					
Yugoslavia total	19	36	8	36	1
Slovenia	29	31	6	34	0
Croatia	23	38	5	33	1
Vojvodina	27	40	8	25	0
Serbia Proper	17	34	9	39	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	17	45	9	29	0
Montenegro	23	34	17	26	0
Macedonia	7	27	2	60	4
Kosovo	18	39	9	32	1
Occupation profile					
Skilled workers	25	46	13	15	0
Unskilled workers	20	38	7	34	1
Highly educated workers	35	46	12	7	0
Clerks	24	50	16	10	0
Peasants	18	30	4	46	2
Private tradesmen	41	29	10	21	0
Pensioners and disabled	24	44	5	27	0
Students	28	54	8	10	0
SKJ members	25	54	14	7	0

Source: Firdus Džinić, *Odnos Građana Prema Savezu Komunista i Misljenja o Njegovoj Reorganizaciji* (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1967), pp. 3, 8.

links to the ideology of self-management. Brioni stripped the state security organizations of many of their police powers and severed the connection of the police as an armed element of the League. The conference also set into motion a series of Party reforms that eventually reduced the scope of the transmission-belt role to the other political organizations, vastly expanded upward communication channels within the League, and generally led to the acceptance of pluralism and diversity, and to a cessation of the Party's monopoly over social change.

Brioni's impact on quickening political and ideological change cannot be overestimated. A national poll conducted in 1967 found that 36 percent thought that the SKJ's reputation had been enhanced by the Brioni Plenum, and only 8 percent disapproved. The level of approval remained high for all republics and all social groups, as indicated in table 2.2.

Following Brioni, several steps were taken to strengthen the League's commitment to its social role in support of self-management. Beginning with the

Ninth Party Congress in 1969, the republic congresses were held before the national congress, and the republic congresses debated and amended the platform and program to be discussed by the national congress. The republic and provincial Parties gained more influence in the decision-making process, and local organizations experienced disciplinary measures when they arbitrarily intervened in local economic and political decision-making.

The impact of Brioni on popular willingness to affiliate with the League was dramatic. Compared to 1963, respondents were much more willing to join the League if invited. In 1966, only 25 percent stated that they would refuse membership in the SKJ, compared to 68 percent in 1963. Opposition to the Party appeared concentrated among those aged sixty-six or over (45 percent refusal) and the Republic of Slovenia (55 percent). Opposition was weakest in Vojvodina (12 percent) and Serbia (15 percent), and among students (14 percent) and youths aged eighteen to twenty-five (14 percent).²⁴

Since Brioni, several events have occurred which have further refined the SKJ commitment to self-management and to self-management processes. Two of the most important were the campaign in 1971 against the resurgence of nationalism, most forcefully exposed during the Croatian demonstrations in 1971, and the second was the resistance to "anarcho-liberalism." The League interpreted the second movement as an attempt to reduce the involvement of the SKJ under a slogan of "noninterference," to abolish the basic organization of the League in the factory, and to eliminate democratic centralism.²⁵ Tito characterized this movement as an attempt to turn the League into a "debating society."²⁶

Part of the response to these developments was the issuance of Tito's famous letter, the twenty-first meeting of the Presidency of the SKJ, and Tito's speech to the political activists in Serbia in 1972. These documents, in Tito's words,

marked a turning point in the direction of strengthening the ideological-political and action-taking capabilities of the League of Communists in order to enable it to perform the role it should play. We resolutely took the view that through their struggle Communists must act as an internal force of social development, in other words, not outside self-management and outside the working class, but in all forms of its organization—in organs of self-management, political communities and organizations, government agencies, etc.²⁷

The events of the early 1970s led to a series of policy shifts within the Party. Two of the most significant were the concrete objective to achieve a workers' majority at all levels of the Party, and the goal to reduce political professionalism and careerism (Tito Initiative). The incentive for these acts was the realization that bureaucratic tendencies in the League had grown too rapidly, and that the political leadership exercised excessive influence over

Table 2.3 Distribution of actual and desired influence of social groups within the League of Communists, Sarajevo region, 1972*

Group	<i>Actual desired difference</i>		
	<i>All Communists (N = 742)</i>		
Political leaders	4.53	4.20	.33
Workplace leaders	4.34	3.86	.48
Experts	3.77	4.08	-.31
White-collar workers	3.17	3.66	-.49
Blue-collar workers	2.80	4.58	-1.78
Worker sample (N = 352)			
Political leaders	4.53	4.20	.33
Workplace leaders	4.35	4.00	.35
Experts	3.86	4.05	-.19
White-collar workers	3.27	3.67	-.40
Blue-collar workers	2.85	4.85	-2.00
Leadership sample			
Political leaders	4.44	4.21	.23
Workplace leaders	4.36	3.88	.48
Experts	3.78	3.95	-.17
White-collar workers	3.15	3.61	-.46
Blue-collar workers	2.80	4.60	-1.80

*Key: 5 = very strong, 4 = strong, 3 = average, 2 = weak, 1 = none
Source: Vlado Sultanović and Nedo Miljanović, "Uticaj Pojedinih Struktura Članstva u Organizaciji Saveza Komunisti, *Opređenja* 2 (February 1974): 66-67.

League affairs. Several studies confirmed the existence of this unfavorable trend and pointed out the shortfalls between desired influence of workers in the Party and their actual influence. Table 2.3 lists some of the results found among SKJ members in the Sarajevo urban region.

In summary, the League of Communists has dramatically altered its role since its formation in 1919. The general League goal of the enhancement of self-management evolved over a long period of time and is continuing to evolve today. The role of the League of Communists and the League's relationship to society are fluid and change roughly according to the demands of that society. Budislav Šoškić, a former major figure in the Party, summarized the major points of the League's transformation. They included: (a) a shift from direct management of society to self-management, (b) precise separation of the state from the Party, (c) abolition of the transmission-belt relationship between the League and other political organizations, (d) democratization of internal affairs within the League of Communists, and (e) strong opposition to the granting of extraordinary privileges and rights to Party members.²⁹ Together, these five points outline the marked difference between the Yugoslav League of Communists and other parties in Eastern Europe

and the Soviet Union. They define, in other words, the skj's unique role.

Current Role, Program, and Activities

The most concrete expression of the ideological and action behavioral roles for the League of Communists can be derived from the program and platform statements found in the skj Congress documents. Since 1958, the League has consistently outlined both its vision of a self-management society and the ideological and practical steps that must be accomplished before the next Congress. Self-management has remained the goal, but its definition and practical implications are sharpened and elucidated further at each succeeding congress.³⁰ In this section, we summarize the ideological role developed by the Eleventh and Twelfth Congresses of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. We also define the legal position of the League, and list the activities in which League members and the League organization are currently involved.

According to League Congress documents and statements from League officials, the ideological commitment of the skj has various practical implications. One of these implications is that the League has an important role in integrating society by articulating and supporting both the general community interest³¹ and the values of self-management.³² The skj, in other words, helps to set the national agenda and the national goals and values.³³

A second implication of the general societal goal of the League is support for policies that provide a higher standard of living and that prevent the reemergence of what Party leaders call the "technocratic-bureaucratic elite." At the Eleventh Party Congress, President Tito's opening address unambiguously presented this charge to the Congress's delegates.³⁴

The third practical application of the general role of the skj is rooted in the Yugoslav historical experience. The League and its members are expected to behave as an All-Yugoslav institution that supports the multinational state and permits each nationality to express its interests without compromise to the national interest. Members of the League are expected to be internationalists first and members of constituent nationality groups second.³⁵

Historically, the constitutional treatment of political organizations, and particularly the League of Communists, can be divided into two phases, with the 1963 Constitution as the transition from one phase to the other. The first phase is characterized by the absence of any mention of the political organizations in the constitution, even though these organizations played a major role in political affairs.

The introduction of the ideology of self-management reopened the question of constitutional recognition, and debate divided along two views. One viewpoint opposed any change, and claimed that constitutional treatment of

the political organizations would represent a foundation for governmental supremacy over the organization. The other, and prevailing, viewpoint considered that the constitution needed to determine exactly the place for the League and other organizations in the political system of self-management so that no organization would exceed its statutory powers and each organization would know its rights and responsibilities in the functioning of the system.³⁶

The 1974 Constitution gives a considerable amount of attention to the collective roles, duties, and responsibilities of the political organizations within the framework of self-management. Some specific attention is also given to the League of Communists. This document credits the League for initiating and organizing the liberation movement and revolution; it declares the League to be the vanguard and major articulator of the interests of the working class; and it credits the League as the major political force for building socialism, solidarity, and unity.³⁷

The following paragraph in the Constitution is even more precise. It states, "the League of Communists, through its directive ideology and policies, is the initiator and implementor of political activity to protect and advance the socialist revolution and socialist self-management relations, and particularly to work for strengthening social and democratic consciousness in an environment of socialist democracy and social development." Most important, the constitution gives responsibility to the League alone for these activities³⁸ which, in effect, means that the League has legal responsibility for determining society's basic direction, its values, and its goals.³⁹

Since the Seventh Congress of the SKJ in 1958, the League has used the resolutions from the Congress as formal statements of the ideological goals and practical objectives for the League of Communists and its members. The last four congresses have even followed the identical organizational patterns, and have divided the resolutions into five distinct programmatic areas: social and economic development, political development, organizational issues, education/science/culture issues, and national and civil defense. Supplementary resolutions are often added, depending upon need, such as the resolution of the Twelfth Congress on the policy of economic stabilization. Within each of the five major areas, the particulars vary from Congress to Congress, but the goals are always precise.

The following is a summary of the action-related objectives adopted by the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982, which all members pledge to help implement.

(a) *Social and Economic Development*

- Restructure the economy to rely more heavily on domestic resources
- Develop a domestic energy base and substitution of domestic fuels for imported petroleum products
- Invest in agriculture and animal husbandry

- Develop coastal, mountain, and other tourist industries
- Integrate the Yugoslav economy into world markets, and provide support for eventual world market convertability of the dinar
- (b) *Political Development*
 - Strengthen self-management decision-making to OOURs and neighborhoods, and strengthen the influence of these basic institutions in the political process
 - Support the delegate system
 - Develop collective responsibility
 - Enhance conditions for equality of nations and nationalities
 - Correct inefficiencies in the decision-making process
 - Condemn bureaucratism and nationalism, particularly in Kosovo
- (c) *National and Civil Defense*
 - Support local defense mobilization and training efforts
 - Increase awareness of the need to resist aggression
- (d) *Culture, Science, & Education*
 - Assist cultural, scientific, and educational institutions in reorganizing procedures to comply with self-management norms
 - Continue efforts to fund, manage, and administer these institutions with minimal state intervention
- (e) *Organizational Issues*
 - Support democratic centralism
 - Enhance the role of workers throughout the organization
 - Expand Marxist education
 - Oppose expression contrary to self-management⁴⁰

Collectively, these resolutions define the current role and the expected behavior of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its members. Prior congresses emphasized other particulars, and future congresses can be expected to develop new programs. For the present, however, this platform is the basis on which to evaluate the performance of the SKJ.

Organizational Principles, Structure, and Communication

In this section, we present the organizational principles, structural environment, and patterns of communication of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. As a necessary preliminary, however, several factors must be taken into account and explained. One factor is that the structure of the organization is not permanent, and, in fact, is not intended to be permanent.⁴¹ The size of organizational units within the SKJ, their method of selection, the duties and responsibilities of individual units, and the processes of communication with other political organizations vary across time and, for some

features, vary from republic to republic within the same time span. The justification for this constant change is that society is constantly developing and that the SKJ must adapt its organization to fulfill its basic role in a changing society.

A second feature which the SKJ shares with other ruling Communist parties, but not with other Yugoslav political organizations, is that the League is not considered a mass organization. Rather, it is a selective organization reserved for the "vanguard." Membership in the League is by invitation only, and enrollment is dependent upon minimal levels of participation, active endorsement of all of the League's ideological principles and positions, and correct behavior of the member.⁴²

The third major feature, and one that differentiates the SKJ from many other ruling Communist parties, is that the SKJ tries to maintain a strict separation between the government and the Party. One practical result of this policy is that Party leaders are not permitted to hold simultaneously important elected or appointed positions in the government. A second result of the policy is that organizational processes and procedures of the Party do not need to parallel those of the state. This preserves the unity of the Party, even under situations where the government is weak, indecisive, and divided.⁴³ An additional side-benefit of the strict separation of Party and State is that the Party retains its freedom, at appropriate moments, to act as an opposition or critical force for change in the government. Thus, the Party can be simultaneously a constructive organization working with the government and a critical element working outside the government.

Organizational Principles

Two organizational principles effectively define the internal operation and behavior of the League of Communists. One, which the League shares with all other Marxist-Leninist parties, is Lenin's principle of democratic centralism. The other, which is largely a Yugoslav outgrowth of the first, is the principle of collective responsibility.

Since 1923, the League of Communists' basic principle of internal relations and political activity has been democratic centralism. All the decisions, conclusions, and positions of the League must be based on it, and the use of the principle differentiates the League from all other political organizations in Yugoslavia. The League's platform defines democratic centralism in this way:

The principles of democratic centralism are the expression and best organizational condition for the ideological and behavioral unity of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Democratic Centralism means a struggle of opinion in the organization, along with the required accep-

tance of conclusions and the undertaking of action on the basis of an open exchange of opinion and decision of the majority. Consistent application of the principle of democratic centralism contributes best to true Party tendencies, and, at the same time, against the appearance of bourgeois anarchism.⁴⁴

Within the Yugoslav context, democratic centralism controls more than simple internal Party relationships. The principle is an important constraint against the reappearance of nationalism, bureaucratic centralism, or anarchism within the Party,⁴⁵ and it provides a mechanism through which the general community interest can be expressed.⁴⁶ The League's democratic centralism, in other words, contributes to the maintenance of political stability and general effective decision-making for the entire society.

Democratic centralism is also vital to the continuance of the Party. It is the principle that holds the League together, and is responsible for its unity. Without democratic centralism, it is likely that the League would quickly evolve into a loose coalition of parties, or would disappear.⁴⁷

In Yugoslav practice, democratic centralism has evolved over time, and is dramatically different from that experienced by the Soviet Union. Its application changes as it conforms to changes in the role of the League, and as the League's role in society has become more open, the democratic component of the principle has become more important.⁴⁸

Democratic centralism has two fundamental components. The first basic feature of democratic centralism is open discussion at every level of the organization and in every Party body. Yugoslav Party leaders stress that discussion should be open to all members, because all members bear the responsibility for implementing and supporting decisions that result from the discussions. Decisions are based on majority vote, and discussion ceases after that vote. In recent years, however, there has been some criticism, particularly at the federal level, that the Party has tended to defer decisions while seeking unanimous consent from all republic and provincial parties.⁴⁹

Openness of the work of the Party organizations and institutions is a second important feature of Yugoslavia's application of democratic centralism. The results of discussions of every unit of the League, from the basic chapter to the federal level, are public to both members and nonmembers. Discussions, particularly among the higher-level leadership, are public to enable all members to follow and to contribute their comments and suggestions.

Occasionally, special efforts will be taken to solicit member involvement in leadership decision-making. For example, following the Thirteenth Session of the Federal Central Committee in July 1984, all units of the Party were directed to meet, discuss, and transmit suggestions to the Central Committee regarding the need for and direction of political and economic reform.⁵⁰

In practice, some committees attempt to avoid public discussion.⁵¹ In 1981, following the Albanian nationalist riots in Kosovo, some Kosovan Party committees and the Provincial Committee held closed meetings to protect themselves and hide their responsibility for the events and to try to manipulate the organization. The press, however, quickly discovered these attempts and exposed them, and those who took part were eventually subject to Party discipline. Even at the national level, there have been breakdowns in public discussions. These occurrences, however, tend to be perceived to be the result of negligence, and not the result of criminal intent.⁵²

The second component of democratic centralism is the obligation of each member to carry out the decisions of the Party body. This means that once discussion is completed and the vote is taken, all members, even those who disapprove, must help put the decision into practice and must support it.⁵³ Those who disagree and persist in criticism have a responsibility to resign or they will be expelled from the organization.⁵⁴ In this way, the unity of the Party is maintained.

The case in 1982 of Rade Končar, the son of a famous war hero and revolutionary, illustrates a recent application of this component in Yugoslavia. As a delegate to the National SKJ Congress in 1982, Končar had pushed for an amendment to the charter of the Party which would alter the organizational structure of the SKJ in large economic enterprises. Following debate, the Končar amendment was defeated, but Končar refused to accept the decision and publicly attacked the Congress. Several attempts were made by the republic, city, and communal League organization to persuade Končar to accept the Congress's decision, but these were unsuccessful. Eventually, Končar's commune committee voted to accept his resignation from the organization.⁵⁵ A notable difference between the Končar case and similar situations in other Communist states is that the government did not intervene against Končar, harass him, or have him arrested.

Most breakdowns in Yugoslav Party discipline are not as public or dramatic as the Končar case. In these situations, the member simply remains silent and only apathetically supports a League's decision. Such cases, of course, are nearly impossible to identify or enforce.

The principle of collective work and responsibility, also referred to, in part, as the Tito Initiative, is an outgrowth of democratic centralism. It is an accommodation to the multinational structure of the state and to the distrust of executive authority. Under this principle, responsibility for decisions is held by the group making the decision, and new individuals who join the group accept that collective responsibility.⁵⁶

In practice, collective work and responsibility imply rapid rotation of members in decision-making bodies, and there are statutory prohibitions against the development of a professional group that permanently maintains control over decision-making processes.⁵⁷ Terms of office are limited to four years,

usually less, and an individual can be reelected only once. The executive heads of Party committees, however, are prohibited from serving a second term, and the length of their term cannot exceed two years. After completion of a term in office, all individuals must return to their former employment or retire.

Collective responsibility also involves a responsibility of the higher-level leadership bodies to work with lower-level units and to maintain two-way communication. The leadership, according to the Charter of the SKJ, is required to inform the membership about its activities and to solicit support and advice from the membership. At the end of a term of office, the leadership body is required to submit a report and receive an evaluation.⁵⁸ The intent, of course, is to prevent the aggregation of power into a few hands and to minimize the probability of abuse of position.

Structure

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia is not a small organization: in 1983 the League had enrolled over two million members, approximately 10 percent of the total population.⁵⁹ These members formed over 67,000 chapters, and 85 percent of these chapters had less than fifty members each.⁶⁰ Virtually every work organization has a chapter, as well as 85 percent of all organized neighborhoods.⁶¹ The structure of the organization parallels the territorial divisions of the country with entities existing on the communal, city, province, republic and federal levels. In addition, the Yugoslav National Army maintains a League organization separate from the geographical divisions of the country.

Federal Structure Nationally, the Yugoslav League of Communists is a relatively streamlined organization with few conflicting lines of authority, and with direct communication channels. Figure 2.1 outlines the structure.

The Congress is considered to be the fundamental decision-making body for the League. It generally meets every four years, and the most recent Congress was held from 26 June to 29 June 1982 in Belgrade. A great deal of preparation is involved in the Congress, and advance work begins two full years before a Congress. Also, approximately six months before a national Congress, the Central Committee submits to the membership for their advice and discussion a draft platform designed to serve as the policy base of the Congress.

Delegates to a national Congress are selected on the basis of a combination of their membership and their federal status. In 1982 each commune received one delegate and an additional delegate for every additional two thousand members. Each republic was also apportioned sixty delegates, and each province received forty delegate seats.

The delegates to the Congress are generally representative of the League's




Figure 2.1: Organizational chart for the federal League of Communists

full membership, and most delegates can be considered to be political novices. In 1978, 77 percent of the delegates had never attended a national Congress before, and 73 percent had never even attended a republic Congress or provincial conference. The Congress delegates are usually male (73 percent), middle-aged, and well educated. Most nationalities are represented in close proximity to their population proportion. Only Montenegrins are more heavily represented, largely a result of their republic status and inordinately high membership rate in the League.⁶² In addition, most major occupational groups are represented, although farm workers tend to receive fewer seats and political workers more seats than their population proportions would suggest. Table 2.4 gives the profile of delegates at the Eleventh National Congress in 1978.

The Congress follows a preset agenda that always includes a welcoming address, a review of past performance, election of national officers and committees, discussion of proposed Congress resolutions, and the report from the Congress's commissions. Each Congress divides itself into commissions, and most of the second day of the gathering involves meetings with these commissions. The Twelfth Congress had six commissions which roughly paralleled the divisions found in the resolutions. They were: (1) commission for the development of socialist self-management (economic), (2) commission for the development of the political system of socialist self-management, (3) commission for organizational renewal of the League of Communists, (4) commission for problems in educational, scientific, and cultural affairs, (5) commission for international issues, and (6) commission for problems concerning national and civil defense.⁶³

An important purpose of the national Congress is to provide a mechanism for legitimizing the policy of the League in the ensuing four-year period.

Table 2.4 Delegate profile at the Eleventh National SKJ Congress

<i>Profile characteristic</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Republic	2,283	100
Bosnia-Herzegovina	318	14
Montenegro	118	5
Croatia	340	15
Macedonia	166	7
Slovenia	160	7
Serbia	521	23
Kosovo	114	5
Vojvodina	219	10
Yugoslav National Army	123	5
Age		
0-27 years of age	354	16
28-35 years of age	280	12
36-45 years of age	643	28
46-55 years of age	691	30
56 and over	123	5
Education		
Under 8 years	7	0
8 years	20	1
12 years or less	692	30
14 years or less	559	24
Over 14 years	813	36
Prior congress participation		
First time	1,753	77
One prior participation	178	8
Participated twice	52	2
Participated three times	43	2
Participated four or more times	65	3

Source: "Jedanaesti Kongres Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije," *Jugoslavenski Pregled* 22 (June 1978): 219.

The resolutions of the Congress, as noted earlier, present the criteria for evaluating each organizational entity, and the major themes of the Congress often become major societal themes. The case of secondary school education reform illustrates this process. President Tito and others had stressed the need for education reform in Tito's letter and in the Resolutions of the Third Conference of the SKJ in 1972. Nevertheless, little action was taken. The Eleventh Party Congress (1978), however, strongly emphasized this problem and mandated reform, which the republic Parties, in spite of strong non-Party resistance, then implemented from 1979 to 1981.

A second important function for the national Congress is the election of the Central Committee and other commissions. Presently, the Central Committee has 165 members, eight of whom are ex officio members as a result of their position as president of a republic or provincial League of Communists organization. The remaining members are elected for four year terms according to the following formula: twenty members per republic, fifteen members per province, and fifteen members for the Yugoslav National Army. Members are limited to two consecutive terms, and approximately one-third of the members of the last two Central Committees had previously served a term.⁶⁴

The Central Committee meets approximately every other month during its term of office. These meetings usually last a full day and are presided over by the President of the Presidency of the Central Committee. An agenda is announced in advance, and generally the agenda is limited to one major issue (e.g., economic stabilization, political reform, problems in Kosovo, etc.) and to a series of more routine matters. The Fourteenth Session in October 1984, for instance, lasted twelve hours, heard twenty speakers, and discussed economic reform and the problems of consensual decision-making.⁶⁵

Much of the preparatory work of the Central Committee is conducted by subcommittees, and presently, there are five such committees (see figure 2.1). These subcommittees prepare recommendations, but they cannot make policy without the approval of the full committee. Membership on these committees is apportioned equally by republic and province, and representation is also given to the Army.

Like all Party bodies, decisions in the Central Committee are made by majority vote but, in practice, attempts are usually made to achieve more harmony before a vote is taken. Democratic centralism determines individual behavior.

Unlike the custom of the Soviet Union and other East European states, the Yugoslav League of Communists no longer elects a politburo or small working executive body. Executive and administrative authority is held by a collective body called the Presidency, which presently consists of twenty-three members. There are three members per republic, two per province, and one for the Army.⁶⁶ The Presidency is elected by the Central Committee. The League Charter specifies the duties of the Presidency, which include the following: organization of the activities of the Central Committee, cooperation with republic and provincial and army committees; representation of the SKJ abroad, evaluation of the ideological and political climate, formulation of political positions, execution of decisions of the Central Committee, and exercise of emergency powers in crisis situations.⁶⁷

The Presidency selects a President to serve for a one-year, nonrenewable term. This individual is elected from within the Presidency according to a predetermined pattern of rotation among the republics and provinces.⁶⁸ The President, who receives no additional powers or responsibilities, speaks as

the representative of the League, but his actions are perceived as restatements of policy of the Presidency and not as personal opinions.

Since 1978 the Presidency has abolished its executive committee and now delegates its detailed working responsibility for ideological, international, and membership policy issues to three executive secretaries. These positions are rotated by republic and province. The Presidency also has formed several distinct standing subcommissions (administration and finance, petitions, appeals and complaints, ideology, and defense) and a Secretary for the Presidency. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, the position of Secretary lacks policy or administrative powers and is rotated biennially. The intent of this organizational structure is to reduce occasions where power could be concentrated by an individual or small group, and to achieve more equal division of work among the members.⁶⁹

Generally, the Presidency meets relatively frequently—about once every six weeks. Its meetings rarely exceed one day in length, and the agenda may contain such items as reports of foreign visits, preparation for the upcoming Congress, reports of presidential subcommissions, proposed amendments to the Party Charter, preparation of discussion documents for the Central Committee, and political developments in the republics or provinces.⁷⁰ From 1974 to 1978, the Presidency met thirty-three times, and from 1978 to 1982 it met over forty times. Table 2.5 provides supplementary information about the activities of the Presidency between the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses that indicates the level of involvement of the SKJ Presidency by subject matter. As is evident from these data, the League's Presidency concentrates much of its time on economic, international, and, especially, organizational issues and activities.

In addition to the bodies mentioned above, the Yugoslav League of Communists maintains two standing commissions that are elected directly by the Congress, are independent of the Central Committee, and have no overlapping membership with other leadership bodies. These are the Supervisory and the Statutory Commissions.

The Supervisory Commission currently has fifteen members apportioned according to province, republic, and the Yugoslav National Army. Its primary duties are to oversee the collection and expenditure of Party funds and to recommend measures to the Central Committee to assure the fiscal health of the organization. It reports to the Congress and, generally, meets quarterly.⁷¹

The Statutory Commission interprets the League's charter, rules on conflicts between the national and republic organizations, suggests changes in the charter, and hears appeals from republic statutory commissions. It presently has twenty-four members, apportioned according to republic and province and the Yugoslav National Army, and each member serves a four-year term. The commission meets approximately five times a year, but the number and length of sessions can vary dramatically according to the caseload.⁷²

Table 2.5 Activity of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia by subject area, 1970-78

Activity	1970-74		1974-78	
	Total	%	Total	%
Sessions	48		33	
Agenda items	121		79	
Subject				
Domestic politics	15	12	6	8
Economics	16	13	17	22
International relations	15	12	18	23
Organizational issues	19	16	11	14
Publishing and media	6	5	1	1
Evaluation and congress	38	31	21	27
Yugoslav National Army	4	3	1	1
Agriculture	5	4	0	0
Other	3	2	4	5

Sources: 1970-74—Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, *Deseti Kongres SKJ: Stenografske Beležke I* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1974), p. 135. 1974-78—Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, *Jedanaesti Kongres SKJ: Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1978), p. 272.

Republics and Provinces Republics follow an organizational pattern nearly identical to the Federal level, but smaller in scale. The provinces have slightly different structures and terminology. Like the federal skj, republics have congresses, central committees, presidencies, presidents, and supervisory and statutory commissions. In place of congresses, the provinces convene election conferences where they elect a provincial committee. Members of both provincial League organizations are simultaneously members of the Serbian republic League and participate in Serbian League activities. Both provincial organizations, however, have additional rights, and they can choose members to sit on the Federal League Central Committee and Federal League Statutory and Supervisory Commissions.

The congresses of the republic parties are considered to be the most important institutions of the republic parties. They establish general policy guidelines, approve their charter, hear and approve the evaluation of their leadership institutions, and elect officers for the republic and national League organizations. Republic congresses are held for a two- to three-day period preceding the National Congress, and like the National Congress, they are large gatherings, averaging 700 delegates.

Approximately three-quarters of the delegates to the republic congresses are elected to the positions by their communal committees, and each commune organization receives a number of delegates apportioned according to its membership size.⁷⁴ The remainder of the delegates are members of the

Congress by virtue of their offices in the organization. This group includes the republic members of the republic and national central committees, and republic supervisory and statutory committees. Delegates are generally political newcomers; many are workers; and there is wide occupational variation. Table 2.6 provides some comparative data.

Republic congresses are very involved meetings. On the first day, a plenary session is held with welcoming addresses and reports on the state of the Party and on Party activities. On the second day, the typical congress will divide into a number of policy areas and form commissions. Generally, the commissions correspond to the policy areas used by the National Congress. During the course of each commission's session, as many as sixty delegates will speak, and as many as fifty proposals, amendments, etc., will be proposed. In 1982, 250 delegates addressed the commissions during the Bosnian Congress, 228 spoke at Croatia's Congress, and 214 spoke at Montenegro's Congress.⁷⁵ The third day of a republic Congress typically includes the election of officers, reports of the commissions, approval of the charter, and speeches by the new officers.⁷⁶

Elections for republic League officers are conducted by secret ballot. Multiple candidacies are not presently permitted, but even so, elections are not unanimous. Most candidates receive 98 to 99 percent of the vote, but occasionally, a candidate will be passed over by as many as 10 percent of the delegates. Such a large percentage of a negative vote indicates some dissatisfaction with that individual.⁷⁷

Like the National Congress, republic congresses elect a central committee, a statutory commission, and a supervisory commission, and the size of these bodies varies by time and by republic/province.⁷⁸ In 1982, the size of the republic central committees and provincial committees ranged from 149 in Serbia to 55 in Montenegro. Statutory and supervisory commissions had similar ranges, with an average size of twenty-five for statutory commissions and fifteen for supervisory commissions.⁷⁹ The republic congresses also nominate their candidates for the national Central Committee, and in 1982, they elected sixty delegates for the National Congress. Provinces also nominated candidates for the Central Committee and elected forty delegates to attend the National Congress.

Republic-level central committees tend to meet less frequently than their national counterpart, and, on the average, a republic central committee will meet in full session about four times per year.⁸⁰ The agenda of the meetings vary widely according to the current needs of the republics and provinces. Typical agenda items include agriculture, economic reform, education, finance, and Congress preparations. Occasionally, there will be extraordinary sessions to deal with urgent problems. Serbia, for example, scheduled several meetings to discuss the Kosovan problem and responses to it. The result of the work of these committee discussions is public information and is

Table 2.6 Comparative background data on elected delegates to 1982 republic and provincial SKJ congresses and conferences

Characteristic	Republic				
	Bosnia	Croatia	Macedonia	Kosovo	Vojvodina
Women	27	25	—	—	—
Workers	37	31	25	38	45
Farm workers	7	2	—	—	7
Students	2	3	—	4	5
Unemployed	0.3	1	—	—	—
Youths					
(under age 28)	20	18	—	—	—
Highly educated*	—	33	16	—	—
Army members	—	5	—	1	—
Sociopolitical organization members	—	9	—	24	—
Cultural, education, and science organization members	—	12	12	10	—

*Over 14 years of education.

Sources: *Vjesnik* and *Politika* for the period of the respective congress or conference.

often widely distributed. As with all Party bodies, decisions are made under conditions of democratic centralism and are binding on all members.

Like their national counterpart, the republic central committees delegate their work to special subcommittees. In addition, individual members may specialize in particular policy areas such as education or housing. They will then be responsible for providing expert advice and guidance when their policy areas are under consideration.

Much of the administrative work of the central committees in the republics is delegated to the presidency. The size and organizational format of this body changes with each republic, but currently no republic League presidency exceeds nineteen members. Several republics have also created an office entitled Executive Secretary for members of the central committee to specialize in specific policy areas and to provide assistance to the republic presidency.

Meetings of the republic SKJ presidencies are frequent. Macedonia's League presidency, for example, scheduled and held thirty-two sessions in an eight-month period from May to December 1983. The agenda included forty-five items with topics ranging from economics to Marxist education. The president of the presidency presides at each meeting, and this position rotates among members of the presidency each year.

Communal and Local Organizations Every commune in Yugoslavia has an SKJ organization. The organizational structure is generally simple and parallels the federal and republic organizational patterns. In place of a Congress, the commune SKJ members elect a commune conference, which is composed of delegates from the chapters residing in the commune. Conference members serve four years, and they elect a commune committee which performs functions similar to that of the central committees. In addition, the conference elects a statutory and a supervisory commission, which perform the same functions as do the similar commissions on the republic and federal levels. Finally, the commune committee elects a presidency to perform the necessary administrative duties, as with the presidencies at the republic and federal levels.

Central data about the activities of the commune League organizations are not generally available, but the impression given is that there is considerable variation in the activity of these organizations. A study prepared for the Eleventh Congress on the work of the communal committees in thirty-seven large cities found that there were problems, particularly in the generational and nationality composition of the leadership, but that these organizations have markedly improved their overall level of performance.⁸² A recent report from the metropolitan committee of Belgrade also noted considerable activity. During the period April 1982 to March 1984, the city committee held seventeen sessions, while its presidency held forty-four. Economic policy, unemployment, and housing were the major issues under consideration.⁸³

The League at the national and republic levels has been very concerned about the role and performance of the commune committees and the need to restructure these organizations.⁸⁴ It is generally recognized that the communal committees are overburdened with complaints about the administration of communal institutions, and that they lack the time and resources to fulfill their primary obligation to oversee the activities of the local chapters.⁸⁵ Under these conditions, there is a danger that the League may assume governmental responsibility, particularly in an underdeveloped commune.⁸⁶

The local chapters comprise the heart of the League of Communists. In 1982, there were 65,613 organized chapters,⁸⁷ which is 19,000 more than in 1978, and 50,000 more than in 1972 when the Party reforms took hold.⁸⁸ The increase in the number of chapters corresponds to a dramatic drop in average size. In 1982, most chapters (82.4 percent) had less than 50 members, 14 percent had between 50 and 100 members, and less than 1 percent had more than 200 members.⁸⁹

Chapters can form in any recognized OOUR, work community, neighborhood, or unit of the Yugoslav National Army; no other basis for chapter formation is permitted.⁹⁰ The structure of a unit is very simple and consists of the group, its secretariat, and a secretary to carry out any administrative-executive duties. In addition, the secretariat can appoint

a treasurer and a record keeper if there is a need to delegate these duties.

The local chapter may become involved in a wide range of activities. It serves to educate its members and to review and guide self-management processes in the work unit or neighborhood. Work unit chapters can review the activities of the workers' council and the director of the enterprise and can ask for an accounting from either body directly if a League member is accused of wrongdoing. If the accused party is not a League member, the SKJ chapter can direct its inquiry through the trade union.

In the past, many local chapters have been very involved and very successful in maintaining a high level of ethical conduct of public officials and enterprise managers. In recent years Party initiatives have been exercised in a wide range of firms and institutions. Party discipline and review activities have led to the expulsion from the League and resignation from office of directors of some of Yugoslavia's largest firms, including the director of the national airline and the largest automobile producer.

In summary, the League of Communists maintains an extensive organizational structure that encompasses all segments of society and all levels of government. Thousands of officials at all levels are involved in League activities, thousands of documents are annually issued by League organizational units, and thousands of viewpoints are harmonized to create a common policy for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In short, the organizational structure and the desire to democratize relations within the League have created a strong need for Party discipline and an even stronger need for timely and correct dissemination of information in order to coordinate activities and to maintain order.

Communication

Communication and relationships in the League of Communists are based on democratic centralism, and consist of vertical and horizontal connections. Free-flowing and accurate information is vital to the success of the League, and through communications the SKJ can implement policy, exercise control, disseminate innovation, and respond to problems.

Vertical communication generally occurs through the appropriate channels, and most often consists of formal reports, particularly the annual report. Members communicate with their basic chapter, chapters communicate with the communal committee, the commune committee with the province or republic central committee, and the republic central committee with the national Central Committee. Another direct method of communication is through the press, primarily the weekly newspaper *Komunist* at the national level and enterprise or commune newsletters at the local levels. Printed materials like *Komunist* not only transmit information about decisions made by republics or federal bodies, but they also regularly inform Party leaders

about the opinions and activities of communal committees and basic chapters.

A third procedure for facilitating communication is the visits and addresses of leading League officials at factories, cooperatives, communal conferences, etc. A good deal of the time of the members of the Presidency of the League, for example, is spent in direct involvement in public relations activities.

One example of the reciprocal nature of vertical communication within the Party is the extraordinary decision of the Central Committee at its thirteenth session in July 1984 to ask every basic unit to discuss, in depth, the organizational problems of the League and to formulate proposals to remedy them.⁹² From July through December 1984 leading Party officials attended meetings organized by local Party chapters; they heard grass-roots statements of the problems and suggestions for improvements. In addition, the mass media reported nearly every day on the suggestions of a city, local or factory committee, and the agenda of the Central Committee was apparently strongly influenced by these events.⁹³

Horizontal communication within the League is less structured. Members within the same unit are in contact with each other, but Party units can also communicate laterally, though this generally occurs on an ad hoc basis according to the needs of those who are involved. Commune organizations which have similar economic profiles can communicate even across republic boundaries. Committees in the steel centers of Jesenica (Slovenia) and Smederevo (Serbia) regularly communicate, as do organizations from metal-working centers such as Trstenik in Serbia, Vrbovec in Croatia, and Trbovlje in Slovenia.

External communications with other organizations are not based on democratic centralism. Serious efforts have been undertaken during the last three decades to break down the classical transmission-belt process in which the Party made decisions and the adjunct social organization communicated those externally imposed decisions to their members. Today, the League must negotiate with the other political organizations, and its powers are limited to facilitating the adoption of its ideological position, the presentation of an integrated national and community orientation for discussion, and the identification of issues for which discussion and debate are necessary.⁹⁴

The League is selective in its external communication patterns. It communicates with the Youth League on youth questions and attempts to get this organization to adopt a more forceful approach on youth issues.⁹⁵ Workplace issues are coordinated with the Trade Union Association,⁹⁶ and more general questions are discussed with the Socialist Alliance.⁹⁷

Communication occurs at all levels of the organizations involved. Federal League officials regularly meet with their counterparts in other organizations, and they may occasionally issue joint statements and positions. Similar activities can occur down to the level of the neighborhood or factory, and there is no set pattern, format, or even obligation for interorganizational communica-

Table 2.7 Reasons given for joining the League of Communists, 1983 (in percentages)

<i>Reason</i>	<i>Correct</i>	<i>Mostly correct</i>	<i>Mostly incorrect</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>
For status and reputation	6	12	15	66
Because of friends and relatives in the SKJ	10	13	15	62
Refusal wasn't possible	6	6	10	77
Personal regard for SKJ members	23	23	14	39
Agree with purposes of SKJ	77	17	2	4
To advance one's career	9	11	18	62

Source: Marksistički Centar SK Beograda, *Determinante Društvenopolitičkog Angažovanja SK* (Belgrade: Centar za Politikološka Istraživanja, March 1983).

tion. The major incentive for such communication, therefore, is the recognition that the social influence of the League is dependent upon interaction.

Administration and Management

In order for the League of Communists to complete its tasks and achieve results, it must be able to manage and administer its own organization. In particular, it must be able to recruit and hold members, select effective leaders, train and equip members and leaders, resolve conflict within the organization, and support itself financially. This section deals with these kinds of administrative and management issues.

Membership Selection, Growth, and Composition

Not everyone in Yugoslavia is a member of the League of Communists. Membership criteria are strict, and membership is limited to those willing to accept Party discipline, accept the program and charter of the League, participate in the activities of a basic chapter, and regularly attend meetings of the chapter, and pay the appropriate dues. An additional requirement that limits membership in the League is the stipulation that membership is contingent upon acceptance of the member by the basic organization. In spite of these hurdles, however, over two million Yugoslavs are presently members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Most Yugoslavs, and young people in particular, appear to accept membership in the League. In Serbia, in 1978, only 13 percent of youths surveyed were not members of the League and did not want to join, and in Macedonia, the corresponding percentage was only 6 percent.⁹⁸ Among new members,

Table 2.8 SKJ membership totals (in thousands) and percentages of the employed population in the SKJ by republic, 1972, 1976, 1981

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Growth index 1972/81</i>	<i>Total 1972</i>	<i>Total 1976</i>	<i>% 1976 employed</i>	<i>Total 1981</i>	<i>% 1980 employed</i>
Bosnia-						
Herzegovina	282	139	222	24	391	33
Montenegro	192	38	53	21	73	23
Croatia	168	207	261	17	348	19
Macedonia	223	67	95	21	150	23
Slovenia	199	63	93	11	125	13
Serbia total	211	430	635	24	908	29
Serbia proper	212	279	407	23	593	28
Kosovo	208	44	65	27	91	29
Vojvodina	211	106	163	26	224	31
Yugoslav National						
Army	160	66	89	—	107	—
Federation	190	—	12	—	15	—
Yugoslavia total	210	1,010	1,460	21	2,117	23

Source: Gojko Stanić, "Članstva Saveza Komunisti Jugoslavije," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* 26 (May 1982): 147.

reasons for joining vary, but the answers given generally tend to be supportive of the League's mission. Table 2.7 lists reasons given for joining the League by a sample of new members in Serbia in 1983.

Occasionally, the membership process is subject to abuse. In Serbia, a commission from the Central Committee studied this problem and noted that a considerable number of chapters enrolled large numbers of members to meet their membership goal, but later dropped them from the rolls for inactivity and passivity.⁹⁹ A commission from the national Presidency of the Central Committee also studied this problem and recommended closer supervision by the communal committees.¹⁰⁰

In 1982, there were 2.2 million members enrolled in the Yugoslav League of Communists, representing a significant share of the total population. In 1976, 7 percent of the population (9.3 percent of those aged seventeen or older) were SKJ members, and 22 percent of those employed in Yugoslavia held Party membership.¹⁰¹ Compared to other states, Yugoslav enrollment in the Communist Party is high. At the end of 1977, when Yugoslavia recorded 7 percent of the population as members, the Soviet Union had 6.3 percent, China 4.3 percent, and Italy 3.3 percent.¹⁰²

Since 1972, party membership has increased over 200 percent, and this high growth has occurred in all the republics and provinces. Membership increases have been highest in Bosnia (282 percent) and lowest in Croatia

(168 percent).¹⁰³ By 1980, the League's penetration among the employed population reached 23 percent or over 9 percent of the total population over age sixteen. Table 2.8 provides some comparative data by republic for 1972, 1976, and 1981. The general conclusion which can be made is that the League of Communists is a large organization with strong roots in every republic and province as well as among the working age population.

While overall growth of the organization is important to the SKJ, of equal concern is the social composition of the membership. The most important criterion is that the membership reflect a worker orientation, which means that a relatively large proportion of its membership should be employed as workers. In addition, there is considerable concern that managerial personnel not dominate the organization, that rural residents have an impact on the organization, and that the organization be open to women and youths.

Analysis of compositional data of the League from 1946 to 1981 highlights several trends. First, the worker percentage of the total League membership, despite intensive campaigns in recent years, has consistently hovered around 30 percent.¹⁰⁴ Second, the farm worker/peasant proportion of the total membership has declined dramatically from 50 percent in 1946 to 4 percent in 1981. The sharp drop in farm worker membership, however, has been compensated by equally sharp increases in the membership involvement of professional, managerial, and administrative personnel.

The proportion of worker and technical personnel in the Party is relatively similar across republics and provinces. In 1981, the percentages ranged from a low of 28 percent in Kosovo, a province with relatively fewer industrial workers, to a high of 36 percent in Vojvodina, a province with significantly more workers.¹⁰⁵ When skill categories of workers are differentiated, more highly skilled and more highly educated workers are more likely to be members of the League of Communists. In fact, as table 2.9 indicates, the growth in the overall membership rate of the League has been entirely due to greater membership affiliation among the more highly skilled workers. Today, a highly skilled worker is four times more likely to be a Party member than his unskilled colleagues.

Membership rates among women are less than expected. Women compose 26 percent of the total membership, which is the highest level ever achieved in Yugoslavia, but still much less than their proportion of either the work force or population (see table 2.10). Between 1978 and 1982, 32 percent of all those admitted to the Party were female, thereby continuing the upward trend. The occupational profile of female League members is also worrisome. Women in the League tend to come from professional or managerial occupations, and only 8.5 percent of female League members are workers.

The persistence of traditional sex-role stereotypes in underdeveloped areas appears to have depressed the rate of progress for women and may be responsible for the lackluster admission rates for women in the League. Kosovo, the

Table 2.9 Work force enrolled in the League of Communists by occupational skill level, 1958–81 (in percentages)

<i>Occupational skill level</i>	<i>1958</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1981</i>
Total employed population	19	19	26
Unskilled workers	8	5	8
Semiskilled workers	11	7	11
Skilled workers	18	16	25
Highly skilled workers	18	24	32
Low technical/professional expertise	53	21	47
Middle technical/professional expertise	29	29	41
High technical/professional expertise	22*	44	62
Very high technical/professional expertise	22*	44	65

*These categories were not separated in 1958.

Source: See table 2.8 (p. 149 in source).

least-developed province, registered only 13.2 percent of its membership as women, while Slovenia, the most-developed republic, achieved a 31.7 percent female membership rate.¹⁰⁶

The youth membership situation is considerably more favorable over time. The percentage of youths in the Party varied, particularly in the 1960s, but those figures reflect primarily demographic trends rather than an attempt of the League to discriminate against the youths or rejection of League membership by them. In 1981, youths (those aged twenty-seven or less) constituted 31 percent of the total League membership, and the rate varied from a high of 40 percent in Kosovo to a low of 24 percent in Slovenia. Table 2.10 provides supplementary data.

In general, the leadership of the SKJ recognizes that the overall trends are positive, but that there are some inadequacies in the social composition of the League. First, there is a recognition and awareness that more recruitment needs to be conducted among farm workers¹⁰⁷ and that some negative attitudes need to be reversed. Second, League leaders have retained their public commitment to maintain youth and female participation in the League, and they realize that greater efforts need to be made among the less-skilled workers.¹⁰⁸ A third concern is that nearly all the growth that has occurred has been registered in relatively few basic chapters, and that many chapters have stagnated. In Croatia, for example, the central committee noted that 73 percent of the chapters did not admit a single member for the year ending June 1984.¹⁰⁹

Leadership Selection

The process of leadership selection has changed over time, and it is constantly a subject for debate by the League. The current electoral formula is

the result of considerable discussion within the Party, with many calling for secret voting and multiple candidacies.¹¹⁰ The result of the debate, reviewed at some length in a special report in *N.I.N.*, was the acceptance of secret voting and the rejection of multiple candidacies.¹¹¹

As a group, the leadership bodies of the *skj* tend to be more male, older, and have fewer workers in their ranks than exist in the general membership. The 1978 Central Committee was 90 percent male, compared to the general membership that was 76 percent male. In Macedonia, the 1982 republic central committee was 15 percent female, compared to 21 percent female among the general membership. Thus, in the National Central Committee, women received only 42 percent of the positions that their general membership size would indicate, and in Macedonia, women received 71 percent of the seats on the republic central committee suggested by their proportion of the membership.

Positions on the federal and republic central committees which are held by workers have also declined over time. In 1974, 20 percent of all members of the National Central Committee were workers, and 29.7 percent of the republic/provincial committee members were workers. By 1978, the worker percentage declined by over 50 percent for the National Central Committee

Table 2.10 Total female and youth membership of the League of Communists, 1946–81, and by republic, 1981 (in percentages)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Youth</i>
1946	15.6	—
1950	18.0	39.8
1958	16.6	23.6
1962	16.6	18.1
1966	17.8	11.5
1972	19.5	21.0
1974	20.8	27.1
1976	22.5	30.9
1978	24.0	33.7
1980	25.8	33.1
1981	26.1	31.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	28.3	39.8
Montenegro	25.5	28.3
Croatia	26.9	24.2
Macedonia	21.0	24.8
Slovenia	31.7	23.8
Serbia proper	27.9	30.5
Kosovo	13.2	40.1
Vojvodina	30.6	26.0

Source: See table 2.8 (p. 150 in source).

to 9.7 percent, and it declined 10 percent to 26.8 percent of all seats in the 1978 republic central committees. In 1982, the percentage of Central Committee members who were workers declined even further to 8 percent.¹¹²

The age composition of the Central Committee also is not reflective of the general membership profile. Young and middle-aged members are in a distinct minority, and nearly all seats are occupied by those over age thirty-six, and over three quarters of all Central Committee members were over forty-five when elected to office in 1978 even though less than 25 percent of the membership is that old.¹¹³

Further analysis of the national and republic central committees indicates that the goals to replace the leadership and to deprofessionalize the elected leadership have been achieved. While members are limited to a maximum of two terms, many do not serve a second term. In the National Central Committee in 1978, only 36 percent of the members were reelected, although nearly all were eligible for reelection, and in 1982, only 30 percent of the seats were held by incumbents, even though potentially there were 64 percent of the committee membership who were eligible for reelection. Among republics and provinces, the percentages were lower than the national level, with an average 24 percent reelected. At the communal level, there was also considerable turnover. In Serbia in 1984, of 114 communes, twenty-five new presidents of the communal committees were elected and forty new secretaries.¹¹⁴

One problem that is fully recognized by the leadership is the need to avoid losing control of the organization to the professional staff who might use their resources to dominate the elected bodies. The traditional response has been to limit the size of the professional staff, which today numbers approximately 1,500 (a ratio of one staff person per 1,500 members) for all republics and the federation combined.¹¹⁵ Since 1950, when the total number of employed professional staff in the League reached 11,930,¹¹⁶ there has been a sharp decline in absolute numbers of staff, and an even sharper increase in the staff/member ratio. Table 2.11 provides comparative data for the period 1973–81. These data lead to the conclusion that the leadership and membership devote a considerable amount of time to League activities, and that they have not surrendered the organization to their professional staff.

Training

Training and development of personnel is important to any organization. For the SKJ, however, the training and development of its members takes on an even greater significance. The leadership role of the League in the system of social self-management demands well-trained and capable members at all levels of the organization. For the League of Communists, all members, not just the leadership, need to be well prepared, and training programs, therefore, need to be well developed.

Table 2.11 Paid professional staff of the SKJ by republic, 1973–81

<i>Republic</i>	<i>1973</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1977</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>Member-staff ratio 1981</i>
Bosnia-Herzegovina	158	174	205	188	2,081
Montenegro	44	52	60	54	1,354
Croatia	212	186	201	267	1,304
Macedonia	60	79	97	148	1,011
Slovenia	119	155	190	250	501
Serbia	345	484	537	578	1,570

Sources: 1981 — “Koliko Ima Funcionera u SKJ,” *Komunist*, 13 November 1981, p. 6. 1973–77 — “Izveštaj o Radu Nadzorne Komisije SKJ od Desetog do Jedanaestog Kongresa SKJ,” in *Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, Jedanaesti Kongres SKJ—DOKUMENTI* (Belgrade: *Komunist*, 1974), pp. 305–6.

Membership development and training in the League have two facets. One is learning by experience, and the other is training through formal course work. The charter of the League requires every chapter to maximize opportunities for its members to become involved in decision-making processes at all levels. It also requires the chapters to discuss among its members those activities and objectives that were reached, and those that were not. The intent, of course, is to assist the member to examine his actions critically and from a Marxist, self-management perspective.

In addition to practical experience, the League has developed an extensive system of training institutions and programs throughout the country. Each republic central committee, as well as major city, commune, and enterprise committees, have created Marxist study centers whose purpose is to investigate and evaluate the activities of the League in their areas. These centers also bring together practitioners and qualified experts from around the region to develop appropriate training packages. The communal and enterprise centers are primarily devoted to assisting the chapters in their membership training programs, and to lecturing and preparing written training materials to assist the chapters in the performance of their educational responsibilities.

The network of training centers also involves political schools in regional centers and metropolitan areas. Many republics also conduct training classes at republic Party schools, and at the national level, there is the Josip Broz Tito school in Kumrovac, Tito's birthplace, which conducts a year-long program.

Yugoslavia's League has tended to avoid the adoption of a formal system of training for particular positions in the League. There is, however, a general recognition that training needs are most acute for the new members and especially for the workers in that group.¹¹⁷ All training centers, including the

Tito school, are open to all members, and priority for training is given to those workers who apply.

There is considerable usage of Party training opportunities. According to the report of the Twelfth Congress, there were 1,838 political school programs throughout Yugoslavia from 1978–82. These programs were subdivided into 3,806 training groups, and they enrolled a total of 128,066 members (approximately 10 percent of the membership). Fifty-seven percent of those taking classes were less than twenty-eight years old, 53 percent were workers, and 67 percent had been members of the League for less than six years.¹¹⁸ In addition, nearly 200,000 Party members attended other political schools offered by the trade unions, youth organization, etc. These training programs involved all sectors of the League, not only new members. Fifteen percent of Party chapter secretaries attended, and 13 percent of all elected members of self-management decision-making bodies were involved.¹¹⁹

Supplementing the formalized school programs are regular seminars, lectures, etc., which could last from a day to a week, and are offered to the entire membership. From 1978 to 1982, 480,984 members attended such programs, including many Party secretaries and communal committee members. The net result is that educational and training opportunities are available to the membership and are used by them.¹²⁰

Finances

The primary source of income for the League of Communists is dues payments by members. From 1974 to 1977, 86.2 percent of all SKJ income was derived from dues,¹²¹ and from 1978 to 1981, 89.3 percent of all income originated from dues.¹²² The remaining sources of income were subsidies from governmental and self-management bodies (8.1 percent during 1978–81) and sales of books, etc. (2.6 percent during 1978–81). The dues structure is progressive, based on the income of each member. Payments are set by the republic organization and can vary by republic.¹²³

Two major problems consistently affect SKJ revenues: inflation and collections. Because dues schedules are not indexed, inflation has raised the total revenues and expenditures, but has made the dues structure less progressive. This phenomenon has caused the republics to lower their dues structure, but it has also brought about stress in the organization's finances and extensive cost-cutting measures.

The second problem is even more serious for the League. Collection rates vary dramatically from year to year, thereby affecting total revenues in an unpredictable manner. In 1975, only 80 percent of the membership paid their dues,¹²⁴ in 1976, 89 percent paid dues regularly, and in 1977, 92 percent paid their assigned dues.¹²⁵ Obviously, it is very difficult to project revenues and commit the League to expenditures under such circumstances.

The expenses of the organization are limited because most activities are based on voluntary actions rather than on direct payment for services. During the most recent Congress period, salaries accounted for 42.4 percent of expenditures; material costs and functional activities such as meetings accounted for 48.6 percent of expenditures; and the investment fund received 9 percent of total income.¹²⁶ Compared to the 1974–77 period, salaries currently constitute a smaller share, and material and functional costs constitute a higher proportion of the budget statement.¹²⁷

Activities that the League funds include the quadrennial Congresses, the salaries and expenses of the leadership and staff of the Presidency, Central Committee, etc. In addition, the Party must cover the expenses of the Party schools, newspapers, Communist publishing house, and the expenses related to international meetings with other parties.

Discipline

Democratic centralism, as the major operating procedure for the League of Communists, implies a need to maintain discipline to enforce the decision-making process. In the League of Communists today, outright opposition is rare, and the more usual discipline problem concerns inactivity or passivity. To illustrate this point, a survey of 253 Bosnian League chapters completed in 1974 found that only 4.3 percent of the chapters perceived that their chapters had active opposition groups, factions, or individuals in their ranks. However, 62.2 percent of the chapters acknowledged that they had passivity or neutrality in their membership.¹²⁸

The disciplinary procedures available to the League vary by circumstances of the offense. Passivity or neutrality are generally handled by the member who simply fails to attend meetings or pay dues. Such members are eventually dropped from the membership rolls. Active opposition, however, involves a series of warning steps, public expressions of disagreement, a request for resignation, and, for the most extreme cases, expulsion. In the four-year period between the Eleventh and Twelfth Congresses, 12,689 members were dropped at the initiative of the chapter. This group represented less than 1 percent of the membership, and for the majority the reason was either failure to complete their assignments in the chapter or failure to be active for an extensive period of time. Only a small fraction represented resistance or outright opposition to the League's program.¹²⁹ Twenty-eight thousand members during this period chose to leave the League by failing to attend meetings or to pay their dues.

Expulsion is used as a last resort, and generally corresponds to political trends. In recent years, for example, Kosovo had a higher rate of expulsion than other republics or provinces. Even in this extreme case, however, the numbers were small (534 in 1981 and 318 in 1984).¹³⁰ A system of warnings

Table 2.12 Total expulsions from the SKJ and percentage distribution by reason for expulsion, 1972–79

	Year				
	1972	1974	1976	1979	Total*
Total expulsions	12,941	5,879	4,974	3,332	49,596
Percentage of membership	1.3	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.5
Reason for expulsion					
Conflict with SKJ platform	17	18	15	13	16
Violation of self-management	3	6	6	5	5
Moral character	2	4	3	3	3
Criminal activities	9	15	25	22	16
Attendance/dues/passivity	69	67	51	57	60

*Includes all years from 1972 through 1979.

Source: Boris Vušković, "Rast i Fluktuacija Članstva SKJ," *Naše Teme* 25 (May 1981): 410.

is used prior to formal expulsion, and this method seems to be effective. In 1977, there were 8,483 disciplinary actions throughout the League; 2,897 were first warnings, 1,686 were second warnings, and 3,900 were expulsions.¹³¹

Procedures to expel are involved and subject to a large number of formal checks and review procedures. For instance, the process of expulsion of a local bank manager in Krusevac, Serbia, for ignoring a Party recommendation to resign his job due to alleged embezzlement lasted several months and involved all the commune's local chapters, many hours of testimony, and extensive discussion and counsel with republic officials.¹³² In Kosovo in 1981, similar exclusion procedures for participation in the nationality riots took place, and even under these stressful situations, Party guidelines for expulsion tended to be followed.¹³³

The most common cause for exclusion is political passivity, and from 1972–79, 50 percent of all expulsions were attributed to this problem. Sixteen percent of expulsions were linked to criminal behavior, 16 percent to political opposition, and 8 percent each to violations of self-management rights and to moral/ethical charges.¹³⁴ Table 2.12 provides annual comparative data.

Party statutes provide an extensive network of safeguards over the expulsion process. Provincial, republic, and National Statutory Commissions exist to hear grievances, appeals, and complaints of members against perceived arbitrary or unjust actions by their chapters. From 1974–78, the National Statutory Commission heard 310 cases. Three hundred and three of them were from individuals and seven were from chapters. Two hundred and

fifty-nine of the decisions involved exclusions, and only fifty-one involved other matters. Most appeals at this level were rejected, but thirty-five decisions were reversed by this commission. Charges were distributed as follows: 108 cases (35 percent) for violation of democratic centralism, 60 cases (19 percent) for perjury, 57 cases (18 percent) for misuse of position, 38 cases (12 percent) for moral questions, 27 (9 percent) for nationalist behavior, 26 (8 percent) for speculation and fraud, 23 (7 percent) for techno-bureaucratism, 17 (5 percent) for careerism, 16 (5 percent) for passivity.¹³⁵ Again, considering that there were over 50,000 local chapters at this time, the incidence rate of petitions and grievances is very small.

Evaluation and Appraisal

The previous discussion focused on a description of how the League views itself, how it organizes itself, and how it carries out its organizational imperatives. In this section, we examine and evaluate how well the League is currently fulfilling its responsibilities. We are aware of the difficulties involved in providing an accurate appraisal of an organization with over two million members, 67,000 units, over 500 regional sections, and in eight republics and provinces. In short, we expect to find considerable variation, and we have tried to insure that our analyses focus on the mean performance and not on the extremes.¹³⁶

We are aware that the League presently is facing a considerable number of difficulties, ranging from a resurgence of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, to a crisis of confidence in the economic sector. In spite of these difficulties, the League has survived, endured, and even prospered. The League's unity has not been shattered, its effectiveness has not been eliminated, and it continues to play an important role in the social and political life of the country.

Our evaluative task is made a little easier by the rapid development of a Party reform movement within Yugoslavia. The movement, whose efforts have been endorsed by the National League organization, has identified a series of issues that must be addressed. They include weaknesses in the effective application of the general goals of the SKJ; the need for political-structural adaptations in the SKJ; recruitment and retention of youths, workers, and rural residents; more effective member and organizational participation in the delegate system and political decision-making process; and the need to develop a stronger policy role for the League.¹³⁷ Each of these problems will be discussed in turn.

Unlike other Communist nation states, the Yugoslav League of Communists does not initiate broad purges of its membership. It prefers, instead, to recruit members more carefully, to educate and inform its membership, and to leave questions about membership and the proper socialization of members to the local chapter. One possible implication of this policy is that there

may be considerably more ideological differences among the membership than is the case in other Marxist-Leninist parties.¹³⁸ A second possible implication is that the Yugoslav Party members may be better informed and educated concerning their Party values than are Party members in other Communist systems. Both implications, however, are not verified by empirical study.

For over thirty years, the general social role for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has been directed toward the development and enhancement of the socialist self-management ideology. It is essential, therefore, that Party members be supportive and knowledgeable about self-management values and its processes. It is also essential that considerable attention be constantly given to issues dealing with ideology or values within the Party.¹³⁹

The results of research studies conducted by the League indicate that self-management and nonalignment are well accepted by the general membership.¹⁴⁰ One study conducted in 1979 in Serbia found that 85 percent of the members polled supported self-management. An extension of this study conducted simultaneously among over 3,000 League members from Slovenia and Serbia concluded that Party values were accepted by up to 92 percent of the League members polled.¹⁴¹ Another study of current and former League members discovered that current members were more supportive of self-management than were former members, and that differentiation in support of these values is the only significant difference between the two groups.¹⁴² Among youths, research results show that young SKJ members support self-management values more consistently than do nonmembers, and that young SKJ members are much more willing to be politically involved than are nonmembers.¹⁴³ In short, it seems that ideological diversity regarding core League values is minimal, and that current League recruitment and exclusion procedures facilitate ideological homogeneity.

Although the level of acceptance of core values is high, the level of knowledge among League members is relatively low. For instance, a recent study of League members attending political schools discovered that 90 percent of the students could not identify the major components of anarcho-liberalism, techno-bureaucratism, and nationalism, nor could they explain why these values conflict with self-management.¹⁴⁴ A more extensive cooperative survey conducted in Serbia proper, Slovenia, and Belgrade also demonstrated the need for more effective and broad-based Party education (see table 2.13). Over half of all surveyed members could not correctly explain democratic centralism, and half or more of the respondents failed to define nationalism, liberalism, and unitarism.

This brief review illustrates the nature and scope of the ideological problems facing the League. Members accept the League's core values, but many are unable to translate these values into practice, or to understand the nature of the opposition to these values. As the Twelfth Congress noted in its report

Table 2.13 Party members who correctly identified various ideological items in Serbia, Belgrade, and Slovenia, 1977 (in percentages)

<i>Question</i>	<i>Serbia</i>	<i>Belgrade</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>
Purpose of nonalignment	81	82	79
Basic character of the socioeconomic system	79	80	77
Relationship of republics/provinces in the federal system	77	78	78
Why self-management is a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat	68	72	58
Reason for Cominform-skj conflict	55	61	63
Definition of nationalism	47	52	52
Definition of liberalism	43	47	45
Definition of unitarism	35	43	51
Democratic centralism	26	43	45
Marx's concept of revolution	18	22	12
Average correct test score*	52.7	53.4	56.2

*Not all questions used in the test are listed in the table.

Source: Teodor Anđelić, "Grupni Portret Partije," *N.I.N.*, 26 April 1981, p. 16.

on ideological, organizational and membership-enhancement issues, much more work needs to be done.¹⁴⁵

Today, there are three major political/structural issues that the League needs to address. They are the tendency for federalization of the Party, the resurgence of nationalism in Kosovo, and the overburdening of the communal organization. All are interrelated, and all concern aspects of the application of democratic centralism and the continuance of the League's role vis-à-vis society and the policy process.

The federalization of the Party is a very difficult issue to measure with the use of empirical evidence. The tendencies of the republic organizations to select their own paths have been present since the Brioni Plenum in 1966. Moreover, since the death of President Tito, the absence of a single leader to enforce unity the problem has become a bigger threat.¹⁴⁶ League leaders, such as Franc Setinc and Najdan Pašić, have noted a tendency for the republic parties to withdraw into themselves and to defer discussions, rather than to debate and confront major issues.¹⁴⁷ Stane Dolanc and Mitja Ribičič also noted the phenomenon, and they have suggested the need for structural reform to encourage dialogue within the Party.¹⁴⁸

Two implications resulting from this tendency have become apparent. One has been the postponement of action on major issues, such as economic reform. The second has been an unwillingness to enforce the decisions made throughout the federation. Najdan Pašić's letter to the Presidency of

the Central Committee in late 1982 highlighted the problem,¹⁴⁹ and the Thirteenth Session of the Central Committee in July 1984 indicated a willingness on the part of the republic leaderships to begin to deal with the situation.¹⁵⁰ Thus, the consensus emerging in the Party is that the League must assume more responsibility for its actions,¹⁵¹ must return to a policy of direct confrontation of issues, and must turn away from a consensus or veto mentality as an operating procedure in the League.¹⁵²

The second political issue facing the League is the resurgence of nationalism, primarily Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. The initial Party response was left to the Serbian League, which had direct responsibility for the matter. It discussed the problem, condemned the perpetrators, and diagnosed the problem in terms of a breakdown of democratic centralism in the Party.¹⁵³ The Twelfth Congress also sharply condemned the actions of the Kosovan leadership for misusing their Party's autonomy to divide the League of Communists. Among other charges, the Kosovan leaders were found to have deliberately exacerbated relations between Kosovo and the more highly developed areas of the country in an attempt to hold hostage "Party solidarity" for personal and political benefits.¹⁵⁴

Unrest continues in Kosovo, and the situation may be difficult for some time to come. Many in the province are distrustful of the League and its officers, and resistance to League policies still continues. Again, the League's prior unwillingness to face situations realistically and in a timely manner may have inadvertently contributed to the problem.

A third political-structural problem facing the League is how to organize the communal committees to become more effective political instruments. The communal organization is presently given general responsibility for an exceedingly wide range of policies and activities. It is part of the citizen's appeal process; it is the watchdog of self-management in the commune and its enterprises; it establishes social priorities, supervises elections, and plans housing projects. It carries out the education of the members, and it is responsible for the actions of the chapters within its territory. To accomplish these tasks, the communal organization must rely on volunteers, many of whom are untrained or inexperienced. In retrospect, considering the scarcity of resources and personnel, as well as the wealth of responsibilities, there are relatively few cases of abuse, incompetence, or neglect. Nevertheless, this is a growing problem that is beginning to get increased attention.

Recruitment and retention of women, youths, farm workers, and workers in the Yugoslav League of Communists have been constant problems for many years. With some of these groups, considerable progress has been made, but, in general, the League recruitment and retention goals have not been met.

The recruitment of youths and the number of youths in the League of Communists is not a major problem because nearly one-third of the member-

ship is twenty-seven years of age or less. Youths seem to be very supportive of Party membership, as indicated by a 1977 survey which found that 74 per cent of the youths are either members or would accept membership in the League.¹⁵⁵ What is at issue, however, is the degree of influence and the level of participation that the Party youths possess.¹⁵⁶ As the Secretary of the National Youth League recently asked, "Do we have to demonstrate on the streets to be heard?"¹⁵⁷

The relatively weak leadership role granted to the younger generation in the Party demonstrates the acuteness of the problem of influence. In most republics and provinces, there is no mandatory retirement age for League officers, and the leadership bodies of the League at all levels are relatively aged. According to Vladimir Goati, a noted social scientist and researcher for the League in Serbia,

The average age for a member of the SKJ is 36, and members 27 or less make up one-third of the SKJ. In the composition of the communal committees the middle-age group (36–45) dominated in the last election, and this group received three times the amount of representation than its membership size in the League. On the republic and communal level, there is a significantly smaller rate of participation of the younger generation and significantly stronger participation of the older. In the last election, the participation of young Communists in the Central Committee of the SKJ reached only 1.2 percent, which is twenty-seven times less than this generation's proportion in the membership. The "Old Generation" (56 and older) in the last election had twice the representation in the Central Committee compared to its proportion of the membership and the "Old Middle Generation" (46–55) had three times more. At the last Congress, the most numerous and most successful group was again the "old generation" (56 and over). Its participation increased from 37 to 53 percent of the members.¹⁵⁸

It is recognized that some improvement in representation is in order.

Achievement of a worker's majority in the League has been policy since 1972, but the goal remains elusive. In Serbia, for example, only 39 percent of the membership are engaged in production work.¹⁵⁹ Workers leave the League in disproportionate numbers, and League secretaries often find it difficult to retain the worker Party members who are recruited.¹⁶⁰

Like the issue of youths, the problem of workers is not really numbers but rather their influence in the League.¹⁶¹ Many of the workers who remain in the League are less active than others. This is illustrated by a recent empirical study of Party members in Serbia which found that workers participate in the League less intensively than higher-status professions.¹⁶² The problem was addressed by the Twelfth Congress, which called for more political influence of workers in the League decision-making process,¹⁶³ but the

Congress did not introduce any new major concrete steps or policies to change the situation radically.

The most obvious recruitment problem in the League concerns the issue of farm worker membership. In 1977, of 8,700 village Party chapters, only one-third of the members were directly engaged in agriculture, and only one-third of the agricultural villages had a League chapter. In Slovenia, less than one-half of 1 percent of the membership (382 individuals) were farm workers, thereby calling into question the Slovenian Party's capacity to influence farm policy.¹⁶⁴ Farm workers have also dropped their membership in the League in disproportionate numbers, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain adequate membership levels in agriculturally based village chapters.¹⁶⁵

While the problem of low rural membership has been recognized for some time, not much progress has been achieved. The Twelfth Congress pledged itself to initiate efforts to rectify the situation,¹⁶⁶ but again, no new policy initiatives have been suggested.

Party members are heavily involved in all stages of the delegate process. Studies indicate that League members dominate delegations, delegate positions, and leadership posts at all levels of government.¹⁶⁷ Surveys show a high level of satisfaction with the influence of the League in OOURS¹⁶⁸ and in the neighborhoods.¹⁶⁹ Other studies have noted that League members participate more in the local electoral process¹⁷⁰ and are more knowledgeable about politics than nonmembers,¹⁷¹ and that most chapters are prepared to exercise political influence.¹⁷² Thus, the record generally indicates that the League as a group is heavily involved.

The issue facing the League with respect to participation and involvement is not overall influence and power. The problem is the distribution of influence and involvement among the membership. A study conducted in Serbia in 1982 among Party members, for example, found that 40 percent of the membership was inactive.¹⁷³ Another study in Zagreb discovered that nearly half of the members in surveyed chapters were unaware of and uninvolved in city League activities.¹⁷⁴ Other studies found that League leaders carry a disproportionate amount of the burden,¹⁷⁵ and that newer League members are less involved and committed than more senior members.¹⁷⁶

It is difficult to find a simple resolution for the participation problem, but the League has been fighting it for years. It appears that progress has been made, but, unfortunately, time-series analyses are not available to confirm or disprove this hypothesis.¹⁷⁷

The last major problem issue facing the League is currently the most problematic and difficult: namely, how to translate resolutions and position papers into policy results. This is best illustrated today by the difficulties the League is experiencing in achieving a resumption of economic growth and

stabilization. It is also the area in which the League has been most pressured to concentrate its reform efforts.

The League now recognizes that the Party was too slow to react to the intransigence of the economic difficulties.¹⁷⁸ It has also been recognized that the League was not successful in mobilizing the membership in support of stabilization,¹⁷⁹ and that even at the highest levels of the Party, support was general and not specific or concrete.¹⁸⁰

Throughout 1984 and into 1985, the National Central Committee has undergone considerable self-criticism. It recognized a lack of commitment on its part and inadequate authority to enforce decisions.¹⁸¹ It noted a breakdown in Party unity,¹⁸² and a paralysis in decision-making.¹⁸³ As noted earlier, it has opened up a general Party debate on this problem, and initial impressions indicate that serious, long-term reform is under consideration.¹⁸⁴

Summary

Our analysis of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia indicates that the League has undergone and is continuing to undergo considerable change. It appears that the general direction of these changes tends to be toward more openness and away from hierarchical control in the SKJ. No element of the Party, including goals, structure, or membership policy, appears to be immune from these changes, and the League appears to be willing to encourage change without recourse to totalitarian pressures or autocratic rule by one man.

3 The Socialist Alliance

Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the League of Communists is an organization that requires adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles, including democratic centralism. The League is a party for a relatively limited group of individuals. It is not open to all, nor is it designed to fulfill many of the policy, political, or social needs of a politicized population. In Yugoslavia, the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) carries out many of these roles. In this chapter we discuss the evolution and the present legal and social roles of the Socialist Alliance, describe its organizational structure and activities, analyze its internal relations, evaluate its current behavior, and suggest areas for future study.

The Socialist Alliance, reduced to the least complex level, is designed to be an association of associations, not an alliance of individuals.¹ In accordance with this definition, the first major duty for the SSRNJ is to solicit opinion and information from individuals and groups to create a common policy. The second major duty is to regulate the behavior and activity of individuals and groups in order to facilitate a cohesive policy and decision-making process that minimizes conflict and counterproductive activities.

To fulfill these duties, the Alliance has been designed to be an inclusive mass organization that is open to input from all sectors of society. Its membership includes production workers, housewives, retired individuals, peasants, white-collar workers, artists, etc. It makes few ideological demands on its membership and includes every nationality and group in Yugoslavia regardless of income, education, religious affiliation, or philosophical orientation. Officially, the Socialist Alliance does not pursue a policy against religion, and the various organized religious communities are encouraged to become part of the Alliance. The Alliance, in short, is expected to become the

organization that links government and its institutions to the vast majority of the people and vice versa.

Unlike other national front organizations found in much of the Third World and throughout Eastern Europe, the Socialist Alliance is neither a political party like the East German SED nor a fusion of parties like the Polish PUWP.² The Yugoslav Socialist Alliance is a more general social and political organization that does not pursue an independent policy platform and does not seek political office for its leadership. As stated in the Federal Constitution, its primary purpose is to promote "conditions for the development of a socialist self-managed society."³

In practice, the Alliance carries out many of the classical duties of a political party. It aggregates and articulates group interests. It is involved in formulating public opinion and political socialization, and it is involved in both the selection and the election of political leaders. Nevertheless, the Alliance does not have its own platform, does not exclude groups from participation in its activities, and does not control or reduce the autonomy of those groups that are affiliated with it.⁴

The relationship of the Socialist Alliance with the League of Communists, an avowed political party, is often difficult to pinpoint precisely, and it has changed dramatically over time. Currently, while the League and its members participate in Alliance activities, they are not expected to treat the Alliance as an adjunct mass organization or transmission belt for the League of Communists. At the same time, the League and its members are expected to work to convince the Alliance to promote and pursue the platform and program of the League of Communists.

In short, the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia has few organizational counterparts in other countries. A major reason for this is that Yugoslavia's system of self-management, with its accompanying delegate system, gives a distinctive character to the role, purpose, and behavior of this mass political organization.

Historical Evolution

One major reason for the distinctive character of Yugoslavia's Socialist Alliance is the unique history of mass political movements in Yugoslavia before, during, and after World War II. A second major reason is the development of self-management and the periodic needs of Yugoslav society to adapt its institutions to it. Both factors are important to the evolution of the Socialist Alliance, both are intertwined, and both must be considered in any discussion of the contemporary Socialist Alliance.

The Socialist Alliance has a relatively long tradition in the political life of Yugoslavia. Its origins stem from the formation in 1935 of an antifascist front organization that included Leninist, social democratic, peasant party and

other groups opposed to the continuation of the Yugoslav monarchial dictatorship. While other nations, such as France, experimented with similar popular front movements during this time, this was a radical new political experiment for Yugoslavia. For the first time in modern Yugoslavia, an organization was formed that crossed nationality and religious cleavages, included people and groups representing very different political persuasions, and linked industrial workers and agrarian peasant movements together. Even at that early time, Eduard Kardelj and others envisioned that the organization ideally could be different from the typical popular front. In it, "only peasants would decide about agrarian issues, workers about workplace issues, tradesmen and intellectuals about issues which involved them, and all members collectively would decide about community issues."⁵

At the outbreak of the war, the People's Front organization added a new dimension. It reduced its previous reliance on social democratic, Marxist-Leninist and other party ties; it increased its involvement and commitment to the general interest; and most significantly, it became a unified national patriotic organization that linked all those groups opposed to the foreign occupation and domestic fascist forces, regardless of nationality, religion, occupation, or party affiliation.⁶

With the conclusion of the war, the Front adopted the name of the National Front and continued its successful tradition as a broad-based mass political movement. Its major objectives shifted from armed opposition to support for the new Communist-led state in the reconstruction of the country from the wartime devastation.

Although the Communist Party dominated the political life and government of early postwar Yugoslavia, the National Front exercised an important role during this period. This role is exemplified by three important functions. First, the Front assumed responsibility for heightening the political awareness of the population and for politicizing as many people as possible to support the new regime. The Front conducted its affairs so as to encourage mass identification with the Yugoslav regime, as well as to give the impression of a great popular movement to transform society. For example, during this period, the major newspapers and radio stations were instruments of the republic, regional, or city Front organizations.

A second major function carried out by the National Front during the immediate postwar period also utilized the organization's links with the public. The Front enlisted the aid of the populace to organize the rebuilding effort. Its membership was organized into work brigades that undertook the reconstruction of ruined cities and villages, as well as meeting the immediate needs of the people by distributing foodstuffs and fuel. This function, of course, became less vital as Yugoslavia returned to a more normal economy and as basic services were restored.

The third function for the Front was to propagate the decisions of the state

and Party and to assist in their implementation. The Front, like all other non-Party organizations, was viewed primarily as an agent to transmit and to carry out the will of the Party. Therefore, the Front was formally excluded from major policy-making, and it was valued chiefly for its direct ties to the population.

Objectively, the formal role and functions of the Yugoslav National Front were not materially different from the experience of analogous organizations in other Communist-led nation-states. Qualitatively, however, the Yugoslav case differed. The Yugoslav Communist revolution was largely an indigenous patriotic movement, and the role of the Soviet Union was much weaker than in neighboring socialist states. The National Front in Yugoslavia had much deeper popular roots, and relations with the Party were more collegial and less hierarchical than was true in other East European states.⁷ Even Stalin recognized the relative independence and autonomy of the Front when he criticized the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1948 for failing to dominate the National Front organization and for losing its identity in it.⁸

As time progressed, the very success of the National Front helped to undermine the possibility for its continued importance without major changes in its roles and functions. The successful completion of the reconstruction effort eliminated the need for further mass-based labor brigades. The heightened political sophistication of the population lessened the need for consciousness-raising, and the increased complexity of the society and economy underscored the need to institute more multilateral communication channels with the Party and the state. Thus, simultaneously, the National Front found itself less capable of remaining an effective transmission-belt agent, and the Party-state found less need for such an agent.

The introduction of self-management in 1953 and its diffusion to the general political system in the 1963 Constitution radically altered the behavioral foundation of the National Front. The extent of the change was reflected in the adoption of a new name: The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia.

In the 1963 National Constitution, the Socialist Alliance was given specific mention and attention, and its role in society was redefined in light of the expansion of the principles of self-management to the social and political contexts. Specifically, the constitution charged the Alliance with responsibility to discuss and formulate policy, supervise and evaluate the work of public bodies and officeholders, protect citizen rights, encourage social and political participation, and raise socialist consciousness among the entire population.⁹ The republic constitutions further broadened the charge and generally gave the Alliance overall responsibility for the execution of social self-management.¹⁰

In accordance with the new spirit of decentralism and debureaucratization, the Alliance tried to adapt its behavior toward and alter its relations with

other political organizations, particularly the League of Communists. It abolished collective membership in 1966 and eliminated the Congress as the primary decision-making body of the organization. It substituted the Conference, a body largely composed of affiliated organization representatives, as the primary decision-making body, and it formally established its independence from the League of Communists.

By the end of the 1960s, it became evident that the expected changes had not been put into practice. In many cases, the Alliance was still perceived to be a servant of the legislative assemblies,¹¹ the League-Alliance interactions often remained muddled, or, as in the case of Banja Luka, the transmission-belt procedures continued into the new constitutional period.¹²

Public attachment to the Alliance also diminished, so that in 1967 in Croatia, only 22 percent of Alliance members regularly attended Alliance-sponsored meetings.¹³ Attendance was weighted in favor of particular social groups and varied dramatically by such factors as religious involvement.¹⁴

In addition, the leadership structure at the republic and commune levels of the Socialist Alliance became dominated by political workers and management personnel, particularly at the republic level. Workers and peasants constituted only a little over 10 percent of the republic conference membership totals and less than 10 percent of the republic Alliance presidencies.¹⁵ These groups had no representation on any of the republic executive committees. At the commune level, workers and peasants constituted well under half the membership of the commune Socialist Alliance conferences and only one-quarter of the commune executive committees.¹⁶

By 1969, a resolution of the Ninth Congress of the League of Communists called for reform in the Socialist Alliance. In particular, the resolution called for more active participation of League members in the Alliance and for more active involvement of the Alliance in the decision-making process.¹⁷ These charges were also echoed and reinforced by many of the republic League Congresses and detailed more thoroughly by the Socialist Alliance leadership itself.¹⁸ These problems were serious, and the urgency of the need for reform was compounded by the nationality outbreaks in Croatia and Kosovo in 1971.

Contemporary Role

The Constitution of 1974 ratified and solidified the reforms that were undertaken earlier by the SSRNJ. In this constitution, no new policy duties were added to the agenda of the Socialist Alliance and, in fact, the language found in the introductory principles of the 1963 and 1974 constitutions applying to the Alliance are almost identical.¹⁹ The Alliance is expected to develop the public policy agenda, formulate policy options, direct electoral activity, evaluate the activities of governmental officers, and promote the interests of its

members.²⁰ What has changed with the most recent constitution, however, is the seriousness with which the charges are taken, particularly the promotion of membership interests,²¹ and the addition of new institutions and procedures that facilitate the ability of the SSRNJ to carry out its tasks.²² The Socialist Alliance, for example, was given a special role in the development and functioning of the delegate system.²³

The activities and behavior of the contemporary Socialist Alliance can be divided into six general components. They are (1) electoral activity; (2) maintenance and facilitation of political communication channels; (3) aggregation and synthesis of interests; (4) policy initiation, formulation, and evaluation; (5) political socialization; and (6) coordination of the activity of the other political organizations.²⁴ Each of these components fulfills an important role in Yugoslav society. The Socialist Alliance must be evaluated on how well it performs these responsibilities.

Leadership recruitment and the conduct of elections are exceptionally important components of the social role of the SSRNJ. According to the constitution and the electoral statutes, the Alliance organizes the nomination process, approves the candidatures, generates the electoral discussion and debate, coordinates the election work of other organizations, and conducts the election, particularly in the territorially based districts.

Supervision of mass communication and the development of political communication channels are very important within the context of the delegate system. The public broadcast and print media are, to a large extent, supervised by the Alliance. Also, on all governmental levels but particularly at the local level, this organization has responsibility for informing the public about the work of their delegates and delegations. The Alliance is also responsible for conducting meetings, public forums, public opinion polls, etc., to improve the responsiveness of political leaders to public needs and desires.

The third major component of Socialist Alliance activities is the aggregation and synthesis of interests. According to Kardelj and others, the Socialist Alliance has a duty to induce citizens to become involved in political affairs, consider and debate policy questions that are on the minds of citizens, and to initiate action to include everyone in public discussions. The Alliance cannot exclude those who disagree with some features of the Marxist-Leninist state (for example, clergy), and it is expected to be an institutional guardian to encourage a "pluralism of interests in political life."²⁵

A fourth major responsibility assumed by the Socialist Alliance is direct involvement in the delegate system and policy initiation, formulation, and evaluation in the delegate-based bodies.²⁶ One major way this objective is realized is through direct involvement in the legislative process.²⁷ At the republic, provincial, and communal levels, for example, the Socialist Alliance is directly included in the Chamber of Socio-Political Organizations,

and it has a formal decision-making role in all remaining legislative chambers.

Policy evaluation and oversight is a second major way that the SSRNJ conducts its policy responsibilities. The Alliance is obligated to review the actions of public officials and governmental bodies. It can publicly investigate abuse, abrogation of responsibility, or occurrences of particular social problems, such as the shortage of a particular good or service in the marketplace.

The fifth social responsibility of the current Socialist Alliance organization is to assist and promote the process of political socialization. This has been a traditional function of the organization since its founding, but it has somewhat different directions and emphases today than it had in the past. The SSRNJ supports the advance of particular disadvantaged groups. It supports the realization of the rights of women and maintains a specific suborganization for that purpose. It has responsibility for protecting nationality minorities and for insuring their members easy access to services, cultural expression, and sources of information in their own language. The Alliance also takes more direct responsibility for encouraging the involvement of the agricultural sector, which is more isolated than other groups and tends to be outside the concern of other organizations like the Trade Union Association.²⁸ It conducts and supports activities ranging from agricultural extension services to the subsidization of theater performances and newspaper distribution.

Finally, the Alliance is empowered to coordinate the general political activities of all the political organizations. It is in this role that the SSRNJ maintains its basic identity as a front, and it is also in this role that it interacts most directly with the League of Communists. The intent of this objective is to minimize repetition and accompanying inefficiencies. Meeting this goal, however, can be problematic and can lead to the assumption of a subordinate transmission-belt role of the Alliance vis-à-vis the League of Communists. Other possibilities include an Alliance threat to the autonomy of the other organizations affiliated with the Alliance,²⁹ or the development of an opposition-party mentality in political affairs.³⁰ The results of this process of interorganization negotiations and discussions are not expected to be fully formulated policy proposals to be rubber-stamped by the appropriate assembly, but rather general statements or positions and directions for future action.³¹

This catalog of Alliance activities and objectives is only a partial statement of the organization's role in Yugoslav society. The SSRNJ is also envisioned as carrying out an important theoretical purpose in support of Yugoslavia's system of pluralist socialist self-management. As Kardelj outlined, the SSRNJ has a major role in the conduct and further development of the system,³² and its most important systemic obligation is to serve as a societal regulator to limit conflict and to promote the general interests of society. The Alliance is

charged with limiting the fragmentation of interests and the degeneration of politics into a series of zero-sum conflicts. In a multi-cleavage society such as Yugoslavia's, the Alliance performs the role of channeling off divisive disputes, signaling the need for policy change, and acting as a spokesperson for the general interest.

Perhaps the most important implication of the Alliance's regulatory role is in its application to the management of ethnic conflict. Mitija Ribičić, a member of the federal presidency of the Alliance, argued from this perspective, and offered the thesis that the Alliance has been responsible for preventing Yugoslavia from becoming another Lebanon.³³ While Ribičić's conclusion may be somewhat overstated, the logic of the analysis demonstrates the importance ascribed to this national front organization.

Organizational Structure

The organizational basis of the Socialist Alliance is significantly different from other political and social organizations. Its membership is inclusionary; it operates solely on territorial principles; its structure is constantly changing; and its decision-making procedures are consensual, not democratic centralist.

Membership in the Alliance is very open so that theoretically every citizen could join. The charter itself specifies no external limitations on membership, save voluntary choice and citizenship.³⁴ The organization is truly mass-based, and in 1980 it encompassed over fourteen million people, which represents 85 percent of the total population aged fifteen or older.³⁵

Members can be involved directly in the SSRNJ as individual citizens or indirectly as members of other organizations which are associated with the Alliance. They can discuss a wide range of issues with education, health, economic, consumer, and safety-environmental issues among the most prevalent. Because of the wide sphere of involvement, the Alliance must maintain an organizational structure that is simultaneously broad-based, professionally competent, and flexible and responsive to the changing concerns of its membership.

A second important structural constant for the Socialist Alliance is that the organizational structure is based on territorial principles. In other words, the structure of the Alliance parallels the territorial divisions of the country, ranging from the organized neighborhood to the federation. It does not, however, exist on the level of the workplace.

The third major organizational factor which differentiates the Alliance from the League of Communists is that decision-making is conducted by consensual agreement, not democratic centralism.³⁶ This means that the primary emphasis of policy formulation for the Socialist Alliance is the reconciliation of varied opinions and viewpoints. A minority group is not required to support the decision of the majority, and such




Figure 3.1: Organizational chart for the federal Socialist Alliance

a group can reintroduce the issue with new arguments at a later time.

A fourth major organizational feature for the Socialist Alliance is the commitment to widespread participation and the rotation of leadership offices to include as many members as possible. This is reflected by two procedural factors. One is the multiplication of committees, commissions, sections, etc., which exist to include the members who are most interested in the decision-making process on a particular policy problem. The second is the organization-wide two-term limit on elected leadership office.

The following section demonstrates how the organizational structure operates within the constraints outlined above. Primarily, we outline the organizational structure of the Alliance from the federation to the neighborhood. We also discuss the process of decision-making within the Alliance, and finally, we enumerate the activities of the Alliance and the means that exist for the organization to carry out its societal goals and purposes.

Organizational Framework

As mentioned earlier, the SSRNJ is organized at several levels that correspond to the political-geographic divisions of the country. This range of levels includes the federation, republic, province, intercommune organization, commune, and organized neighborhood. Each level is also connected to the level directly above and below it, and each communicates with the others by means of a system of delegates and delegations.

There are two primary institutions for the SSRNJ at the federal level: one is the Federal Conference and the second is the Federal Presidency. In addition, there exist a host of committees, commissions, councils, and special conferences that are either permanent bodies or are formed on an ad hoc basis to serve the major constituent groups, provide important services, or gather information about specific social problems. Figure 3.1 presents a visual representation of these bodies and how they relate to each other.

The Federal Conference is the central and most important body in the Federal Alliance structure. It is currently composed of 243 delegates who are drawn from the republic and provincial SSRNJ organizations, other political organizations, and other associations (see figure 3.2). Each republic Alliance organization is entitled to a delegation of twenty members and each province is allowed fifteen. In addition, the Central Committee of the League, the Federal Chamber of the Trade Union Association, and the national executive bodies for the youth and veterans' organizations are permitted eight delegates each. Organizations such as the Army, Cooperative Association, and Federal Economic Council³⁷ are also given representation in the Conference. Other organizations, such as musicians, engineering societies, etc., are granted delegates depending upon their membership size.³⁸ As with many other Alliance bodies, the membership term lasts four years, and no more than two consecutive terms are permitted to any individual.

Due to its large size and extensive network of committees, sections, and commissions, the Federal Conference meets infrequently—about four times per year.³⁹ When this body does meet, it tends to consider relatively broad-based questions such as economic growth, political developments, or elections. More narrow questions are discussed by preexisting or special ad hoc commissions or sections.

Sessions of the Federal Conference generally last about a day, and their

Figure 3.2: Organizational composition of the federal Socialist Alliance conference




Figure 3.3 Meeting dates and important agenda subjects for the federal conference of the SSRNJ, January 1981–December 1982.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>
19 February 1981	Social plan, development of agriculture, and village life
27 May 1981	Evaluation of the Socialist Alliance, physical fitness in Yugoslavia, amendments to the Federal Constitution, election of president
2 October 1981	Electoral process in 1982
14 January 1982	Social plan, electoral process, discussion of SSRNJ operating papers
18 February 1982	Evaluation of the media, order of elections (by republic)
24 May 1982	Evaluation of the SSRNJ, election of the president
21 July 1982	Election of Presidency, social plan of Yugoslavia, employment policy, economic stabilization policy
16 December 1982	Election of officers, economic stabilization

Source: "Tematika Sednica Savezne, Republičkih, i Pokrajinskih Konferencija Socijalističkog Saveza Radnog Jugoslavije," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* 26 (December 1982): 447.

deliberations receive widespread publicity in the newspapers and broadcast media. An agenda will typically contain four items, only one of which is a major thematic problem. A session held in July 1984 was devoted completely to problems in the economy, while earlier sessions discussed employment and productivity, relations with other organizations, and the need to reform the political system.⁴⁰ Figure 3.3 lists the agenda issues and dates for each of the meetings of the Federal Conference from January 1981 to December 1982 in order to provide a better understanding of the activities of this body.

A second important unit within the Federal SSRNJ structure is the Presidency. This body functions as an administrative agent for the Alliance. It oversees the implementation of Conference decisions, cooperates with the republic organizations and integrates their activities, suggests the agenda for the Conference, and prepares a program, based upon Conference policy, for consideration by the governmental-legislative institutions and its allied organizations.

The Presidency consists of thirty-five members, the majority of whom are elected by the Federal Conference. These members are selected from the provincial and republic organizations, political organizations, and other associations according to a prearranged formula (see figure 3.4). Ten members of the Presidency sit in this council by virtue of their office, and they are identified in figure 3.4. Finally, a President is elected from within the Presidency to coordinate the activities of this body and to meet with foreign


dignitaries. The President is elected to serve a one-year, nonrenewable term, and the position is rotated across republics and provinces according to a preselected formula.

To a great extent, the Presidency of the SSRNJ functions more as a coordinative and deliberative body than as a decision-making group. It can meet in full or partial session, and members from the republics and provinces can be added temporarily to the Presidency to participate in discussions that require more detailed expertise. As a result, the Presidency behaves like a collegial body that is primarily directed toward the assimilation and dissemination of information and the presentation of policy options for further discussions. Any decisions are based on consensus.

The Presidency also can meet with representatives of the other political organizations. In the recent past, there have been joint sessions of the Presidency of the Alliance with its counterparts in the Trade Union Organization, League of Communists, and youth organizations. There have also been meetings with the Serbian and Kosovan Alliance officials regarding events and developments in Kosovo. The Presidency, in short, can be an important body in identifying public opinion and discovering policy solutions to important national questions.

A major distinctive feature about the Socialist Alliance is its heavy reliance upon, and widespread use of, commissions and sections for the administrative and policy formulation roles of the organization. Commissions generally handle administrative issues such as finance and personnel, establishment of procedures for elections, and the development of relations with international organizations ranging from UN-specialized agencies to liberation front

Figure 3.4: Composition of the federal Socialist Alliance Presidency



organizations.⁴¹ Sections tend to deal primarily with policy matters and the development of policy options. Their membership is balanced by republic and province, and their task is to develop a consensual agreement on the correct policy approach to particular problems. Sections, for example, can contract with institutes for research, hear expert testimony, and develop policy scenarios. These bodies are generally composed of both experts and generalists, and they try to include representation from all the relevant interests involved in a particular problem. In recent years, issues such as education reform, inflation, investment priorities, and agricultural reform have been discussed by specialized sections. Their recommendations have either been adopted or, at a minimum, seriously debated by the organization at large.

Structurally, the republic-level Socialist Alliance organization parallels the federal structure. Like its federal counterpart, each republic possesses a republic conference as the major decision-making body, a presidency for administration, a president of the presidency, and various commissions, sections, committees, etc.

The republic conference is composed of delegates from communal, intercommunal, city, and the other republic-level social and political organizations, including the League of Communists, Trade Union Association, Veterans' Association, and Youth League. The membership size of the republic and provincial conferences varies widely from a low of 92 in Montenegro to a high of 232 in Croatia. The presidencies also vary in size from 22 in Macedonia to 64 in Serbia.⁴² Since 1978, the executive committees of the presidencies have been abolished, thereby simplifying the structure and lines of authority for these organizations.

As was the case in the federal organization, a large number of organizations are included under the umbrella of the Socialist Alliance and given representation in its leadership structure. Vojvodina, for example, grants delegate status to twenty-five different organizations, including the following: Veterans' Association, University of Novi Sad, Yugoslav National Army, People's Technicians, Council of Retired People, Retirement and Disability Insurance Association, Farm Workers' Health Insurance Association, the Council for the Care and Upbringing of Children, Council of Reserve Officers, and the Red Cross.⁴³

Republic and provincial conferences meet regularly and average about one meeting every other month.⁴⁴ The agenda averages three or four items per meeting, and the range of issues include such subjects as electoral procedures, cooperation with other organizations, economic stabilization, review of the public media performance, health services, education, and child welfare. The republic conferences generally include discussion of controversial issues. In Serbia in 1984, the republic conference strongly criticized the operation of the political system, the failures in economic policy, and the deviations

from constitutional intent.⁴⁵ No attempt was made in this republic to downplay the seriousness of the issues or to cover up policy failures.

The widespread inclusion of organizations that are formally allied to the SSRNJ at the republic and provincial levels is only a partial indicator of the widespread concerns that involve the Socialist Alliance. More indicative perhaps of the range of issues that involve the Alliance is the work of the sections. For instance, most republics and provinces have organized a section on education, and in many of them, notably Croatia, Serbia, and Vojvodina, these sections have undertaken much of the exploratory work and have conducted many of the difficult negotiations that have preceded the adoption of major secondary and higher-level school reforms. The sections, in other words, fill a vital function in the overall policy process, and in some cases, their role needs to be strengthened further.⁴⁶

The communal organization structure of the Socialist Alliance parallels that of the republic and federal organization. The primary decision-making body is the communal conference, which is constituted of delegates elected by the neighborhood chapters, commune-level political organizations, other commune organizations, the public media, and military units that may be located within the territory of the commune. In Serbia in 1980, the typical commune conference consisted of 90 to 150 delegates, with a range from 47 to 215.⁴⁷ Fifty-five percent of Serbian SSRNJ commune conference delegates were elected by the constituent neighborhoods, 6 percent by the League, 11 percent by the unions, 7 percent by the youth organizations, and 4 percent by the Veterans' Association.⁴⁸

A presidency is elected by the commune conference to assume collective responsibility for the administration of the organization. Sections can also be formed according to the needs of the community. Typical sections include such broad-based issue areas as economics, health, education, and culture. In the commune of Zrenjanin, during the period from January to March 1978, 60 section meetings were held that involved over 3,000 people (3 percent of the total membership) and over 150 meetings of the various commune commissions, committees, and boards were conducted.⁴⁹ Every commune also forms an electoral commission to manage and coordinate the nomination and election of commune officials during electoral periods.

In many local areas, particularly metropolitan ones, the commune SSRNJ organizations associate together and coordinate their activities for their region. These intercommune organizations form parallel structures and provide a useful link between the republic and commune organizations.

The lowest level organizational unit is the neighborhood chapter of the Socialist Alliance, and 97 percent of all neighborhoods in 1977 had such a chapter.⁵⁰ The local organization includes all citizens, as well as all organizational entities which exist in that neighborhood.

Local organizations structure themselves according to the needs and prac-

tical limitations of the community. Larger neighborhoods, for example, may form a neighborhood conference on the delegate basis. Smaller neighborhoods will include all members in their conference. In Serbia, 55 percent of local chapters used delegates, and the remainder included all members within the neighborhood as a conference of the whole.⁵¹ These organizations can also form commissions, committees, sections, or thematic conferences to discuss alternatives and disseminate information about events that may affect the neighborhood. Issues that may be discussed are varied and may include questions such as hygiene at the neighborhood markets, distribution of food and other commodities, bus schedules, street repairs, playgrounds, etc. In practice, there are few, if any, public social questions that are outside the purview of the organization.

Decision-Making and Activities

Decision-making, organizational activities, and the general social role of the SSRNJ are integrally related. The fact that the Alliance is a front organization limits its authority, but expands the opportunities for the organization to influence policy and politics throughout the country. The Alliance must depend upon the behavior and involvement of the constituent organizations in order to succeed. This dependence is most acute when considering the League of Communists, but is applicable to other organizations as well. The SSRNJ must take into consideration the opinions of all constituent organizations, and must be open to inputs from non-Marxists, be tolerant of religious groups, and be the forum where other organizations can criticize political events and policy directions. As a result, the Alliance often receives criticism for events for which it is not directly responsible, or which may be directed against someone else.⁵²

Opportunities for influence are particularly great in the process of policy evaluation and political oversight, and according to the documents of the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists, this is the greatest strength of the Alliance.

The working people and citizens of the SSRNJ review and monitor the performance of the executive and administrative agencies, judicial bodies, civil service of the SIZs and other organizations that are involved in resolving concrete problems of concern to workers and citizens. The criticism and obstruction of bureaucratism and other negative concepts and behavior of these organizations is a constant task of the Socialist Alliance. Responsibility (including suggestions for resignation, firing, etc.) over those who hold authority in these institutions and agencies is held within its purview.⁵³

As a direct result of its widespread obligations, the SSRNJ is engaged at all levels in a wide range of activities. In recent years, the federal, republic, and local bodies have forged the agreements for the social plan and the establishment of the public agenda, reviewed broadcast and journalistic policies, reviewed the general political situation, and evaluated the state of the economy.⁵⁴ They have also ratified economic recovery agreements, planned and coordinated education reform, developed a new employment policy, and secured public approval for hospital expansion referenda.⁵⁵

At the local level, the most notable increase in involvement has been the participation of the Socialist Alliance in electoral policy. Among other tasks, the Alliance's organizations have conducted the elections, reviewed and changed the electoral rules and regulations, formed electoral committees, and minimized electoral abuses. In addition, these bodies have coordinated electoral activity, helped nominate candidates, and developed procedures for the transfer of public offices and the distribution of delegate seats.

To a great extent, the negotiational and interest aggregation performance of the SSRNJ has contributed to the continuation and furtherance of collective decision-making in Yugoslavia. Without this front organization, the Yugoslav system of self-management would lack its most important regulatory mechanism for adjustment and change.

Administration and Membership Issues

Membership policy in the Socialist Alliance is distinctive from the other political organizations discussed in this book. In part, this results from the specific character of the organization as a front or association of associations. The Alliance is an organization that permits both individual and collective membership, and it does not grant special rights to members or distinguish between members and nonmembers in its activities. This section discusses the issues involved with membership recruitment and organizational maintenance. It describes leadership recruitment patterns, policies regarding membership and leader training, finance, and other administrative issues that affect the Socialist Alliance.

Membership Recruitment

The charter of the SSRNJ clearly specifies membership criteria for the organization. The criteria are broad, and few individuals are excluded from joining:

It is the right of every working person and citizen who accepts the programmatic purposes and charter of the SSRNJ to affiliate himself and participate in the Socialist Alliance. Through joint efforts, action-political

Table 3.1 Socialist Alliance membership of the available population by republic, 1970 and 1980*

Republic	1970		1980	
	Total population	% Rate	Total population	% Rate
Yugoslavia total	8,575,192	57	14,151,135	84
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1,512,068	62	2,350,000	79
Montenegro	205,806	57	332,354	78
Croatia	1,868,818	55	2,895,500	80
Macedonia	584,614	53	830,000	61
Slovenia	731,868	56	1,298,989	89
Serbia total	3,671,998	58	6,444,292	91
Serbia proper	—	—	4,093,982	91
Kosovo	—	—	765,430	82
Vojvodina	—	—	1,584,880	97

*Available population is the population aged fifteen or over according to the 1971 and 1981 censuses.

Sources: 1970—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1971* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1971), p. 68, and Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1977* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1977), p. 377. 1980—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1983* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1983), pp. 434, 438.

interrelations, and association with the Socialist Alliance, working people and citizens freely, equally, and on the basis of their mutual democratic responsibilities express their positions, opinions, initiatives, desires and activities in the realization of their social, workplace, and life interests.⁵⁶

In addition, the Socialist Alliance has collective members from all the political organizations. This includes the League of Communists as well as other social organizations and associations.

Members of the Socialist Alliance do not have any specific rights over those who are not members. They do, however, have greater responsibilities than nonmembers in that they are expected to be more involved in the political and social development of the country. Unlike some other organizations, members of the Socialist Alliance are expected to be completely free to select and choose which organizational activities they wish to be involved in as well as their level of participation. Occasionally, this principle is overlooked,⁵⁷ and the Alliance may demand too much from some of its members.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the organization was conceived to permit different levels of activity among its members. The important point is not that all

members use the organization all the time, but that they use it when they need it.⁵⁹

It is relatively futile to try and identify members of the Socialist Alliance according to occupation, geography, or philosophy because all categories of the population are members, including workers, farm workers, intellectuals, youths, retired persons, women, etc. Nearly 85 percent of the population aged fifteen or older were members in 1980. Membership ranged from a high of 97 percent in Vojvodina to a low of 61 percent in Macedonia.⁶⁰ Compared to 1970, the Alliance has grown significantly, and the proportion of the population included has increased 47 percent during the decade. This growth, however, actually reflects both a liberalization in the definition of membership and an expansion of social groups affiliated with the Alliance.

Although the vast majority of adults are members of the Alliance, levels of involvement and types of involvement vary dramatically by social category. Overall, activists tend to be middle-aged or elderly males. Women and youths are less likely to be heavily involved. Participation, particularly at the neighborhood level, also tends to be higher for retired persons, farm workers, and housewives because they are less likely to belong to competing organizations. In fact, the Alliance has been criticized for fostering an image of itself as an organization for the farm workers and the elderly.⁶¹

Participation also varies by ideological orientation of the member and the type of community in which the member lives. On the one hand, League of Communist members are three times more likely to participate at SSRNJ meetings than nonmembers.⁶² On the other hand, those with strong religious beliefs are less likely to be involved actively in the front organization.⁶³ Rural areas generally see more individual members participating, while urban areas tend to have more associational participation in the SSRNJ: "In Belgrade alone, there are about 2,000 societies and associations, of which approximately 1,500 are organized at the city and commune levels. Three hundred of these organizations are organized at the republic level."⁶⁴ This implies that an urban resident is more likely to be involved in the Alliance through associational membership than through individual efforts, as is the case in rural areas.

Leadership Recruitment

The unique status of the SSRNJ also has an impact on the process and results of leadership recruitment. In many ways, the organization is faced with a dilemma. As a mass organization, the SSRNJ's leadership structure should include every major grouping in society, including nationality, occupation, gender, age, religion, and educational groups. In particular, we would expect relatively large percentages of workers, farm workers, women, and youths in the leadership bodies. As a front organization, however, the SSRNJ's leader-

ship must include a large proportion of officers who are selected by the organizations that are affiliated with the Alliance, and the Alliance cannot exercise control over these groups. Thus, the Socialist Alliance is responsible for the social characteristics of its leadership, but it lacks the authority to direct and manage the selection of many of its leaders.

A second criterion for leadership selection within the Socialist Alliance is rotation of leadership posts. Officeholders are restricted to two consecutive terms, and chief executive officers (that is, presidents) are limited to one nonrenewable term. While the utility of this position can and has been debated, it remains an official Alliance policy, which limits the number of incumbents in leadership posts.

The third criterion for judging the success of leadership selection is the relative involvement of Communist Party members. We would expect to find relatively large proportions of SKJ members in SSRNJ leadership positions as a result of the League's ideological role.

Local Leadership Patterns Special significance should be given to the social composition of the neighborhood conference and the presidency of the neighborhood Alliance chapter. At this level, the leadership institution should adequately reflect the social makeup of the neighborhood. As a result, we should expect to find wide variation across neighborhood organizations. Rural neighborhoods should be dominated by farm workers, industrial neighborhoods by workers, minority nationality communities by that minority, and student areas by students.

Table 3.2 Composition of delegates to the neighborhood Socialist Alliance conferences by major intercommunal region in Serbia, 1980 (in percentages)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Workers</i>	<i>Farm workers</i>	<i>Youths</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>SKJ members</i>
Belgrade city	30	11	19	19	65
Timoc	25	35	17	13	40
Šumadija	25	28	13	11	45
Kraljevo	33	37	15	10	52
Titova Užica	28	44	16	11	44
South Morava	26	42	24	14	52
Niš	37	38	13	11	47
Kolubar	15	56	18	9	31
Serbia proper	27	36	18	13	48
(<i>N</i> = 75,277)	20,174	27,273	13,017	9,531	35,703

Source: Republička Konferencija SSRN Srbije, "Analiza o Akciono-Političkom Organizovanju i Delovanju Mesnih i Opštinskih Organizacija SSRN Srbije," in Republička Konferencija SSRN Srbije, *Sedma Sednica Republičke Konferencije SSRN Srbije* (Belgrade: Republička Konferencija SSRN Srbije, 1980), pp. 217-24.

Table 3.3 Composition of presidents of neighborhood Socialist Alliance chapters by major intercommunal region in Serbia, 1980 (in percentages)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Workers</i>	<i>Farm workers</i>	<i>Youths</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>SKJ members</i>
Belgrade city	28	9	4	3	93
Timoc	35	44	7	2	89
Šumadija	29	34	6	1	68
Kraljevo	19	45	8	2	79
Titova Užica	22	40	1	2	86
South Morava	18	55	9	0	80
Niš	49	22	3	0	74
Lower Danube	24	33	6	0	85
Kolubar	19	44	6	0	75
Serbia proper	24	42	5	1	78
(<i>N</i> = 3,271)	801	1,345	179	31	2,564

Source: See table 3.2.

Table 3.2 lists the percentage distribution of some of the major social characteristics of neighborhood conference delegates in Serbia in 1980. Overall, workers and farm workers constitute nearly two-thirds of the conference delegates,⁶⁵ and they dominate every region of the republic save Belgrade, an administrative center. Those regions that are heavily agricultural (for example, Kolubar) have larger proportions of delegates who are farm workers. Those regions that have larger industrial components (for example, Niš or Kraljevo) elect more workers.

Youths fare relatively well in most regions of the republic in neighborhood leadership bodies, given their higher mobility and weaker store of experience. Although total youth representation (18 percent) is less than their proportion of the population (23 percent), there do not seem to be systematic discriminatory roadblocks placed against this population group at this level.

The situation with women, however, is different. While composing over 50 percent of the adult population, they receive less than 13 percent of the conference delegation seats. Part of the poor performance can be attributed to the reduced participation level of women in the Alliance, part to the lower affinity of women to join other social groups, and part to the occupational choices of women, which reduce their commitment to political affairs.⁶⁶ Evidence supporting this point can be seen from the fact that the female percentages in neighborhood conferences climbs to 35 percent in some of the communes of metropolitan Belgrade.⁶⁷

Communist Party members are heavily involved in the leadership of the Alliance chapters. Although Party members constitute less than 14 percent of the adult population (defined as nineteen and over), they receive three and

a half times the number of neighborhood leadership posts expected from their share of the population. The Party, in short, is well-situated to influence the activities of the Socialist Alliance at the neighborhood level.

When we limit our analysis to chapter presidents, we find similar patterns in the social composition of the Alliance. As seen in table 3.3, 24 percent of chapter presidents are workers, 42 percent are farm workers, and 78 percent are members of the League. On the negative side, however, the percentage of youths who have been elected as neighborhood SSRNJ presidents falls dramatically to 5 percent, and female presidents are virtually nonexistent.

Commune Leadership Patterns The same criteria for leadership selection at the neighborhood level can be applied to the commune Alliance organization. Data from Serbia indicate that, with the exception of women, the leadership structure in the commune meets or exceeds expectations. Table 3.4 provides comparative data by region which indicate that, with the exception of Belgrade, workers and farm workers dominate the commune SSRNJ. The data also indicate that variation across regions in the relative importance of industrial vs. agricultural workers has been reduced, as expected, from the levels recorded by the neighborhood conference.

Youths maintain their overall level of involvement at the commune level, but the changes between neighborhood and commune level youth representation at the regional level are striking. The Timoc region, for instance, registers 26 percent youth inclusion for the commune conference, but only 17 percent at the neighborhood level. This is in contrast to the south Morava region, which possesses an almost inverse pattern.

League members participate at the commune conference levels in Serbia in almost overwhelming numbers. Three-quarters of all Serbian commune conference members are Party members, and in some communes (for example, Kladovo), the percentage approaches 100 percent.

Rotation of leadership positions appears to be established relatively uniformly across the republic. Seventy-seven percent of commune conference delegates are serving their first term.⁶⁸ Obviously, the SSRNJ has been successful in implementing the Tito Initiative.

Republic-Federal Level Data regarding the social composition of the Socialist Alliance Conferences are generally not available and would not be very meaningful if listed. Indications, however, are that the trends found at the lower levels regarding incumbency and League participation continue, and that worker and farm worker representation declines somewhat.⁶⁹ A comparison of the federal level Alliance Presidency membership lists from 1976 through 1982 reveals almost no overlap across terms and nearly universal Party membership. Relatively few women and youths served in the Presidency, and most members have had a distinguished

Table 3.4 Composition of delegates to the commune Socialist Alliance conferences by major intercommunal regions in Serbia, 1980 (in percentages)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Workers</i>	<i>Farm workers</i>	<i>Youths</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>SKJ members</i>	<i>Incumbents</i>
Belgrade city	25	7	19	23	80	28
Timoc	30	23	26	23	80	28
Šumadija	30	22	16	18	75	23
Kraljevo	26	27	17	16	76	19
Titova Užica	24	24	15	15	57	25
South Morava	24	32	17	16	71	26
Niš	25	31	17	17	75	21
Lower Danube	22	22	18	17	81	25
Kolubar	22	30	17	14	73	21
Serbia proper	25	33	18	18	75	23
(<i>N</i> = 11,213)	2,834	3,621	1,993	1,997	8,414	2,609

Source: See table 3.2 (pp. 225–33 in source).

political career in other organizations and fields, particularly at the republic level.

Traditionally the higher level of the Socialist Alliance is not an organizational entity that attracts political careerists. The front foundation of the organization makes it very difficult for an individual to build a personal power base. At the local level, some people may be able to hold on to office for years, but recently, that phenomenon has become rare.

From an organizational perspective, the rapid rotation of leadership can have both positive and negative features and is currently under some reconsideration. One viewpoint opposed to rapid rotation argues that its abolition would strengthen the leadership core of the organization and the organization's autonomy and control. The opposite and presently prevailing view argues that long-term devoted activists would eventually identify more with the organization and less with its membership, thereby leading to bureaucratization and a reduction in the organization's openness.⁷⁰

Training and Administrative Issues

Two types of training characterize the Socialist Alliance. One is directed toward the development of skills that would permit members and leaders to carry out their political duties. The other is directed toward the education and socialization of the general population in the values of socialist self-management.

From one perspective, everything the Alliance does is directed toward effecting heightened participation among its members so that they can func-

tion more effectively in society. From this perspective, the entire program of the Alliance can be conceived as a type of school or training institute. Meetings conducted by the Alliance are expected to serve, in part, as educational functions. Leaders who hold the meetings are expected to follow current procedures, permit debate and discussion, and invite commentary on the normative intent of Alliance activities.

Special attention is given by the Alliance to its duty to raise the socialist awareness of its members and to develop the system of self-management. Each republic organization develops a program for mass ideological activities. The majority of communes then refine this program and conduct it among their members at the neighborhood level. A typical program will contain about ten to twelve themes, and the major daily newspapers will carry brief explanatory articles on each of them. In the past, the programs have centered on issues such as constitutional reforms, national popular defense, solutions to problems in the economy, and electoral rights, processes, and obligations.

In addition, in some communes the Alliance can prepare a systematic political school program. These "schools of self-management" are usually conducted in the people's or workers' universities, and courses are formally offered for extension-type credit.⁷¹ Programs include a series of theoretical lectures, followed by practical implications and demonstrations. The broad themes usually involve the practice of self-management, internationality relations, and the advantages of Yugoslavia's nonaligned foreign policy.

Considering its enormous size, the Socialist Alliance has a very small administrative staff and relatively few administrative management problems. In all the communes of Serbia combined, there are only 160 administrative technical employees, 120 political workers, and 173 elected full-time officers.⁷² This averages out to one paid employee for every 9,000 members. All the remaining activities are conducted and led by individuals who volunteer their time and resources.

To a large extent, the organization is financed by the dues of its members. The total charge to an individual is insignificant and averages less than the equivalent of one U.S. dollar per year. Collection is not a problem and the dues are used to finance local activities.

At the commune, republic, and federal levels, finances are less automatic. Income for the organization is derived from contributions and from formal agreements made with the relevant legislative body for grants from the public treasury. Grants are not automatic and are contingent upon legislative approval of the program of the respective SSRNJ organizations. The process can be cumbersome, and this has led to some discussion about the adoption of a set formulae.⁷³

The major administrative problem facing the organization is the shortage of meeting space. An overwhelming majority of the local organizations lack their own halls and must contract for space with a union, school, or other

public institution.⁷⁴ Sections and commissions must generally meet in an institution related to the activity that they are discussing. For example, an education section will meet in a school, a cultural section in a movie theater, or an athletic commission in a sports arena. While there may be occasional advantages to this procedure, the absence of meeting space is felt by many to impair the autonomy of the organization and to call into question its legitimacy or professional expertise.

In summary, the Socialist Alliance's administrative and membership environments are considerably different from other organizations. The SSRNJ is much more fluid and less structured than the other political organizations discussed in this book. In particular, the Alliance's administrative and membership environments differ in most major characteristics from those of the League of Communists.

Evaluation of the Behavior and Activities of the Alliance

As discussed above, the Socialist Alliance is a complex organization with a broad range of roles and responsibilities. An appraisal of the current performance of this organization must consider each of these roles and responsibilities, as well as variation in performance across republics, communes, and neighborhoods. In this section, we carefully consider these points. First, we examine the performance of the general social role and the overall position of the Alliance in contemporary Yugoslav political life. Second, we analyze the overall performance of the Alliance with respect to its six major functional activities. Finally, we present a program for change in the future behavior and activities of the organization.

General Role

According to most Yugoslav political analysts, the major social goal for all political organizations is to facilitate the citizen's exercise of his or her political rights, primarily self-management. The Socialist Alliance contributes to this goal by becoming the major interface between other organizations and individuals and the institutions of the state. It measures its overall success not by the number of meetings, reports, initiatives, etc., but rather by how much a citizen uses the organization when it is needed.⁷⁵

On the whole, we can say that the Socialist Alliance is functioning well as a front organization and as a factor in political decision-making. It appears that institutionally the organization has achieved considerable autonomy from the League of Communists, and that it has overcome much of its earlier heritage as a transmission agency for the Party. In fact, there is some concern that the Alliance may have strayed too far

in the opposite direction, and under some circumstances may behave like an opposition party.⁷⁶

It can also be concluded that the Alliance is relatively effective in conducting large-scale activities. Some of its general tasks, such as the management of the electoral system, have been performed relatively well. Other large-scale undertakings, such as the mobilization of the entire country to provide assistance following earthquakes in Bosnia and Montenegro, were carried out to general satisfaction. The net effect and general opinion is that the Alliance is effective when we consider broad-scale activities on the national level.

When one examines the question of implementation of the general role of the Alliance at the commune and neighborhood levels, however, the appraisal is not as positive, and the organization has not met expectations. At the neighborhood level in Serbia, for example, a 1979 poll found that citizens felt that the influence of the Alliance on neighborhood activities was less than that of the League of Communists and only marginally better than the Veterans' organization, an association with a greatly reduced neighborhood role.⁷⁷ It is also noteworthy that a greater proportion of respondents from rural neighborhoods gave a positive evaluation to the Alliance than did respondents from urban areas. A similar trend appeared for respondents employed in the trades, housing, and tourist industries, who rated the Alliance more favorably than employees in other industries. The report concluded by noting the failure of the Alliance to plan and coordinate local activities. The implications from this are that there are serious problems in carrying out the Alliance mandate at the local level.

Specific Activities

The second part of the appraisal examines the effectiveness of the Alliance in carrying out its specific responsibilities in six functional areas outlined earlier in this chapter. The functions include elections, communications, interest aggregation, policy-making, political socialization, and political coordination.

As noted in chapter 6, the activities of the Alliance with respect to general elections are quite pervasive. The Alliance manages elections in the neighborhoods, coordinates all elections, supervises the nomination process, and establishes criteria for selection of delegates in general, and in the political chambers in particular. Recent elections show that voting turnout is respectable, and participation at nomination meetings has rebounded from its low levels recorded in the late 1960s. On the negative side, however, nomination meeting attendance is still too low, not all social groups participate equally in the electoral process, the level of understanding is not high, and enthusiasm for the process could be strengthened. In short, the SSRNJ is

doing a satisfactory job in this area, but with the adoption of some political reforms and institutional changes, its impact could be greatly enhanced.⁷⁸

Some specific problems which have surfaced include a tendency for some members of the Alliance to perceive the organization as an opposition party and to argue for institutionalization of that role.⁷⁹ While this perspective is by no means predominant in the Alliance and has been attacked by the League, it is a logical outgrowth of the Alliance's renewed critical role in politics and an expression of the sense of competition with the League for political influence.⁸⁰

A second worrisome tendency is the inverse of the first: namely, a continuing concern that the traditional transmission role vis-à-vis the League is resurfacing. While part of the concern can be attributed to a natural organizational insecurity, there have been some indications of League monopolization of some electoral responsibilities of the Alliance. Marijan Rožić, a member of the Presidency of the Alliance, noted that often delegates to legislative bodies ignore the Alliance and communicate directly with the League organization.⁸¹ It was also charged at a special two-day session to discuss reform in the SSRNJ that often election candidates were hand-picked by the League and the decisions simply rubber-stamped by the Alliance's electoral committees.⁸²

In spite of the misgivings and problems, the SSRNJ is very active and generally very important throughout the electoral process. Instances of abuse, fraud, or negligence are rare, and the anomalies that result are exceptions to the rule. Finally, the simultaneous appearances of both overengagement and underinvolvement of the SSRNJ in the electoral system suggest that there is little cause for deep concern.

A second important function for the Socialist Alliance is management of the communication process between citizens, state institutions, and elected delegates. Objectively, mass communication appears well developed. Subscription to the radio and television networks is quite high, averaging, respectively, 1.3 and 1.6 households per subscriber. Thirty-nine percent of radio time is devoted to informational subjects, and 35 percent of television air time in 1982 was devoted to news and informational (noneducational) subjects.⁸³

In 1982, there were over 3,000 different newspapers, with a combined average circulation of nearly seventeen million or 1.2 persons per subscription.⁸⁴ Some of the largest of these papers, such as *Borba* (national) and *Vjesnik* (Croatian) are managed by the Socialist Alliance. Others, such as *Politika* (Serbia) are closely monitored and supervised by the SSRNJ.

Extensive efforts are made to publish in minority languages. In 1982, there were over one hundred newspapers and sixty-two journals published in minority nationality languages. Most of this reading matter appeared

in Albanian or Hungarian (the two largest minorities), but significant quantities also appeared in the other minority languages.⁸⁵

The presence of extensive communication channels may not necessarily mean that the message is seen, read, or heard. This problem was approached by a study conducted in the mid-1970s on patterns of mass communications. It discovered that large segments of the population did not inform themselves about news subjects, and that no medium reached all the people. For example, a comparison of receptivity to news by news source among republics reveals that only 44 percent of the Yugoslav adult public read daily newspapers for news, and that percentage dipped to 23 in Macedonia. A bare majority of adults admitted to listening to radio or television news, and only in Serbia did over two-thirds of the population hear their news from the broadcast media.⁸⁶

A breakdown of news sources by political, occupational, generational, and educational background reveals that there is considerable variation in the use of news sources by these various groups. League members, office workers, professionals, and the highly educated expose themselves to more and varied news sources than other groups, yet it is precisely the other groups (particularly, farm workers and workers) that the Alliance needs to reach the most. The overall figures are far from poor, but they do demonstrate a need for the Alliance to undertake efforts to reach out to more groups.⁸⁷

Little hard statistical information exists on the extent to which the media broadcasts and commentary are believed and trusted. During the events in Kosovo in which a news blackout was initially imposed, there was a widespread perception that news reports could not be trusted. Following this period, a poll commissioned by Radio-Television Belgrade on the credibility of Radio Belgrade found considerable hesitancy to accept media reports. In this poll, 37 percent stated that they believe what they hear. Ten percent perceived that occasionally the broadcasts are not correct. Thirteen percent do not believe what they hear, and 40 percent refused to commit themselves.⁸⁸ Again, there appears to be room for improvement.⁸⁹

Perhaps more important to the Alliance than mass communications is the network of communication patterns that links citizens with their delegates and delegates with their delegations at all levels of society. The Socialist Alliance has a crucial role in that process, and the delegate system may depend on how well that role is carried out.

The Alliance is often criticized for not having sufficiently effective and timely information for its members.⁹⁰ However, it should be noted that there is dramatic variation across organizational units in regard to this, and that the introduction of the delegate system has institutionalized the need for a constant stream of bilateral communications that may appear occasionally overwhelming to some units.⁹¹ It is not surprising, therefore, that at the local level the system may break down, the delegates are sometimes uninformed, and the members are inadvertently misled.⁹²

Yugoslavia's most dramatic example of communication breakdown under the new delegate system was prior to and during the Albanian demonstration and riots in Kosovo in 1981. The provincial leadership, communal organizations, and neighborhood chapters did not communicate with each other. As a result, the local chapters were unprepared to deal with the situation, and the Serbian and national organizations were surprised by the outbreaks as well as by their intensity. Soon after the disturbances, many of the republic and communal officers resigned.

It would be a mistake to categorize the information system as a complete failure. A poll conducted in 1978 in Vojvodina, a multinational region with many national minorities, provides a little more perspective. Thirty-nine percent of respondents characterize themselves as being completely satisfied with the quality and quantity of information they receive from the relevant SSRNJ organization. Forty-five percent were satisfied with some reservations. Less than 7 percent were dissatisfied. The study also found that the level of respondents expressing complete satisfaction varied by circumstances. It was highest among League members (57 percent), higher in rural areas (46 percent) than in urban areas (35 percent), and higher among Serbs and Croats than Hungarians (28 percent). Levels of dissatisfaction, meanwhile, remained very small.⁹³

The aggregation and synthesis of interests are extremely important to the organization. It channels conflict, resolves problems, and promotes a greater sense of community. Problems that occur in the Alliance's performance of this function, however, are not generally cases of exclusionary or discriminatory treatment, but rather of inefficiency or ineffective decision-making.

Aggregation of interests is well developed. Youth interests appear to be generally well represented,⁹⁴ but the voices of women are not heard as well.⁹⁵ Relations with religious groups can often be conflictual, but they vary by time and place.⁹⁶ Many local organizations are dominated by farm workers, retired persons, or homemakers.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, charges about the exclusion of groups or favored treatment within the organization rarely surface, and the inequities that exist are often a consequence of differences in the participation rate of particular groups.

Synthesis of interests is much more troublesome than interest aggregation. Generally speaking, the more open the system, the slower the synthesis process, which makes the Alliance more open to charges of ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Alliance procedures are often perceived to be complicated and thus closed to some groups.⁹⁸ Decisions are sometimes late so that delegates, in effect, must take positions without appropriate consultations with the machinery of the Alliance,⁹⁹ and sections are occasionally weak or poorly organized, particularly on the local levels.¹⁰⁰ The net effect is that the system is slow and often cumbersome, but it is a system in which everyone can become involved.

The Socialist Alliance has variable responsibility for all stages of the policy process, including policy initiation, formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Our general caveat is that the success of the SSRNJ varies by stage of the policy process and by time, issue, and place. The overall appraisal of the Alliance across all policy stages is positive. However, there are serious problems in realizing the Alliance's potential in policy implementation and evaluation, particularly at the local levels.

A major factor that emerges when we examine SSRNJ policy activities is the relative success of the organization at the top of the organizational pyramid and the corresponding weaknesses at the lower levels. This problem has become generally well-known and has been characterized in the press as an "inverse pyramid." This describes a process whereby participation falls precipitously as one descends the Alliance's organizational hierarchy. The Vojvodinan organization, among others, has noted the need to strengthen the commune organization's roles in the policy process,¹⁰¹ and some changes are likely in the future.

A second critique of the Alliance policy role concerns its inability to follow through on the implementation of several important Alliance programs and policy platform statements. For nearly a decade, the Alliance has condemned the regionalization of the Yugoslav economy and marketplace into distinct republic units. For four years, and particularly since 1982, the Alliance's program, which was developed after extensive and intensive consultations and negotiations with myriad social, political, and economic groups, has not been adopted into practice. For five years, the Alliance has been unsuccessful in translating consumer complaints about the shortages of market commodities into effective policy action. In all cases, the Alliance has not ignored the problem, but it has not been able to achieve more than a paper agreement. This problem has adversely affected morale, even among officers at the highest levels of the organization. For example, a Federal Conference meeting on economic priorities was nearly canceled for lack of a quorum after the lunch break because apparently many delegates felt that their presence had little significance.¹⁰² If nothing else, the SSRNJ needs some structural or institutional assistance in preventing the adoption of decisions contrary to its position.¹⁰³

The third negative feature to the SSRNJ policy role has been the almost complete neglect of its evaluatory or oversight functions. For example, hardly any recalls among delegates occur, and cases of systematic abuse or incompetence are generally handled by resignations.¹⁰⁴ Alliance sections and committees concentrate their attention on new policy issues, and rarely have the capacity or interest to review the behavior of elected and appointed officials or to review the programs managed by these officials. Evaluation, in short, is not conducted in a regular or timely fashion.

This function is the traditional role of the Socialist Alliance since its

founding. However, it is a role which is now shared with a steadily growing number of institutions, including schools and other political organizations. As a result, it is no longer possible to pinpoint responsibility for any failure of political socialization or place the blame solely on the shoulders of the Socialist Alliance.

Generally, there have been two tests for successful socialization in Yugoslavia. One is acceptance of self-management; the other is support for the multinationality community concept of Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁵ Failure in the acceptance of either concept would imply weakness in the behavior of the SSRNJ.¹⁰⁶

It is an almost impossible task to test the extent to which these two primary values have been accepted by the population. Any deviation from self-management principles and multinational ideals could be considered a sign of failure, and any agreement with the values as a sign of success. Public opinion polls consistently showed wide support among the Yugoslav public for both self-management and the multinational community concept.¹⁰⁷ There are differences among individuals and groups, however, in the interpretation of the meaning and application of these concepts, and, in fact, there are often differences in interpretation among experts and political leaders.

Perhaps the only meaningful test of the failure or success of political socialization is the identification of the importance of those groups opposed to these core Yugoslav political values. Presently, two potential candidates stand out. One is fundamental or nationally oriented religious groups, and the other is militant Albanian nationalists in Kosovo.

Since the socialist revolution, there have been a series of disputes with different religious bodies, primarily the Roman Catholic archbishopric in Zagreb. These disputes have their origins in perceived Church support for the "Croatian Independent State" during World War II, but are expressed today over an entire range of social and political issues, including the definition of Croatian nationalism in the Yugoslav state.¹⁰⁸ The importance of this cleavage between religion and state seems to be diminishing over time, although occasional flare-ups occur. First, secularism among the youth and in cities like Zagreb has increased markedly,¹⁰⁹ and second, the separation between religious beliefs and acceptance of the core Yugoslav values is narrowing. To illustrate the latter point, a recent survey of public opinion in Croatia found that 73 percent of all respondents agreed that an individual could be religious and support socialism, and 76 percent concurred that a religious person could support self-management.¹¹⁰

The case of Albanian nationalism has considerably more negative overtones. The riots and demonstrations of 1981 are well known, and individual or small group acts of resistance and sabotage continue. However, the nationality outbreaks were preceded by a breakdown in the local and communal SSRNJ organizations,¹¹¹ thereby permitting a series of negative, anticomunity activities to grow and develop persistently to the flashpoint level reached in 1981.

These negative trends included social prohibitions against intermarriage, nepotism, the use of nationality criteria for job placement and career advancement in the province, and forced social isolation and out-migration of Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins.¹¹² It is evident, therefore, that political socialization has failed among a significant population in Kosovo, and that considerable rebuilding by the Alliance is necessary.

Since the adoption of the new Constitution in 1974, the task of coordinating the activities of various social and political organizations has been greatly simplified. The youth organization has been given the charge to promote youth interests, the union manages political affairs in the workplace, the Veterans' Association services its special clientele of war veterans and the aged. The only potential organizational overlap, therefore, is with the League of Communists, a problem discussed earlier in this section.

General success in organizational coordination is largely dependent upon the communication and organization skills of the officials involved. At the national and republic level, few problems develop, and the major organizations appear to be in close contact with each other, and to coordinate their activities within the Alliance. At the local level, the general appraisal is that the system generally works, but in some neighborhoods this is not the case and the process is subject to breakdown.¹¹³

An Agenda for Action

Our overall appraisal is that the Socialist Alliance has improved its performance dramatically since the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. Its role in society is much broader, and it seems to be more capable of fulfilling many of its responsibilities. Nevertheless, most observers agree that important problems exist, particularly at the local levels. To meet this challenge, the Alliance has sponsored a series of forums, conferences, and study commissions which have agreed that some changes are needed, and have made several recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of this organization.

Further change of the Socialist Alliance at the federal and republic levels includes several prominent features. These are heightened interactions in the legislative process, further emancipation of the Alliance from the League of Communists, more rapid and effective communication with communal and local organizations, and improvements in the cooperative, decision-making process.

Marijan Rožić, a member of the Federal Presidency for the Socialist Alliance, listed a series of objectives that the SSRNJ has begun to consider in order to heighten its involvement in the legislative process. They include:

- (1) Further development of the sociopolitical chambers
- (2) Active participation of SSRNJ delegates in the public councils

- (3) Inclusion of the SSRNJ in preliminary stages of the decision-making process
- (4) Enhanced linking of section activity to delegate priorities
- (5) Participation in the agenda-making exercises of the assemblies
- (6) Enlargement of the delegate clubs for the purpose of informal discussion and information-sharing
- (7) More involvement with the SIZ assemblies
- (8) Perfection of the information dissemination system
- (9) More effective linking of delegates and delegations through the mediation of the SSRNJ conferences ¹¹⁴

The need to emancipate more rapidly the Socialist Alliance from the League of Communists by granting more freedom to act has often been mentioned in the discussions from 1982 to 1984. The major expected impact of this change will be pressure on Alliance officials to assume direct responsibility for their organization's positions and to carry out their programs without continual reliance on the League.

A third weakness isolated by the previous analysis is the neglect of bilateral and timely communication among various levels of the organization, especially with the local chapters. Problems on the local level need to be identified and addressed by the responsible republic officials in the early stages when the problems are more tractable to solution. The present system of crisis response makes problem resolution much more difficult.

The final area for structural improvement concerns the process of decision-making in the Socialist Alliance. Often the process lasts too long, becomes too complex, generates too much conflict, and results in a weak or delayed response. While the problem is self-evident, a solution that does not undermine interest aggregation is not apparent. At a minimum, it is expected that reforms will give greater weight in the decision-making process to those groups, associations, or individuals who are most affected by the decisions, or who are likely to bear the burden of responsibility for it.

Our analysis has indicated that the need for change is especially acute at the local governmental levels. The Alliance is not sufficiently involved in the neighborhoods, particularly with the delegate system and with the organization of the community. Requirements that neighborhood delegates and delegations meet with the neighborhood conference of the SSRNJ in a timely and constructive fashion have been often evaded, and it can be expected that some attention will be given to that problem. Second, the chapters are often neither sufficiently prepared nor inclined to present their positions to the delegates, and some sort of encouragement needs to be devised to alter this situation.

It is also essential that Alliance activities in the neighborhoods and communes be revitalized. As pointed out by the study commissions, neighborhood conferences need to discuss potential price increases, commodity distribu-

tion bottlenecks, traffic patterns, utility service difficulties, and rent increases before decisions are made by public officials, rather than to respond angrily after decisions have been made. Responses after the fact are largely ineffective and serve to reduce the future influence of the Alliance. The neighborhood and commune organizations, in other words, need to become more active and less reactive bodies.

Summary

The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia is undergoing considerable change. Its mission is constantly expanding, its expectations are constantly increasing, its position in society is in dynamic flux, and it can be expected to continue to change in the future. The Alliance is neither completely successful, nor should it be considered a shell of an organization. Its influence and effectiveness vary by time, issue, and governmental level. In that sense, the Socialist Alliance is truly a front organization, an association of associations, whose strengths and weaknesses are related to the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations that form it.

4 The Trade Union Association of Yugoslavia

In this chapter we examine the role and behavior of the Trade Union Federation of Yugoslavia (*Savez Sindikata Jugoslavije*). The trade union organization is one of the most significant and the second largest of the political organizations in Yugoslavia. Nearly 90 percent of all employed people are members of the union confederation, so that in 1981, nearly six million Yugoslavs were members of a union in one of over 55,000 local union chapters (see table 4.1).

The Yugoslav union organization (SSJ) is an inclusive organization like the Socialist Alliance, rather than an exclusive organization like the League of Communists. Formally, membership in a trade union is on a voluntary basis; any employed, unemployed, or retired person can become a member of a union or leave whenever he/she desires. In practice, however, since nearly all employed people are union members, over 97 percent of potential members are enrolled in the SSJ.

Historically, the trade unions in Yugoslavia have a relatively long tradition of involvement in revolutionary activities. Unlike the Socialist Alliance, Youth Federation, and Veterans' Organization, the Trade Union Federation's origins precede World War II. During the interwar period, a large part of the urban working class belonged to unions, even though membership or strike activity was illegal for much of this period. The majority of the unions and union membership identified with leftist or socialist movements, but smaller segments were members of unions with a pro-regime or conservative orientation.

The unions, as an organized force, were not part of the wartime resistance movement, and this lack of organized involvement in wartime activities gives a distinctive outlook to the trade union federation. The unions are perceived to be more service-oriented, practical, and less exclusive than some of the other political organizations. In these respects, they fulfill a distinctive role in contemporary Yugoslav society.

Table 4.1 Total membership and organizational units of the Trade Union Association, 1981, by republic

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Union local chapters</i>	<i>Number of employees</i>	<i>SSJ membership</i>	<i>Executive committee members</i>	<i>Supervisory committee members</i>
Yugoslavia	48,265	5,793,496	5,756,451	292,940	129,381
Bosnia-Herzegovina	7,430	733,536	731,425	43,372	18,691
Montenegro	1,435	134,500	131,818	7,171	5,103
Croatia	10,782	1,431,087	1,425,362	67,979	29,864
Macedonia	3,369	443,924	441,165	18,617	8,726
Slovenia	6,827	801,746	790,268	51,407	18,914
Serbia total	18,422	2,248,703	2,236,421	104,394	48,083
Serbia proper	11,366	1,497,534	1,490,479	69,429	33,542
Kosovo	1,997	188,590	186,851	7,839	4,620
Vojvodina	5,059	562,579	559,091	27,126	9,921

Source: Veće Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije, *Zbirni Podaci o Osnovnim Organizacijama Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Savez Sindikata Jugoslavije, 1982).

The General Role of the SSJ in Contemporary Yugoslavia

In this section, we examine the evolution of the formal, legal position of the trade union association in Yugoslavia and the expectations placed on this organization. We examine the union's position within the constitution, changes in goals and orientations since 1946, the current platform of the organization, and the direction for future changes in the union's mission.

As is the case with all other political organizations in Yugoslavia, the trade unions operate within the ideological system of self-management. Within this system, the unions have considerable freedom of action, but their overall purpose and normative goal is expected to be directed toward assisting workers, not opposing the government or Party.¹

The optimal social role of unions in Yugoslavia differs from unions in western societies, as well as from labor organizations in other Marxist-Leninist systems like the Soviet Union.² In the former, organized labor either takes an oppositionist or coalition role vis-à-vis the government, as in Great Britain, or it takes a more limited, service-oriented role as in the United States. In Marxist-Leninist systems, the Party and state decide policy in the name of the working class and leave little autonomy to the unions.³

In Yugoslavia, the union federation receives a considerable amount of attention and is formally given a more significant societal role. Nevertheless, the formal responsibilities and autonomy that have been granted to the Yugo-

slav labor organization create a complicated set of social expectations for these organizations, and their general role in Yugoslavia's self-management system can be contradictory. In some situations, the trade union simultaneously participates in the administration and management of society and in the critique of governmental policy.⁴ For example, unions were involved in the recent creation of the 1982 economic stabilization program as well as in the general criticism following adoption of the program.

Yugoslav unions are faced with a second, more normative problem. They are entrusted to represent and to articulate simultaneously the interests of the general working class, the interests of groups within that class structure, and the interests of individuals within the groups. Obviously, these three interests do not always overlap and may conflict with each other. One of the union's roles, therefore, is to reconcile these differences and, more important, to achieve agreement without resort to force or pressure.⁵

Finally, the union is entrusted with direct responsibility for the enhancement and development of self-management procedures and processes. This does not mean that the union mingles in policies and decisions which are the responsibility of other institutions of society (for example, foreign policy). It does mean, however, that unions are expected to use their resources to insure that self-management processes are followed by their members. This presupposes that the unions can discuss and criticize the work of other social and political institutions ranging from the governmental institutions to the League of Communists.⁶

Current Constitutional Position of the Trade Unions

The 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia articulates the parameters of involvement of the trade unions similarly to the way in which it defined the Socialist Alliance. Among other items, the Constitution states that the unions are empowered to fight for "the Constitutionally designated position of the working class," "the realization of socialist self-managed relations and a deciding role of the worker in the management of social reproduction," "the securing of conditions for the distribution of income according to work, and equality in the working process and management in general," "self-managed linkages and integration of the different fields of work in society," "self-managed harmonization of individual, community, and general social interests."⁷

The 1974 Constitution enumerates several other features of the social role of the union. It gives particular attention to raising worker productivity, enhancing educational opportunities of the workers, and defending self-management. The last reference in the Constitution defines the role of the union in the self-management process. "The union initiates self-management agreements and social agreements, it directly participates in the agreement

process and makes recommendations to the institutions of management in self-managed enterprises, the assemblies of the political community, and other state and social institutions regarding solutions to problems pertaining to the social and material position of the working class.”⁸

The constitution's definition of the role of the union implies that unions must be concerned about all the interests of the worker, including economic, political, and cultural issues, and that unions are constitutionally obligated to participate in the decision-making process. The charters of the individual local chapters and communal SSJ organizations provide the practical application to this charge. Thus, the union is charged to be a protective labor organization, a political socialization institution, the guardian of self-management in the workplace, and the provider of worker services and benefits. The relative weight and priority given to each of these missions varies by time and circumstances, but each is always present.

Changing Positions of the Unions

As was the case for the organizations analyzed previously, the position and role of the union in Yugoslavia has not remained unchanged over time. In the immediate postwar years, the union's primary function was to transmit decisions of the Communist Party to the union members. With the introduction of self-management, the formal role of the unions gradually changed, and from 1950 to today, the union has slowly evolved into one of the central institutions in Yugoslavia's self-management system.

Yugoslavia's period of social revolution lasted for approximately five years, from the end of the war to the introduction of self-management in 1950. Because this period was so short, a strong, centralized management apparatus never completely formed and solidified its power. Nevertheless, the role of the union immediately after the war was as an arm of the state and an extension of the director's and minister's authority.

The most important difference between the immediate postwar years and contemporary Yugoslavia is that in the early postwar years the state monopolized management of the economy. For instance, the entire economy of Yugoslavia was organized into giant enterprises resembling a trust. The national government directly administered these enterprises through various economic ministries and local institutions. Under this system, the republic and local political and economic institutions were subordinated to the national government.⁹

Under the state-centralized system of management, the classical functions of the unions atrophied. Negotiating functions were reduced because there was no need for negotiations with the state, which was the “revolutionary instrument of the working class.” Strikes were against the national interest, and worker grievances were not the responsibility of the enterprise union organizations.

In the political-administrative domain, the Communist Party held most of the power for determining both the short-range and long-range economic policies. The union's role in policy-making was largely limited to transmitting Party decisions to the workers who were union members. It accomplished this role by mobilizing and organizing workers to support and carry out the decisions of the Party.

Although the role of the unions was relatively weak, they were well connected to the centers of power. They participated in the determination of the general plan, supported more equal distribution of income, and facilitated increases in the productivity of workers. In addition, the unions had an important role in nation-building following the war. They helped create an aura of unity and cooperation, so that even Tito gave considerable credit to the unions during the Stalin split and proclaimed, "Today [because of the unions] our entire country should be considered to be a single collective."¹⁰

In the area of economic development and reconstruction, the unions played an additional significant role. Most notably, they helped transform the Yugoslav peasant into a disciplined, well-trained industrial worker. In 1945, there were only 46,000 non-agricultural civilian workers; by 1949, that figure had multiplied to approximately two million. The entire employed population was organized into trade unions, and these unions had to learn very quickly to function as large, mass-based organizations, committed to modernization and development.

The initiation of Yugoslavia's system of self-management introduced the problem of justifying the continued existence of the union movement. A popular opinion after the introduction of self-management was that the involvement of workers in direct decision-making in the workplace made a union organization redundant. The Communist Party, however, rejected that thesis and insisted on the continuation of the union in a self-management environment, albeit with a greatly transformed role.

By the Second Congress of the Trade Union Association in 1951, the unions faced their crisis of confidence and challenge to survival head-on by taking a firm position in support of the necessity of further union involvement in a self-management system. The Congress documents noted: "It is not in the least contradictory nor redundant that the union governing bodies in conjunction with other social organizations participate in this work [self-management]. Although the workers' institutions of self-management and the unions both represent the working class, they fulfill and complement each other with respect to their social functions and tasks."¹¹

The Second Congress also concluded that the union needed to become an active agent for political socialization. Aser Deleon, president of the national confederation, stressed that further development of socialist democracy was dependent upon the unions becoming involved in the educational and cultural enrichment of the working class, and the expansion of educational and

training opportunities. Deleon stressed, further, that all citizens, particularly workers, must learn to make decisions about their working and living conditions, and that the obligation of the union was to help assist the working class to learn about and appreciate self-management.

In summary, the Second Congress of the Trade Union Association signaled the transition of the union from a transmission-belt agency to an autonomous supporter of self-management. After 1951, the union became concerned not only about the outcome of economic decisions (for example, labor productivity), but also about the performance of the decision-making process itself.

Later developments and the extension of the self-management system outside the workplace forced the union organization to reevaluate and expand its role even further. In 1959, the association's new president, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, a famous revolutionary and postwar economic leader, stressed two basic goals: to strengthen the union as a primary force in the political life of all society, and to expand the importance of the union to its membership. Among other points, he stated, "The union must be a dynamic and vital organization which has a vibrant internal life with close relations between its membership and leadership. The union must be an organization which is always prepared for a showdown on behalf of its principles, and it must hold its members' interests in trust."¹²

After 1959, the unions were expected to heighten their involvement at all levels of society, and this was especially true at the national level. They were encouraged to express energetically their viewpoints and to criticize the actions of the federal as well as other governmental units whenever they had sufficient cause. Simultaneously, the unions were expected to pay particular attention to their trusteeship role in the system.

In accordance with socialist self-management ideology and the constitution of Yugoslavia, the union has an important, defined role. Among other functions, the union is charged to assist the integration of workers and citizens into the self-management system, to encourage political participation, to facilitate labor productivity, and to guard its members from abuses in the practice of self-management. In addition, the current responsibility of the union association includes involvement in leadership recruitment, social policy, education, socialization, and political communication. The precise nature of the role of the SSJ in contemporary Yugoslavia is described in more detail below.

The development of self-managed social relations is a major component of the union association's formal societal role.¹³ For example, in 1949, the unions were responsible for introducing the experiment of self-management in economic organizations. Later, they led the movement for the decentralization of industrial decision-making during the 1960s, and presently they are actively involved in reintegrating the Yugoslav economy.

Political involvement is the second basic function of the unions. This implies direct and indirect participation and the exercise of the union's influence throughout the political system. Involvement includes the recruitment and selection of leaders, selection of delegates and other representatives in political, social, and economic institutions, maintenance of public control over the actions of leaders and delegates, and the removal from office of those who abuse or violate their mandate.

Fostering equitable treatment for its members and improving labor productivity are two other major goals of the unions.¹⁴ In this respect, the unions try to narrow inequalities within the workplaces, as well as across them, and to raise the general standard of living. In recent years, this problem has become acute and can be considered a top priority for the organization.¹⁵

Another major goal for the union is the classical role of protecting the members from infringement upon their rights on both the level of the workplace and at higher governmental levels. The union is empowered to speak for and defend the workers' interests in government and the workplace. Specifically, these concerns may include neglect of labor's interests, abuses of authority by a firm's director or by governmental officials, or improper behavior by local or republic bureaucrats.¹⁶

Yugoslav unions also fill an important social function. They are expected to become acquainted with, and involved in, social welfare policies like housing, health, unemployment relief, etc. Even though the unions are involved in social welfare problems, they supplement rather than supplant other institutions that have the primary responsibility. In this respect, the union behaves more as an ombudsman by solving problems rather than as an administrator directly executing social welfare policy.

Supporting education and cultural activities for workers is also within the domain of the contemporary Yugoslav union. The official position of the union is that a worker must be well trained in self-management in order to practice it. To help achieve this goal, the union conducts and supports educational programs, articulates and communicates its positions to members, and reviews and evaluates decisions which may affect its members.

Information is a basic component of the role designated to the SSJ. In this function, the union acts to assure that its members' interests are discussed and seriously considered by the print and broadcast media. It also conducts publishing activities ranging from journals to newsletters which are designed to inform its members about local, republic, and national union activities and positions on issues.

Further developments in the self-management system will necessitate changes in the role of the trade unions and their association. An extrapolation of current trends leads to the expectation that the union's role will become more pronounced in two functional areas, decision-making and self-management.

The first change will be the advancement of additional direct decision-making by workers, probably within an even more decentralized and localized environment.¹⁷ Rade Galeb, a member of the presidency of the SSJ, forecast this general trend to the participants at a conference following the 1982 Congress of the Trade Union Association:

The essence of union action is in the involvement of the workers so that as a class they can build upon their real interests and realize them in the processes and institutions of self-management and the delegate system of decision-making. The foundation and growth of self-management incorporates union action as an actual political and organizational precondition, and as a condition for ensuring the working class content in self-managed and delegate institutions.¹⁸

The second expansion of union action is likely to occur in the protection of the workers against weaknesses in the practice of self-management. This is becoming apparent in the constant planning process and the program for economic stabilization. The unions are becoming more forthright in their public concern for the decline of living standards, weaknesses in working conditions, and ineffective investment priorities.¹⁹

An effective way to illustrate the future direction of the Trade Union Association of Yugoslavia is to examine its most recent congress platform statements. Some of the purposes and tasks of the program have a long range character; others are of more limited concern and duration. The 1982 platform contained seven major components, and each commits the unions to specified action.²⁰

(1) *Enhancement of worker control over personal income.* The program of the Trade Union Association in 1982 mandates that the unions become more actively involved in planning and implementing policies that affect the production of goods and services, distribution of enterprise income, and the distribution of net personal income. In the introductory speech to the Ninth Congress of the SSJ, Bogoljub Nedeljković, the president of the association, stated:

One of the fundamental reasons for today's difficulties and problems is that the workers are not always sufficiently engaged in making decisions about the conditions and fruits of their work. A large proportion of their income is taken from the workers and is occasionally not used in their best interests, and very often used without their approval. . . . We must quickly and forcefully root out the tactic where everyone gives lip service to the principle that workers must determine the distribution of income, but not increase the share of income which is under their direct control.²¹

(2) *Implementation of the economic stabilization policy.* A second priority for the unions is the implementation of the policy of economic stabilization.

The SSJ pledged to become more involved in the promotion of the development of underdeveloped regions in the country, namely, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Macedonia, and the restoration of economic growth leading to a higher standard of living for the population. Involvement in these activities also implies a need for more influence by the union in investment and pricing policies. A new emphasis was also placed on the development of the small business sector and support for agriculture and agriculturally related industrial enterprises.

(3) *Working and living conditions.* The question of working and living conditions has always been a major responsibility for Yugoslav unions. Currently the platform directs the unions to become more concerned and outspoken about these problems, because the real wages of workers have fallen dramatically in recent years, including an additional 25 percent from January 1983 to July 1984.²² The concern is to be centered on such issues as employment, productivity, housing policy, safety and working conditions, and integration of the younger workers into the economy. There is also renewed concern for issues relating to pension protection, workmen's compensation, disability insurance, recreation and physical fitness, and child welfare, maternity, and infant care policies.

A nationwide poll of SSJ members conducted in 1977 revealed the depth of concern about these issues. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents agreed that the union needs to become more concerned and involved in these basic policies.²³ A poll of members in Slovenia in 1982 supported this finding by noting that 59 percent of those polled were unaware of any union involvement in these areas.²⁴

(4) *Protection of workers temporarily employed abroad.* This program plank introduces a series of questions relating to the basic welfare of Yugoslavs employed abroad. It includes a concern for the position of the guest workers' families and particularly for their children. It is also concerned with facilitating the entry of those workers who wish to return to Yugoslavia by expanding job opportunities and permitting the investment of foreign-derived capital into the small business service sector. Recently, for example, SSJ involvement was instrumental in establishing a program of amnesty for the children of guest workers who had not fulfilled their military obligations to Yugoslavia.²⁵

(5) *Education, science, and culture.* The unions also obligated themselves to become involved in the enhancement of a comprehensive and unified system of education in Yugoslavia. They are expected to accent particularly the need for training of the industrial work force and to insure equal opportunity for education for all, regardless of the individual's social origin and personal family wealth and connections. The SSJ is expected to play a central role in each republic's attempts to reform the structure and content of the educational system.²⁶

(6) *Improving the organizational, ideological-political, and membership position*

of the ssj. The union's organizational structure also received some notice in the Congress's 1982 platform. Generally, union locals were perceived to be in need of revitalization and enforcement of due process. At the national level, difficulties in coordination and communications with republic bodies were noted, as well as a tendency for the national leadership to defer their obligations in the legislative assemblies to others.²⁷ The organization also reaffirmed its commitment to rotating leadership and to the deprofessionalization of the union's leadership hierarchy.

(7) *International cooperation.* International cooperation was another issue for union involvement in the 1982 Congress platform. Particular emphasis was placed on the development of cooperation with unions in neighboring countries. It also encouraged additional cooperation with unions in countries such as West Germany and Austria where there are considerable numbers of guest workers or emigrants from Yugoslavia.

In summary, the ssj has changed dramatically from the days following the war when it was a captive institution of the Party. These changes have continued to the present time, generally in the direction of more responsibilities and duties. Today, the unions have at least partial responsibility for a wide number of specific policy areas such as work security, vocational education, and income distribution. They also retain their general responsibility for encouraging self-management and the delegate system in the country. Succeeding sections describe the institutional structures that the ssj employs to achieve its goals, and they evaluate the success of the ssj in reaching its current goals and purposes.

Organizational Structure of the ssj

The Trade Union Association of Yugoslavia was chartered to be the only recognized labor union organization in Yugoslavia. Union locals in economic enterprises and service organizations are consolidated into communal organizations. Communal organizations are consolidated into republic organizations, which are merged into the federal-level Trade Union Organization. The ssj, the national consolidated grouping of trade unions, contains members from such diverse fields as production-line workers, white-collar workers, technicians, agricultural workers, and even university professors and artists. No other organization, with the possible exception of the Socialist Alliance, possesses these characteristics.

According to the charter and rules of the ssj, membership in a Yugoslav union is voluntary. Anyone who chooses not to belong cannot be forced to join, and every member can resign whenever he or she wishes to do so. Few members, however, choose not to join or to resign, and it is extremely rare for an individual to be involuntarily excluded from the ssj. To illustrate this point: no one had been excluded from the Slovenian ssj for the entire period

from 1974 to 1978.²⁸ The unions cannot exclude members for ideological, religious, nationality, or other differences. According to the charter, all members have identical rights, and there are strong prohibitions against any religious, nationality, or ideological discrimination. In Kosovo, for example, some union officials were removed from office for discriminatory behavior.

Structural Framework

Beginning in 1945 when the SSJ was formed, the unions organized themselves on the industrial pattern (that is, all union members in a particular work organization belong to the same union). If the organization is large enough to have more than one local chapter, the locals all affiliate with the same union according to the predominant activity of the workplace. Thus, for example, all union employees of a firm like Yugopetrol, which in its various branches markets and refines petroleum products and operates restaurants and hotels, belong to the same union, albeit to different locals. Examples of trade union branches include the energy workers' union, transportation and communications union, and education, science, and cultural union.

Functionally, each union is a separate organization, but, in practice, the more important consolidation of employees beyond the enterprise level occurs on a territorial, not a functional basis. At each territorial level beyond the organized neighborhood (commune, city, province, republic, and federation), an association of trade unions is formed that consists of all the local chapters that exist and operate within the relevant territory. Thus, the union organization parallels the organizational pattern of the other political organizations and political institutions.

As is the case with all the political organizations, excluding the SKJ, the Trade Union Association operates on the delegate principle. At all levels, the charter of the SSJ demands that discussions and decision-making be public and open to membership involvement. Leaders are to be selected on the delegate principle and serve no more than four years. Elections are to be conducted publicly, and public discussion and evaluations of SSJ leadership performance must be scheduled. Recently, the charter strongly insisted on collective leadership, shorter terms of office, and consistent rotation of new leaders to achieve deprofessionalization of the leadership.

Federal Organization At the federal level of the SSJ there are three major delegate institutions (see figure 4.1): the Congress, the Chambers (*Véće*), and the Supervisory Committee. In addition, the SSJ maintains a federal advisory committee, a collective presidency, and other committees and commissions as needed.

The Congress is the most important institution of the Federal Association of Trade Unions. Its primary purposes are to implement policy in the platform,




Figure 4.1: Flow of authority in the National Union Federation

to renew and amend the charter, to evaluate the performance of the organization over the previous four years, and to select leaders for the inter-Congress period. The Congress usually lasts three days and is usually held in November every four years.

The size of the Congress varies. In 1974, there were 1,495 delegates to the Seventh Congress; in 1978, there were 1,383 delegates; and in 1982, 1,085 delegates attended the Ninth Congress.²⁹ Each republic and provincial commune organization sends delegates to the Congress, each according to its union membership size. In 1982, there was a minimum of one delegate per commune plus one delegate for every additional 5,000 members. The provincial and republic ssj organizations, associations of pensioners and the association of disabled workers separately send delegates to the ssj Congress.

Congress delegates tend to reflect multiunion constituencies from the communal organizations, rather than single-union or single-enterprise representation. The operating paper also mandates that women and workers be represented proportionately by their size in the organization. In 1978, approximately 24 percent of delegates were women and 7 percent were youth.³⁰ In 1982, the corresponding figures were 24 percent and 10 percent.³¹ Congressional delegates were largely from the ranks of work organizations; however, less-skilled and trained workers were somewhat underrepresented. For example, engineers held 22 percent of the seats designated for direct producers, while enterprise directors and lawyers held an additional 16 percent.³² The Congress is still largely a middle-aged, male gathering, although major changes have occurred since the 1960s.

The typical program of the Congress follows a pattern in which the outgo-

ing officers of the SSJ evaluate the performance of the organization and pinpoint problems which they feel the Congress should address. Following these introductory addresses, various committees make reports on such subjects as the financial and membership situation in the union organization. The second day is largely taken up with the work of the various commissions. In 1982, there were thirteen commissions, including seven commissions for Congress business (for example, credentials) and six policy commissions (for example, living standards and social policy). The commissions then report to the Congress, and their recommendations and amendments are taken into consideration in the drafting of the platform of the Congress. In 1982, there were forty-five amendments, of which thirty-seven were accepted by the commissions. The third day sees the approval of the platform, election of officers, and a closing address by the newly elected officers.

Since 1974, the Congresses have gradually become more critical and outspoken in their protection of worker rights. The Seventh Congress brought attention to the problems associated with inflation, but its criticisms were relatively muted. In 1978, the Eighth Congress noted some impending economic problems such as the decline in investment and productivity rates and housing shortages. The Ninth Congress in 1982, however, was noteworthy for its general critical tone.³⁵ Among other points, the introductory and closing addresses brought attention to weaknesses in the economic stabilization program, excessive governmental expenditures, the decline in the standard of living for workers, etc. The congresses of the SSJ are now far removed from the self-congratulatory gatherings that typified some of the earlier meetings.

A second major institution of the Federal SSJ organization is the Federal Chamber. The Chamber (*Véce* SSJ) is elected by the Congress and serves an organizational function similar to the Central Committee in the League and Socialist Alliance. Among other duties, it implements the resolutions of the Congress, represents the unions in the preparation, negotiations, and ratification of social agreements, and participates in the electoral process. This institution coordinates the efforts of the republic-consolidated union organizations as well as individual industrial union organizations. Among other duties, it is responsible for international cooperation with unions outside of Yugoslavia. The agenda of Chamber meetings varies considerably but often concentrates on establishing general policy guidelines for various national labor problems.³⁴

Another significant duty of the Chamber is to represent the interests of the SSJ in the political and economic institutions of the federation. It is often called upon to cooperate with other political organizations on a one-to-one basis, or indirectly through the Socialist Alliance. From 1978 to 1982, the Chamber met as a single body twenty-eight times, or approximately every other month.³⁵

The Chamber of the SSJ fulfills another administrative function. Together with the republic and provincial organizations, it selects major program activities, and forms new ad hoc institutions to examine specific problems and to make policy recommendations. For example, on the federal level, several labor committees identify with particular policy problems and carry out the duties that are given to them by the Chamber.

Since the 1982 Congress, 117 members sit on the Federal SSJ Chamber, compared to 146 in 1978. The reduction is intended to facilitate the Chamber's decision-making potential. Presently, each republic receives fourteen members on the Federal SSJ Chamber and the provinces receive eleven members each. The pensioners association receives two members, and the disabled workers' organization receives one member on the National Chamber.

The term of office for Chamber members is four years, and no one can serve more than two consecutive terms. Membership in the SSJ Chamber is largely middle-aged (73 percent), male (74 percent), dominated by League of Communist members, and heavily weighted with individuals from the technical or professional occupations.³⁶ The operating papers specify that at least 25 percent of the Chamber be female and that 51 percent be employed by firms engaged in direct production. Table 4.3 lists the appropriate figures for 1978 and 1982. There has been little change in the background characteristics of the Chamber since 1978. The 1982 Chamber is slightly younger than its predecessor and has a slightly higher percentage of workers. Even though the percentages have not varied dramatically, there has been a considerable amount of rotation, with less than 7 percent of the current Chamber having been reelected from the previous Chamber.

Unlike the other political organizations in Yugoslavia, the Trade Union Association provides for quasi-executive bodies whose role and function somewhat parallel that of the Chamber. These bodies are composed of representatives from each of the republic trade union organizations,³⁷ and their primary purpose appears to be to assist the republics and provinces in communicating attitudes and forming solutions to industry-wide problems.³⁸ These boards represent an industrial branch such as construction, communications, or health and social welfare workers.

In 1982 there were fifteen of these industrial, general branch trade-union boards. Twelve of the fifteen boards embraced general industrial branches that were common to all the republics and provinces. Three boards served a more narrow focus, and, correspondingly, had less than full representation. The committee varied in membership size from twelve to thirty-two and involved a total of 345 delegates. From 1978 to 1982, the boards held 256 sessions, 76 hearings, and 298 thematic sessions or collaborative meetings with other organizations.³⁹

Although the Federal SSJ Chamber has the right to initiate the formation of a Federal Board, this rarely occurs. Instead, republic or provinces or specific

branches of industry take the initiative and form a Federal Board. They are often constituted for the purpose of expediting the negotiation processes, particularly among republics and provinces in a certain industrial sector. Another purpose is to facilitate interrepublic cooperation among independent firms or economic branches.

Executive decision-making within the national union organizations is carried out by two bodies: the presidency and the supervisory committee. The presidency is constituted on the basis of republic/provincial representation and presently has twenty-two members, with three from each republic and two from each province. All the members of the presidency are members of the Chamber and, collectively, they behave like the Chamber's secretariat. They serve four-year terms and elect a president from their ranks to serve as chairperson of the body for a one-year nonrenewable term.

The spirit of the Tito Initiative appears to be very strong in leadership recruitment for this institution. In 1982 only one member had served as a member of the presidency four years earlier, and two members had served as former delegates to the Chamber. In fact, only six members of the 1982–86 presidency had even attended the previous national SSJ Congress as delegates. The occupational distribution, however, is more consistent with earlier findings. Of the twenty-two current members, seven classify themselves as workers, seven are economists, four are political workers, one each is a sociologist, lawyer, engineer, and one did not specify his occupation.

The SSJ presidency is relatively active. From 1982 to 1984, it met twenty-seven times (about twice the rate of the Chamber), and it considered 169 agenda items.⁴⁰ Items of special concern discussed included the decline in the standard of living for workers, the economic stabilization program, and the prevailing sense of inactivity or malaise among part of the membership. To a great extent, the presidency used its meetings to prepare documents and recommendations for consideration by the national SSJ Chamber.

Financial affairs for the national union organization are overseen by the supervisory council, a body of eight with one delegate from each republic and province. Its role is limited to financial affairs, and it performs a fiduciary, trustee function for certifying the correct revenue statements and expenditures of the union organization.

Republic Organization Patterns The republic trade union organizations are generally composed of the consolidation of the commune and city organizations within the territory of the republic. Serbia also has responsibility for the provincial organizations in Kosovo and Vojvodina. In many ways, the republic structure parallels the structure of the federal organization.

Republic and provincial trade union organizations are autonomous bodies within the general framework of the charter of the Federal SSJ. They independently formulate policies for their republics or provinces, and they take

positions that are relevant to the activities and needs of the union movement in their geographical areas.

As is the case for the federal ssj, the highest forum for the republic organization is the republic congress, which convenes every four years and precedes the national ssj congress. The duration of a republic ssj congress varies from one to two days, and the number of delegates varies, depending upon the republic ssj charter. The format of the republic congress parallels that of the national Congress, with speeches and addresses, committee reports, and elections.

Delegates to the republic congress are selected by the communal organizations that compose the republic. In Croatia during 1982, 33 percent of the delegates were women, 22 percent were youths,⁴¹ and only 14 percent were over fifty years of age. In addition, 71 percent were employed in economic enterprises and less than 3 percent were full-time union professionals.⁴² The data from this republic indicate that the composition of the republic congresses closely matches the membership profile.

As is the case with the national-level ssj, the republic congress outlines the policy of the organization for the succeeding four-year period. The congress and its commissions discusses and evaluates the work of their leadership as well as the performance of their delegates in the federal union and governmental institutions. The content of the congress varies by republic and time. In 1982, for instance, the primary agenda items for all republics were the stabilization plan, excessive growth of the bureaucracy, housing shortages, and the need to establish responsibility and rational investment in the economy. Some variation in the programs exists, depending upon the needs of the republic. Montenegro stressed the need for outside (that is, non-Montenegrin) assistance for her economy, while Slovenia brought up the need to restore confidence in the government.

Over time, the republic congresses have developed a more strident and concrete tone. The agenda of the 1978 republic congresses stressed organizational issues (primarily youth questions), distribution of income, and job safety.⁴³ In 1974, the primary issue was support for self-management and general satisfaction with union performance.⁴⁴ From 1974 to 1982, the level of self-criticism and inclusion of controversial, concrete issues has gradually increased, so that in 1982, the Croatian union association president, Mirko Mečave, demanded less government interference, accused the trade union branches of losing touch with their members, and charged state planners with unrealism and incompetence.⁴⁵

The work of the republic ssj chamber closely resembles that of the national ssj chamber. One of the more important activities of the chamber of the republic is its consultations with the republic conference of the Socialist Alliance, the republic youth federation, the republic League of Communists, the republic legislative assembly, and the national offices of the ssj. The

chamber decides the general direction of the union movement in the republic during the period between two congresses. A republic chamber such as Macedonia's has, in the past, discussed and debated such questions as the implementation of the economic stabilization policy, the situation of foreign guest workers, and employment policy. It has met an average of seven times per year and has considered approximately five agenda items per session.⁴⁶ In the 1978–82 intercongress period, Bosnia's chamber met twenty-one, Montenegro's twenty-six, Croatia's thirty-five, Macedonia's twenty-seven, Slovenia's thirty-five, Serbia's twenty-seven, Kosovo's twenty-three, and Vojvodina's twenty-seven times.

Members for the republic SSJ chambers are recruited from several sources. Some delegates are selected from the communal organizations and are elected to serve a four-year term. Others serve one- or two-year terms and are members because of their functions as presidents of the republic or regional union branches. In Croatia, eighty members of the republic SSJ chamber are elected at the republic congress, and thirty-one members are appointed for one-year terms on the basis of their office in the republic union movement.⁴⁷ Like the national chamber, the republic chambers are disproportionately middle-aged and male, and the delegates possess higher educational background. The chamber of Serbia in 1982, was disproportionately male, older, and from administrative and professional sectors.⁴⁸ Serbia, in 1974, had a slight majority of workers, up from 34.5 percent during the preceding period; however, in recent years, the dominant trend has been a decline in worker membership in the republic chambers.⁴⁹ In 1979, for example, only 31.4 percent of republic and provincial chambers members were workers.⁵⁰

Republic SSJ associations organize executive authority in a manner analogous to the national-level organization. Each republic or province has a presidency selected by the republic chamber or congress, a president of the presidency who is selected by the presidency, a secretary, and a supervisory committee to regulate financial affairs. The Croatian union association, for example, consists of twenty-seven members, including the presidents of each of the branch unions. Its supervisory committee is much smaller, consisting of seven members. With the exception of the president, members of these republic executive bodies are prohibited from serving simultaneously in the national level executive institutions.

The republic and provincial organizations not only maintain consolidated territorial based unions, they also possess republic-level union organizations based on the industrial principle and roughly paralleling in function the national union boards. The number and industrial base of each branch union varies by republic. In some cases, the needs of a particular industry, such as shipbuilding in Croatia or the chemical industry in Slovenia, must be addressed separately. In such cases separate industrial branch organizations can be very useful in helping to resolve problems and in formulating a




Figure 4.2: Institutional organization of the republic-level Trade Union Association

common industry-wide solution. The charter of the Serbian SSJ, for example, states that “the union, according to its rules, should include organized units from the fields of production of raw materials, assembly production, crafts, export and import trade, educational organizations, and scientific-engineering organizations.”⁵¹ In 1974, these units were consolidated into six branch organizations, one each for industry and mining, social services, agriculture and food processing, service activities, construction, and transportation.⁵² Figure 4.2 provides a typical republic organization chart.

Communal Organization The communal organizations of the trade union association are composed of the union locals in the enterprises and other workplace units in the commune. This level of the SSJ is responsible for the implementation of union programs in the political system of the commune and in the enterprises. In all likelihood, this level faces the most difficult tasks and bears the greatest share of responsibility.

On the commune level, the SSJ possesses several institutional bodies, which include the communal forum, chamber, supervisory committee, and presidency. Each of these bodies is elected on the delegate basis, which in these cases, means that union locals select delegations which then select delegates to serve on these bodies.

The data in table 4.2 provide information about the structure of these organizations by republic (figures include republic-level bodies as well). Of the over 43,000 elected officials in Yugoslavia, nearly 25 percent are women, 12 percent are youths, and nearly 70 percent are members of the SKJ. At this

Table 4.2 Number and type of elected officials in the Trade Union Association by republic, 1982

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Total elected officials</i>	<i>Total women</i>	<i>Per- centage women</i>	<i>Total youths</i>	<i>Per- centage youths</i>	<i>Per- centage Party members</i>	<i>Per- centage war veterans</i>
Yugoslavia	43,528	10,746	24.7	5,272	12.1	68.8	2.5
Bosnia- Herzegovina	5,142	1,157	22.5	862	16.8	79.2	1.5
Montenegro	1,234	217	17.6	163	13.2	87.0	4.3
Croatia	14,033	3,390	24.2	1,540	11.0	64.5	2.9
Macedonia	3,126	664	21.2	296	9.5	28.9	8.5
Slovenia	6,109	2,010	32.9	744	12.2	54.2	1.3
Serbia total	13,884	3,308	23.8	1,667	12.0	70.4	2.7
Serbia proper	9,255	2,191	23.7	1,008	10.9	67.8	2.8
Kosovo	1,422	226	15.9	243	17.1	83.1	3.0
Vojvodina	3,207	891	27.8	416	13.0	72.3	2.2
Federal Chamber and boards	498	92	18.5	11	2.2	98.0	10.0

Source: See table 4.1.

level, there is considerably higher representation by women and youth, but considerably less representation by party members, compared to the national ssj elected bodies.

There is considerable variation in communal-level representation among republics. Women constitute nearly 33 percent of the elected leadership in communal ssj organizations in Slovenia but less than 16 percent in Kosovo. Youth constitute over 17 percent of the organizational leadership in Kosovo but less than 10 percent in Macedonia. Party membership shows less extreme variation, with a high of 87 percent in Montenegro and a low of 54 percent in Slovenia. The variation, moreover, appears to follow a pattern that is best explained by cultural, demographic, and developmental differences among the provinces and republics.

The occupational structure of the communal leadership of the ssj demonstrates that no single occupational category dominates the leadership at this level (see table 4.3). Blue-collar workers are approximately one-third of the leadership bodies for all communes combined; the range is from 45 percent in Vojvodina to marginally under 30 percent in Slovenia. Occupational distributions, in general, seem to parallel the economic structure of the communes, with communes in Slovenia registering percentages of technicians over four times higher than in Kosovo, which has fewer technicians in its economy.

Each of the institutions in the communal ssj organization fulfills a differ-

Table 4.3 Occupational composition of the leadership officials of the Trade Union Association, 1982

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Bosnia</i>	<i>Montenegro</i>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Highly skilled workers	15.5	15.8	17.3
Skilled workers	19.2	22.7	19.9
Semiskilled workers	2.6	2.8	3.2
Unskilled workers	1.1	1.6	1.0
Self-employed	0.1	0.3	0.4
Privately employed	0.3	0.3	0.2
Engineers	7.5	6.4	5.3
Technicians	11.8	8.7	7.7
Economists	5.9	6.3	7.7
Lawyers	4.0	3.5	4.9
Cultural workers	10.5	9.9	10.4
Health occupations	4.4	3.3	4.3
Scientists	0.3	0.2	0.4
Administrators	9.9	10.4	9.0
Directors	3.2	2.4	3.6
Sociopolitical workers	2.4	3.1	3.6
Retired or disabled	1.1	1.3	1.1
Unknown	0.1	1.0	0.0
Private farmers	0.1	0.0	0.0

Source: Veće Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije, *Zbirni Podaci Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Savez Sindikata Jugoslavije, 1982).

ent role. The communal forum is analogous to the republic or provincial congress. It convenes once every four years, reviews and evaluates the overall performance of the SSJ in the commune, and evaluates the activities of the communal leadership and its delegates in the communal legislative assembly.

The other institutions of the communal SSJ include the communal chamber and its supervisory committee. The first deals with broad policy questions at the commune level, while the second is appointed by the chamber and performs the regular administrative tasks. In addition to the supervisory committee, the chamber elects a collective presidency and secretary as well. The duties of those offices parallel those of the corresponding republic-level bodies.

Communal chambers coordinate the work of individual union locals and attempt to direct the locals toward cooperation and the implementation of the communal organization goals. This implies that the chambers support those local activities that expand the members' participation in political and economic institution decision-making, ranging from elections to investment

<i>Croatia</i>	<i>Macedonia</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>	<i>Serbia</i>	<i>National bodies</i>
100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
18.4	12.5	9.3	15.5	13.7
15.9	16.4	17.7	22.3	8.6
2.5	1.6	1.5	3.3	0.0
0.5	0.7	1.1	1.8	0.0
0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
0.1	0.0	0.6	0.5	0.0
7.6	11.0	9.1	6.4	15.8
11.7	11.3	24.1	7.9	8.6
6.5	7.9	4.7	5.0	14.5
3.4	6.8	3.1	4.6	5.6
9.2	14.2	10.3	11.3	6.4
4.1	4.1	4.7	5.0	3.2
0.2	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6
12.2	6.3	6.6	9.8	2.8
4.3	4.7	2.5	2.4	5.2
2.5	1.7	3.2	1.7	14.9
0.8	0.2	1.1	1.5	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0

decisions. It also implies vigilance in the defense of the interests of the membership in such issues as job safety, pension payments, unemployment, etc.

A communal trade union organization often has additional commissions or bodies. Trstenik, a commune in central Serbia, maintains a membership commission, a commission for working and living conditions, and social policy boards like housing and education.⁵³ These bodies have defined and limited interests, and they may be either permanent or ad hoc committees, depending upon the nature of the problem.

The typical commission is formed to probe into questions that directly concern the membership or that may highlight weaknesses in the decision-making procedures. It also can reach conclusions and make suggestions for action to the communal chamber, but it is up to the communal chamber to take action, because this authority cannot be delegated to the commission.

Most communal ssj chambers possess a commission for complaints and petitions, a quasi-investigative body for determining the facts of cases brought

to them by an individual worker or group. Decisions can be appealed, and from 1978 to 1982, the republic and provincial review commissions received complaints from approximately 20,000 members. Approximately 60 percent of the complaints centered on poor performance of local chapters or communal organizations. Thirty percent concerned alleged violations of hiring practices or work rules, and much of the remainder centered on health or pension questions.⁵⁴

The institutions of the communal ssj cooperate with other political institutions and political organizations in the commune. The ssj communal chamber sends a delegation to the sociopolitical chambers of the communal legislative assembly, one of the most important political deliberative bodies in the commune. This delegation is responsible for articulating, formulating, and promoting policies of concern to union members and the union movement. Its activities and performance are discussed more fully in chapters seven and eight on legislative behavior and communes.

Communal trade union associations are expected to coordinate their activities very closely with other union locals and with other political organizations in the commune. The cooperation can occur with the Socialist Alliance for activities like electoral nominations, housing policy, and communal capital planning programs. This level of the trade union movement can also be significant in promoting the political involvement of the worker, and it can be significant in formulating policy procedures that can affect the living standards of workers and lessen social inequalities. One good example of this is local union involvement in determining priorities for the distribution of apartments to advance the welfare of individual disadvantaged workers.

Other Levels The Republic ssj can authorize the formation of two other subrepublic organizations, city organizations and regional organizations. City trade union associations exist in many of the larger cities that embrace the territory of more than one commune (for example, Belgrade, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Zagreb). These units are organized very similarly to the communal units, but they do not supplant the communal ssj. For example, Belgrade's city ssj organization works in conjunction with Belgrade's sixteen communal organizations.

Republic trade union associations can also authorize the formation of intercommunal organizations to link in with intercommunal regional associations. Such organizations exist in regions such as Split, Osijek, Maribor, Niš, and Banja Luka.

The Union Local A local can be chartered in nearly every work organization in Yugoslavia, and it is the basic building block of the ssj. No one can be a member of a union without being a member of a local where he/she works. In 1981, there were over 48,000 union locals with 5,756,451 members.⁵⁵

Most business at this level is conducted at the meeting of the local. A full membership meeting must be called at least once a year to discuss the current workplace problems, particularly those that touch on employee rights. Meetings can adopt positions relevant to the firm, approve higher-level decisions, and petition the communal chamber to consider particular problems.⁵⁶ The local union's meetings are open to all employees, even nonmembers, but only members can participate. Once a local becomes so large that mass meetings become unwieldy, the local is broken down into smaller units called branches.

At least once a year, a meeting must be held to evaluate the local's performance and the performance of its leaders. There is usually a separate organizational meeting to select the secretary, treasurer, president, and executive committee members for the local. The executive committee is the political unit that coordinates and directs the local during the period between the full membership meetings. As seen in table 4.1, approximately one out of six members of the SSJ serves as a member of an executive or supervisory committee.

Communication in the SSJ

Communication patterns within the SSJ are very different from those found in the LCY. While the Party decision-making is based on the principle of democratic centralism, unions use the delegate system, social compacts, and social agreements as their basic organizing principles. The operational implication of this difference is that in the unions, decisions are made only after participation of the membership and locals, with an emphasis on the widest possible discussion in the locals as a prelude to making decisions, arriving at recommendations, or enforcing positions. A preponderant majority, rather than a simple majority, is needed before common policy is agreed upon.

There is considerable variation from the ideal decision-making process mentioned above. In the final analysis, everything depends upon the capability and willingness of the locals and higher-level leadership to discuss and decide about their problems in a collegial and democratic manner. Often this occurs, but sometimes it does not.

Communication patterns within the SSJ may be considered from three perspectives: lateral communication, upward communication, and downward communication. Each is important to the decision-making process of the organization, and deviations from expected patterns of communication can impede the implementation of the goals of the organization.

Internal communications within the union local are only meaningful if examined within the context of the enterprise and the commune. The center for lateral communication within the local is the local's executive committee working together with its commissions and subcommittees. Their functions are to receive and transmit information of concern to the membership of the

locals and to the decision-making bodies in the commune and work organization. It is their responsibility to control the agenda and set the groundwork for public discussions. They also, in conjunction with higher levels of the organization, take positions and make recommendations, particularly concerning enterprise actions.⁵⁷

Another channel of communication for the local is directed toward maintaining relations with the other administrative, executive, and political institutions that affect the enterprise. A major goal of this interorganizational cooperation is to participate and organize policy for the enterprise. This takes the form of a semilegal document called a self-managed agreement. As the ssj charter points out,

The local of the Trade Union Association participates in concluding a self-managed agreement which determines the working relationship in associated work, or determines the basis and measures for the distribution of net income and the distribution of funds for personal income and the community consumption of the work, as well as other questions relating to the general self-management act or law. The local can sign this agreement if their decisions are in accordance with the positions developed at its meetings or in cooperation with other locals or bodies of the Trade Union Association.⁵⁸

On the enterprise level, there is also communication between the ssj local and other political organizations. The ssj must coordinate its activities and policies with the chapters of the Youth Federation, League of Communists, and Socialist Alliance. Most activities within the enterprise, particularly the larger and more important ones, must be coordinated in order to maintain a modicum of order and efficiency.

An agro-industrial enterprise at Trstenik, Serbia provides an illustration of how this process works. The leadership bodies from the enterprise and the political organizations conducted discussions within the framework of the national program of economic stabilization on the preferred direction of agricultural development in the commune. The union locals as well as the other political organizations were included in the discussions and the practical implementation of the program. The local ssj directly influenced the course of events by explaining the need for the commune to appropriate funds that would guarantee loans for workers and citizens to maximize agricultural production.⁵⁹ These recommendations were accepted in the communal plan and were part of the self-management agreement that followed.

Formal communication with communal institutions is executed through delegates elected by the locals. In the communes, particularly in the political chamber of the communal assembly, the union has a direct voice and influence in the decision-making process. Contacts with republic- or federal-level political institutions are also facilitated by elected delegates from the locals.

Generally, such contacts are more prevalent between locals from larger or more prestigious firms such as major steel works, auto producers, electronics firms, etc. Sometimes, however, this form of communication can break down, as occurred during the Kosovan difficulties in 1980–81. Under such circumstances, the entire organizational communication network needs to be rebuilt.

We have already discussed some aspects of this communication, which appears in various formats, including the delegate process, on-site visits from union leaders, sponsorship of social science research, and the union press. The primary method of horizontal communication is through the delegate process. Generally, this system appears to work; however, there are cases in which the system fails to achieve its goals or cases where speed is of highest priority. Under such circumstances alternate mechanisms for communication must be used.

Under high-conflict conditions within the institutions of the union in the commune, province, or republic, the delegate system may be stalemated. When this occurs, higher-level representatives will be sent to arbitrate disputes and settle conflicts. Higher-level union representatives will also regularly visit and consult with union locals as part of their normal duties.

The union press is designed not only to inform members about association decisions, but also to identify serious violations of individual or group rights and to publicize these problems. Large organizations will produce a professional-type newspaper. Smaller organizations tend to print newsletters that accomplish the same goals. Items of general interest can be circulated through the general mass media, and most of the federal and republic information is disseminated that way.

Recruitment

There are two fundamental purposes for recruitment policy in the union organization: to expand opportunities for workers to achieve leadership positions in the union and other organizations, and to maximize union influence in the general election process. This section examines membership trends in recent years, patterns in leadership recruitment, and procedures for training leaders in the ssj.

Membership

According to the charter of the Trade Union Association of Yugoslavia,

The worker who becomes a member of the Trade Union Association is enrolled as a member in a local chapter of the association and, simultaneously, is enrolled as a member of the republic or provincial organi-

zation inside the federation. Membership in the Trade Union Association is voluntary, and enrollment is delegated to the local chapter of the SSJ on the basis of a declaration from the worker that he is willing to support the charter of the Trade Union Association of Yugoslavia and the charter of the Trade Union Association of the republic and province in which he lives.⁶⁰

The charter mandates that members of the union local must be responsible for formulating the policies and decisions of the organization. They have the right to elect or be elected to all leadership bodies in the union, and membership in the organization ceases whenever a member violates the charter of the organization and the member has been formally excluded by the union local chapter. In reality, resignation from the SSJ and instances of involuntary exclusion are very rare.⁶¹

The membership rolls of the trade unions have grown as the number of employed workers in the economy has grown. By 1979, there were 5,500,000 employed and almost that many members of the union—99.1 percent. In 1981, the number of employed increased to 5,793,496, and the trade union membership jumped correspondingly to 5,756,451 (see table 4.1). The number of union members increased in all republics at a rate generally proportional to the increase in the number of employed.⁶² Among republics and provinces, Montenegro and Vojvodina have somewhat smaller membership rates than the other federal entities, but the differences are not very significant.

On the basis of the data indicating that membership in the union is nearly universal, there is little reason for the SSJ to engage in special membership drives, or to consider that it has a membership recruitment problem. Nevertheless, there may be a different sort of problem resulting from the fact that SSJ membership, in many cases, is automatic and does not really indicate a conscious decision to join. The Croatian organization recently recognized this problem, and the 1982 Congress decided to require potential members to petition for membership.

Due to the large membership rate of the SSJ, the social structure of the membership of the unions is nearly identical to the social structure of the employed in Yugoslavia. The largest category in terms of numbers is that of qualified workers, immediately followed by the unskilled workers and middle-educated workers.⁶⁴ The total work force is approximately 36 percent female, 21 percent aged twenty-seven or less, but with considerable variation by republic.⁸⁴ Table 4.4 provides data on the skill, age, gender distribution of the workforce in the federation and the republics and provinces. These figures are the base to make later judgments about representation of selective groups in the leadership bodies of the union.

Nearly all leaders in the economic and political life of Yugoslavia are members of a union, and union membership could be considered one of the

prerequisites for performing leadership functions. Only two social groups appear to be less willing to join a union: one is the group composed of those who own small private shops, the other is farm workers. Both groups, however, do have many members who are active in unions.

Leadership Recruitment

A policy of leadership recruitment in the SSJ rests on the principle of granting priority to the members from the dominant occupational category in the enterprise. For example, in an industrial work organization, priority for election to the governing boards of the union is given to industrial workers, engineers, and technicians. If the enterprise is a school or medical clinic, then priority belongs to teachers and medical personnel, respectively. The general principle which should be followed is that in each working organization, most leadership positions should be reserved for that category of worker which best represents the activity of the enterprise. It is, of course, understood that those selected are considered to be among the best workers and are among the most active union members.

The data from table 4.1 show that the leadership bodies of the unions in Yugoslavia had 42,528 elected leaders at the end of 1981. Of that number 24.7 percent were women and 13.1 percent were youths. Of the total leadership structure in the SSJ, 68.3 percent were LCY members compared to approximately 10 percent of the population as a whole.

If we analyze this structure by republic, we can see significant differences. In Slovenia, the most developed republic, 32 percent of the leaders are women, compared to 15.9 percent in Kosovo, the least-developed region. Conversely, Kosovo, the province with the largest percentage youth population, also has the largest youth contingent in the SSJ leadership bodies. LCY membership was highest in Montenegro with 87 percent Party membership, followed by Macedonia with 78 percent.

The republics also vary in the success to which their leadership profiles match the profiles of their membership. Table 4.5 provides an index of inequality between leadership and membership characteristics, with numbers smaller than 1.0 indicating a less equitable distribution of leaders for the particular group under investigation.⁶⁵ The results indicate that women and youths are underrepresented for their proportion of the work force in every Yugoslav republic and province. Nationally, women receive only 68 percent of leadership posts than their size would justify. On the federal level alone, they receive only 51 percent of their proportionate leadership posts. Youths fare even more poorly; they receive nationally only 57 percent of their proportionate leadership posts, and with respect to federal SSJ bodies, they receive only 10 percent.

In general, there are an insufficient number of women and youth leaders

Table 4.4 Structural and occupational characteristics of workers in the Yugoslav republics and provinces, 1981 (in percentages)

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Workers in 1000s</i>	<i>Percentage female</i>	<i>Percentage youth</i>
Yugoslavia total	5,873	36.1	21.1
Bosnia-Herzegovina	854	32.3	25.4
Montenegro*	133	33.2	19.9
Croatia	1,418	39.9	—
Macedonia	435	32.1	16.6
Slovenia	780	45.2	26.5
Serbia*	2,226	34.0	19.8
Serbia proper	1,482	34.7	19.7
Kosovo	183	21.1	22.2
Vojvodina	560	36.5	19.4

*Youth and occupational figures for Montenegro and Serbia are for 1978.

Sources: 1978 Data for Serbia and Montenegro—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Radnici Prema Polu Starosti, Vrsti Radnog Odnosa i Smena, 1978," *Statistički Bilten* 1277 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, January 1982), and Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Radnici Prema Stepenu Stručnog Obrazovanja, 1978," *Statistički Bilten* 1272 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, December 1981). Yugoslavia and Female—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ* 1983 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za

in the trade union organizations, even though the total numbers of these groups who hold leadership posts are not small. The reason for this relatively poor performance for youths probably lies in the fact that Yugoslav youths enter the work force somewhat later in life compared to other countries. Vocational education and military service last longer, and a disproportionately large number of youths remain in school without interruption until they complete their university training. Another impediment to youth leadership representation is the fact that two-thirds of the unemployed are in the younger age brackets, thereby limiting selection from these individuals.⁶⁶

Among all the political organizations in Yugoslavia, the leadership institutions of the SSJ are most successful in recruiting workers to leadership posts. Highly qualified workers constitute 15.5 percent of the leadership, compared to 9.4 percent of the members. The qualified workers receive 19.2 percent of leadership posts, compared to 30 percent of the membership. The next largest occupational categories for SSJ leaders are the technicians, which compose 11.8 percent of the leadership, followed by cultural workers and artisans with 10.4 percent. Both of these groups are disproportionately favorably represented in the leadership. Unskilled workers, of course, suffer arithmetically the most serious handicaps.

Education				Training level			
Higher	High	Middle	Low	Highly skilled	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled
7.9	6.7	18.3	3.9	9.4	30.0	12.9	11.1
6.1	5.5	15.6	5.3	7.3	28.2	13.7	18.3
7.1	6.2	18.4	4.4	7.4	29.8	10.8	15.9
6.7	5.5	17.8	5.3	5.2	28.1	10.9	20.5
7.1	5.1	19.3	6.4	7.0	28.3	13.7	13.0
4.7	4.8	17.1	5.0	3.0	28.5	17.2	19.7
6.6	5.5	17.9	6.2	8.1	27.0	11.8	16.9
7.2	5.5	18.2	6.1	8.5	26.9	12.1	15.5
5.4	7.4	21.1	6.3	8.7	22.5	12.0	16.6
5.4	5.2	16.4	6.4	6.8	28.4	10.7	20.7

Statistiku, 1983). Macedonia—Republički Zavod za Statistika, *Statistički Godišnik na SR Makedonija 1983* (Skopje: Republički Zavod za Statistika, 1983), pp. 142, 155. Slovenia—Zavod SR Slovenije za Statistiko, *Statistični Letopis SR Slovenije 1983* (Ljubljana: Zavod SR Slovenije za Statistiko, 1983), p. 106. Croatia—Republički Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SR Hrvatske, 1983* (Zagreb: Republički Zavod za Statistiku, 1983), p. 69. Bosnia—Republički Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SR Bosne i Hercegovina* (Sarajevo: Republički Zavod za Statistiku, 1983), p. 86.

The leadership occupational structure is not without fault. White-collar occupations are overrepresented, and the individual agricultural workers are severely underrepresented. White-collar workers represent 60 percent of the union leadership, but only 37 percent of the employed labor force. Unskilled workers constitute only 1 percent of the leadership, but represent 11 percent of the total national labor force. The indices of inequality illustrate the problem, generating scores of 1.63 for white-collar workers and only 0.10 for unskilled workers. The results with respect to the occupational distribution of the leadership indicate that the republics, provinces, and national SSJ bodies have not achieved full occupational equity. Less-skilled workers are underrepresented and white-collar administrative types are overrepresented. There is a nearly linear positive trend toward favoring more highly skilled groups for all republics, provinces, and the national organization.

It is necessary when considering Yugoslavia to examine the nationality component of the leadership. This concern, unlike gender, age, and occupation, is formally regulated by a system of quotas. First, parity is given on leadership bodies on the national level to each republic. A slightly smaller representation is given to each of the provinces. For example, the Federal Chamber of the SSJ apportions fourteen members to each republic and eleven

Table 4.5 Indices of inequality for leadership post distributions compared to membership distribution in the Trade Union Association, 1981

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Youth</i>	<i>White collar</i>	<i>Highly skilled</i>	<i>Skilled</i>	<i>Semi-skilled</i>	<i>Unskilled</i>
Yugoslavia total	.68	.57	1.63	1.65	.64	.21	.10
Bosnia-							
Herzegovina	.70	.52	1.50	1.68	.80	.46	.09
Montenegro*	.53	.66	1.38	2.33	.67	.30	.06
Croatia	.61	—	1.56	3.54	.57	.23	.02
Macedonia	.66	.58	1.65	1.77	.58	.12	.05
Slovenia	.73	.46	1.99	3.10	.62	.09	.06
Serbia total*	.70	.61	1.40	1.91	.83	.28	.11
Serbia proper	.68	.55	1.38	1.86	.84	.24	.10
Kosovo	.75	.77	1.30	1.23	.59	.70	.08
Vojvodina	.76	.67	1.44	1.91	.89	.40	.13
National leaders	.51	.10	2.12	1.46	.29	.00	.00

*Membership figures for occupational categories are based on 1978 data.

Source: Computed by the authors.

to each of the two provinces. Second, every year the position of the union association president rotates from one republic or province to another, and the same principle holds for the federal boards, with some modifications. In cases where the principle of parity would lead to an absurd situation of malrepresentation (for example, shipbuilding in Macedonia), participation within a union leadership body is based on the size of the membership in the province or republic.

At the republic, commune, and local union levels, the accepted policy is that leaders should be recruited on the basis of nationality equality and fair representation of all nationalities. In most republics, minority nationalities tend to receive a disproportionately larger share of representation in the republic SSJ leadership bodies.

All political organizations in Yugoslavia have accepted the principle that leadership posts should be as close to the membership as possible and that leaders should be rotated as often as possible from their posts. This principle is a form of deprofessionalization, and its implementation has been labeled the Tito Initiative. The SSJ, however, appears to have adopted this policy more intensively and extensively than nearly any other political organization in Yugoslavia.

The unions appear to have led in the deprofessionalization of the leadership. They were the first organizations to introduce the shortened term of office and the mandatory return to a leader's workplace at the conclusion of the term of office. Even the national SSJ president serves for one year, and

members of the presidency tend to serve two years with few second terms. For example, a comparison of the 1978 and 1982 membership lists of the National ssj Chamber revealed only eight names or 7 percent of the body who were incumbents. Among the presidency there was only one individual or 5 percent of the total who had served through both congresses.

Deprofessionalization also acts to reduce the size of the professional paid staff. The number of people who are employed by the ssj in a professional capacity is relatively tiny compared to the size of the membership. For all levels of the union organization combined, there were only 1,074 paid employees for an organization containing nearly six million people.⁶⁷ The ratio is one paid functionary per 5,498 union members, and the background of the paid staff in the union does not pose a threat to the union leadership. The occupational structure of the union staff reveals that nearly three-quarters have some education beyond high school, but only 27.6 percent have a bachelor's degree or higher.

Leadership Training

Among unions, there is an old tradition of instructing members in the performance of union leadership duties. In the Yugoslav case, however, the union not only instructs members for leadership roles in their union, but they also train people for leadership functions in other institutions. Training is an important activity for the ssj at all levels.

Instructional activities of the union have two foci. One is to maximize the direct and indirect influence of the member who participates in economic and political decision-making. To achieve this goal, the union influences the school curricula, ranging from the primary school to the university. In recent reforms of the secondary and higher educational system, for example, the unions played a crucial role. They served on the policy committees, conducted studies of labor force needs, suggested curricula changes, and generally tried to eliminate elitism from the school system. The ssj also assists other organizations, notably the youth federation, in the preparation and conduct of their educational seminars.

The second focus of the leadership training program is direct instruction of members in performing the functions and activities of the union. All republics and provinces have an instructional training program, and many communal and larger work organizations or locals have their own programs in self-management processes.

Many of the union associations maintain a union school for leadership instruction. For example, the Serbian ssj Chamber has a trade union school that organizes different educational programs for its members including seminars, lectures, series, courses, etc. Unions also manage publishing out-

lets that prepare and disseminate literature for use by the general membership.

Often, the education programs can include a wider circle of people than the leadership. In 1975, the Vojvodinan ssj Chamber authorized a program of Marxist education and ideological-political education for the general membership. In the same year, the union association in Kosovo adopted a similar orientation program for political and ideological education of the workers. Other republics have similar training opportunities. During 1977-78, approximately 183,000 individuals attended seminars sponsored by the republic branches of the ssj. The ssj of Bosnia also sponsored ninety classes that enrolled 4,500 students. Croatia enrolled 1,395 members in forty-four classes. Slovenia registered 1,485 participants and Serbia 2,700.⁶⁸

Communes that have their own instructional programs can rely heavily on the provincial or republic programs for curriculum development. They can also rely on the expertise and assistance of the appropriate republic chamber and the republic's scientific and educational institutions.

The program of the political school of the ssj of Serbia highlights the typical educational program. It was adopted near the end of 1979 and consisted of four subject areas. *Area One*: Introductory themes about self-management and the role of the unions in it. *Area Two*: Explanation of socialist self-managed social-economic relations and how the workers interact in this system. *Area Three*: Description of the union in the political system. *Area Four*: Analysis of the organization and social role of the Trade Union Association. Each area involves approximately ten hours of classroom instruction.

For every theme, there is a well-trained expert in the field who prepares brochures and teaching materials. These booklets are available for study by every member of the union, and they form the basis of lectures in the communal centers or in the union schools. The lectures are followed by discussion which tries to relate the more theoretical content of the lectures to practical problems in the issue area.

Finances

Union finances are very simple. The unions are financed almost completely by the membership, and the majority of dues payments come from an assessment of 0.6 percent of net personal income of the member.⁶⁹ Table 4.12 provides data about sources of union revenue as reported at the Ninth National Congress of the ssj in 1982. The Chamber of the Trade Union Association formulated guidelines for the disbursement of dues and procedures for financing the activities of the union. Funds for the national-level organization result from formal agreements among the republic and provincial associations.

At least once a year the SSJ organization is required to inform its membership about expenditures and the current condition of the treasury. An examination of the expenditure pattern for the national-level SSJ indicates that most expenditures are related to administrative expenses. Publishing, for example, accounts for 15 percent of expenditures. Administration and salaries account for 65 percent.⁷⁰

Evaluation of the Performance of the Trade Union Association

The criteria for evaluating the performance of the SSJ is rooted in the evaluation of how well the association performs its political, social, and individual level responsibilities at the national, republic/provincial, or local governmental levels. Because so many goals are involved, and because so many governmental units must be taken into consideration, the evaluation, by necessity, can address itself fairly only to estimations of mean or general behavior and not to the extremes or particular union practices.

Political Institutional Responsibilities

As discussed earlier, the 1974 constitution expanded the political responsibilities of the union movement, and delegated some additional new political responsibilities to it as well. The duties lie primarily in three interrelated areas: protection and enhancement of self-management, particularly in the firm or enterprise; support in the nomination and election process; and the advancement of workers into key decision-making posts. Each element will be examined separately.

In the past, the union's overall influence in society and its ability to direct social development were quite limited. A number of independent surveys conducted during the 1960s drew attention to this weakness. One national survey of forty-six enterprises conducted by Kristo Kilibarda in 1970 documented that the influence of the union organization on the success of a particular firm was relatively low. Less than one percent (0.6) of the respondents perceived that the union should receive the credit for the economic success of a firm.⁷¹ The union leadership was also perceived to have less influence in personnel policy and in the selection of enterprise leaders than any other group,⁷² and only 5 percent of respondents thought that the union organization had much or very much influence in the reelection of a firm's director.⁷³

Kilibarda's findings were confirmed by other studies as well. A series of polls conducted by the Slovenian trade union association in 1967, 1969, and

1971 discovered that less than a majority of the Slovenian workers polled thought that the union was a necessary institution.⁷⁴ A national poll of 2,500 individuals conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in 1968 compared the responses of occupational groups on the necessity of the union. The results reinforced the findings and discovered that even for skilled and highly skilled workers, only a bare majority (50 percent) felt that the SSJ was necessary, while most of the other occupational categories registered less than 50 percent support.⁷⁵

Since 1974 less empirical-based research on the role of the union in society has been made available. Nevertheless, the evidence which exists seems to indicate that the SSJ has greatly enhanced its role and magnified its influence over society.⁷⁶ Rade Galeb, president of the association, noted at the 1982 union congress the change and praised the union for becoming more involved in the promotion of societal goals like self-management.⁷⁷

There have been some concrete successes by the union in the realization of its political institutional goals. The union has been in the forefront of implementation of the Tito Initiative. It has reduced leaders' terms of office, promoted workers into leadership functions in greater numbers, and rotated leaders at a more rapid rate than in the past. They have also sponsored the Self-Management Congresses, which have been instrumental in diffusing innovative solutions to problems, training workers in decision-making, articulating problems in the self-management system, and determining the social agenda in the country.

Evidently, some progress in enhancing the influence of the union organization has been achieved. A Serbian survey sponsored by that republic's Socialist Alliance in 1978 noted the progress (see table 4.6). Only 16 percent of the respondents expressed critical impressions about the union's activities in the firm or enterprise. Nearly half thought that the union was doing a good job.⁷⁸

Table 4.6 Evaluation of the activity of the sociopolitical organizations in the OOUR by organization

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Communist League</i>	<i>Trade Union</i>	<i>Youth League</i>
Positive	54	43	30
Satisfactory	29	35	30
Weak	9	16	21
Don't know	8	6	19

Source: Radivoje Marinković, "Položaj, Moć, i Uticaj Osnovnih Subjekata Delegatskog Sistema," in Radivoje Marinković, ed., *Delegatski Sistem: Funkcionisanje i Ostvarivanje* (Belgrade: Institut za Političke Studije, 1979), p. 328.

Table 4.7 Evaluation of the electoral activity of the Trade Union Association in Croatia and Serbia, 1978

<i>Evaluation</i>	<i>Croatia</i>	<i>Serbia</i>
Positive	25	35
Satisfactory	37	38
Weak	30	3
Don't know	8	21

Sources: Croatia—Branko Caratan, “Društveno-Političke Organizacije u Delegatskom Sistemu,” in Ivan Šiber and Zdravko Tomac, eds., *Teorija i Praksa Delegatskog Sistema* (Zagreb: Zagreb, 1979), p. 236. Serbia—Ranka Stanojević, “Uloga Društveno-Političkih Organizacije u Delegatskim Izborima,” in Radivoje Marinković, ed., *Izborni Proces u Delegatskom Sistemu* (Belgrade: Institut za Političke Studije, 1979), p. 13.

Compared to the recent past, the SSJ is much more involved in the process of economic and political decision-making. The public media has noted the union's position on issues ranging from education reforms to economic stabilization, and the process of decision-making now obligates other organizations to include the union in formal deliberations and discussions.

A second change mandated by the 1974 Constitution is the direct participation of the unions in the candidate selection process for all elections. As mentioned earlier, union delegates now sit on the committees which select candidates for delegate posts; unions are given delegate seats in the political chambers of the communal and republic assemblies; and they conduct the electoral campaign and nominations process within the workplace.

Two separate, republic-based surveys were conducted during the 1978 elections to evaluate, among other points, the electoral activity of the Trade Union Association. The two gave contradictory results, but neither gives an enthusiastic endorsement or condemnation of union electoral performance (see table 4.7). In Croatia, nearly 30 percent of the respondents perceived the electoral role of the union to be weak, while in Serbia, only 3 percent gave such an evaluation. The Croatian survey also had lower levels of support compared to the Serbian scores, 25 percent to 35 percent, respectively. Although the differences may be attributed to differences in the effectiveness of the respective republic organizations, the overall conclusion is that the union does have room for improvement in its electoral activity and involvement.⁷⁹

A third political responsibility for the union is affirmative action in increasing worker involvement in decision-making, particularly in the firm or enterprise. Each union local is obligated to expand the number of leadership posts available to workers, particularly on the workers' councils. Many local and communal organizations have drawn attention to this problem. The union chamber of the commune of Voždovac, a commune in Belgrade, asserted,

Table 4.8 Indices of inequality for workers' council delegates compared to the population distribution by age, sex, and occupational skills by republic, 1979

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Youth</i>	<i>Higher education</i>	<i>High education</i>
Yugoslavia	.68	.63	.98	1.15
Bosnia-Herzegovina	.79			
Montenegro	.61	.72	.70	.73
Croatia	.64	—	.88	.82
Macedonia	.61			
Slovenia	.75			
Serbia total	.66	.63	1.02	.94
Serbia proper	.67	.64	1.04	.92
Kosovo	.77	.70	1.22	1.06
Vojvodina	.65	.60	.98	.93

Sources: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1981* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1981), pp. 132, 128, 138. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak 1980* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod

The locals are still not completely involved now in the development and affirmation of the delegate system in their environment. Nor have they offered the assistance and orientation necessary for the work of the delegations and delegates. The majority of union locals (in Voždovac) have not even discussed the question of the implementation of the delegate system and the work of the delegation and delegate.⁸⁰

An analysis of the occupational background of worker council members for each republic in 1979 demonstrates relatively limited success in this endeavor (see table 4.8), but data limited to Croatia indicate some improvement over time.⁸¹ In the nation as a whole, however, highly skilled workers receive more representation in the workers' councils than their share of the work force would indicate, and all the highly educated groups also benefit disproportionately. Unskilled and semiskilled workers fare relatively poorly, receiving only 40 percent and 73 percent of their share of council seats respectively. Such a finding appears to indicate that the union is not randomly recruiting council members, but selecting the best and most respected workers in a firm or enterprise.

Several explanations can be suggested for the limited success the union has enjoyed in carrying out its political institutional responsibilities. First, the unions, under some circumstances, have their independence and autonomy constrained by the practices of other organizations, notably the League

<i>Middle education</i>	<i>Low education</i>	<i>Highly skilled</i>	<i>Skilled</i>	<i>Semi- skilled</i>	<i>Un- skilled</i>
1.16	.75	2.12	1.19	.73	.40
1.10	.94	2.38	1.20	.68	.33
1.09	.74	2.51	1.26	.83	.40
1.09	.72	1.92	1.22	.73	.41
1.13	.67	2.01	1.21	.66	.34
1.17	.94	1.92	1.18	.53	.32
1.02	.77	1.81	1.24	3.30	.50

za Statistiku, 1981), p. 426. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Organi Upravljanja i Drugi Organi u Organizacijama Udruženog Rada, 1979," *Statistički Bilten* 1322 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, October 1982): 15.

of Communists. The continuance of the remnants of the old transmission-belt mentality may be attributed to underdevelopment in some regions or failure to adapt to new circumstances. The phenomenon, while still existing, however, appears to be fading over time.⁸²

A second factor contributing to a lower than optimal evaluation is related to unclear division of responsibilities. For those activities for which the union bears sole responsibility (for example, selection of worker council members), union success is relatively high. For those activities that depend upon cooperation and coordination with other bodies (for example, general elections), union success is lower. Apparently, whenever everyone assumes responsibility for an activity, no one actually takes it.

The third mitigating circumstance limiting success may be related to the implementation of the Tito Initiative. The rotation of personnel and the limitation in terms of office may lower expertise, hinder institutional memory, and reduce leadership initiative. Proposed changes in current procedures and practices limiting turnover and expanding initiative may affect this phenomenon in the future.

Social Responsibilities

A second important responsibility for the Yugoslav union movement is to fulfill certain obligations to society. Most notably, these include the removal

of social barriers that maintain social inequality among groups, and the reduction of income inequalities among occupational categories of workers. Both goals are integrally related to the basics of Marxist doctrine.

Without question, social inequalities exist in Yugoslavia, and two areas of everyday life best illustrate the problem. One area is access to education; a second is access to housing. Until recently, patterns of admittance to more prestigious secondary and higher educational programs perpetuated social differences across generations. To illustrate the point, in 1972, 41 percent of children from worker backgrounds attended vocational schools, and only 18 percent attended the gymnasium, a college preparatory program. Conversely, children whose parents were administrative personnel were two and a half times more likely to attend the gymnasium (48 percent), and only 18 percent matriculated at a vocational school.⁸³ The pattern became even stronger in higher education, so that the children of workers were distinctively handicapped in receiving a university education.⁸⁴

By the latter part of the 1970s, the unions had begun to recognize the magnitude of the problem. Along with other organizations, they pushed hard to standardize the secondary school curriculum, provide vocational education for everyone, and open university faculties to children from more modest backgrounds. It is much too early, however, to evaluate the results.

The problem of housing inequalities has proved to be more intransigent. Housing, unlike education, is in very short supply and demand for prestigious, conveniently located, and modern accommodations is intense. As a result, pressure to violate procedures or to exercise influence in the distribution of housing is immense. To illustrate the point, Stipe Šuvar discovered that worker neighborhoods in Zagreb averaged only about two-thirds the living area of white-collar housing areas. Other researchers noted the persistence of considerable social segregation in new housing areas in Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Zagreb. This has occurred in spite of the fact that the housing was largely built with public and enterprise funds.⁸⁵

Several institutional problems beyond the union's control exacerbate this tendency toward inequality in the housing field. First, much housing construction is financed by firms or enterprises that purchase apartments for their employees. Thus, wealthier firms can afford to purchase more and better accommodations. Second, many firms find it necessary to offer apartments to individuals to attract technical or managerial personnel who are in short supply in the labor market. Third, apartments can be inherited, so children with relatively advantaged parents will continue to enjoy the advantages in later life.

The unions have been gravely concerned about the problem of housing inequality. Their policies have been channeled into two directions. One is to encourage more housing construction and relieve the pressure. The second is to regulate the distribution of housing within the firm even more strictly,

Table 4.9 Variation from mean salary by industry
for selected industries, 1965–81 (in percentages)

<i>Economic sector</i>	<i>Year</i>			
	1965	1970	1975	1981
Industry and mining total	1.00	.95	.97	.97
Coal	1.14	.94	1.15	1.18
Steel	1.23	1.07	1.11	1.12
Shipbuilding	1.33	1.32	1.22	1.21
Paper processing	1.06	1.00	1.03	1.02
Agriculture and fisheries	.80	.82	.93	.98
Construction	.88	.96	.99	.94
Transport and communication	1.11	1.09	1.07	1.05
Hotel and tourism	.90	.90	.85	.84
Education	1.17	1.11	1.09	1.06
Health services	1.19	1.11	1.11	1.08
Government	1.22	1.26	1.23	1.15
Mean income	501	1,173	3,060	10,159
Maximum variation*	1.66	1.61	1.45	1.44
Mean variation**	.139	.118	.095	.076

*Result of the largest index score per year divided by the smallest index score per year.

**Sum of the absolute value of the difference from 1.00 divided by the total number of categories. Industry and mining are considered one category.

Source: Computed by the authors.

and to publicize fully all cases of corruption in this area. Neither policy or both combined, however, are likely to solve completely this thorny problem.

Income inequality has also been worrisome to the union movement. This policy area, unlike housing, has proved to be more tractable to solution. Since 1965 variation across major industrial sectors has been reduced almost by half. Average wages in agriculture and fisheries, for example, have increased from 80 percent of average monthly wages in Yugoslavia in 1965 to 98 percent in 1981. Government employee wages, on the other hand, have been reduced from 22 percent above the mean to 15 percent during the same period. Table 4.9 provides supplementary information.

Of equal concern to the union movement is the existence of inequalities between categories of workers, particularly within a firm. A majority of Slovenian workers, for instance, indicated that they perceived income inequality to have increased during the 1977–82 period.⁸⁶ The leadership in Pirot (Serbia), however, perceived that the problem is lessening.⁸⁷

Table 4.10 demonstrates that income inequality among occupational sectors still exists, and that it has not been reduced dramatically over time. In

Table 4.10 Variation from worker personal income means by occupational skill, 1966-81 (in percentages)

Year	Monthly dinar income	Higher education	High education	Middle education	Low education
1966	730	1.83	1.36	1.10	.85
1968	895	1.88	1.36	1.09	.86
1970	1,250	1.89	1.37	1.08	.83
1972	1,760	1.83	1.33	1.05	.81
1974	2,534	1.78	1.30	1.06	.84
1976	3,640	1.75	1.30	1.05	.83
1978	5,172	1.78	1.33	1.07	.82
1981	10,159	1.67	1.26	1.02	.79

Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1983* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1983).

1966, the most highly trained employees earned a salary differential of 2.69 over the unskilled worker. In 1981, this differential had only been reduced to 2.61. The fifteen-year period since data have been made available indicates that no occupational category has significantly altered its relative position. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that the absolute magnitude of this income differential is, comparatively speaking, quite small.

Membership Services

While political and social responsibilities are important, most members of a union would judge its effectiveness and value by how well the union provides services and solves problems for the members. Yugoslav unions are expected to provide counsel and assistance for financial, personnel, payroll, and legal issues that confront an enterprise. They also are expected to promote work safety, secure adequate housing, offer recreational opportunities, and secure pensions for their members.

Relatively little recent empirical information exists on the issue of membership services, and the available information suggests that there is considerable variation across communes and local chapters. The communal trade union organization in Trstenik, Serbia, is an example of a heavily involved unit. During the 1978-82 period, the Trstenik SSJ gave highest priority to apartment construction. The union placed this item on the agenda of political bodies throughout the region, obtained financing, promoted private construction, and achieved significant increases in housing construction. Trstnik's SSJ also promoted the formation of a metalworker's association that

<i>Highly skilled</i>	<i>Skilled</i>	<i>Semi-skilled</i>	<i>Un-skilled</i>	<i>Highest variance</i>	<i>Average variance</i>
1.27	.93	.77	.68	2.69	.29
1.22	.90	.76	.67	2.81	.30
1.25	.89	.75	.65	2.91	.31
1.25	.90	.75	.67	2.73	.29
1.23	.93	.77	.66	2.70	.27
1.21	.90	.76	.69	2.53	.27
1.21	.91	.74	.65	2.74	.28
1.20	.93	.77	.64	2.61	.25

sponsored competition, cultural programs, and metalworking exhibitions. As a result of its activities, a local Trstenik chapter received a national award, the AVNOJ prize.⁸⁸

While some organizations may be very involved, others may be nearly moribund. A 1982 Slovenian poll found that 59 percent of the workers could not identify any activity conducted by the union from which they perceived a benefit. The remainder of the sample named, in order of importance, recreation opportunities, cultural and entertainment events, and protection of the standard of living for workers.⁸⁹

A national poll of 5,000 workers in nine communes reemphasized the problem. Over three-quarters of the respondents (76.7 percent) were dissatisfied with union efforts to protect their jobs and income.⁹⁰ An older, but more detailed, poll conducted in six regions in Croatia found more disturbing evidence. Workers generally perceived that their unions were not involved in issues concerning recreation, job safety, modernization, and enterprise finance. Only a bare majority felt that their union was involved in housing, health, and pension issues, and less than two-thirds of the workers agreed that their unions were active in income distribution activities (see table 4.11).

In summary, the evaluation of the three major program areas of union involvement (political, social, and membership) suggests that there is a need for improvement in most areas, but that the unions are not completely ineffective or even abnormally weak. In some areas, particularly the distribution of income and political involvement, considerable progress has been made. Nevertheless, weaknesses in other areas, like housing and membership services, imply that there is a need for renewed efforts and activities.

Table 4.11 Perceived reasons for union involvement in membership activities in Croatian sample, 1973 (by activity)

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Percentage involved</i>	<i>Percentage not involved</i>
Income distribution and earnings	64.2	35.6
Business and financial problems	30.4	69.5
Modernization of plant and equipment	27.6	72.3
Enterprise/Firm elections	62.4	37.6
Self-Management agreements	71.2	28.6
Policies of the enterprise	61.1	38.7
Working conditions	29.8	70.2
Housing, pensions, and child care	53.9	46.1
Entertainment and recreation	21.3	78.7

Source: Nada Čazi, "Efikasnost Osnovne Organizacije Sindikata i Učešće Radnika u Samoupravljanju," *Socijalizam* 17 (1974): 1054-55.

The Future of the SSJ— Response to the Evaluation

Current developments indicate that the ssj has endorsed major changes in its societal role and patterns of behavior. Most prognoses point to the need for the national organization to encourage more activities on the part of the local chapters and the communal organizations. The need to implement the program of economic stabilization and promote economic growth requires more decentralism and initiative by union locals and their officials. More risks need to be taken; union locals must strengthen their defense of workers' rights and their standard of living in the currently difficult economic times.

Success in these endeavors would require qualitative and quantitative improvements in cooperation with the Chamber of the National ssj and the republic trade union organizations. It would also imply that the union organization cooperate more with scientific institutions and other political organizations to help diffuse innovative solutions and to receive more accurate information. In particular, this implies more cooperation with the Socialist Alliance as the united front organization.

Further enhancement of the delegate system and the strengthening of the influence of the union in the legislative arena is a second important priority for the ssj in the near future. Criticism about union weakness in the electoral process and in the legislatures has been widespread and generally deserved.

A third priority for the ssj is to get workers more involved in decision-making, particularly in the enterprise, and particularly about the distribution of income. The uncontrolled growth of the szs, for example, needs to be arrested and more income returned to the enterprise for distribution.

Related to the issue of income distribution is the problem of paying more attention to preserving and enhancing membership services.⁹¹ The union has pledged to become more involved in activities to protect the living standards of the poorest-paid workers by such programs as the subsidizing of rents, provision of child care, and other services for the poorly paid categories of workers.

5 The League of Socialist Youth

The League of Socialist Youth (SSOJ) is an organization that represents all young people in Yugoslavia. While other youth organizations exist, the SSOJ is the single youth organization whose role and purpose are so broad that it can be characterized as a major political organization. The SSOJ's members include students and young workers, rural and urban dwellers, males and females, communists and noncommunists. Unlike the Komsomol organization in the Soviet Union and analogous organizations in other socialist states, the membership of the SSOJ is open to nearly anyone between fourteen and twenty-seven years of age; it is the mass-based organization for youth.

A socialist-oriented youth movement in Yugoslavia has a long and important historical tradition dating back to the Communist Youth League that was chartered in 1919, the same year as the Yugoslav Communist Party. Prior to World War II, the youth organizations participated in many antiregime activities. They played a major role in the street demonstrations leading to the collapse of Prince Paul's regime in 1940, and in World War II they provided considerable resistance to the occupying armies. By the end of the war, they were combined into a single youth organization, now called the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia. This historical legacy as a united front organization defines and limits the role of the SSOJ in Yugoslav politics today.

This chapter describes the position of the SSOJ in contemporary Yugoslavia. It covers the evolution of the SSOJ's formal societal roles, organizational structure, membership policies, and activities. Then it analyzes the changes in the role, behavior and activities of the SSOJ, and finally it evaluates the organization's general effectiveness in the political and social system of Yugoslavia.

General Position

Current Role

The social role of the League of Socialist Youth is part of Yugoslavia's political system of self-management. The League contributes to the political socialization process, and it plays a crucial position in the Yugoslav system of self-management. According to its charter, the SSOJ league is the sole mass-based political organization for youth:

The SSOJ is a united and mass-based political organization. As the broadest democratic front of the young generation in Yugoslavia, the various interests, aspirations and creative energies of the youth are expressed and directed toward socialist self-management in and through this organization.

The SSOJ is committed to developing and strengthening the organized ideological-political unity of the young generation; it concretely prepares the youth for their active and direct participation and involvement in our self-managed organizations and its structures, in the delegate system, and in the political organizations and social life in its entirety.¹

There are important differences between the SSOJ and functionally equivalent organizations in other polities. The League is neither an opposition movement to the government, nor is it a satellite organization for the ruling party. Formally, the SSOJ has adapted to become a constituent link in the network of political organizations in Yugoslavia. As such, it operates within the ideological framework of self-management and cooperates in joint programs with other organizations, although it is also an autonomous body with its own goals, norms, and purposes.

As with the other political organizations, self-managed socialist ideology is the foundation for the ideological, political, and educational activity of the League of Socialist Youth. The SSOJ is the organizational base for all Yugoslav youths. Its primary mission is to assist society in the ideological and political socialization process of youths, and it has a particular obligation to attract all young people who are not presently members. Its mission, in short, is complex and important to the preservation of the Yugoslav political environment.

The SSOJ is not designed to be an elitist organization serving a limited, narrow stratum of the younger generation. Rather, it brings together all the youth, regardless of background, and tries to induce them to participate in Yugoslavia's self-management system. It can fulfill its tasks of service and political socialization by using three mechanisms. They are sponsorship and supervision of youth-oriented activities, inclusion and participation within the Socialist Alliance, and participation in the delegate system. The quality and quantity of these activities determines the effectiveness of the SSOJ within the general framework of the Yugoslav system. The extent to which these

goals are achieved would form the basis for an empirical evaluation of the SSOJ.

The first way in which the SSOJ accomplishes its dual goals of service and socialization is to engage in a number of ideological, political, educational, cultural, and other activities. These activities include the sponsorship of sports clubs and athletic activities, encouragement of youth involvement in the arts and literature, sponsorship of film festivals and music concerts, travel programs, and myriad other youth-related programs. The intent is to socialize the membership by strengthening a social climate that favors the abolition of class privileges, and bureaucratic, technocratic, nationalist and other traits deemed socially undesirable in Yugoslavia.

The annual report of the youth organization in Beli Manastir, a small town in rural Croatia, clearly illustrates the service socialization objective:

Often we wrestle with questions of whether youth work is 100 percent economically justified, whether work action is necessary, and whether these work projects are too expensive, etc. A dilemma does not exist. Many decisions, in particular the resolutions of the Third Conference of the League of Communists that discussed this work of the League of Socialist Youth, are clear and unequivocal. What we gain from these kinds of projects cannot be measured by any currency, as is evident from the statement of one young woman: "Here we are all the same, we represent a single united community, we are all dedicated to a selfless life, we realize our great creative goal—fraternity, brotherhood, and unity."²

A second major mechanism for the fulfillment of the goals of the SSOJ is the inclusion and participation of the youth league and its members in the Socialist Alliance. This involvement has two facets. The first is the inclusion of the youth and their different activities within the broader spectrum of the general social community. Joint action includes civic projects, political campaigns, participation in the nomination and electoral campaigns of delegates, and other general activities of the Alliance. This cooperation is designed to bring the youth into the political system and to circumvent the formation of a generation gap that might have political overtones.

The second aspect of Alliance-SSOJ cooperative activities directly benefits the Alliance. SSOJ involvement can intensify and stimulate the overall activities of the Socialist Alliance and the League of Communists. It can encourage greater social activism in the realization of the system's ideals.³ Eduard Kardelj, for example, suggested that fostering strong Socialist Alliance linkages to the SSOJ would induce the Alliance to demonstrate more determination and concern for solving the basic problems that face the younger generation.⁴

In the past, the linkages between the SSOJ and other organizations were

relatively weak and did not further younger people's position in Yugoslav society. For example, a 1980 meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists criticized all the political organizations, but the SSOJ was singled out for ineffectively advancing the cause of the youth. Newspaper accounts of the meeting stated:

Are the youth sufficiently mature for these complex tasks? We are aware (and plenty has been said about it) that the organization has a considerable number of shortcomings. For example, until recently, the youth organization has not been sufficiently involved with the key questions which affect the workplace like the acquisition and distribution of income, planning production, etc. Out of misplaced habit, as some refer to it, we constantly put on our agenda some aspect of the problem of contact with the youth. . . . The fact is that the leadership of the SSOJ is just too far removed from the membership of their organization.⁵

The third mechanism for the realization of the social role of the SSOJ is through the delegate system. The SSOJ is encouraged by other organizations, particularly the SKJ, to participate constantly and effectively in the work of the delegations and the legislative assemblies at all levels. In practice, the SSOJ is expected to formulate and publicize its particular concerns in areas such as employment, housing, and educational reform and to nominate candidates for the various delegations.

Participation of youths in the political system and their efforts to influence policy is not always an easy process. Sometimes the effort of the youth movement to influence policy can be frustrated, as a statement regarding the resignation of a Serbian commune (Arandelovac) SSOJ president and secretary indicates: "Rajko Marceta: The voice of the youth is not heard as it should be in the delegations, the communal assembly, and in the workers' councils. Workers and citizens funded for eight years the construction of a center for culture and sports that does not serve the youth at all. This generation should not permit this."⁶

As with any organization, the SSOJ does not completely achieve its goals. There are practical limits to the extent to which it can provide sufficient facilities and programs for members. Occasionally, instances of prejudice and bigotry will occur, particularly within the decentralized and autonomous organizational structure of the SSOJ. Finally, personal ambition or political naivete can frustrate attempts of the SSOJ to work within the delegate system.⁷

Occasionally, the entire system can collapse. The experience of the Kosovan SSOJ in March 1981 illustrates these inherent problems. The immediate cause of the nationality outbreaks in Kosovo, a primarily Albanian province within Serbia, was inadequate student housing and poor food services. This dissatisfaction led to student demonstrations, which later snowballed to include industrial strikes and boycotts of the school system and the provincial

university.⁸ Throughout the Kosovan crisis, youths formed the bulk of the demonstrators and rioters, and, in this particular case, many of the Kosovan SSOJ leaders promoted Albanian nationalist demonstrations and contributed to the general political unrest.⁹

Excessive concentration on extreme behavior, problems, incidents of corruption, etc., may give a distorted picture of the SSOJ and its activities. Normally, the League's activities are not as controversial, as is illustrated by the summary from the annual report of a Vojvodinan SSOJ organization:

Work of the Chapter Organization of the SSOJ

This school year there was a reorganization of our youth organization because of the size of the membership and for organizational reasons. There exist ten chapter organizations in our center (two in the ninth grade, two in the tenth grade, and three each in the eleventh and twelfth grades). At the center level is a conference that includes delegates from each of the chapters. The task of the conference is to coordinate and unite the work of the chapters.

We conducted three classes of the youth political school for our members to further their ideological-political and Marxist education. One class was formed from youth in the tenth grade. Professors from our school as well as other well-known revolutionaries and political workers lectured in the program. The audience consisted of our students as well as some youth from outside the center. Because of this program, the largest group of youth who were accepted into membership into the Party came from the ranks of this class.

Also, for the first time, we nominated for Party membership six youth from the tenth grade who distinguished themselves in noncurricular activities and who finished the political school curriculum. Five of our most distinguished activists attended a two-day seminar for youth leaders at Cortanovac at the expense of our organization.

Our youth demonstrated their ideological-political maturity in several activities that were initiated this year. At the end of the last calendar year all members raised funds for building the national political school in Kumrovac. In April our members became heavily involved in the relief effort for those who suffered from the earthquake in Montenegro.

Within the context of the celebrations for adult day, we successfully organized a presentation "Adults—Direct Self-Managers." In honor of that, the youths successfully exchanged positions with professors and other workers in the Center.

In conjunction with the vacation club and the city conference of the SSOJ, we organized trips and work projects in Novi Sad and Futog. This year several of our comrades participated at the national work projects,

and cooperation with the presidency of the city conference of the SSOJ was more direct and fruitful than at any time in the past.

All classes received a copy of *The Voice of Youth* for the purpose of better informing our members about the problems of youths from other areas. At meetings of the conference of the center the members were often reminded to utilize and participate in the self-management of the school. In spite of this, and in spite of the achievements that we reached, the level of youth inclusion in the work of the self-management bodies of the school is not on the level that it ought to be.

President of the Conference SSOJ-Center
Mirjana Matejević, Student II Form¹⁰

Historical Antecedents

As is the case with the other political organizations in Yugoslavia, self-management has altered dramatically the role and function of the SSOJ. Two youth organizations survived the war: the League of Communist Youth and the United League of Anti-Fascist Youth of Yugoslavia. In 1948, these two youth organizations combined and formed a new organization called "The People's Youth." In the mid-1950s, the advent of self-management transformed the role and status of the People's Youth within the political system.

Before 1966, the youth movement shared a position in the political system identical to the other non-Party groups as a transmission agent for the Communist Party. Thus, the State and/or Party made all the important decisions concerning the activities and direction of the youth movement in Yugoslavia.

During the years following the war, the People's Youth was a massive organization. Although it lacked autonomy, it was important to many young people at that time. This organization brought together and organized the majority of youths in the country. It participated very actively in the reconstruction of the country from the ruins of war, and helped to construct numerous new public works and industrial projects. All the early important postwar building projects, including roads, factories, schools, and dams, involved the People's Youth. Many of these projects still remain and are in active use. The Belgrade-Zagreb highway, for example, is among these early projects.

During this period of reconstruction, the People's Youth performed a crucial service to the state. Their loyalty during the early years of the Cominform campaign against Yugoslavia was acknowledged by the Party; and, although the Party dominated the youth movement, the People's Youth members were important participants in Party decision-making. The sheer size of the youth movement's membership and the fact that most Party members and Partisans were quite young themselves gave the organization considerable influence in

the corridors of power. Its influence survives even today because much of the contemporary political leadership of Yugoslavia learned their leadership skills while members of the People's Youth.

The People's Youth was instrumental in the introduction of the socialist self-management system. The advent of self-management, however, altered the organization's position in society, and particularly changed its relationship to the Party. To highlight these changes in its mission, the People's Youth renamed itself "The League of Youth of Yugoslavia." Further development in its ideology and the adoption of the 1974 current constitution led to its present name, "The League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia."

Political Platform

The formal, societal position of the SSOJ can be expected to change in accordance with changes in the ideology of the state and practical political realities. Although the organization faces many strains and problems, it is unlikely to alter fundamentally its broad social purpose in the near future. According to the documents of the Eleventh and most recent Federal Congress of the SSOJ in 1982, the development of the self-management system will continue in its incremental fashion. For now, this means that the SSOJ is expected to intensify its involvement in the institutions of self-management with a commensurate push to get the youth more involved and more influential in decision-making. In addition, the immediate future suggests, particularly because of Kosovo, that there will be a self-examination of the organization to oppose tendencies of nationalism, apathy, and corruption.

The Eleventh Congress also called for more involvement of the movement's youth throughout society, especially in the Socialist Alliance. Reminiscent of its People's Youth origins, the SSOJ pledged itself to a renewed and heightened mobilization of the youth to get them more involved in concrete projects that can benefit society. It also pledged that there would be more effective coordination and cooperation among the various single-purpose organizations of young people.

At the Eleventh SSOJ National Congress, delegates addressed and recognized many weaknesses in the SSOJ organization. In particular, this Congress noted the need for much more SSOJ activity in everyday political and social life and the need to defend the interests of the youth more effectively. It also recognized the need for organizational and political reforms within the organization. In his introductory speech to the Congress, Bogić Bogičević, president of the SSOJ National Conference, frankly noted these concerns:

The SSOJ must pay constant attention to its ideological, political, action, organization, and membership development. This is necessary because we are not yet satisfied with the social role of the League of Socialist

Youth because it is not yet in harmony with the actual interests and needs of youth in society. . . . The chapters of the SSOJ must become the seat of our political and social activities. We should behave in these chapters so that the pulse of our generation can be felt in all the delegations and self-management bodies.¹¹

This discussion about the immediate future of the SSOJ poses several practical questions: What, in particular, does the SSOJ intend to do? What is its program? How does the program compare with its past and with the programs of the other political organizations?

An examination of the Action Program of the SSOJ from its Eleventh Congress can provide partial answers to these questions. The basic program of the SSOJ reiterates the priorities of the other organizations, but it also identifies some specific tasks applicable only to the SSOJ.

The first priority of the SSOJ is to "assist in creating a political climate for the further development of self-managed socialism." The goal, of course, is similar to that of the other political organizations. In practice, however, this priority pledges the SSOJ not only to support the general program for economic stabilization that began in 1982, but also to try to improve training and work discipline to achieve more rapid growth in economic productivity, a current major problem in the Yugoslav economy.

The second priority is to become involved in the major reforms which are occurring in the educational, socialization, and scientific institutions. There is a need to reform these institutions to cope with the demands of the economy and to facilitate more rapid economic and technological growth.

A third priority in the 1982 action program is increased involvement of the youth movement within the institutions of the state and economy. Particular emphasis is placed on promoting youth participation and influence within the political and economic institutions. A practical application of this priority is to get more youth representation in the various delegations.

The socialization purpose of the SSOJ is included in its current program. It continues to stress the basic tenet that the youths must enhance their socialist consciousness. In fact, most of the activities of the SSOJ are directed toward this fundamental purpose. In addition, the program makes specific charges for political and ideological socialization. For example, the SSOJ pledges itself to work with other youth-oriented organizations such as stamp clubs, outdoor recreation groups, cultural-artistic groups, and other single-purpose groups. It expects to revitalize the sponsorship of practical building projects such as railways, bridges, schools, roads, etc.¹²

Organization and Communication

Relations within the League of Socialist Youth are formally based on democratic principles. Policies are implemented and decisions are made only after active discussion and debate by the membership. In addition, the organization is relatively decentralized, so most units of the organization are relatively free from central controls. The League is a part of the collection of organizations and individuals that compose the Socialist Alliance. From both the organizational and membership perspective, however, the SSOJ is completely independent of the Alliance.

The SSOJ has two types of memberships: individual memberships and collective memberships. Individuals join the organization to satisfy many of their personal athletic, cultural, and entertainment needs and interests. In addition, groups can join the SSOJ, but the individuals who belong to organizations that have collective membership in the SSOJ are not ipso facto members of the SSOJ. Organizations affiliated with the SSOJ are autonomous from the League, although they coordinate some of their activities with it.

Organizational Structure

The structure of the League of Socialist Youth reflects the federal organization of Yugoslavia. The foundation of this structure is the local chapter, and the predominant influence in the formation and implementation of the policies of the SSOJ formally rests with them. These chapters then combine together to form the communal organizations, and the communal organizations are gathered together to form the republic or provincial youth organization. Finally, the republic organizations and the two provincial organizations are combined to become the League of Socialist Youth for the Yugoslav Federation. Figure 5.1 provides the schematic details.

Federal Level The highest national SSOJ institutional authority is the Congress of the SSOJ. It is generally held every four years, but primary responsibility for directing policy in the intervening periods is taken by the Conference of the SSOJ that, in practice, meets at least several times a year and is elected by the Congress. Execution of Conference policy recommendations is the responsibility of a collective body called the Presidency, which is chaired by a President who serves for one year. Both the Presidency and the President are selected by the SSOJ Conference.

The Congress of the SSOJ determines the general framework for policy of the organization, serves as the highest level of authority for the organization, and evaluates the activities of the League. Among other duties, the Congress drafts and passes a new charter and platform for the organization, elects the SSOJ Conference, and prepares reports from committees and commissions.




Figure 5.1: Organizational chart of the League of Socialist Youth

The Congress typically has about one thousand delegates and hundreds of guests, and the last Federal Congress, the eleventh, was held in December 1982 in Belgrade.

Delegates to a SSOJ Congress are selected on a proportionality principle, with each of the republics receiving identically sized representation. Collective organization members, particularly the armed forces, also send delegates. In 1982, the Congress had 959 delegates with an average age slightly over twenty-five. Three-quarters of the delegates were male, and they were largely employed in white collar occupations. Over 98 percent of the delegates were members of the League of Communists.¹³

The Conference is responsible for policy-making between Congresses. It consists of delegates from all the republics and provinces. It has presently 135 members, and reserves seats for the main editor for the SSOJ newspaper and leaders of some of the major collective organizations affiliated with the SSOJ (see figure 5.2). In accordance with the spirit of the Tito Initiative, no more than half of the members of the Conference may have served as Congress delegates. This provides an institutional check on the growth of professional political careers.

Conferences of the SSOJ establish general policies for the SSOJ within the guidelines laid out by the Congress and its charter. It meets approximately every other month, and discusses a wide range of issues. In the recent past, these issues included education reform, the impact of unemployment on youths, additional representation in political and economic institutions, youth participation in civil unrest, and trends in youth socialization. A conference

Figure 5.2: SSOJ national conference membership, 1982

<i>Republic/province</i>	<i>Members</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Members</i>
Bosnia-Herzegovina	13	Yugoslav National Army	6
Montenegro	13	Young Pioneers	6
Croatia	12	Vacation association	6
Macedonia	13	Scouts	6
Slovenia	13	Young musicians	6
Serbia	12	People's technicians	6
Kosovo	9	Physical fitness clubs	6
Vojvodina	9	Youth press	1

held in December 1981, for example, discussed and criticized the role of youths in representative bodies and the sociopolitical organizations. Among other items, the Conference pledged itself to recruit more youth delegates for the congresses of the League of Communists. The Conference also pointed out that, although youths compose 34 percent of the Communist Party membership, they received much less representation in the SKJ. Finally, it noted with concern present employment practices under which 65 percent of the unemployed are youths.¹⁴

The Presidency of the SSOJ currently has twenty-seven members—two from each republic, one from each province, and five from the collective organizations and youth press. It is the executive branch of the organization, and it is responsible to the Conference. It has the authority to make administrative-executive decisions based upon Congress or Conference recommendations, and it can also make recommendations to the Conference. The Presidency meets approximately twice a month.

In addition, the SSOJ organization includes various commissions and other ad hoc bodies. These commissions can investigate problems more thoroughly than either the Conference or the Presidency. Some current commissions are the commissions on education, science and culture, youth involvement and participation in society, membership, social development, and economic stabilization. Commissions are usually formed with republic/representation principles in mind and are chaired by members of the Presidency. Commissions report their recommendations to the Conference, Congress, or Presidency, depending on the circumstances.

The Conference and the SSOJ Presidency participate directly in the work of many political institutions on the federal level. SSOJ members also cooperate directly with other groups on matters concerning Yugoslav youths. Formal cooperation occurs most often with the Trade Union Association and the Socialist Alliance, although the Central Committee of the League of Communists as well as the Veterans' Association make regular efforts to formalize contacts.

Republic Level Members of the republic organization of the SSOJ are simultaneously members of federal, communal, and, when appropriate, the city or provincial organizations. The republic organizations determine their policies and activities within the general guidelines of the national-level SSOJ.

With respect to organization, the republic/provincial organizational charts roughly parallel the institutions that exist in the federation. The Congress is the primary policy body, and there is a republic conference, presidency, president, and commissions, all of which function analogously to their federal counterparts.

The republic congresses meet before the federal one, and the provincial meetings of Vojvodina and Kosovo are held before the Serbian SSOJ congress. Republic congresses, like their national counterparts, are held at least every four years and last three days. The most recent republic congresses were the tenth in the series and were held at various times throughout the autumn of 1982.

Republic SSOJ organizations constitute an important organizational link in the SSOJ. For example, Croatia's SSOJ organization in 1982 had 813,434 members, 14,954 chapters, and 88,628 League of Communist members, representing 26 percent of the total Croatian Party membership.¹⁵ Croatia's most recent Congress had 728 delegates and elected a republic Conference of 133 members and a 23-member Presidency.¹⁶

Commune Level The communal SSOJ is composed of the members of the chapters and those members who do not have a chapter but live within the boundaries of the commune. From the program, organizational, political, and ideological perspectives, the communal organization is a single body. The commune SSOJ, not the chapters that compose it, interacts with the collective member units of the SSOJ and selects the delegation to the republic and national levels of the youth organization.

Unlike the higher federal organizational units, the commune SSOJ does not have a congress. Instead, it maintains a conference composed of delegates from each of the chapters located in the commune. The conference, in turn, elects a presidency and a president of that presidency. The conference cooperates with other groups in the commune and with the communal legislative assembly. Communal conferences also cooperate with other communal organizations of the SSOJ, particularly on the regional level.

Chapter Level Membership in the youth organization can only be meaningful within the context of the chapter organization. These primary units can be organized in the workplace, neighborhood, village, military units, schools, or any other social place where there are enough potential members.¹⁷ Primary organization units are quite widespread throughout the country. For example, 89 percent of all organized neighborhoods (*mesna*

zajednica) in 1977 had organized neighborhood chapters of the youth league.¹⁸

The primary organizations meet approximately once a month. At least once a year, each chapter reviews its past performance and draws up an annual program for its work. The chapter organization also elects a presidency to be the collective executive institution, and the term of the presidency for a term of two years or less. It must be remembered, however, that organizational formats within the SSOJ chapter can vary enormously depending upon the complexity of the factory, school, or neighborhood in which it is organized.

Chapter units discuss the problems of the organization and conduct their activities. During their meetings, members of the chapters discuss and adopt the annual program, evaluate past performance, accept new members, and prepare specific activities. A sample four-month agenda for an SSOJ organization in a technical education center in Belgrade is listed below. As can be seen from this chapter's proposed plan, the SSOJ can engage in a number of diverse activities throughout the course of a year.

Annual Proposed Program for the "Rade Končar" Educational Center

<i>Month and Activity</i>	<i>Participants</i>
SEPTEMBER	
1. Admission of new members	Presidents of the Classes
2. Preelection activity and formal formation of the chapter	
3. Formation of the Vacation Society	Delegates from the Membership
4. Current Problem	
OCTOBER	
1. Plans for the Excursion	Excursion Commission
2. Organization of local work projects	
3. Start of the work of the youth political school	President of the Commission for Ideological Work
4. Commemoration for the 20th of October Holiday	
5. Cultural-Recreational Problems	
6. Preparation and Printing of the School Paper	
NOVEMBER	
1. Cultural-Recreational Activities	
2. Political Lecture	
3. Blood Donation	
4. New Business	

DECEMBER

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Celebration of Army Day | Commission for Cultural-Recreational activities |
| 2. Lecture on the Youth and their Role in Building Self-management | |
| 3. New Year's Preparation | |
| 4. New Business ¹⁹ | |

Communication Within the SSOJ

Communication within chapters and other organizational units is designed to be direct. All questions are strongly encouraged to be openly discussed at SSOJ meetings. Members and delegates take positions and approve decisions at their meetings which can be quite intense and lengthy. The presidency coordinates discussions, initiates the agenda, and encourages activities. All meetings and activities of the chapters are open to all members.

Upward communication is based on the delegate principle. Chapters select delegates for the commune SSOJ organization, and, in an analogous way, delegates from the commune organization form the leadership bodies of the republic, province, city, or intercommunal SSOJ organizations. As the last link in the federal chain, the republic and provincial organizations send their delegations to the institutions of the SSOJ federation.

Delegations and delegates are required to operate within the constraints of the organizational unit that elected them. According to the charter of the SSOJ, "Delegates are obligated to bring together the positions and interests of the organizational units which elected them with those interests belonging to the organizational unit in which they are delegates. The delegates actively participate in agreements, contribute to the process of reaching a joint and satisfactory position, make decisions, and get involved in the implementation of these decisions."²⁰

If a delegate is inactive or works against the interests of the organizational unit that delegated him/her, the organizational unit has the right and duty to recall or remove the delegate. Recall or removal occurs rarely and generally only for very serious offenses. In recent years, recall and removal measures existed only in Kosovo and in small numbers.²¹

Delegates are required to insure the flow of upward communication. They have a duty to meet regularly with the organizational unit that selected them, and their decisions must be made in accordance with the wishes of the body that elected them.

The leadership bodies of the SSOJ are required to monitor the activities of the organizational units below them. They are also required to participate in the work of the chapter organizations, and to inform all organizational units about changes and activities in the organization as a whole.

One way the communication pattern within the SSOJ is facilitated is through the youth press. The federation, republics, and many large cities and universities publish their own newspapers and periodicals. The publications contain information about youth activities, films, books, and athletic events as well as more serious interviews and announcements. Generally, the editors receive a seat on the presidency of the relevant organizational unit, thereby illustrating the significance that the SSOJ attaches to the communication process.

A second way in which downward communication can be handled is by using various special conferences, meetings and thematic discussions held by the communal, republic, provincial, and federal organizations. Past discussions have centered on major social and economic events like the Kosovo unrest or the economic stabilization program. In addition, some republics, notably Serbia and Croatia, maintain and support youth research centers.

Finally, the leaders of the SSOJ communicate with other organizations, particularly with the Socialist Alliance. The delegates of the SSOJ are required to implement the policies of their organization and to advance their organization's interests in the community.

Membership and Leadership

Each chapter can make some modification of the rules regarding membership. A school chapter, for example, may require that members be currently students of the school in good standing. A member can often be both an individual and a collective member of the SSOJ. This happens, for example, when members of the Young Pioneers—an affiliated collective organization member—wish to join a youth league chapter when they reach age fourteen.

Exit from the organization is also voluntary. Exclusions rarely occur and the organization is generally flexible about demanding some prescribed level of activity. Most chapters, however, insist on at least minimal involvement, and failure to pay dues is the most common form of self-exclusion from the SSOJ.

Membership Growth

The SSOJ demonstrates considerable membership growth. During periods of heightened activity resulting from domestic or international tension, the number of members of the League of Socialist Youth has grown significantly. Often, the membership figures are conservative estimates because the numbers of actual individuals involved in SSOJ activities are greater than those that appear on the membership lists of the chapters. The largest growth of the SSOJ of individual members occurred in the postwar years of reconstruction, and then again in the period of conflict with the Cominform.

Table 5.1 SSOJ membership by republic and province, 1968–81* (in thousands)

<i>Federal unit</i>	1968	1969	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1981
Yugoslavia	2,085	2,490	3,133	3,224	3,224	3,710	3,851	3,842
Bosnia-								
Herzegovina		480	700	784	784	1,040	1,053	904
Montenegro		90	90	101	101	123	132	136
Croatia		500	680	685	685	720	764	685
Macedonia		262	205	230	230	260	303	260
Slovenia		166	264	315	315	320	320	410
Serbia		991	1,194	1,109	1,109	1,247	1,278	1,447
Serbia proper			674	605	605	660	660	793
Kosovo			300	251	251	320	320	336
Vojvodina			220	253	253	268	298	318

*1968–74 university student association members are not included. For all years Yugoslav Army members are not included.

Sources: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1970–80).

Table 5.1 lists membership totals for the SSOJ and each republic from 1969 to 1981. The data in this table indicate considerable growth in total membership for each republic and province, but with considerable fluctuations in membership among republics in recent years.²²

Table 5.2 lists SSOJ membership penetration rates by republic and province during the 1969 to 1981 period. Penetration is the percent of the estimated population aged fourteen to twenty-seven who are members of the SSOJ. These data indicate that not only has total membership increased, but also that increasing proportions of this age group have become SSOJ members. In the nation as a whole, approximately three-quarters of those eligible are now members of the SSOJ compared to 59 percent in 1969. In Slovenia, for example, nearly 98 percent of the eligible youth population appear to be SSOJ members, while Macedonia lags behind with only a 53 percent penetration rate. Collective membership has also grown from year to year as new social organizations either become affiliated with the SSOJ or grow in size. For example, in Croatia in 1981, the SSOJ youth collective membership figures totaled over one and a half million, a figure that exceeds the individual membership by over 200 percent.²³

The largest component of the membership is from the category of gainfully employed youth. This has always been the most numerous and dominant category. The next largest category is membership from school and college students. Agricultural chapters rank third, which is not unusual because they are now the smallest segment of the general youth population. The largest chapters are found in the major industrial centers, followed by the developed agricultural centers. Organizing in schools is more successful

Table 5.2 Eligible youth members in the SSOJ by republic,
1969–81 (estimated percentages)

<i>Federal unit</i>	<i>1969</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1976</i>	<i>1977</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1979</i>	<i>1981</i>
Yugoslavia	59	64	66	65	75	78	74
Bosnia-Herzegovina		69	75	73	95	94	80
Montenegro		64	71	69	83	88	89
Croatia		70	71	71	75	81	69
Macedonia		47	52	52	58	66	53
Slovenia		70	83	84	85	86	98
Serbia		62	57	58	65	67	72
Serbia proper		57	51	53	60	62	67
Kosovo		92	75	72	88	84	80
Vojvodina		52	60	61	65	74	76

Sources: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1970–83). Population estimates were interpolated from the 1971 and 1981 federal censuses.

in those schools that are more closely affiliated with industrial and economic enterprises. Between the individual and collective memberships, it can be safely assumed that there is almost no young person in Yugoslavia who is not somehow affected by the youth organization, either on a collective or individual member basis.

Leadership Selection

The basic formal principles for leadership selection in the SSOJ are identical with the principles of the other organizations. They are (1) proper class-political orientation that is supportive of socialist self-management; (2) good reputation for involvement in the political work of the organization (this includes a reputation in the youth movement); (3) good reputation as a worker, student, etc. In addition to these individual-level criteria, the League of Socialist Youth insists on some systemic criteria. The most important of these is the fulfillment of the spirit of the Tito Initiative on collective leadership.

In the past, the League's leadership was often perceived as dominated by those who used offices within the SSOJ as stepping-stones for their personal political advancement.²⁴ Some corruption, such as excessive reimbursements, use of luxury automobiles, and favoritism in receiving apartments occurred. The Tito Initiative was designed to stem this tide of political professionalism and its accompanying abuses. Among other points, the Initiative supported shorter terms of office for leaders, more rapid rotation of officeholders, the return of the youth leaders to their former duties, and recruitment of working class leaders. Generally speaking, the reforms

have been widely accepted and implemented, although resistance may still occur.

The ssoj leaders at all levels are generally elected for two or, at most, four years. In addition, there is considerable change in the composition of the governing institutions. Commissions and ad hoc conferences change their membership composition depending upon the problem under consideration, and one-third of the conference is elected each year.

Opinions regarding these relatively rapid personnel changes are mixed. One part of the membership believes that rapid rotation is a good way to promote democratization of the leadership and democratic decision-making within the organization. Others disagree, and those who dissent suggest that excessive rotation leads to an increase in the power and influence of the permanent professional staff.

The League of Socialist Youth pays attention to the training of the membership in the functions of the organization and in general political education. One way that members are trained for future leadership responsibilities is through the general education program of the schools. For example, Marxism-Leninism and the study of self-management are now required subjects for all students in the secondary school system throughout Yugoslavia. In most republics, four hours per week are devoted to these subjects.

Another method for mass training is through direct participation in organizations like the SKJ, trade unions, and Socialist Alliance. A third method is participation in the self-management institutions in the workplace, schools, or neighborhoods. Many young people, of course, participate in leadership training sessions sponsored by the League of Communists, the trade unions, and associations of self-management.

The ssoj also has its own political education programs. The primary responsibility for the conduct of such programs rests on the chapter and commune organization. A typical curriculum for an ssoj sponsored political youth school is listed below. As can be seen, the training is largely theoretical and neglects practical political skills. The republic organizations assist in compiling materials and creating the curriculum for local training efforts. Considerable numbers attend these training sessions. During 1976, for example, two training courses for youths were offered and over 60,000 youths took one of these courses.²⁵ There is ample leadership training for the membership, and often a chapter will encourage all its new members to take a political school training program such as this one:

*Educational Plan for the Youth Political School*²⁶

1. Basic Marxism—7 Themes—15 Hours
2. The Socialist Revolution in Yugoslavia—3 Themes—7 Hours
3. The Social System of Yugoslavia—14 Themes—32 Hours
4. Sociopolitical Organizations—4 Themes—8 Hours

5. Culture and Education—3 Themes—6 Hours

6. International Relations and Foreign Policy—4 Themes—8 Hours

Evaluation

An evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of the SSOJ in contemporary Yugoslavia would depend upon the SSOJ level of success in two organizational activities. They are: (1) increased involvement of youth and the SSOJ in the decision-making processes, and (2) success in socialization of the youth in societal values.

Youth Involvement and Influence in Decision-Making

This mission of the SSOJ can best be evaluated by examining two phenomena: the expansion of youth representation in leadership functions and the appraisal of the SSOJ's influence in the decision-making process. Generally speaking, youths aged fifteen to twenty-seven compose from 20 to 25 percent of the total Yugoslav population, and approximately 25 to 30 percent of the total work force. They also account for over 65 percent of the unemployed, but they hold, on the average, less than 10 percent of leadership positions. Table 5.3 lists the percentage of youths in federal, republic, provincial, and communal legislative bodies for each republic and province from 1963 to 1982, the year of the most recent election. This table shows that youths are severely underrepresented in governmental legislative bodies, and that this underrepresentation has not changed in recent years. Indeed, the fact that youth representation in communal legislatures has dropped from over 20 percent in 1963 to 12 percent in 1982 is notable.

Neighborhood council youth representation from 1969 to 1980 shows some improvement in recent years, as indicated by table 5.4. Youth increased their total representation from 8.7 percent to 13.1 percent of all neighborhood council seats. Nevertheless, the data demonstrate that they hold only about one-half of the positions they should receive based on proportional representation. Representation of youth on special interest boards (SIZ) is also weak. They hold less than 1 percent of the presidencies of these bodies and less than 10 percent of council positions and legislative bodies.²⁷

Recent research indicates that youths tend to participate less intensively than other groups. For example, only 6 to 8 percent of active participants at neighborhood town hall meetings (*Zbor Birača*) in the republic of Croatia in the late 1970s were youths. This figure is far less than their percentage of the population and indicates a basic weakness in the quality of youth political participation.²⁸

Comprehensive figures on youth representation in leadership positions in the League of Communists and other organizations are not readily available;

Table 5.3 Youth representation in federal, republic, and commune Legislatures 1963–82* (in percentages)

<i>Federal unit</i>	<i>1963</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>1969</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1982</i>
Yugoslavia	4.7	4.6	1.7	1.3	2.9	2.3	2.0
All republics	12.2	8.9	5.4	5.2	8.1	7.7	8.4
Bosnia-							
Herzegovina	16.0	11.3	2.8	5.5	7.8	12.2	9.1
Montenegro	8.9	6.7	5.9	2.4	7.4	7.3	4.9
Croatia	5.2	4.8	5.1	4.7	8.7	4.8	7.0
Macedonia	17.6	11.4	11.0	6.0	5.4	2.8	3.6
Slovenia	20.0	10.7	4.2	2.8	16.0	4.0	10.0
Serbia	6.3	8.2	4.5	7.6	8.5	10.9	14.1
Kosovo	16.6		18.5	14.9	13.2	11.6	10.5
Vojvodina	12.3	11.7	10.0	9.9	18.4	14.7	18.4
All communes	26.1	23.0			15.6	14.3	12.0

*Youth is defined as age twenty-nine or younger for the period 1963–69. It is defined as twenty-seven or younger for the period 1974–82.

Sources: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Bilten*, 296, 372, 491 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1964–67). Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Samoupravljanje i Društveno-Ekonomske Razvitak Jugoslavije, 1950–70* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1971). *Politika*, 20 September 1982, p. 6.

however, a somewhat dated but illustrative study by Zdravko Lekovic suggests that youth representation in the leadership structure of the party has grown weaker. Although youths composed approximately one-quarter or more of Party membership in Belgrade in 1970, only 4 percent of youth members held leadership positions in the Party apparatus in 1968. In 1948, those aged twenty-five or less constituted nearly 27 percent of the city Party conference and 10 percent of the city Party committee. By 1968, those aged twenty-five or less composed less than 8 percent of the city Party conference and had no representation at all in its Party committee.²⁹ There is little evidence to suggest that these trends have abated or been reversed. In fact, some journalistic accounts suggest the presence of informal resistance to enhanced membership involvement of the youth in the Party.³⁰

The second aspect of youth involvement in the decision-making process is the importance and esteem ascribed to the SSOJ and its members. Recent studies suggest that the SSOJ is ineffective. A Croatian survey of commune citizens in 1978 noted that only 15.75 percent of the respondents thought that the SSOJ was performing its role in the neighborhood effectively, and only 15.73 percent agreed that the SSOJ was influential in the workplace.³¹ A similar survey conducted in Serbia found an identical low ranking for the SSOJ, although nearly 33 percent of the respondents appraised the performance of the youth organization as effective.³² In both

Table 5.4 Youth representation on neighborhood councils
by republic, 1969–80 (in percentages)

<i>Federal unit</i>	<i>1969</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1972</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1977</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1980</i>
Yugoslavia	8.7	8.5	8.2	8.9	11.7	11.0	14.0	13.1
Bosnia- Herzegovina	9.2	10.2	9.0	10.8	13.5	12.1	16.9	16.6
Monte- negro	7.1	7.9	7.6	7.2	11.4	11.0	13.2	16.8
Croatia	7.6	7.1	7.2	7.6	9.9	9.7	11.5	10.7
Macedonia	11.2	10.7	9.7	8.9	9.3	9.3	11.8	10.2
Slovenia		6.2	5.8	6.0	13.1	10.8	13.5	11.7
Serbia	8.7	9.2	9.0	9.7	11.7	11.6	14.1	13.1

Sources: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Bilten* 1317, 1205, 1121, 982, 901, 783, 724, 623 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1969–80).

surveys, among all the organizations, the weakest appraisal was given to the SSOJ.

Even SSOJ members have relatively poor perceptions of their organization's influence. In Macedonia, only 22 percent of members thought that their organization had great influence in the work environment, and in Serbia only 19 percent held that opinion.³³

There is room for considerable improvement in expanding the influence of youth in decision-making processes and in expanding the collective influence of the SSOJ. In recent years, SSOJ attempts to become more influential have been unsuccessful. Interpersonal politics often dominates organizational activities, and intraorganizational feuds have also intensified.³⁴ The most recent national congress of the SSOJ drew attention to these matters, and there has been severe self-criticism of internal politics within the SSOJ.³⁵

Socialization of the Youth

Empirical sociological research on the socializing role of the SSOJ indicates that the SSOJ is relatively more successful in this objective than it has been in enhancing youth influence. For example, as tables 5.1 and 5.2 indicated, membership in the SSOJ is growing and the penetration rate is improving as well. In addition, two independent surveys of youth conducted in Serbia and Macedonia in the late 1970s found that only 7 percent of the sample in Serbia and 3 percent in Macedonia did not want to become members of the SSOJ.³⁶ Clearly, the SSOJ is successful in attracting and keeping members.

More detailed research about the level of participation in the Serbian and Macedonian SSOJ underscores the nature of youth involvement. Although relatively few youths are in leadership positions, large numbers are involved

in attending meetings, participating in community work projects, and implementing SSOJ work projects.³⁷ Participation in work projects, although not at the level of the postwar reconstruction period, is still substantial. In 1982 at the local level alone, the SSOJ sponsored 37,042 work projects which involved over 2.5 million youth and nearly 1.7 million working days.³⁸

Evaluations of the quality of the SSOJ involvement in youth socialization differ. On the one hand, a Serbian survey conducted in 1976 found relatively high levels (46 percent) of satisfaction of SSOJ members with chapter activities. On the other hand, only 19 percent of the respondents believed that the SSOJ had much influence in resolving problems at the workplace or school.³⁹

Generally, research tends to suggest that the socialization influence of the SSOJ is limited. One Croatian poll on the issue of socialization of rural youth determined that the role of organizations such as the SSOJ in socialization is relatively weak, particularly when compared to the mass media, parents, and schools.⁴⁰ This finding by itself is not disturbing, assuming that other agents of socialization support the basic goals of Yugoslav society, and most research suggests that socialist self-management is being inculcated among the young.

Not all subsidiary values associated with Yugoslav self-management may have been successfully transmitted. For example, resistance to a worker-dominated society may exist. According to a poll of the leaders of the SSOJ attending political schools in Croatia in the late 1970s, only 26 percent of the respondents hoped to become employed in the general economy. The remainder sought professional, private, or full-time political employment.⁴¹ Clearly, the current program to deprofessionalize the leadership and membership of the youth movement was needed.

The ability of the SSOJ to implement its goals is handicapped by the problem of interorganizational communication and membership apathy. The earlier-cited Serbian survey of SSOJ members found that 41 percent of the membership were unfamiliar with the policies of their chapter, 55 percent were unfamiliar with their commune organization positions, and 66 percent were unfamiliar with the positions of their republic SSOJ.⁴² The point was reiterated by the research in Serbia and Macedonia which determined that 27 percent of the youth members were informed about SSOJ positions in Macedonia and only 20 percent of SSOJ members in Serbia considered themselves to be well informed.⁴³ This same survey also discovered that only 18 percent of the membership in Serbia were moderately or intensively involved in the organization. The remainder were considered to be passive or marginally involved members.⁴⁴ In fact, a more recent poll suggests that a majority of SSOJ members cannot even recognize the names of their leaders.⁴⁵

Summary

This research on SSOJ leadership involvement and socialization of members indicates the existence of some problems within the organization. An article entitled "A Leadership Without a Membership?" in Yugoslavia's news weekly journal, *N.I.N.*, asked a series of questions that summarize this point: "Is the League of Socialist Youth narrow and closed to the problems of the youth? Is it also overly obedient and dependent? Is it, in short, an organization without a dominant purpose and reason for existence?"⁴⁶ The article concluded that perhaps all three questions might be answered affirmatively.

At the last national congress, the SSOJ has faced these problems and critically evaluated its performance. It pledged to improve its capacity to motivate the youth, to socialize them into socialist self-management, to end leadership professionalization, to expand its role in society, and to promote youth goals throughout society. Only time will tell how successful these attempts will be.

6 Elections and Political Organizations

Our major strategy for evaluating the role and performance of the Yugoslav political organizations is to examine the behavior of the four political organizations with respect to their position in the electoral process. This chapter outlines the basic functions of the organizations with respect to the selection, recruitment, and election of public officials in Yugoslavia. It also describes the evolution of the electoral process and the organizations' role within the process over time, concentrating on a description of the current delegate system. Finally, this chapter evaluates the current electoral activities of the Yugoslav political organizations with reference to the objectives of the electoral system.

Introduction

Any detailed appraisal of a nation's political organizations must include an analysis of the electoral behavior of those organizations. Participation in the electoral arena is an important component of the activities and behavior of most modern political parties, and party electoral activity helps forge the links between citizens and policy-makers.¹ In fact, party involvement in the electoral process can be a surrogate measure of the political power and political influence of particular political parties and other political organizations.

Political parties are generally under considerable pressure to become involved in the electoral system of a nation-state. Failure to get involved directly impairs the party's societal influence. For instance, absence from the electoral process isolates the party from the leadership selection process, and it reduces the party's capacity to introduce or to manage the policy process, particularly with respect to the determination of the agenda. Furthermore, continued nonparticipation in the electoral process gradually breaks the

linkages between the masses and its government, and contributes to the withering away of the party's mass base. A party, in short, has much to lose from isolation or withdrawal from the electoral process.

A party is also under considerable pressure to perform well in the electoral arena. Failure to win corrodes the party's leadership base and negatively impacts the political career ladders of its leadership.² It also makes it more difficult for a party's social and political value statements to become adopted by the political system. This, in turn, reduces the short- and long-term policy impact of a political party or other political organization.

Party involvement in the electoral system serves four purposes beyond survival: (1) enhancing the links between the government and public opinion, particularly when a political party represents a large sector of the population; (2) organizing the public will; (3) educating the citizens to exercise their political responsibility; and (4) helping to select leaders.³ Together, these four purposes provide criteria by which to compare, contrast, and evaluate the involvement of a political party in a political system. Heightened success of a political party in implementing these purposes would imply greater influence and effectiveness for that political party.

Socialist one-party states provide a distinctly different and more complex approach to the study of the party-electoral interchange. For many years in Western-based studies, Communist-dominated elections have been treated as ritual expressions of patriotism or indicators of the power of the Party socialization mechanism.⁴ Recently, however, the perspective has changed, and some recognition has been given to the important purposes of such elections; namely, to organize participation in the political process and to encourage the socialization and active adoption of the system's norms, values, and ideology.⁵

Of greater significance than the recognition of the importance of socialist state elections has been the trend of recent empirical research, which has noted that elections vary in purpose and impact among the socialist states.⁶ The recent research has noted not only that the functions of socialist state elections are nonhomogeneous across states, but that the purposes for elections can change over time within a socialist nation-state. Temporal transformations of elections have been studied in Czechoslovakia,⁷ East Germany,⁸ Poland,⁹ and even in the Soviet Union.¹⁰

Relatively little attention in the West has been given to Yugoslavia's unique electoral position among socialist countries or to its adaptations over time. In this chapter, we partially remedy that lack. In particular, we outline the ideological perspective of the Yugoslav electoral process and its evolution over time, describe the evolution of the electoral process and roles for the political organizations, measure the effectiveness and power of the Yugoslav political organizations with respect to elections and the electoral process, and analyze and evaluate the individual and combined behavior of the political organizations in the contemporary electoral system.

Yugoslavia, apparently, has used the electoral process to realize a number of social objectives. One objective, of course, is the legitimation of the system by encouraging widespread participation and nearly universal voter turnout. A second objective is to promote particular social goals in the selection of candidates. Examples include the advancement of women, youth, and workers and the reduction of the influence of political professionals. A third goal is to draw attention to, and receive support for, the political agenda being formulated at that time. Finally, elections serve as a mechanism to revitalize the mass-based political organizations by involving the members with the machinery of government and by testing the capacity of the organization to mobilize its members and to influence the public.¹¹

During Yugoslavia's postwar history, the priority given to each of these goals has changed and the institutional structures for the electoral process have been altered to reflect the changes in priorities.¹² Thus, not only do the Yugoslav elections meet the criteria for party involvement outlined by Neumann, but the relative importance of each criterion changes with time.

A major incentive for change in the purposes of elections and interaction of the political organizations with these elections has been the gradual development or evolution of Yugoslav society in general. For example, major rallies in the city squares and ritualistic displays of regime support are less meaningful to a society no longer facing an immediate threat from a hostile neighbor or neighbors, or highly organized revolutionary or counterrevolutionary movements. Centralized control over electoral activity is also counterproductive in a society with a rapidly growing proportion of highly educated and socially sophisticated people.¹³ Therefore, preservation of meaningful election activity requires commensurate changes in the structure, institutional settings, and interfaces with the political organizations involved with the electoral process.¹⁴

Evolution of the Yugoslav Electoral Process

Postwar Yugoslavia has experienced three major different electoral systems and a host of relatively minor electoral reforms. Change can be considered to be a constant in Yugoslav electoral processes. For example, during the entire postwar period each election was conducted under different electoral laws and regulations.¹⁵

In spite of the numerous changes, the history of the electoral process can be categorized into three distinct stages: the postwar, party-dominant stage from 1948 to 1963, the pluralist period from 1963 to 1974, and the delegate system from 1974 to today. For each stage, the normative goals, structural characteristics, and behavior of the political organizations varied. These changes, more than anything else, provide the pattern by which to define and chart the evolution of Yugoslavia's electoral experiences.

Figure 6.1: Prioritization of electoral system goals by Yugoslav electoral period

<i>Goals</i>	<i>System</i>		
	<i>(1948–53)</i>	<i>(1963–74)</i>	<i>(1974–Current)</i>
Legitimation/participation	Primary	Tertiary	Secondary
Social change	Secondary	Secondary	Primary
Political agenda support	Secondary	Secondary	Secondary
Organizational enhancement	Tertiary	Primary	Secondary

Normative Change

As mentioned earlier, there are four goals or objectives that must be considered in a discussion of the Yugoslav electoral process. They include fulfilling the legitimation function for the state, expanding social opportunities and promoting social change, generating support for the political agenda, and revitalizing the political organizations. Each electoral epoch has its own election goals, and each assigns priority to these objectives in its own distinctive way. Figure 6.1 outlines an evaluation of the prioritization of the above-mentioned goals for each electoral period.¹⁶

Yugoslav legal scholars do not consider their electoral process and institutions to be fixed in concrete. Instead, following the example of Kardelj, there has been a tendency to accept each electoral system as a temporary experimental arrangement. Whenever considerable societal changes have occurred, or when political needs dictate, the electoral system is expected to rise to the new challenges and to undergo reform.¹⁷ Thus, we would expect that the dramatic changes which have occurred in Yugoslavia's economy and society would be reflected in periodic reorderings of the objectives of the political electoral system.

In 1948, when Yugoslavia was largely undeveloped and beset with external and internal threats to her stability, elections were called and conducted to generate enthusiasm for the regime and to help legitimize the decisions of the government and Party. The Cold War, territorial disputes with Italy, Bulgaria, and Albania, political unrest in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and the COMECON campaign against Yugoslavia all contributed to a tense external political atmosphere which dictated that Yugoslavia deter aggression by presenting a strong, united front. Elections, as a symbol of national unity, contributed to this image. In addition, the efforts of a strong, disciplined, and united Party, disciplined national front and union organizations that were transmission belts for the Party, and few differentiated social groups in the country to fragment social interests made this united front effort possible.

Just as the tense international situation and weakly developed social forces

made legitimacy a primary goal for the electoral process in the late forties and early fifties, changes in the international arena and in Yugoslav society made this objective obsolete by the early 1960s. At this time, the Soviet Union had accommodated itself to Yugoslavia's independent existence. Western nations had begun to invest in the Yugoslav economy, and foreign leaders began to lower the barriers separating the two blocs.

Within Yugoslavia, considerable changes had occurred. Several social groups had grown stronger and differentiated themselves from the mass of society.¹⁸ Regional economic inequalities and regional economic interests began to assert themselves.¹⁹ Better educated and more urbanized groups had become a significant segment of the population and distanced themselves from the campaign-style rhetoric and behavior of the prior period. Major cities, for example, no longer decked themselves out in red banners and posters, and May Day parades were canceled due to lack of interest. Decentralization of the economy had also begun, following the introduction of self-management.

The second electoral system, from 1963 to 1974, took into account the rapid and profound changes that had occurred in Yugoslav society. Pluralism was recognized as a social force in the institutions, and a five chamber legislature was initiated to represent the needs of the major social groups. An unexpected feature of this change in goals was a decline in mass participation in the electoral system. From 1946 to 1969, overall voter turnout in the national elections ranged from 88 percent to 96 percent.²⁰ However, from 1963 to 1969, there was a substantial drop in all republic participation rates, and in Montenegro, the turnout percentage barely exceeded the prewar Yugoslav voting turnout.²¹

Other forms of electoral participation also showed substantial declines during the course of the second electoral period. Citizen participation at voter meetings, which were held to select candidates, dropped precipitously from 1963 to 1969. By 1969, considering all levels of government, all republics, and all chambers, only one chamber in one republic registered a citizen turnout in excess of 50 percent of eligible voters. In most cases, the average was closer to 30 percent.²² Thus, it is evident that declining electoral participation was a problem that marked the second electoral system.

Considerable research established that economic development and increasing pluralism was responsible for the declining participation levels.²³ The research also highlighted the need for the electoral system to accommodate itself more readily to the shifting needs of a pluralistic society.²⁴ The Standing Conference of Cities suggested that urban areas lacked the homogeneity and the sense of community found in rural areas. The conference noted that this phenomenon highlighted the need to provide additional incentives to encourage participation at voter meetings.²⁵ Sociological research by Josip Obradović also confirmed the need to rethink the institutional electoral linkages to participation or face even more severe declines in nonelectoral involvement.²⁶

As a result of the problems with citizen participation in the second system, one of the challenges of the third electoral system was to reverse the decline in participation, and to retain the accommodation to the differentiation and pluralizing of society. While participation did not become the primary goal of the new system, many new forms and institutions were developed with that intention in mind.²⁷

A second normative goal of the electoral process in Yugoslavia is the promotion of social change. This means the creation of a system that permits the political advancement of particular groups in society. Again, the importance of this objective varies according to the social development of society. In the early 1950s, a relatively large proportion of the elected political leadership had agricultural or worker backgrounds and relatively little formal education. The revolutionary experience and discrediting of the prewar leadership brought enormous political career mobility to many poorly educated and young citizens. In the 1953 Serbian Assembly, for example, 69 percent of the members had no more than a primary school education, and only 11 percent possessed a university education. Seventy-one percent of this body was younger than forty years of age, and only 4 percent were fifty years old or older.²⁸ Thus, in the early years following the war, there was apparently little reason to be concerned about the advancement opportunities of the youth and worker/peasant classes.

By the early 1960s, the rapid expansion of the economy and unprecedented development of society fostered a situation of expanding pluralist interest group involvement in which formal expertise and professionalism were considered to be more necessary to the functioning of the elected political bodies.²⁹ The recognition of pluralism and designation of five functional chambers of the national legislature also highlighted the trend toward professionalism. Primary school education or less characterized 69 percent of Serbia's republic assembly's members in 1953. It declined to 55 percent in 1958, and was less than 10 percent in 1963. Correspondingly, the percentage of postsecondary school educated members climbed from 11 percent in 1953 to 52 percent in 1963.³⁰

The latter part of the 1960s witnessed increasing criticism of the trend toward professionalism of elected bodies. This criticism centered on a decline in worker involvement in the political process,³¹ with a commensurate increase in strike activity,³² culminating in Tito's famous letter of 1972, which demanded an increased role and voice for workers and youths in the political process.³³

Considerable case study and statistical information verifies this concern. Minović's study of politics in rural communes in Serbia during this period drew attention to the impact of increasing professionalism where even local agricultural communes developed political machines.³⁴

Empirical data reflect the trend and indicate that worker and youth inclu-

Table 6.1 Composition of the federal, republic, and commune legislatures, 1963–69 (in percentages)

<i>Characteristic</i>	<i>1963</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>1969</i>
Youth (under 29)				
Federal	3.2	1.0	0.5	0.7
Republic	12.2	9.0	5.4	5.1
Commune	26.1	23.0	14.5	16.2
Women				
Federal	19.6	17.3	13.3	7.9
Republic	20.8	19.0	12.8	5.8
Commune	16.4	14.4	9.4	6.9
8 years of education or less				
Federal	9.1	7.3	4.3	2.6
Republic	9.5	8.5	5.7	3.5
Commune	46.8	46.6	43.9	36.3
Over 12 years of education				
Federal	66.3	70.6	75.0	82.3
Republic	53.3	59.2	68.7	76.8
Commune	18.3	18.9	22.1	26.8
Workers*				
Federal	5.5	1.9	3.9	0.6
Republic	7.5	4.6	2.5	1.2
Commune	43.4	46.2	47.0	44.1

*Includes agricultural workers.

Source: Sergije Pegan, "Socijalni Sastav Predstavničkih Tijela," in Firdus Džinić, *Skupštinski Izbori 1969* (Belgrade: Centar za Istraživanje Javnog Mnenja, 1970), pp. 150–52.

sion in the electoral institutions had fallen at all levels of the political process and for all republics and provinces (see table 6.1). In the Federal Assembly, from 1963 to 1969, the worker component consistently fell from 6 to less than 1 percent of the total. University-educated members climbed from 49 to 68 percent, women dropped from 20 to 8 percent, and incumbency rose from an average 35 percent in 1963 to 47 percent in 1969.³⁵ On the republic level during the same period, worker membership fell from 8 to 1 percent; the youth contingent dropped from 12 to 5 percent, women lost ground from 21 to 6 percent, and the university-educated jumped from 37 to 58 percent. On the communal level, workers maintained only about 22 percent of the total, youth dropped from 26 to 16 percent, and female membership in communal legislatures plummeted from 16 to 7 percent.

It is generally well accepted that, by 1969, Yugoslav elected institutions had lost their worker character and appeared to be dominated by older, male,

political professionals. A change in this situation was a clear imperative in the 1974 constitutional reforms.

The third normative goal of the electoral process in Yugoslavia is to provide support to the political agenda, articulate public issues, and suggest possible change. In the early years of the republic, most elected bodies were designed to transmit decisions of the Party, but by the second period, candidates competed among themselves and offered separate, and often different, political programs and platforms.

To an increasingly worrisome extent, the second electoral system contributed to divisive factionalism among the electorate. Yugoslavia's Institute for Social Research consistently monitored the attitude of the public from 1965 and confirmed these weaknesses. Forty-eight percent of its respondents noted that the selection process did not respect and express the desires and positions of the voters, and only 6.5 percent thought that the voters' wishes were completely satisfied.³⁶ Of those who were less than completely satisfied by the electoral process, 54 percent placed the blame on an uncontrolled nomination process.³⁷

Public media involvement also dropped dramatically. To illustrate this point, a study of the election coverage of three of the major daily newspapers found that coverage of electoral activity had dropped by approximately two-thirds during the 1963–67 period.³⁸ Evidently, the election's usefulness as a forum for national policy debates had deteriorated. By 1974, in other words, there was sufficient cause to reexamine the electoral process with an intent to improve control over the political agenda.

The final normative objective of the Yugoslav electoral process is to provide a focus for the energies of the political organizations, to expand their influence and to involve their members in political activities. Again, during the first electoral period, the League dominated all electoral activity, while the unions, youth organizations, and Socialist Alliance performed a largely cheerleading function. Beginning in 1963, this situation had changed, and major responsibilities were given to each of the organizations, with primary emphasis given to the Socialist Alliance.

By many authoritative accounts, the Socialist Alliance never fully succeeded in managing the electoral system during the second electoral period. Divisions within the communities were often overlooked, interest groups formed,³⁹ and Alliance attempts to control the process were often met with resistance or gradual disillusionment of the populace.⁴⁰ The Institute for Social Research charted the weaknesses in the performance of this organization. In 1969, only 20 percent of the respondents to a national poll identified the Alliance as the most influential actor in elections, and only 15 percent identified the League of Communists as the most important group in the conduct of their elections.⁴¹ The only positive aspect of this result was that the figures were only marginally different from those tallied in 1967,

Figure 6.2: Summary of electoral system structural changes by electoral period

<i>Structural characteristic</i>	<i>Period</i>		
	<i>(1948–63)</i>	<i>(1963–74)</i>	<i>(1974–Current)</i>
Territorial representation	Strong	Weak	Moderate
Functional representation	Weak	Strong	Moderate
Multicandidacy	No	Yes	No
Nomination process	Controlled	Weak	Some control
System type	Representative	Representative	Delegate

indicating that the Alliance’s position had not continued to deteriorate.⁴² On the negative side, however, both polls confirmed that the perceived influence of the political organizations was less than that of informal groups or special interest groups.

This overview of the normative impact of the second electoral period in Yugoslavia’s postwar history reveals a system beset by major problems. A first priority for change was the restoration of a workers’ character to the elected body. A secondary goal was to revitalize the political organizations and give them greater influence in public life. A third objective was to devise a system that would bring more attention to policy issues and to help formulate a workable policy agenda for the future.

Structural Change

In addition to changes in the normative goals and expectation of the electoral system, there has been an evolution in the structural aspects of the electoral process. Figure 6.2 outlines the scope of those changes.

One of the major developments in the evolution of Yugoslavia’s electoral system has been the interrelationship between territorial and functional representation through the electoral structure. In the early years after the war, the country was poorly developed and the population was primarily engaged in agricultural or extractive industrial pursuits. This, coupled with the formative experiences of the war, had revived for the population the interest in territorial concerns and nations. It was natural, therefore, for elections to be conducted on the basis of territorial interests, and be directed toward the reduction of tensions between nationalities.

A major shift toward functional representation occurred in the early 1960s, which was reflected by the changes in the legislative structure and the growth of interest in pluralism at that time. All levels of government stressed functional considerations, with one significant, but unintended, result being the heightening of economic and social inequalities. Developed sectors of the

population had more political clout and power than underdeveloped sectors, and popular perceptions of political influence varied according to one's economic power.⁴³ Negative features included domination of political institutions, particularly local, by large, well-developed enterprises,⁴⁴ declines in participation, particularly in urban areas,⁴⁵ and an increase in overall power and influence of economic directors and administrative staff who exercised more control over economic resources.⁴⁶

One area where this negative feature became evident was in perceptions of voters about the distribution of political power. Generally, in areas dominated by highly centralized economic enterprises, participation was lower, and the nominations and candidature processes were more heavily dominated by the more powerful economic strata.⁴⁷ The level of economic development affected the relationship,⁴⁸ and the net result, without controlling for development, was a disharmony between desired influence and real influence in government. The results of a survey completed in Slovenia in 1970 indicate particularly large discrepancies between the desired and actual political influence of various social groups at this period.⁴⁹ The largest negative coefficients went to voters, voluntary associations, and most noteworthy, members of the communal legislatures. These results tend to verify the anomalies brought about by excessive functional representation.

Control over candidature is another structural consideration that has changed markedly in the four decades of postwar Yugoslavia. The first electoral period authorized the presentation of a single slate of national front delegates which was uncontested at the polls. Such a system permitted the political organization, chiefly the Party, to control the recruitment process, but also fueled apathy or cynicism in the voter. The second period radically changed this system and opened up the electoral process to considerable numbers of new individuals. From 1963 to 1969, the number of contested seats grew remarkably. In 1963, on the federal level, there were 1.005 candidates for each seat, but by 1969, the figure grew to 1.692. On the republic level, a similar pattern occurred, with a growth from a 1.009 ratio of candidates to positions to a 1.975 ratio in 1969.⁵⁰

The growth in multiple candidacies was not without its handicaps, and, by 1969, it reflected distinct liabilities in the system. Elections for contested seats generally favored older, male candidates with prestigious reputations from the leadership ranks in industry and the political organizations. Women, youths, and workers were handicapped by this process. Table 6.2 presents data from the 1969 election comparing the percent elected to percent nominated for major social categories of the population for the federal, republic, and communal elections. Often, the multicandidacies tend to lead to a less representative electoral body.

A challenge facing the framers of the 1974 Constitution was to develop a system that could leave some choice to the voter, but restore some control

Table 6.2 Composition of nominated and elected representatives at the federal, republic, and communal levels, 1969 (in percentages)

Legislative unit	Leaders		Women		Youth	
	Nominated	Elected	Nominated	Elected	Nominated	Elected
Federal legislature						
Sociopolitical	70	80	4.2	5.0	2.1	1.7
Economic	45	56	1.7	1.7	0.4	0.8
Republic legislature						
All chambers	—	59	8.7	5.8	3.8	2.3
Sociopolitical	54	74	—	—	—	—
Economic	43	58	2.8	3.4	1.6	1.7
Commune legislature						
All chambers	—	42	8.0	6.9	6.3	8.5

Sources: Computed by the authors from Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Predstavnička Tela Društveno-Političkih Zajednica Statistički Bilten* 590 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1970), see also table 6.1 (pp. 148–49 in source).

over the social compositions of elected bodies. The delegate system was designed, in part, with this concern in mind.

The nominating process is another structural feature that has evolved over time in Yugoslavia's electoral process. In the first stage, nominations were relatively simple. The Socialist Alliance, under the guidance and control of the Party, selected candidates for elected posts, and these candidates were then confirmed by the voter assemblies. Beginning in 1963, however, the system had changed radically. Each commune's Socialist Alliance chapter formed a candidacy committee that considered nominations and accepted individuals to become candidates. Each commune also scheduled and held voter meetings in the organized neighborhoods and workplaces where potential candidates could also be considered, nominated, and accepted for public office. The prospective candidate, therefore, had two potential routes for nomination: one through the candidate conference, and one through the voter meetings. Often, however, a potential candidate chose both routes in order to make a stronger case for nomination. A candidate for higher office, for example, would visit a series of voter meetings within the electoral district in order to receive the endorsement of as many meetings as possible and be accepted by the communal electoral commissions. The process was time-consuming and somewhat disorganized, and it encouraged a propensity toward interest-group behavior.⁵¹

Several negative features manifested themselves after the introduction of

the system. Participation at voter meetings fell dramatically from 1963 to 1969, and often participation averaged less than 30 percent of the voters.⁵² In 1963, participation at the federal-level nominations had been much higher than it was by 1969.

Second, although the candidature committees tried to increase worker, youth, and female candidatures, the time constraints on the potential candidates and the advantages of name recognition at the voter meetings operated against these relatively disadvantaged groups, thereby contributing to their relatively poor participation in Yugoslav political bodies at that time (see table 6.2). This problem reinforced further the need for change in the electoral system.

Sociopolitical Organizational Changes

In addition to the normative and structural evolution of the Yugoslav electoral system, there has also been a shift in the pattern of relationships among the political organizations in support of the electoral process. Before 1963, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia exercised general control over the other political organizations with respect to electoral activity. The system, of course, was somewhat dissatisfying to the other organizations that fulfilled a transmission-belt role. By 1963, however, much had changed.

The new constitution and election laws delegated considerably more authority and responsibility for electoral activity to the Socialist Alliance. It received authority to organize electoral activity and oversee the management of the selection and nomination process. It also received responsibility for enhancing turnout and encouraging the recruitment of women, youths, and workers into the political system. Finally, the Alliance was encouraged to develop closer relations with the youth, veterans', and union organizations in order to maximize participation and involvement in the system.

As the system developed over time, several anomalies began to appear. First, unrestrained conflicts began to occur over the nomination and election of particular candidates, particularly at the communal level. The conflicts seemed to be most pronounced whenever the Alliance tried to overmanage and control excessively the electoral process.⁵³ Second, the tendency of the League in some areas to withdraw from active involvement in elections created a vacuum of power, which led to internal conflict at many governmental levels.⁵⁴

The most important weakness, however, was the lack of central coordination of electoral activities. As a result, few citizens were really knowledgeable about electoral activities, and, in many areas, the Alliance failed to carry out its mandate. The 1967 election study noted that only 12 percent of the local population understood the nomination rules and procedures, and nearly 60 percent knew almost nothing about them.⁵⁵ The same study also discovered

Figure 6.3: Summary of sociopolitical organizational changes by electoral period

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Period</i>		
	<i>(1948–63)</i>	<i>(1963–74)</i>	<i>(1974–Current)</i>
League of Communists	Dominant	Supportive	General policy
Socialist Alliance	Transmission belt	Nomination and candidacy	Coordination and neighborhoods
Trade Union Association	Transmission belt	Assist alliance	Workplace
Youth Organization	Transmission belt	Little or none	Assist other organizations

that even among the local political leadership, 43 percent knew little or nothing about what the Alliance did concerning elections.⁵⁶ Obviously, the Alliance’s electoral activity left much to be desired.

By 1974, changes in the roles, responsibilities, and activities of the political organizations were in order. The Socialist Alliance needed to be revitalized, the League needed to reassert its coordinative role, and both the trade unions and the youth movement needed to be more committed to, and involved in, the electoral process.

In summary, the electoral process by 1974 was in a serious quandary. Participation had dropped, elected bodies had taken on the appearance of elite institutions, public control over the political agenda had faded, functional representation had increased political inequalities, the candidature process discriminated against the workers, women, and youth, the nomination process tended to encourage community divisions and factionalism, and the political organizations had, in many places, lost management and coordinative control over the selection and recruitment of elected officials. The 1974 electoral system addressed itself to these concerns and attempted to create a more workable system. Figure 6.3 outlines the scope and nature of these changes.

Current Approach

The problems with the second electoral system discussed above were accompanied by other worrisome events. These events included political unrest in Kosovo and Croatia, and even some political difficulties in Slovenia in the latter 1960s and early 1970s. Also involved was a rising tide of industrial disputes and major disturbances at Belgrade and Zagreb universities. Perhaps more worrisome to President Tito and others was the rising perception

that the League had begun to lose control and had begun to resemble, in Tito's words, "a debating club," rather than a strong and vital political institution. Tito's intervention in replacing the Party leadership in Croatia, and later in Serbia, served to underscore the concern and led to a consensus that the reforms since the Brioni Conference had advanced too far. This was the environment in which the 1974 Constitution was drafted, and it was this complex situation with which the new constitution was designed to deal.

Yugoslavia's 1974 Constitution radically altered the prevailing electoral system and introduced massive changes in its normative goals, structural format, and interface with the political organizations. This section discusses those changes, while the following section evaluates the degree of success with which the constitution's objectives have been met.

Normative Change

By 1974, the problems associated with the second electoral system had become intense. Participation was dropping precipitously, the elected bodies tended to confirm the existence of a new technocratic class, governmental representative institutions were growing distant from the populace, and the political organizations were withdrawing ever further from active involvement in electoral politics.

A major goal, following the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, was the elimination of political professionals and the introduction of new social elements, primarily workers, women, and youth, into the political process.⁵⁷ The new electoral system encouraged this goal through several mechanisms. One was the strict limitation of a maximum of two consecutive terms for all elected officials. A second was the strict prohibition against holding more than a single public office. A third was the delegate system, which made it more difficult for political professionals to emerge as the electorate's spokespersons.

The most significant reorientation of the social composition of elected bodies occurred, however, through direct action by the political organization. At every level, the League of Communists, Socialist Alliance, and Trade Union Association were encouraged to adopt goals for the social composition of elected bodies.⁵⁸ The Socialist Alliance's candidacy committees were encouraged to promote candidacy by workers, women, and youth in the communal chambers of organized neighborhoods.⁵⁹ Committees of trade union organizations were prodded to encourage more worker nominations for the chambers of associated work,⁶⁰ and the League announced itself prepared to intervene wherever goals had not been met.⁶¹

A second normative change was to restore or enhance the policy program component of electoral campaigns. Electoral campaigns, which in the second period had often become personality contests, were now encouraged to

adopt the platform drafted by the Alliance and Union, with cooperation from the youth organization and under guidance from the League.⁶² The indirect selection of delegates and stronger electoral role of the political organizations made reversions to personality contests more difficult, but not impossible.⁶³

Heightened participation became a third normative goal of the post-1973 electoral system. An individual was expected to become involved in electoral politics at the neighborhood level, in the workplace, and within the political organization. The individual, in effect, was participating in three different arenas, with the expectation that at least one of those electoral units would be meaningful to the individual. In addition, the delegate system was designed to encourage participation, particularly at the basic levels, because those involved or selected would be directly known by the electorate and familiar with the local problems of the group. The intended constant feedback from the delegations and delegates to the electoral base was expected to maintain interest and give individuals a greater sense of political responsibility.⁶⁴

The revitalization of the political organizations was expected to be a natural outgrowth of the other three normative goals. Each goal depended upon active participation and acceptance by the organizations. Change in the social composition of elected bodies was managed by these organizations, the policy agenda was formulated by the organizations and was to be publicized by them, and participation had become a direct responsibility of the organizations.⁶⁵

Structural Arrangements

The 1974 Constitution most directly altered the structural arrangement of the electoral process in Yugoslavia. It altered the balance between territorial and functional representation, arrived at a compromise between single-slate and multichamber elections, reformed the nomination process, and substituted the delegate concept for the traditional representative notion of government.

Yugoslavia's current electoral format makes a sharp distinction between functional and territorial interest articulation. Each interest is kept distinct at all levels of government. Territorial interests are articulated at the communal level in the chamber of organized neighborhoods, in the chamber of communes at the republic level, and in the chamber of republics and provinces at the federal level. Functional interests are divided into two streams: policy and economic. The policy boards operate largely outside the territorial constraints but can interact with these units when appropriate. Economic interests parallel territorial interests with representation by the chambers of associated work at the communal and republic levels and the Federal Chamber at the national level.⁶⁶

The current institutional framework has introduced a new coordinative element into communal and republic decision-making, namely, the chamber of the political organizations. These bodies are designed to articulate the general interest, introduce general policy questions, and help resolve divergences between economic and territorial interests.⁶⁷

A second major institutional change following the 1974 constitution was change in the candidacy rules. Multicandidacies, in a sense, were retained by the delegate system. Electors choose a delegation rather than a delegate, with the intent to foster harmony yet allow divergent interests to be included within the framework of the delegation.⁶⁸ Slovenia, for example, has gone so far as to rotate the delegate function among members of the delegation, and constant attention is also paid to the conceptual differences between a delegate and representative in order to deflate factional, personality-based politics. The system is complex, but this may be necessary to reduce occurrences of factional group manipulation and domination.⁶⁹

The nomination process has probably undergone the most substantial change. Nominations occur at candidacy meetings at the workplace and neighborhood. The unions are responsible for the conduct of nominations in the workplace, and the Alliance is responsible for candidature activities in the neighborhood. Both organizations are responsible for establishing candidacy committees whose purpose is to organize the meetings, identify likely candidates, and encourage the selection of youth, women, and workers.

Compared to the 1963–74 period, nomination procedures currently are simpler and easier for the potential candidate. Each meeting must have a quorum of 20 percent of eligible voters, and each candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast to receive the nomination from that unit. Whenever an electoral district is composed of more than a single work group or neighborhood, the candidate must receive nomination from at least a third of all the units involved.⁷⁰ If the number of nominees exceeds the number of delegation slots, those who receive the largest number of votes become members of the delegation. Finally, it is up to the delegates themselves, with guidance from the appropriate political organization, to select the delegate who speaks for the delegation.

The nomination system is designed to ameliorate some of the problems encountered earlier. The process is considerably shorter and the selection units are smaller, thereby encouraging participation.⁷¹ It also discourages factionalism and the formation of interest groups, thereby reducing the probability of conflict. It grants a pivotal role to the political organizations, thereby encouraging their activities and stimulating the selection of women, workers, and youth for the delegations.

Sociopolitical Organizational Involvement

Even a cursory review of the current Yugoslav electoral process would indicate that the political organizations now possess a central responsibility for the maintenance of the system and achievement of electoral goals. The most fundamental change, however, is that responsibility for particular activities has been compartmentalized, which reduces the possibility of repetition of activities or counterproductive behavior, and makes it easier to pinpoint sources of success or failure.

Under the current electoral arrangements, the League of Communists takes a coordinative, policy role rather than a direct participatory role in the process.⁷² Its primary duty is to outline the general policy goals of the campaign. It suggests social compositional goals for the elected institutions, and it identifies problems with the functioning of the delegate system and evaluates the delegate system's performance. The League also provides information, and its basic units will assist the Alliance and SSJ, if needed. The SKJ does not, however, take over direct responsibility for the campaign and electoral functions, nor does it engage in house-to-house canvassing, mass demonstrations, etc., as occur in the Soviet Union.

The Socialist Alliance, compared to the prior period, has reduced its responsibilities for the management of the total system, but it has a heavier obligation to manage electoral activities within the neighborhoods. It is the Alliance that coordinates activities, conducts informational campaigns, organizes voter meetings, and identifies and encourages the nomination of individuals at the territorial levels. The Alliance also coordinates elections for the sociopolitical chambers, and selects members for the communal and republic electoral commissions.⁷³

Trade union chapters have expanded their electoral responsibility under current procedures. They are responsible for nominations and elections within the workplace, and they conduct activities analogous to the Alliance, but on the level of the workplace.⁷⁴

Contrary to the positions of the League, Alliance, and SSJ, the Socialist Youth Organization's role is largely ancillary to the other organizations. The SSOJ is expected to offer its services to the other organizations, contribute enthusiasm to the campaign, and work to have youth included in the delegations.

In summary, the 1974 constitution introduced a series of profound changes into the operation and behavior of the electoral process. The overriding goal was to eliminate or reduce the normative, structural, and sociopolitical problems encountered in the previous electoral process. The following section evaluates the extent to which these intentions were realized.

Evaluation

As indicated above, the Yugoslav electoral system was completely revamped in 1974 and reformed as a response to the four major problems in the prior system. These were declining participation, increasing professionalism of elected bodies, diminishing influence of the political organizations, and a withering of attention to the political agenda. The political organizations were given primary responsibility to oversee the resolution of each of these problem areas, and it is the intent of this section to examine the strengths and weaknesses of these organizations in carrying out their electoral responsibilities.

Participation

The 1974 delegate system was designed not only to stop the erosion in electoral participation, but also to try and make electoral participation more meaningful to the participants. Therefore, an examination of participation trends should study total figures for participation in elections and the nomination process as well as the significance that these actions may have had for the participants.

An examination of the gross voting percentages during the three elections held since 1974 indicate some improvement in the total percentage voting among the five major delegation groups. Although comparisons with earlier elections are not completely analogous, the gross turnout figures indicate that the erosion in participation has been reversed. Overall participation in 1982 reached 90 percent, compared to approximately 86 percent in 1969. Another significant point is that the percentage of those who deliberately or accidentally invalidated their ballots was apparently reduced by half from 5 to 2 percent.

Comparison of participation rates found in table 6.3 reveals that some improvements in voter turnout occurred under the delegate system in nearly every republic and comparable voter base. Among the industrial work communities, the average increase in voting from 1969 to 1978 was over 8 percent. This translates into a reduction in the absentee-spoiled ballot proportion of nearly 50 percent. Among the agriculturally employed population, the gross mean republic/provincial voter increase was over 6 percent, which represents a similarly high reduction of the absentee-spoiled ballot proportion of the potential voting electorate. The mean electoral turnout improvement in the neighborhood delegations nearly reached 7 percent, and represented over a 50 percent reduction of the nonvoting proportion of the population.

Within republics, there continues to be considerable variation in voter turnout rates. A study of the 1978 election in Croatia revealed that turnout in

Table 6.3 Voting participation by delegation for republics, 1969–82, and Change, 1969–78 (in percentages)

<i>Republic</i>	<i>OOOR delegation</i>				
	<i>1969*</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>Change</i>
Yugoslavia		89.4	89.8	87.1	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	82.9	86.3	89.7		6.8
Montenegro	76.5	87.7	92.8		16.3
Croatia	83.7**	89.4	87.3		3.6
Macedonia	81.0	97.0	92.7		11.7
Slovenia	88.4**	90.8	91.0	2.6	
Serbia total	82.5	88.7	90.5	8.0	
Serbia proper	81.4	88.5	89.5	8.1	
Kosovo	81.6	90.6	90.2	8.6	
Vojvodina	86.0	88.8	93.0	7.0	
<i>Agricultural</i>					
Yugoslavia	84.9	90.5	92.4	90.7	5.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	83.3	87.0	88.4		5.1
Montenegro	82.8	87.0	88.0		5.1
Croatia	83.7**	93.2	93.8		10.1
Macedonia	82.8	98.5	93.6		10.8
Slovenia	88.4**	95.4	97.2		11.2
Serbia total	88.1	89.8	92.4		4.3
Serbia proper	86.8	89.4	92.3		5.5
Kosovo	90.5	89.2	89.3		-0.8
Vojvodina	93.6	92.0	95.8		2.2
<i>Organized neighborhoods</i>					
Yugoslavia	86.1	87.9	90.9	90.1	4.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	82.7	81.8	89.2		6.5
Montenegro	78.0	84.8	85.1		18.1
Croatia	86.8	93.7	91.6		4.8
Macedonia	82.4	78.3	85.0		2.6
Slovenia	88.3	89.4	93.7		5.4
Serbia total	87.5	88.9	92.1		4.6
Serbia proper	86.4	88.2	91.1		4.7
Kosovo	87.3	84.5	89.1		1.8
Vojvodina	90.6	92.7	96.2		5.8

*For 1969, the chamber of work community (subgroup industry) was used for associated work, the chamber of work communities (subgroup agriculture) was used for agriculture, and the communal chamber was used for organized neighborhoods.

**Denotes that subgroups were not available. In those instances the entire work community was used.

Sources: 1969—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Bilten* 590 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1970): 11. 1974—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Bilten* 888 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1974): 12. 1978—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Bilten* 1140 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1979): 15–16.

communes for the OOUR-based delegations ranged from 79 to 98 percent. For the neighborhood-based delegations, the range is from 72 to 100 percent, and for agricultural delegations, the range is from 60 to 100 percent.⁷⁵ This study, after employing some empirical-statistical tests, concluded that a large proportion of the variation in turnout appears to be attributable indirectly to economic development factors and to be positively and directly related to the level of social organization within the communes.⁷⁶ In other words, considerable credit for the increase in participation noted under the delegate system can be given to the political organizations and to other highly organized social groups.

Although overall electoral participation is nearly universal under the delegate system, participation in voter assemblies to select the slate of candidates still reflects some inadequacies. As Jovanovic notes, there is insufficient attention given by electors to phases of the electoral process other than voting. This indicates that a considerable number of electors still view elections as a kind of plebiscite and as a way of expressing their support for the system, rather than as a political action directly linked to the decision-making processes in society.⁷⁷

The situation is not entirely negative. The turnout rate at nomination meetings varies by the type of delegation under consideration, and ranges from a high of 78 percent attendance at voter meetings to select delegations from the OOURS to a low of 24 percent for meetings to select delegations from the neighborhoods. For all cases, the attendance rates are considerably higher than before the 1974 electoral changes (see table 6.4). Nevertheless, the high expectations of the constitution's framers may not have been met.

Analysis of the republic and provincial nomination meeting attendance rates listed in table 6.4 shows that there is considerable variation among these governmental units. For all three types of delegations listed, attendance was considerably lower in Slovenia, falling to 16 percent attendance at the neighborhood voter meetings in 1974, and considerably higher in Montenegro where attendance for voter meetings to select the OOUR delegations exceeded 84 percent in 1974. Also, Serbia proper tends to have lower participation rates and Kosovo much higher attendance. Apparently, the republics' political organizations vary in their capacity to generate political participation. The decline in Kosovo's nomination meeting attendance rates in the 1978 elections provides additional support for this view.

The most striking difference in nomination meeting attendance is by type of delegation. For all the elections, about three-quarters of all OOUR members attended the nomination meetings, 40 percent of the eligible farmers attended their nomination gatherings, and less than 25 percent of neighborhood residents bothered to attend their candidacy selection meetings. It should be cautioned, however, that the differences in turnout, particularly between the OOUR meetings and neighborhood meetings, should not be attributed to

Table 6.4 Participation at candidacy meetings by type of delegation, 1969–82 (in percentages)

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Delegation</i>		
	<i>1969</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1978</i>
	<i>Associated work</i>		
Yugoslavia	29.2**	74.6	77.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	39.1	74.2	82.5
Montenegro	41.8	84.2	84.8
Croatia	39.6**	78.7	75.1
Macedonia	46.2	73.1	83.1
Slovenia	30.5**	67.4	—
Serbia total	31.5	74.7	76.2
Serbia proper	30.1	72.7	74.4
Kosovo	40.1	78.5	84.9
Vojvodina	33.7	78.6	78.0
	<i>Agricultural</i>		
Yugoslavia	29.2	40.3	39.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	18.7	41.8	51.0
Montenegro	16.7	66.3	71.3
Croatia	39.6**	44.8	46.9
Macedonia	40.6	65.6	30.1
Slovenia	30.5**	26.0	—
Serbia total	20.7	36.0	34.1
Serbia proper	21.1	33.5	31.8
Kosovo	13.5	46.8	44.9
Vojvodina	30.3	38.2	35.0
	<i>Organized neighborhoods</i>		
Yugoslavia	11.7	24.8	23.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	10.1	30.8	30.5
Montenegro	19.0	40.8	32.0
Croatia	15.7	30.6	28.3
Macedonia	12.3	30.2	28.3
Slovenia	6.2	16.0	—
Serbia total	10.9	19.3	17.1
Serbia proper	11.3	16.4	16.9
Kosovo	15.4	46.9	29.2
Vojvodina	7.9	15.2	11.8

*For 1969, for the associated work delegations the chamber of work communities (subgroup industry) was used, for the agricultural delegations the chamber of work communities (subgroup agriculture) was used, and for the organized neighborhood delegations the communal chambers were used.

**Denotes figures in which the subgroup categories were not available. In those cases, the complete work community was used.

Sources: See table 6.3 (pp. 10, 11, and 13, respectively, in 1969, 1974, and 1978 sources).

the relative strength of the SSJ in organizing or the relative weakness of the Alliance in its neighborhood activities. The differences appear to be caused primarily by the logistical and demographic differences of the settings in which the meetings take place. OOUR members are together in the workplace, meetings are relatively simple to arrange, and voter meeting attendance there is correspondingly high. Neighborhood residents, however, have varied schedules, and can more easily evade meetings, and many residents, particularly the elderly and parents of small children, find attendance to be more problematic. As a result, neighborhood voter meetings generally register a smaller turnout than their industrial counterparts.

Other potentially worrisome developments are the slow and nearly universal decline in attendance rates for all republic neighborhood delegation selection meetings, and the precipitous fall among some republic agricultural delegate selection meeting attendance rates from 1974 to 1978. While the drops in attendance rates have not been dramatic in the aggregate, they may indicate a declining interest in the delegation selection process or a deterioration in the organizational mobilization capacity of the political organizations since 1974. The problems, in other words, will demand close scrutiny in the future.

The second aspect of participation is the issue of saliency (that is, how meaningful is the level of mass involvement to the participants). Several questions need to be addressed here. In particular, are participants aware of the significance of their participation? Do they know who their delegates are? Are there differences in influence among social groups during electoral procedures? Also, have voter meetings become ritualistic displays of regime support?

Social science research conducted during the 1978 and 1982 elections in Croatia and Serbia reveals several successes and problems regarding the level of knowledge and general depth of commitment to participation in the current electoral system. First, a majority of the voters in both republics perceive that the electoral system is becoming excessively complex, and many fail to understand the machinery of elections. In Serbia, in 1979, 60 percent of all respondents admitted that the electoral process was confusing and complicated. This group included 57 percent of all men and 67 percent of all women. Concurring with these sentiments were 57 percent of urban residents and 65 percent of rural residents.⁷⁸ Even a majority (50 percent) of political activists felt that elections were complicated, and 53 percent of this group perceived that the majority of citizens were occasionally confused by the electoral procedures.⁷⁹ In 1982, there were similar findings: 62 percent of the respondents stated that they were not sufficiently knowledgeable about the electoral process,⁸⁰ and only 16 percent felt that they understood the electoral process in depth.⁸¹

Croatian surveys have pointed to similar difficulties with voters failing to

comprehend fully their electoral system. In 1978, only 26 percent of Croatian respondents claimed that they understood electoral procedures, and in 1982, 24 percent of respondents agreed.⁸² Even Vojvodinan studies found very low levels of understanding about the electoral system.⁸³

While knowledge about elections in Yugoslavia may be less than optimal, the relative ignorance may not imply lack of voter interest. In 1979, 90 percent of Serbian respondents declared that they thought elections were important, and only 4 percent stated that elections were a pure formality.⁸⁴ These percentages may overstate the situation somewhat because in 1982, although similar percentages confirmed that elections were important, 17 percent stated that they did not bother to become informed about those elections.⁸⁵

The Croatian voter studies in 1978 and 1982 provide more details about the problem. Among other findings, the evidence listed in table 6.5 indicates that interest in elections declined in 1982 compared to 1978, and that interest in delegate selection in the workplace (that is, OOUR) was higher than in the neighborhood. The figures tend to reflect the findings of the overall turnout data, and they indicate a relatively high level of self-described involvement in elections.

A voter's interest in elections can be explained by many different factors, with two of the major variables being perceptions of social responsibility and personal interest. Currently, Yugoslav elections had been expected to encourage personal interest and involvement, and the results from Croatia, listed in table 6.6, tend to support that expectation. Compared to 1965, there has been a dramatic advance in the percentage of voters in 1978 and 1982 claiming a personal interest in the election process.

Perhaps a better indicator of involvement in elections is the voter's ability to recall the name of the delegate and identify his/her function. Data indicate that a problem exists in this area. In 1976, 65 percent of polled voters in Croatia claimed that they could identify the name of their delegate in the communal assembly.⁸⁶ A different study conducted in Croatia in 1978 and 1982 discovered that the situation was somewhat worse. Only 48 percent correctly identified the name of their communal assembly delegate in 1978, and 56 percent did so in 1982.⁸⁷ In Serbia, in 1978, when asked to name their communal delegates, only 36 percent could do so correctly.⁸⁸

A second issue related to the substance of participation is the problem of identifying which social groups, if any, are most involved in the electoral process, and if there is variation in the intensity of participation by social group. This is important because a major intent of the 1974 constitutional reforms was to strengthen the involvement of women, workers, and youth in the electoral process.

One study conducted in Slovenia found that only 10 percent of the voters were actively involved in all stages of the electoral process, ranging from

Table 6.5 Interest in elections, 1978–82,
in Croatian survey (by electoral unit)

<i>Degree of interest</i>	<i>Neighborhood</i>		<i>Associated work</i>	
	1978	1982	1978	1982
Very interested	32	21	41	33
Somewhat interested	49	54	47	51
Indifferent	19	25	12	16

Source: Ivan Šiber, "Delegatski Izbori 1978–1982," *Politička Misao* 19 (1982): 451.

candidature discussions to the final election.⁸⁹ Croatia's voter study confirmed this and discovered even lower levels (6 to 7 percent) of full participation than in Slovenia.⁹⁰ Thus, a general conclusion which can be drawn is that the nomination procedures generate much lower levels of active involvement than do actual elections.

It appears that particular social groups tend to participate more in the electoral process than do other groups. Inge Perko-Separović's study of voter meetings in Croatia confirmed that male, middle-aged, and better-educated individuals are more active participants in the nomination process than workers, youth, and women.⁹¹ Živkov's study of nomination meetings to select policy board members in Vojvodina also discovered that the local institutional leadership has a tendency to exercise more influence than their numbers would warrant.⁹²

A series of studies conducted in 1978 which involved observations of voter meetings in Vojvodina identified several persistent weaknesses in the nomination process. One major weakness was that few meetings lasted more than half an hour.⁹³ Another was that almost no discussion on the merits of the candidates occurred in many meetings,⁹⁴ and a third problem was that almost no evaluation of the performance of the previous delegation occurred.⁹⁵

Even among the delegates who were eventually elected, participation was not ideal at the nomination process. In Croatia in 1978, nearly 30 percent failed to attend either or both the precandidacy meetings or the candidacy meetings, and among delegates to the sociopolitical chambers that percentage exceeded 35 percent.⁹⁶

In summary, participation in the electoral system and procedures have improved since the introduction of the delegate system. The percentages of those voting are up, the percentages of those involved in the nomination procedures are also up, and there seems to be strong support for the electoral system among the population. Nevertheless, several problems remain and need to be addressed by the political organizations. These tasks include simplification of the electoral process, reeducation of voters in the procedural machinery of elections, facilitation of more female, youth, and worker involvement in the nomination process, reinvigoration of the candidacy

meetings, and the encouragement of deeper involvement of more citizens in nonvoting electoral activities.

Social Goals

The evidence in table 6.7 indicates dramatic improvement in the social composition of major elected bodies in most categories following the introduction of the delegate system in 1974. The female proportion of delegates in federal, republic, and communal elected bodies doubled or tripled from 1969 to 1982 from 7 to 23 percent. Youth representation also followed a similar pattern. Most noteworthy, however, is the explosion in the worker's proportion, which, at the higher levels, increased by a factor in excess of ten since 1969 from 2.3 to 25 percent. The only social characteristic that showed relatively modest gains or actual declines was in the area of political professionalism, where incumbent or experienced legislators continued to claim 30 to 50 percent of all positions.⁹⁷

Electoral results listed above demonstrate that the political organizations have been effective in promoting social goals at the federal, republic, and communal levels for all republics and for all categories with the possible exception of incumbency. These changes have been, without question, profound and sweeping. Nevertheless, some improvements can be made. The recruitment of women, youth, and workers drops dramatically at higher governmental levels so that, at the federal level, women make up approximately one-half of their comparative size at the delegation level, youths are only one-eighth of their delegation strength at the federal level, and workers receive only one-third of their delegation proportion at the federal level.⁹⁸ The political organizations, in other words, can do more, particularly at higher governmental levels.

Nomination procedures can also provide a vehicle for altering the social structure of elected bodies. Table 6.8 provides some evidence to demonstrate

Table 6.6 Motivation for participation in elections in Croatia, 1965–82 (in percentages)

Motivation	1965	1967	1969	1978	1982
Passive	52	33	45	27	27
Perception of pressure				4	4
Citizen duty to participate				22	23
Active	48	67	55	73	73
Support to the system		21		21	23
Commitment to a candidate		46		24	26
Delegate processes				29	24

Source: See table 6.5 (pp. 449–51 in source).

Table 6.7 Total female, youth, and worker composition of delegations and delegate bodies by republic and governmental level, 1969–82 (in percentages)

	1969	1974	1978	1982
<i>Female</i>				
Federation	7.9	13.6	17.2	17.5
Republic	6.7	16.5	22.2	23.1
Commune	6.9	15.2	17.8	17.8
Delegation		30.5	26.3	27.4
<i>Youth</i>				
Federation	0.8	2.9	2.3	1.9
Republic	2.3			
Commune	8.5	15.6	14.3	11.5
Delegation		19.2	18.8	16.4
<i>Worker</i>				
Federation	0.6	19.5	9.1	15.9
Republic	2.3	23.8	20.1	25.2
Commune	44.1	48.7	48.5	45.7
Delegation		53.5	53.6	50.0

Sources: 1969—*Statistički Bilten* 590. 1974—*Statistički Bilten* 888. 1978—*Statistički Bilten* 1140. 1982—Milan Jovanović, "Izbori za Skupštine Društveno-Političkih Zajednica u 1982," *Jugoslavenski Pregled* 27 (May 1983): 199–210.

that there is some attrition in maintaining or improving the female composition of delegate bodies in Yugoslavia, but little erosion for youth. In 1974, women constituted 23 percent of members of delegations but only 15 percent of delegate bodies. Youth, which initially constituted 13 percent of the delegations, formed 15 percent of the delegate bodies. In 1978, both groups improved their performance throughout the nomination process, but the trends remained the same.

For both the 1978 and 1974 elections, the major erosion in social group advancement occurred at the initial precandidacy meetings where individuals put forward their candidacy to be considered by the voters.⁹⁹ After these meetings there was minimal erosion. The limited evidence we have indicates that women and youth are more reluctant to be considered for delegate posts, possibly because of family obligations, transportation difficulties, or educational commitments.¹⁰⁰

Even though youth and women may have a lower propensity to seek nomination, it appears that the political organizations have been successful in promoting the consideration of gender and age characteristics at the voter meetings. In the 1978 Croatian electoral studies, age was the second most frequently cited reason for nomination, immediately following successful performance of duties. Gender was the fourth most frequently

cited characteristic, immediately behind moral-political attractiveness.¹⁰¹

The successful evaluation of gender and age considerations by the political organizations, however, seems to depend upon the social-economic development of the community. As table 6.9 notes, both age and gender are cited at nomination meetings less often in the lesser-developed communities. The political organizations, in other words, are less effective in the more weakly developed areas of the country.

To summarize, the political organizations' attempts to manage the delegate electoral system in order to implement the goal of enhancing the youth, female, worker, and nonprofessional compositions of elected bodies have been generally successful. There is room for improvement, but the attention given to the problem has yielded a successful conclusion, and the goal can be considered to have been met.

Revitalization of the Sociopolitical Organizations

A third important expectation of the delegate electoral system was a renewal and resurgence in the electoral involvement of the political organizations. A primary goal of the 1974 reforms was to encourage the political organizations to exercise a more powerful, active, and constant influence over the execution of the electoral procedures. This subsection concentrates on two elements of that goal, namely, an evaluation of the extent to which members of the organizations are more actively involved in elections than nonmembers, and an analysis of the perceptions of the powers of specific organizations over the electoral process.

Several points of evidence appear to substantiate an inference that political

Table 6.8 Female and youth success rates at various stages of the nomination process, 1974-78

<i>Nomination stage</i>	<i>1974</i>			<i>1978</i>		
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Youth</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Youth</i>
Percentage of delegation	100	23.0	13.3	100	22.7	18.3
Percentage of candidacy conference members	100	27.4	17.2	100	22.4	16.0
Percentage suggested at voter meetings	100	15.6	15.7	100	17.7	15.6
Acceptance rate at voter meetings	81.2	79.6	79.0	91.8	92.0	93.6
Confirmation rate by electoral commission	97.9	97.9	98.7	99.1	98.1	98.0
Percentage on ballot	100	15.3	15.4	100	17.5	15.7

Source: Computed by the authors from *Statistički Bilten* 888 and *Statistički Bilten* 1140.

Table 6.9 Characteristics of candidate mentions at voter meetings in Croatia by level of commune development, 1978 (in percentages)

<i>Characteristic</i>	<i>Level of development</i>			
	<i>Total</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Middle</i>	<i>Low</i>
Successful completion of duties	45.29	45.36	50.00	40.99
Age	44.47	49.18	46.33	37.37
Moral-political fitness	44.26	50.27	34.72	45.96
Gender	44.06	53.55	44.44	32.92
Community involvement	41.19			
Years of work service	36.07			
Rank in job	35.04			
Reputation	32.58			
Nationality	31.35	42.62	16.67	31.68
Work responsibility	28.48			
Knowledge	27.46	30.45	35.42	17.39
Education	19.88	15.85	8.33	34.78

Source: Inge Perko-Separović, *Analiza Zborova Birača u Izbornim Procesima* (Zagreb: Institut za Političke Nauke, 1979), pp. 42–43.

organization members are heavily involved in the implementation of Yugoslav electoral activities. First is evidence indicating that organization members and leaders participate at a disproportionately heavy rate in the electoral process. Ivan Šiber's multivariate analysis of the determinants of participation at neighborhood voter meetings in Croatia in the 1978 elections identified four variables that were significant in predicting participation in the electoral process. They include, in order of importance, membership and office in the League of Communists, membership and office in the Socialist Alliance, type of neighborhood, and sex (male).¹⁰² Although no direct evidence exists, we could conclude, by inference, that membership and office in the trade union movement would be significantly related to participation at voter meetings held in the workplace.

A second piece of evidence suggests that there is heavy involvement of the political organizations, particularly during the nomination process. Sixty-six percent of Croatian delegates polled in 1978 stated that the political organizations were responsible for encouraging them to seek nomination. This compares with 4 percent attributing informal groups and 15 percent each for the electoral commissions and other factors.¹⁰³ During 1982, Croatia and Serbia recorded similar percentages.¹⁰⁴

The final evidence for sociopolitical involvement is the strong success that political organization members and officials, particularly the League, have in obtaining elected positions as delegates. For example, in Croatia, League members constitute 11 percent of the voters, 56 percent of the delegation

members, 67 percent of delegates, and 92 percent of republic or federal elected delegates.¹⁰⁵ In Serbia, 75 percent of the delegates to the communal assembly are SKJ members, and nearly every one at higher levels in Serbia is a League member.¹⁰⁶ In Macedonia, 57 percent of all delegates to the policy boards are League members,¹⁰⁷ and in Bosnia, 75 percent of communal delegates hold membership in the League, while the corresponding figure for Bosnian republic-level delegates is 94 percent.¹⁰⁸ Within cities, Zagreb's city assembly can claim that 87 percent of the membership are Communist Party members,¹⁰⁹ and the corresponding figure in Belgrade is 92 percent.¹¹⁰ Apparently, Communist Party members receive a disproportionate share of delegate positions and are more active in the electoral process.

Sociopolitical organizations other than the League are also heavily favored in elections. In Croatia in 1979, 31 percent of all delegates held some type of office in the Socialist Alliance, 27 percent of delegates held a position in the trade unions, but only 9 percent of all delegates were officeholders in the Youth League.¹¹¹ Considering all these facts, it can be concluded that the League of Communists, Socialist Alliance, and Trade Union Association are all heavily involved and committed to the electoral process.

The second part of this examination is an analysis of the reputation and influence of these organizations in affecting the electoral process. In other words, what is the perceived level of success for the involvement of the political organizations? Are the political organizations working through the electoral machinery or past it? Are the organizations concerned about how decisions are made or only about the result of the decision-making process?¹¹²

In those republics and provinces where surveys of electoral behavior have been conducted, there is a general consensus that the political organizations are influential. In Slovenia, political organizations were found to be the most significant element in the electoral process, with the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance holding the top positions in neighborhood elections and the unions holding the top positions in workplace elections.¹¹³ The Croatian 1982 election studies ranked, in order, citizens, the Socialist Alliance, and the League of Communists as the most influential elements in neighborhood elections, while workers, the unions, and the League of Communists were the three most influential factors in workplace elections.¹¹⁴ In fact, for both types of elections, the top three institutions accounted for over 60 percent of the choices. It is apparent, therefore, that the political organizations exercise considerable influence.

Surveys also point out that the influence which the political organizations exercise is perceived to be a positive and constructive force. In Vojvodina, 84 percent of respondents positively evaluated the electoral activity of the League of Communists, 76 percent graded positively the Alliance's electoral involvement, and 64 percent felt similarly about the Trade Union Association. Negative evaluations were given by 13 percent to the League, 21 percent to

the Alliance, and 31 percent to the unions.¹¹⁵ Serbian voter surveys conducted in 1978 and 1982 corroborate the Vojvodinan results and demonstrate that there is general voter satisfaction with the electoral activity of the political organizations. The results are listed in table 6.10, and they show that only a small minority of voters perceive the political organizations' involvement to be weak.

A general conclusion that can be made about the third normative goal of the delegate electoral process is that the political organizations perform actively and successfully. These organizations have indeed become much more involved and active in the political electoral system, and are now the central elements of the process.

Policy Forum

Of the four normative goals applied to Yugoslav elections, the policy impact appears to be the weakest.¹¹⁶ Evidence from the 1978 and 1982 elections indicates that the level of information about elections is low, and the popular understanding of, or desire for, that information is not very high. Data also suggest that many electoral activities appear to involve more form than substance, and some electoral activities have appeared to become ritualized, tightly controlled events.¹¹⁷

Over two-thirds of Yugoslav citizens claim that they receive most of their electoral information from the public media,¹¹⁸ but an analysis of *Vjesnik's* coverage of elections since 1945 reveals a disturbing trend. The number of articles about the elections in 1978 was only 46 percent of the 1945 figure and only 16 percent of the 1945 space was devoted to the subject. Comparing

Table 6.10 Serbian voter evaluation of the electoral activity of the sociopolitical organizations by organization, 1978–82 (in percentages)

Organization	1978				1982			
	Good	Average	Weak	Don't know	Good	Average	Weak	Don't know
League of Communists	51	27	6	16	44	37	5	12
Socialist Alliance	47	32	9	14	45	32	7	15
Veterans' Organization	50	35	7	8				
Youth League	33	33	19	15				
Trade Union Association					32	31	12	26

Sources: 1978—Dragomir Drašković, "Uloga Društveno-Političkih Organizacija u Funkcionisanju i Ostvarivanju Delegatskog Sistema," in Radivoje Marinković, ed., *Delegatski Sistem: Funkcionisanje i Ostvarivanje* (Belgrade: Institut za Političke Studije), p. 109. 1982—Milan Jovanović, "Izbori za Skupštine Društveno-Političkih Zajednica u 1982," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* 27 (May 1983): 203.

Table 6.11 Coverage of election topics in *Vjesnik*, 1945–78

<i>Year</i>	<i>Article count</i>	<i>Index (1945 = 100)</i>	<i>Square centimeters</i>	<i>Index (1945 = 100)</i>
1945	59	100	29,379	100
1950	45	76	37,310	127
1953	35	59	21,910	74
1958	30	50	16,495	56
1963	23	39	10,791	36
1965	9	17	3,278	11
1967	21	35	5,098	17
1969	24	40	11,434	39
1974	31	53	8,756	29
1978	27	46	4,853	16

Source: Ivan Šiber, *Delegatski Sistem i Izborni Procesi* (Zagreb: Institut za Političke Studije, 1979), p. 81.

1978 to 1969, the number of articles is up marginally, but the space devoted to the subject of elections has been cut by more than half. Table 6.11 provides the details.

The weaknesses in the public media's treatment of elections do not seem to be balanced out or supplemented by other sources. During the 1982 elections in Serbia, specially prepared pamphlets and brochures on elections were classified as important by less than 5 percent of the respondents.¹¹⁹ This problem of diminishing information has an impact on the level of electoral knowledge among the electorate, which the previously cited studies discovered was quite low. One consequence of this problem, therefore, is that the policy role of the elections is handicapped and not fully realized.

An illustration of the problem is the relatively pervasive perception that elections and electoral procedures are often rigorously controlled and formalized. In a 1982 Serbian election study, 54 percent of respondents agreed that workers or citizens did not completely determine the selection of candidates.¹²⁰ In-depth studies of voter meetings in the communes of Stari Pazov, Bačka Palanka, and Kovačica (Vojvodinan communes) in 1978 tend to substantiate the existence of this problem. Sixty percent of meetings in Bačka Palanka were observed to be partially ritualized, and 45 percent of meetings in Kovačica were classified as completely ritualized procedures. Kovačica's voter meetings had no discussion exceeding thirty minutes, and not a single evaluation of the performance of the delegation or delegates at a voter meeting was recorded. Stari Pazov, a more developed commune than Kovačica, still recorded that 40 percent of all voter meetings failed to consider discussing or evaluating the delegation's performance.¹²¹

Obviously, in a considerable number of cases, election procedures are not

forums for policy discussions as planned in the 1974 reforms. As Koviljka Romanić noted, many meetings are only concerned about filling their goal to recruit a particular proportion of workers, women, and youth, and are not concerned about the quality of the selection or the issues over which the election is conducted.¹²²

Summary

Elections in Yugoslavia have changed considerably since the founding of the socialist republic. These changes have been linked to societal transformations, and they have strongly affected the actions and responsibilities of the political organizations. By 1974, a severe crisis had affected electoral processes and procedures in Yugoslavia to the point that the elections were involving fewer people, were selecting political professionals, were not enlisting the active support of the political organizations, and were no longer presenting a consistent policy focus.

The 1974 delegate system addressed itself to the problems facing the electoral system, and it gave primary active responsibility for elections to the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, and the Trade Union Association. These organizations have been relatively successful in turning around the electoral situation. Currently, elections are more participative and less professional, and involve the political organizations more.

Elections can represent an opportunity for public discussion about the direction of policy, and often the discussions that have occurred have been sharp. During the 1982 elections, for example, the most important governmental leaders were subject to direct criticism. Nevertheless, in many cases, the criticisms were muted because the individuals concerned were not eligible for reelection. During the debate on political reform conducted in 1984, that problem was often mentioned and demands were put forward to make elected officials even more directly accountable.¹²³

7 The Role and Behavior of Yugoslav Political Organizations in the Federal and Republic Legislative Process

Throughout the world, a primary function of political parties and of other political organizations has been to expedite, to regulate, and to manage the flow of legislation through legislative assemblies. The absence of political parties in legislatures, or the dominance of a single party within a legislature, can generally have serious consequences for the successful operation of an autonomous and influential legislative branch of government. In the case of Yugoslavia, however, the legislature has not atrophied, even though the nation is currently ruled by a single, united, Marxist-Leninist party. In fact, the Yugoslav legislative system has grown stronger and more dynamic over time.

In this chapter, we first examine the legislative environment and the growth of legislative autonomy and influence in Yugoslavia. Next, we define the ideological framework of the legislature and specific components of the interaction of the legislative system with the political organizations of Yugoslavia. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the political organizations in the legislative process since 1974, and we assess the individual and combined performance of these organizations in terms of a specific set of crucial legislative activities.

The Legislative Environment

The federal- and republic-level Yugoslav legislatures are meaningful policy-making organizations that contribute to the resolution of political conflict in Yugoslavia.¹ These legislative bodies include the bicameral Federal Assembly, as well as the republic and provincial assemblies (both of which have three chambers) in the six republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, and in the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. While the degree of legislative power and autonomy may vary among chambers within a legislative body, among provinces and

Table 7.1 Total legislative output of the federal and republic legislatures for selected years, 1968–78

Item	1968	1971	1975	1978
Federal Assembly sessions*	19	8	22	18
Federal Assembly agenda items*	225	151	388**	287**
Federal laws	122	98	77	71
Serbian laws	91	68†	119	105
Croatian laws	78	64	62	77
Slovenian laws	67	56	43	—
Macedonian laws	—	50	94††	88
Bosnia-Herzegovinan laws	82	93	—	95
Montenegrin laws	58	48	—	64

*In 1968 and 1971 the Chamber of Nationalities and the Federal Chamber were used.

**Total was prorated, and actual agenda item total may vary.

†1970 data.

††1974 data.

Source: Jim Seroka, "The Party, National Crises, and Legislative Behavior in Socialist Yugoslavia," *East European Quarterly* 18 (Spring 1984): 84.

republics, and between republics and the federation, these legislative bodies generally tend to possess more autonomy and power than do similar bodies in the other Marxist-Leninist states. In addition, it appears that the scope and range of their power and autonomy has increased markedly in recent years.

No single objective measure can accurately portray the full dimension of legislative power and autonomy. However, in the Yugoslav case, several trends and events provide evidence of greater legislative power and autonomy. These trends include (1) increased legislative output, (2) greater intralegislative conflict, (3) greater legislative-executive conflict, (4) greater legislative-administrator conflict, and (5) the more complete assumption of political responsibility.

Recently, the Yugoslav federal and republic legislatures have become increasingly involved with the policy-making process. Annual comparisons of total laws passed indicate a moderate growth in legislative output on the federal level² and within republic legislatures as varied as Croatia³ and Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴ While comparisons of gross totals may be misleading in qualitative terms, in the Yugoslav federal and republic cases the increased legislative outputs have been generally considered to be of considerable significance to both the federation⁵ and to the republics.⁶ Table 7.1 provides some comparative data on legislative outputs from 1968 to 1978.

The legislative committees involved in preparing legislation and arranging legislative compromises are also becoming very significant to the legislative process at both the federal and republic levels.⁷ These committees have

Figure 7.1 Committee structure of the Yugoslav federal legislature, 1978

<i>Federal Assembly</i> (joint committees)	
1. Constitutional Questions (N= 16)*	
2. Administration (N= 8)	
3. Information (N= 8)	
4. Textual Accuracy (N= 15)	
5. Procedures and Proposals (N= 8)	
<i>Chamber of republics and provinces</i> (N= 88) (Committees)	<i>Federal chamber</i> (N= 220) (Committees)
1. Social planning and development (N= 8)	1. Socioeconomic (N= 23)
2. Trade and prices (N= 14)	2. Sociopolitical (N= 22)
3. Finance (N= 14)	3. Internal policy (N= 21)
4. Credit and monetary system (N= 14)	4. Foreign policy (N= 22)
5. Economic cooperation (N= 14)	5. National defense (N= 22)
6. Development of the economically underdeveloped republics and provinces (N= 14)	6. Budget (N= 14)
7. Economic relations abroad (N= 14)	7. Judicial (N= 14)
8. Credentials (N= 8)	8. Labor, health, and social policy (N= 14)
9. Legislation and law (N= 8)	9. Veterans (N= 14)
	10. Credentials (N= 8)
	11. Legislation and law

*Number includes only members from the legislative body.

tended to take their roles very seriously and debate and revise many of the basic laws submitted to them.⁸ Legislative committees were heavily involved in recent cases involving currency reform, taxation, pricing, and energy policy, and the amount of newspaper space devoted to legislative committee deliberations has expanded markedly in recent years.⁹ Even at the republic level, there have been considerable committee discussions.¹⁰ Figure 7.1 outlines the present federal committee structure.

Intralegislative conflict is a second indirect measure of the growing relevance of the Yugoslav legislative assemblies to the policy-making process. The improved quality of public debate in the legislative assemblies, and the unprecedented attention and importance given to those debates, attest to the rise of legislative power in Yugoslavia in recent years, and the greater power in turn has fueled intralegislative conflict. The conflict has reached considerable intensity in both the federal and republic assemblies. In fact, there is public doubt about the possibility and practicality of maintaining the unanimity principle on the federal level.¹¹ Najdan Pašić, a noted political scientist and member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists, was very concerned about this problem, which he prominently discussed in his

letter to the Presidency of the League. Among other points, he noted that the consensus principle was not constitutionally intended to be applied to every legislative issue, but only to the most central concerns.¹²

Doubts have been publicly expressed about the ability of the legislatures to promote the common good in opposition to well-articulated particularistic interests.¹³ For instance, the noted Yugoslav legal authority, Berislav Šefer, has characterized many of the legislative debates as "agreements not to agree."¹⁴ The presiding officer of the Federal Legislative Chamber of Republics and Provinces, Zoran Polić, expressed the hope that, in the future, interest pluralism should be expressed more at lower political units rather than at the federation or republics.¹⁵ Illustrating the prevalence of intra-legislative conflict even further is the separateness and poor communications among the chambers within the federal and republic assemblies.¹⁶ Thus, the general interest decision-making capability is weakened even further.

During recent sessions of the Federal Assembly, several republic and provincial delegations moved to veto particular bills and to prevent their adoption. In 1981–82, Vojvodina's delegation vetoed a bill designed to create a federal energy policy,¹⁷ Croatia's delegation refused to support a joint pricing policy,¹⁸ Slovenia's and Croatia's delegations rejected the proposed foreign currency policy,¹⁹ and the Bosnian delegation threatened not to sacrifice further its particular republic's interests for the community interest.²⁰ During the 1983 sessions, disagreements became even more intense. Vojvodina vetoed crucial legislation until it received assurances for foreign currency to purchase fertilizer, Croatia demanded assistance in the repayment of its oil debts, and Serbia held out for an interrepublic agreement to prevent the bankruptcy of one of its major banks.²¹

On the republic level, the degree of disagreement is not as intense, due to the absence of the unanimity principle. Nevertheless, achievement of legislative agreement within republic legislatures is not an easy task.²² Agreements on the determination of the long-term plan, for example, are usually conducted in a very intense and conflictual atmosphere.²³

Greater legislative-executive conflict is a third indirect measure of the extent to which the Yugoslav legislatures are becoming more relevant to the policy-making process.²⁴ On the federal level, delegations have become more outspoken about their irritation with the behavior of the legislature's cabinet. In 1980, the cabinet was accused of abolishing the delegates' legislative initiatives.²⁵ By late 1981, individual cabinet ministers were accused of unsatisfactorily answering questions during the legislative question time,²⁶ and shortly thereafter the Slovenian federal delegation nearly demanded a vote of confidence.²⁷

The foreign currency bill of 1982 is an excellent illustration of the extent to which legislative-executive conflict has grown. After a direct appeal for support for the bill in a speech before the Federal Assembly by the prime

minister, Veselin Duranović, only two republic delegations agreed to support the government's position.²⁸ The current government, headed by Milka Planinc, is no exception to the climate of conflict. In 1984, after two years in office, there was a behind-the-scenes attempt to force the resignation and replacement of the entire executive council.²⁹ To augment the pressure, considerable publicity was given to a poll indicating general popular dissatisfaction and lack of confidence with the executive council.³⁰ Planinc's response was direct and very critical of the National Assembly members. Among other points, she charged that the delegates were "sitting on their hands," refusing responsibility, and, by inaction, sabotaging her administration.³¹ The Presidency of the Federal Assembly appeared to share some of Planinc's opinions and called for an end to the exchange of recriminations.³²

On the republic level, cases of legislative-executive conflict are not as numerous, but they reach their flash points more quickly, and can result in major reorganizations, as occurred in Croatia in 1980,³³ or in the outright resignation of the cabinet, as in Slovenia.³⁴

Executive-bureaucratic conflict is a fourth indirect measure of the extent of the growth of legislative influence. By 1978, the Serbian republican assembly had begun a campaign to make "administration closer to the citizens," to reform the administrative apparatus, and to place administrative activities under more direct legislative scrutiny.³⁵ Federal legislators employed the budgetary process to place the bureaucracy under tighter legislative control.³⁶ This movement generated tremendous conflict with the bureaucratic agencies, but it resulted in a legislative victory by the 1981 budgetary year³⁷ and further cuts throughout 1982.³⁸ One unanticipated consequence, however, may be more reluctance on the part of the bureaucracy to follow through and implement Assembly resolutions.³⁹

The fifth and final indirect measure of the growth of legislative influence is the extent to which individual delegates or legislators consider their job important and fulfilling. The general impressions of observers confirm that Yugoslavia has witnessed a steady, but significant, growth in legislative responsibility. As recently as 1979, delegates to the Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly were complaining about possessing insufficient power.⁴⁰ By 1981, the operating procedures of the Federal Chamber were changed to allow more freedom to the individual delegates,⁴¹ and by 1982, concern was raised about whether those powers had been used excessively.⁴² Clearly, there has been a growth in the perceived power and influence of individual federal legislators.

The republic assemblies also have recorded a general increase in the power and responsibilities of individual legislators/delegates. For example, in 1979, Serbia was very concerned about avoiding past precedents when the delegate's function was simply to "raise his hand in assent."⁴³ It tried to involve all its delegates in the preparation of the legislative agenda,⁴⁴ called

for more direct participation of the delegations in the republic-level decision-making process,⁴⁵ and reformed its rules to give the individual more power.⁴⁶ During this period the Macedonian republic assembly actively limited the recruitment of political professionals;⁴⁷ and, by 1982, the Croatian republic assembly delegates positively evaluated their individual roles and influence in the delegate system.⁴⁸

This brief review of legislative behavior in Yugoslavia suggests that the power and influence of the legislatures, their committees, and delegates have been evolving, and are continuing to evolve, into a dynamic and important element in the legislative process. Unlike the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist states, the legislative process in Yugoslavia is an important and vital element of the political system.

The Ideological Environment

Yugoslavia's legislative system must operate within the constraints of a legal system defined by decentralized federal relations and of a social system nurtured by Yugoslav self-management. Both the legal and social frameworks create particular tensions within the legislative process. If unresolved, these tensions could have severe repercussions upon the political stability of Yugoslavia. The political organizations of Yugoslavia, including the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, the Trade Union Association, the Veterans' Society, and the Youth League, share a responsibility to reduce these tensions and to manage effectively the legislative process in a federal, decentralized, and self-managed ideological environment.

The legal framework for the decentralization of political power and federal legal arrangements was created in response to Yugoslavia's divergent cultural histories and national identities. Three religious and cultural orientations, namely Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Islamic, operate within the confines of the Yugoslav state. The boundaries of the state enclose four major national identities, Macedonian, Serb, Croat, and Slovenian, as well as large Hungarian and Albanian minorities along the border areas. Since 1945, the only practical and long-term solution for minimizing intercultural or internationality conflict has been a policy of governmental decentralism and the granting of administrative autonomy through the mechanisms of a federal state. This solution has not been wholly effective, as the 1981 Kosovan demonstrations indicate. Yet the solution has been reasonably acceptable to most nationalities and has not been an unmitigated disaster, as some pessimistic observers of Yugoslav affairs have claimed.⁴⁹

Federalism and decentralism may reduce, but do not eliminate, the need for intrastate coordination and the resolution of the political problems of distribution and redistribution of political resources. Such problems still remain, and they constantly threaten to become explosive ones in a relatively

open legislative process. The natural tendency of a political agent to promote his or her own particularistic interest can lead to the abuse of the equality principle of federal relations or to a stagnation of political decision-making. As noted earlier, there have been indications that political debates in the Yugoslav legislatures, if unrestrained, can easily lead to the breakdown of political authority within these bodies.

According to Yugoslav theoreticians, a self-corrective institution must be introduced, both to promote the community's joint interest and to weaken the risk of anarchistic fragmentation.⁵⁰ The political organizations fulfill that function. According to Jovan Marjanović, a noted scholar on political organizations in Yugoslavia, "the primary role of the political organizations within the legislative system is to contribute to the overseeing of differences and conflicts between the individual and the political interests of the working people and citizens."⁵¹ Thus, a major function of the Yugoslav political organization lies in its ability to promote the general interest within the legislative assembly. Its success in influencing legislative behavior, therefore, can be evaluated by how effectively it performs that role.⁵²

The Yugoslav system of social self-management poses a parallel problem for the effective functioning of the legislative process in Yugoslavia. In this case, the issue is not the determination of the common interest, but rather establishing priorities for interests and avoiding a policy logjam. Paraphrasing Adolf Bibić, a well-known legislative agent and scholar, we would argue that self-management cannot function in a social environment without prioritizing social claims, determining a schedule for their consideration, and adopting priorities for implementation. Most important, self-management is not some kind of "spontaneous finale from a struggle of all against all."⁵³

Unrestrained self-management would lead to a virtual overloading of the legislative system as each delegate lends his or her voice to the growing cacophony of demands competing for attention and interest. The responsibility for providing effective decision-making, therefore, must again rest on the political organizations.⁵⁴ One particular organization, the Socialist Alliance, is given chief responsibility for coordinating and determining the guidelines for establishing a political agenda:

The Socialist Alliance of Working People thus becomes an essential and immutable factor in political agreement-making and decision-making of the organized socialist forces, a place for expressing united attitudes and actions, a powerful cohesive force for society, a forum for interpersonal coordination and agreement-making among the social political and social organizations, and an association of citizens for implementing programs and executing joint action.⁵⁵

In the overzealous performance of its duties, the political organization can pose a threat to the maintenance of an autonomous and influential legislative

Figure 7.2: Structural characteristics of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, 1946–current

<i>Year</i>	<i>Size</i>	<i>Commit- tees</i>	<i>Type of representation</i>	<i>Electoral system</i>	<i>Chambers</i>
1946– 53	620	10	Territory and population	Single candidate	Federal Nationalities
1953– 63	554	23	Territory, population, and economics	Single candidate	Federal Nationalities Producers
1963– 73	670– 620	50–90	Territory, population, and economics	Multiple candidates	Federal, economic, education, and culture, Social and health and sociopolitical
1974– 83	308	30–25	Territory, population, and economics	Indirect delegates	Federal and republics and provinces

system. The temptation and the capacity of the political organizations to dominate the legislature always exists.⁵⁶ The League of Communists is most susceptible to this temptation, and the possibility that this organization may reintroduce the “transmission-belt, political monopolization” style of governance must be resisted.⁵⁷

The maintenance of an effective and efficient legislative system in Yugoslavia depends upon the successful fulfillment by the political organizations of their coordinative and integrative functions. The extent to which the political organizations walk the tightrope between dominance of the legislative process and anarchy will determine the extent to which the legislatures can continue to keep and advance their autonomy and influence.

The Legislative Framework

Structural Variation

Since 1946, the Federal Assembly has gone through at least four fundamental structural shifts.⁵⁸ These shifts have been associated with the major constitutional adoptions and revisions, and they have altered the number of chambers, legislative size, type of representation, number of

committees, and recruitment process of the Federal Assembly (see figure 7.2).

The number of chambers within the Federal Assembly has varied from two to five during the thirty-seven years under consideration. The number of chambers gradually increased from two in the 1946–53 period to five during the 1963–73 period. In 1974, the trend toward the multiplication of legislative chambers was formally reversed when the constitution that year designated two chambers. At the same time, however, the constitution mandated a large and direct role in federal decision-making to the republic and provincial legislatures, thereby effectively raising the number of chambers involved in legislative decision-making to ten.

There has been a relatively constant membership size of the Federal Assembly until the most recent constitutional format, when it was halved from 620 members to the current 308. The base of recruitment, however, has shifted over time. During the early period, population and territory were the two determinants of representation. By 1960, territorial considerations were reduced in scope, and economic (functional) characteristics achieved greater importance in determining the basis for legislative representation. The 1963 Constitution gave even more power to economic-functional groups such as factory units, but the 1974 Constitution reversed these trends and formally granted primary representation to territorial units in one house and combined the population and economic units of representation in the second house. These shifts correspond to shifts in the national orientation toward decentralization from the federal level to the republics and provinces.

The number of legislative committees has also varied considerably since the founding of the socialist republic. In 1946, only ten committees existed; by the second period, the number of committees more than doubled to twenty-three; and by 1963, the number of committees quadrupled to ninety. Since 1963, however, the proliferation in committee formation has been halted and reversed, leading to today's twenty-five federal legislative committees (as shown in figure 7.1).

A final major shift in structural arrangements has occurred in the selection and recruitment of legislators. Today's present indirect selection system, called the delegate system, was preceded by variations on a multicandidate, single-district election system.⁵⁹ Prior to 1963, of course, the recruitment process was the single-member, Party-slate election process typically found in the Soviet Union and East Europe.

In summary, there has been considerable variance in the structural arrangements of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly since 1946. This variance may prove to be a useful mechanism with which to analyze the impact of structural arrangement on the definition of the policy role of the legislature.

Variance in Constitutional Responsibilities

In 1974, Yugoslavia adopted its fourth postwar constitution. Each of these constitutions, as well as the major amendments to them, has defined the role of the Federal Assembly differently. Not only has the structure of the parliament changed over time, but its mission and formal authority has fluctuated as well. These changes can be expected to affect legislative behavior and the role of the Federal Assembly in the policy process.

The locus of political power in the first and second constitutions rested in the federation. Because the Federal Assembly was officially the "supreme organ of state authority," considerable political power and the expression of the general national interest should have rested with the legislature.⁶⁰ In practice, however, little formal power was given to the legislature during this time.

A major change in the formal centralized arrangement was ushered in by the third constitution of 1963. This constitution formally devolved the locus of power to major economic interests and the communes, a subrepublic territorial unit. The amendments adopted in 1967, however, began to change the trend by reinstitutionalizing the nationalities and republics/provinces to the federal legislative decision-making process.⁶¹ The 1968 constitutional amendments carried the trend even farther and weakened the power of the chambers concerned with promoting national rather than particularistic interests.⁶² These structural arrangements were associated with a partial breakdown in governmental authority, and the period has now been classified by Yugoslav official historians as the period of "anarcho-liberalism."

In 1971, a third set of constitutional amendments to the 1963 Constitution was adopted. These amendments continued the decline of federal authority in areas such as commerce, planning, banking, taxation, and even the amendment process. The authority for these activities, however, was given largely to the republics and provinces, not to the economic enterprises or communes (amendments twenty-five to twenty-seven and thirty-four).

The present Constitution of 1974 continued and strengthened the trend to republic/provincial dominance. Decision-making within the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Republics and Provinces can occur only with the unanimous agreement of the republics and provinces, and members of this federal chamber are appointed by the republic and provincial assemblies. The policy areas for Federal Assembly involvement continue in a much more circumscribed manner.

The constitution and other legal documents have put limitations on the degree of legislative professionalism tolerated by the system. The first and the second constitutions, for example, placed few limitations on reelection and duplication of offices in one person. The 1963 Constitution initially prohibited an individual from serving for more than one consecutive term

Table 7.2 Characteristics of the membership of the Federal Assembly, 1969–82 (in percentages)

Characteristic	1969	1974	1978	1982
Incumbents	53.4	34.0	19.8	—
Youth	1	6	6	2
Female	8	14	17	18
Workers/peasants	0.6	17	17	13

Source: Jim Seroka, “The Policy-Making Roles of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly: Changes, Trends and Implications,” *Western Political Quarterly* 37 (September 1984): 367.

(article 82), but this was altered by the thirteenth amendment in 1968 that provided for up to two consecutive terms.

Simultaneously, the amount of duplication of leadership positions was reduced. Fewer legislators maintained other leadership positions in other organizations. During this period, professionalism of the legislature grew, and attacks on the professionalism of the parliament became more shrill.

The 1974 Constitution directly attacked the issue of professionalism and the duplication of leadership posts. In addition, both the principle of delegate selection and the Tito Initiative served to reduce incumbency. Thus, the change in incumbency rates was considerable. Fifty-three percent of the legislators in 1969 were incumbents. The percentage of incumbents fell to 34 percent in 1974; and the rate fell under 20 percent in 1978.⁶³ The percentage of youth, women, and workers/peasants increased from the third to the fourth constitutional period, also indicating a decline in legislative professionalism. Duplication of position has also virtually disappeared and is now often prohibited by law or statute.

Voting rules within the legislature are a third area of major constitutional change. The first and second constitutions paid relatively little attention to the problem and mandated majority voting by the chambers. The third constitutional period introduced several complications into voting procedures. In effect, it shifted the decision-making rule to a preponderant majority. This, in practice, meant that decisions would be based on agreements encompassing only slightly less than the unanimous approval of all parties. The present constitutional period carried this trend farther by mandating that decisions must be made within the Chamber of Republics and Provinces by the unanimous consent of each of the delegations from the six republics and two autonomous provinces.⁶⁴

In brief, the Yugoslav legislature has undergone considerable change in its legal constitutional environment since its founding in 1946. The locus of power has shifted first from the federation to the communes and then to the republics and provinces. The professionalism of its members has varied, and

Figure 7.3: Constitutional characteristics of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, 1946–current

<i>Year</i>	<i>Locus of authority</i>	<i>Professionalism</i>	<i>Voting rules</i>
1946–53	Federation	Moderate	Majority
1953–63	Federation	Moderate	Majority
1963–74	Communes and work units	Stronger	Preponderant majority
1974—	Republics and provinces	Weak	Unanimity

its voting rules have gradually shifted from simple majorities to unanimity. Figure 7.3 summarizes these shifts.

Contemporary Structure


The current Yugoslav legislative structure is a relatively complex and cumbersome system, reflecting the twin principles of federalism and self-management. Its basic goal seems to be the promotion of the expression of as many social interests as possible. A fundamental characteristic of the present Yugoslav legislative structure is the delegate system. Instead of representatives of the classical type, legislative bodies at all Yugoslav governmental levels are composed of delegates who are obligated to support the views of the group from which they have been chosen.⁶⁵ Theoretically, all decisions are made by the primary selection group, and these decisions are carried out by the chosen delegate. In practice, however, the only feasible mode of operation is for primary electoral groups to direct their delegations and delegates only on major issues.⁶⁶ The fundamental intent of this system is to place as much decision-making power as possible in the hands of an individual citizen within a complex human society.

The Yugoslav legislative structure is a six-tiered structure, as outlined in figure 7.4, and stretches from the Federal Assembly to the local delegate base. The basic electoral units range from the employed individual to a member of a political organization. It is possible, for example, that a single individual would belong to three different constituencies: his or her workplace, his or her neighborhood, and his or her political organization. This individual then helps to elect a delegation that, in turn, elects a delegate to serve in the various chambers of the communal assembly.⁶⁷ The delegates to the communal assemblies then serve as delegations that elect delegates to the republic assemblies or to the provincial assemblies of Kosovo and Vojvodina.⁶⁸

The communal assembly delegates also help to select delegates to the Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly, while the delegates from the

Interaction of the Political Organizations and the Legislative System

Figure 7.4: Legislative system of Yugoslavia



varying intensity. The degree of success with which the specific political organizations undertake these activities can be an appropriate indication of the ability of the political organizations to regulate and to direct Yugoslav legislative activities.

One potentially effective management tool for the political organizations is the nomination of candidates to serve as members of delegations. All the political organizations and individuals are encouraged to participate in the nomination process. Often, specific organizations are given a quota of names to contribute to the joint nominations list, but generally the organizations coordinate their activities under the aegis of the Socialist Alliance.

Control over the nominations process by the political organizations is far from absolute. The nominations committees usually limit their activities to screening out undesirable names and promoting the candidature of individuals whom they would like to see nominated. They cannot force an individual to serve, nor can they dictate the final list of nominees.

The nomination process varies according to the legislative chamber involved. Each level of government has its corresponding nominations committee. At the communal level, the nomination process is largely in the hands of local social-political authorities. At the republic level, nomination is shared by local and republic coordinating bodies, with the republic bodies dominating the process. At the federal level, power is shared between federal- and republic-level political organizations.

Nominating committees take several factors into account during the selection procedures. They attempt to encourage the inclusion of youths, veterans, workers, specific nationality groups, and women on the nomination list. In addition, influential economic enterprises, agricultural communities, scientific institutions, and universities are often given *de facto* recognition, and their representatives are included on the nomination list. Finally, willingness to participate, popular support, general ability, and a commitment to the platform of the Socialist Alliance are other factors the nominating committees consider in arriving at their judgments.

At best, the control of the nomination process by the political organizations is an indirect mechanism for the regulation of legislative behavior in Yugoslavia. These organizations cannot dictate their most desirable lists of candidates. Decisions to approve candidature are based upon compromise decisions of these organizations acting together, and the nominations list is constrained by quotas that encourage recruitment of specifically targeted groups. Thus, a candidate, especially at lower governmental levels, may not necessarily perceive that he or she owes his or her candidature to a particular political organization.

The elections process is the second mechanism through which the political organizations can affect the legislative process. These organizations, under the coordinating control of the Socialist Alliance, implement the

electoral laws. They can discourage those kinds of electoral behavior, such as nationality competition and sexism, that may adversely affect basic political norms. They publicize preelection meetings and propagandize the candidate list. They also can gain considerable voluntary compliance, as indicated by the fact that a huge majority of delegates are members of organizations such as the League of Communists and are subject to their disciplinary activities and information outlets.⁷⁰

The determination of the agenda is the third management tool of the political organizations in their campaign to regulate Yugoslav legislative behavior. These organizations have a prescriptive as well as a restrictive influence on the legislative agenda. They must follow events in the assemblies, develop positions, formulate a set of directives and a priority list of alternatives, and coordinate the agenda of the assembly to match the agenda of the political organizations.⁷¹ In addition, they are responsible for communicating their findings to the delegates and delegations and for encouraging them to adopt their resolutions.⁷²

Agenda-setting largely occurs at forums organized by the Socialist Alliance to discuss important political problems. Depending upon the problem, relevant political organizations participate at these conferences, and forums may be called at the initiative of any of the organizations. In practice, however, the forums are most often initiated by the League of Communists or by the Socialist Alliance. These joint conferences may be held at regular intervals, which are often designed to precede crucial legislative sessions, or they may be held on an ad hoc basis to deal with new problems. The subject of the conference is often very general, and the resolutions are flexible enough to permit the legislative assemblies sufficient autonomy and power to resolve complex issues. In fact, the purpose of the resolution is often to induce the legislature to deal with a crucial policy problem rather than to force some particular solution.

In addition to joint conferences sponsored by the Socialist Alliance, each of the political organizations may formulate its own resolutions and publicize them to the general public and legislative delegates. In recent years, the Trade Union Association sponsored such meetings to draw attention to the declining standard of living for workers, and the League of Communists sponsored similar meetings to encourage the adoption of procedures to limit political professionalism in public life.

A fourth tool through which political organizations influence legislative behavior is direct representation in the legislative assemblies. At the republic level, one of the chambers, the Social Political Chamber, is reserved exclusively for members of the political organizations. Although no such chamber exists at the federal level, nearly 50 percent of the members of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces are drawn from republic level social-political chambers.⁷³ The social-political chambers of the legislative assemblies are a

form of direct action of the political organizations upon the legislatures, and they are philosophically different from the indirect, guiding activities described earlier. As Professor Stavileci pointed out,

The political organizations have two basic functions in the legislative system. One function is broad and expresses itself in the fact that the Socialist Alliance, together with all the other political organizations, are the political foundation of the legislative system. This function, with the League of Communists at the forefront, is realized through the direct activities of these organizations. . . . The other function of the political organizations is narrower, and it is expressed through the activity of the social-political chamber of the assemblies of the social-political communities.⁷⁴

This direct legislative involvement is probably the most important and direct mechanism through which the political organizations can influence legislative behavior.

The particular role of the social-political chamber within the republic legislature is not clear,⁷⁵ and it has been left vague deliberately in the Federal Constitution. The only significant reference to the social-political chamber appears in article 145 of the Federal Constitution, which states that "the Social-Political Chamber participates in decision-making concerning questions for the realization and protection of the constitutionally determined socialist self-managed system."⁷⁶ All other details are left to the republic and provincial constitutions. Although the status of the social-political chamber is vague, it is perceived to be important because it expresses the interest of the collectivity.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, according to Eduard Kardelj, a major architect of the Yugoslav delegate system, the social-political chamber is not some type of "super chamber" with the right to impose its decisions upon the legislature.⁷⁸ Thus, the influence and behavior of the social-political chamber will vary according to the republic or province, issues involved, the leadership selected, and the time examined.⁷⁹

Unlike the other chambers in the legislatures, the social-political chambers are designed to reflect the interests of the entire province, republic, or assembly rather than a single part of it. This commitment to a holistic rather than to a particularistic approach appears even in the nomination and electoral procedures for these delegates. As Stavileci explained, "The election of delegates for the Social-Political Chamber is different from the election of delegates of other chambers. It is based on a joint candidate list. All the working people and citizens on the territory of the province [republic] participate. Thus, the electoral unit is the entire province [republic]."⁸⁰ The holistic approach also appears in the delegate's relationship to the chamber, as Ivan Lovrić explains: "The position of the delegate in the social-political chamber is unique because the delegate does not promote the interest of the

organization from which he originates, but rather the joint program agreed upon inside the Socialist Alliance.”⁸¹

On the federal level, the relationship of the political organization to the Chamber of Republics and Provinces is more vague. The delegates selected by the republic and provincial social-political chambers for participation in the Federal Chamber of Republics and Provinces serve as part of a delegation of the political organization. For practical purposes, we can conclude that at the federal level the political organizations lack an institution through which to influence the legislative process directly.

The fifth mechanism by which the political organizations can influence political behavior is public pressure and oversight capabilities. The political organizations provide information to delegates and facilitate communication among them. They have widespread influence over the mass media, especially through the Socialist Alliance,⁸² and they can maintain daily contact with delegates and their legislative committees.⁸³ This ability to review legislative activity and to organize public opinion can make these political organizations effective instruments for directing and regulating legislative processes.

All the aforementioned activities are coordinated by the Socialist Alliance with important, but auxiliary, roles allocated to the other organizations.⁸⁴ Ultimate responsibility, however, rests with the League of Communists.⁸⁵ The trade unions participate both indirectly through the Alliance and directly through its influence with its members,⁸⁶ while the youth organization participates in a less dramatic and probably less important manner.⁸⁷ The veterans' organization has the most distinctive set of relationships. This organization claims a large percentage of members who are delegates,⁸⁸ but it perceives its duties as largely supportive of the Alliance and the League. Its support is a legitimizing factor in parliamentary life.⁸⁹ Figure 7.5 summarizes the expected involvement of each of the political organizations for each of the legislative regulative activities.

It is evident that the political organizations possess a wide range of instruments with which to direct and regulate legislative behavior on the republic and federal levels. These instruments, if used effectively, can have a notable impact upon the legislative process. If abused, these tools can destroy Yugoslav legislative autonomy and influence. If the tools are neglected, legislative chaos and anarchy may ensue.

Evaluation of the Performance of the Political Organizations

Based upon the preceeding discussion, it is evident that a definitive evaluation of the role and behavior of the political organizations upon Yugoslav legislative behavior cannot be given. The number of legislatures and legislative assemblies involved, and the number of political organizations activities

Figure 7.5: Distribution of involvement for legislative control activities by sociopolitical organization

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Organization</i>				
	<i>Socialist Alliance</i>	<i>League of Communists</i>	<i>Trade Unions</i>	<i>Youth Organization</i>	<i>Veterans' Organization</i>
Nomination	Primary	Secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	Tertiary
Election	Primary	Secondary	Secondary	Tertiary	Tertiary
Agenda-setting	Primary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Tertiary
Direct representation	Primary	Secondary	Secondary	Secondary	Secondary
External involvement	Primary	Primary	Secondary	Secondary	Secondary

involved combine to generate a great deal of uncertainty in the evaluation process. Therefore, our objective in this section is more limited: namely, to provide a general evaluation of the recent performance of the political organizations and to isolate trends in the performance.

Another limiting feature to keep in mind when examining the role and behavior of the political organizations is the lack of experience with the delegate system. When the delegate system began in 1974, the political organizations did not have the experience to adapt immediately to the changing circumstances. In the early years of the delegate system, especially the period 1974–76, considerable weaknesses appeared that could largely be attributed to the dearth of experience with the new system.⁹⁰ Consequently, this analysis concentrates on the period following 1976.

The legislative nomination process is one of the areas in which the political organizations can have an impact upon the operation of the legislative system. In general, the system tends to work well, although it suffers from some handicaps. Often, a large number of candidates are involved in the nomination process. In some cases, more than sixty names are suggested for nomination for a particular post, leading to a situation in which the political organization nomination committee is overburdened with work and may be tempted to endorse the tried-and-true names from the past.⁹¹ A criticism often heard and given serious attention is that the same people always participate,⁹² a charge that is understandable considering the campaign-like character that sometimes accompanies local nomination activities.

The nomination process can only be as successful as the local organization of the political organization involved. Successful selection of candidates

depends upon a well-developed sense of camaraderie and trust among the constituent organizations participating within the Socialist Alliance nominating committee. Occasionally, as happened during the nomination process in 1982 in Aleksandrovac, a commune in Serbia, such camaraderie may be lacking. In Aleksandrovac, twenty-two individuals were nominated for the post of president of the communal assembly in its initial phase. The nominating committee endorsed four from this group. One of these, Milan Šlivić, faced some opposition from the veterans' organization and met with some reluctance within the League of Communists. In addition, this person was also suing certain other communal officials for slander so that his candidacy caused considerable unpleasantness and embarrassment in the commune.

Counterbalancing these negative features, this candidate received strong support from the major industrial enterprise of the commune (which he had helped to found), and from a large number of the neighborhood precincts. For example, a motion to nominate Šlivić included the following observation: "What Comrade Tito was to Yugoslavia, Milan Šlivić is to our region. Comrade Šlivić should be elected as the life-time president of the commune." Because proper procedures had been followed, the Socialist Alliance nominating conference of Serbia was powerless to intervene. Comrade Šlivić was elected, and shortly thereafter the president of the local veterans' organization committed suicide. The two events were allegedly linked.⁹³

The Aleksandrovac events of 1982 were atypical. The nomination of delegates rarely involved such intense participation and the involvement of citizens at nominating meetings was relatively low, often averaging less than 10 percent in the 1978 elections.⁹⁴

Especially at the republic and federal levels, the political organizations have kept the nominations process relatively free from controversy, and they have simultaneously encouraged a greater selection of minority nationalities, women, workers and youths. Nevertheless, even in 1982 there was considerable criticism of the work of the political organizations in the nomination and selection of delegates.⁹⁵ The criticisms involved poor coordination and advance work,⁹⁶ inept public relations,⁹⁷ and inadequately defined selection standards.⁹⁸

The candidate selection process of 1982 paralleled the events of 1974 and 1978. The nomination meetings solicited as many candidates as feasible, strong consideration was given to filling various social group priorities, and little criticism of the current legislative policies and practices was registered. The net effect was that the potential of the political organizations to use the nominations process as a reform instrument of the republic and federal legislatures has not been fully realized.

A second mechanism through which the social-political organizations can help to manage and regulate Yugoslav legislative activities and behavior is the electoral process. In 1974 the electoral campaign primarily served as a refer-

endum on the new delegate system, while in 1978, the chief campaign theme was the ratification and support of President Tito's policies. The 1982 electoral campaign, however, suffered from a lack of consistent focus and generally tended to be characterized by a commitment to stability and a reluctance to engage in new and sweeping social reforms.

We should not interpret the lack of a single-focus social campaign theme in 1982 as an abrogation of responsibility or lack of unity on the part of the political organizations. In fact, it may reflect a new realistic assessment by the political organization leadership that the current social situation in Yugoslavia is too complex to be characterized by a single theme,⁹⁹ or that the current social problems can best be addressed in a serious, unemotional atmosphere,¹⁰⁰ or that stability was necessary in the period after Tito's death. The serious atmosphere in which the 1982 elections were conducted may have helped to develop a consciousness that the legislative sessions following the election would be approached more seriously and somberly than heretofore.¹⁰¹

Contradictions are inherent in the complexity and indirect nature of selection in the delegate system. Although political professionalism of delegates is denounced,¹⁰² there is a concern that an excessively rapid turnover of delegates may impede the legislative process.¹⁰³ Presently, most political organizations have accepted and endorsed the philosophy of the Tito Initiative. This Initiative seeks to limit the time served by an individual in political, including legislative, positions. The mandate may be as short as one year, or as long as four years. In addition, most individuals do not serve more than one term, and no one may serve more than two consecutive terms. So far, the practical implications of the Tito Initiative are unclear, and the application of the principle has been interpreted differently throughout the country. The Ninth Slovenian Party Congress held in Ljubljana in April 1982, for instance, spent a considerable amount of time debating the meaning of the Initiative.¹⁰⁴ On the one hand, the Initiative may open the system to new individuals and new ideas, thereby permitting the political organizations to influence delegates more directly and to assume more responsibility. On the other hand, it can lead to a system of musical chairs, or it can lead to a weakening of the political organizations' influence over delegates, with a concomitant increase in legislative arbitrariness and amateurism.

The 1974, 1978, and 1982 elections have been relatively successful for the advancement of women, minorities, and workers into the legislative chambers, but they have not been successful for youths.¹⁰⁵ Table 7.3 lists the percentage of those relevant categories for the federal and republic legislative assemblies. Presumably, these percentages can reflect an important influence of those social groups in the legislature.

One of the negative features that can be attributed to the influx of new members into the legislatures is a weakening of the delegates' mass base. Various surveys have indicated that few voters are aware of the identity of

their delegates, and that fewer know or follow their voting records.¹⁰⁶ A survey conducted in Serbia, for example, indicates that fewer than 30 percent of the electoral base can correctly identify the name of their delegate.¹⁰⁷ If this trend continues, there may be serious repercussions on legislative behavior and an inevitable weakening of influence and autonomy of the Yugoslav legislatures.

One 1981 study of Federal and Slovenian votes indicated that the possibility of declining influence may exist. Twelve percent of those polled in OOURs admitted that they did not follow the activity of either the federal or republic assembly, and 16 percent of those polled from organized neighborhoods stated the same.¹⁰⁸ Of those who claimed that they followed the work of the assembly, nearly half (46 percent) stated that television was the major information source, thus indicating rather shallow interest.¹⁰⁹ Of more concern was the finding that only a small minority (17 to 20 percent) of all respondents were satisfied with the activity of the federal or republic legislative assembly.¹¹⁰ Table 7.4 provides more detailed data.

The empirical research leads to the important conclusion that there appears to be room for improvement in the utilization of the electoral process by the political organizations. Election campaigns do not focus closely enough on relevant public issues, a clear balance between professionalism and amateurism of legislative delegates has not been implemented, and the voter's identification with his legislative delegate is insufficiently strong.

Control over the agenda is the third mechanism that needs to be evaluated in order to appreciate the role and behavior of the political organizations vis-à-vis the Yugoslav legislative process. General newspaper accounts of the legislative process indicate that the political organizations are not completely effective in directing and managing the agenda of the legislative assemblies and that improvements in this area can be made.¹¹¹ The weaknesses can be attributed to organizational inadequacies on the part of the political organization, the communication overload of the legislative delegate, and insufficiently developed information distribution systems of the political organizations.¹¹²

A basic obstacle to the effective management of the agenda of the political organization is the method of organization of the forums initiated by the Socialist Alliance. For example, when discussing the social-political chamber, Stavileci noted:

There appear to be some objective difficulties in realizing the delegate function on the part of the highest levels of the political organizations. . . . It is the practice that the social-political chamber holds a monthly session at which the average agenda has ten or more points. It is also the practice that the highest organs of the political organizations meet from two to three times annually. In this way it is impossible for the political

Table 7.3 Sex, occupation, age, and minority composition of the federal and republic legislatures, 1968–82* (in percentages)

Legislature	Characteristic					
	Female				Workers	
	1968	1974	1978	1982	1968	1974
Bosnia	5	16	22	23	3	20
Montenegro	4	12	9	13	2	14
Croatia	8	17	17	13	3	18
Macedonia	6	16	12	12	2	19
Slovenia	9	—	—	—	1	—
Serbia	8	19	26	28	3	33
Kosovo	12	17	22	24	10	38
Vojvodina	13	24	25	30	7	44
Federal	8	14	17	18	1	17

*Youth defined as under thirty years of age for the national level but twenty-seven or younger for the republics. Minorities are defined as a minority from a particular republic/province and excluding the category "Yugoslav."

Sources: 1968—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Predstavnička Tela Društveno-Političkih Zajednica," *Statistički Bilten* 590 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1969). 1974—Petar Divjak, "Sastav Delegacija

organization to give the social-political chamber sufficient guidance about many questions which are being considered.¹¹³

Without a major overhaul of this system of relationships, the political organizations will continue to be in a relatively weak position to manage and to regulate the legislative agenda and outcomes.

One alternative which the political organizations have used with increasing effectiveness is the designation of specific organizational individuals, often members of the central committee, to follow and to coordinate activities in specific policy areas. Foreign affairs, for example, has long enjoyed this special status on the federal level. Increasingly, organizations such as the League of Communists, Socialist Alliance, and Trade Union Association on the republic level have appointed watchdogs for such policy areas as education, housing, and worker standards. However, the influence on the agenda process that these individuals can exercise is limited because they do not enjoy the status of the collectivity of the organization and because they must divide their time between oversight of administrative actions in the same policy area as well as becoming involved with different policy activities.

An additional handicap to the effective utilization of the agenda-setting mechanism is the environment in which the legislative delegate must work. Every year the legislative assembly considers over a hundred serious agenda items.¹¹⁴ Delegates are rarely assigned professional staff, and in addition, each delegate has the responsibility to contact his electoral base for advice

Characteristic

<i>Workers</i>		<i>Youth</i>				<i>Minorities</i>		
1978	1982	1968	1974	1978	1982	1968	1978	1982
17	25	5	10	12	9	76	63	65
11	27	2	11	7	6	9	25	22
10	10	5	16	5	7	23	20	24
17	11	6	11	3	4	13	24	18
—	—	4	—	—	—	2	20	—
29	37	4	11	11	14	23	21	26
26	21	15	18	12	9	36	27	27
44	46	10	24	15	15	34	40	46
17	13	1	6	6	6	8	15	15

Osnovnih Samoupravnih Organizacija i Zajednica i Sastav Delegata u Skupštinama Društveno-Političkih Zajednica Izabranih u 1974," *Jugoslavenski Pregled* 18 (1974): 367-84. 1978—Petar Divjak, "Sastav Delegacija Osnovnih Samoupravnih Organizacija i Zajednica i Sastav Delegata u Skupštinama Društveno-Političkih Zajednica u 1978," *Jugoslavenski Pregled* 23 (1979): 91-100. 1982—Milan Jovanović, "Izbori za Skupštine Društveno-Političkih Zajednica, 1982," *Jugoslavenski Pregled* 27 (1983): 199-210.

and guidance on most important agenda items. The net effect is that the legislative delegate at both the republic and federal levels is overwhelmed with information and communication and may not be well prepared.¹¹⁵

The problem of delegate information overload is well recognized.¹¹⁶ As an illustration, the reading material of the delegate of a single legislative session in Serbia was found to exceed the annual assigned reading material of a student in school.¹¹⁷ A poll of delegates at all levels of the social-political system identified information overload as the most serious problem of the delegate.¹¹⁸ The tasks of the political organizations in this environment become very difficult because they must compete with all other centers of information, and often they will not be successful. According to legislative observers, bulletins and other printed means of communication are simply not used.¹¹⁹

A third constraining factor on the effective use of the agenda-setting mechanism is the rather poorly designed system for distributing information. The political organizations have been criticized for overlooking concrete activities, and, in the past, they were lax in taking the initiative in making their views known.¹²⁰ A survey in Croatia found that consultations of the political organizations with delegates were infrequent and irregular, that political organization leaders did not attend meetings of the delegation, and that political organization meetings were not considered to be major sources of information for the delegate.¹²¹ A parallel survey in Serbia indicated that

Table 7.4 Evaluation of National Assembly and Slovenian assembly performance by type of delegate, 1981 (in percentages)

	<i>Evaluation</i>				
	<i>Satisfied</i>	<i>Marginally satisfied</i>	<i>Not satisfied</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Don't care</i>
<i>Federal Assembly</i>					
OOUR					
Nondelegate	16.8	33.7	5.0	25.0	18.5
OOUR delegate	17.3	41.7	6.3	28.7	5.7
Policy board delegate	15.8	39.6	5.3	36.7	7.0
Organized neighborhood					
Nondelegate	20.8	35.7	4.9	19.0	18.7
Neighborhood delegate	24.5	48.8	4.5	16.1	5.5
Policy board delegate	22.4	45.7	4.5	19.4	7.5
<i>Republic assembly</i>					
OOUR					
Nondelegate	17.4	36.4	4.7	23.3	17.8
OOUR delegate	18.0	44.0	6.7	25.7	5.3
Policy board delegate	17.2	41.3	3.6	29.7	7.9
Organized neighborhood					
Nondelegate	19.7	38.0	4.4	19.4	18.1
Neighborhood delegate	23.6	52.7	5.5	12.7	5.2
Policy board delegate	22.4	47.2	3.6	19.1	7.5

Source: Ivan Kristan, "Delegatski Sistem na Ravni Federacije," *Socijalizam* 27 (1984): 411.

only 45 percent of the delegates received all conclusions and reports of the relevant political organizations, 36 percent received limited information from these sources, and 18 percent were forced to seek the information actively for themselves.¹²² There is certainly ample room for improvement for the political organizations in this area.

A fourth and the most significant tool to enable the political organization to regulate as well as to manage the republic and federal legislative process effectively is the social-political chambers of the republic legislative assemblies. There is a consensus among observers that it has been through this activity that the political organizations have shown most involvement and improvement since the introduction of the delegate system in 1974. Direct representation in the legislatures, more than any other legislative activity of the political organizations, poses very severe questions of judgment for an objective evaluation. If the social-political chambers become too involved, they threaten the stability of the system. If they are too weak, they jeopardize the role of the political organizations in the system.

The political organizations have been criticized for the relatively poor performance of the social-political chambers in the first years after their introduction. For example, a full-scale review of the delegate system at a conference in Cavtat in 1975 generally gave a poor assessment to the work of the social-political chambers, and the blame for the weak performance was placed on the political organizations themselves.¹²³ Early journalistic accounts corroborated this view,¹²⁴ contending that the absence of the leadership of the political organizations from the delegate base of the social-political chambers was a major defect in the system.¹²⁵ Criticisms of the political organizations included weak preparation and presentation of the agenda, faulty coordination between the political organization and its legislative chambers, failure to take control over certain severe problems, and the avoidance of tough issues. Many of these problems, however, can be directly traced to the lack of experience and a desire to overcompensate to avoid the "super chamber" mentality of the social-political chambers.

The 1978 elections appeared to signal a new beginning for the social-political chambers.¹²⁶ Attempts were made to learn from the poor experience of the first electoral period and, inevitably, some overcompensation occurred.¹²⁷ In general, however, the second electoral period (1978–82) was characterized by many positive achievements. Four of the most important were (1) Better coordination of delegations in the social-political chambers with the leadership of the political organizations, (2) A more effective system for implementing the positions of the political organizations, (3) An improved, although weakly developed, system to encourage delegates to approach the political organizations and engage in two-way dialogue, and (4) A reduction in direct interference of the political organization leadership over social-political chamber delegate actions.¹²⁸

In spite of these strengths, there have been some weaknesses. Many delegations did not have a clear-cut agenda from the political organizations, and many of those which did have such a program rarely encountered follow-up activities from the political organizations.¹²⁹ There is definitely still room for improvement.

Consequently, it is very difficult to render a final judgment on the assessment of the work of the political organizations in the social-political chambers. Such an assessment is dependent upon the personalities and capabilities of the political organization leaders, the issues involved, the republic selected, and the political organization concerned. At least since 1978, the political organizations have avoided the extremes of over- and underinvolvement, and each of the republic chambers occupies a different position between those extremes.

The fifth mechanism through which the political organizations can influence the legislative process is their capability of providing external pressure and oversight. It is this activity that has been least affected by the new

delegate system, and it is one with which the political organizations have the longest involvement and experience.

Each of the political organizations appears to operate somewhat independently in these activities. For example, the veterans' organization boasts that 300,000 of its members are involved in social-political actions and that they are directly influencing delegations and delegates throughout the legislative process.¹³⁰ The League of Communists, for its part, holds the central place in coordinating the external pressures and oversight function. Many of the other organizations tend to defer to the League, often to the point of inactivity or pure verbalism.¹³¹ The Trade Union Association has felt that it has not worked sufficiently closely with the League and that its effectiveness on the legislative process has suffered.¹³² The weakest position, however, rests with the youth organization whose membership is young and inexperienced, whose leadership is transitory, and whose members are insufficiently oriented toward direct involvement in the legislative process.¹³³

Evaluative surveys of the delegate process tend to support those general observations. A local-level Croatian survey indicates that the political organizations combined are among the most influential elements within the legislative system and that the ranking of influence begins with the League, followed by the Alliance, trade unions, veterans, and finally the youth organization.¹³⁴ While these findings can only be confirmed on the local level of government, observation suggests that the political organization influence would be magnified at higher levels of the social political community.

In summary, the political organizations are involved with all legislative activities. For each activity, however, there is some room for improvement, but the general consensus is that the political organizations are doing a respectable job.

Summary and Conclusion

Our fundamental conclusion is that the Yugoslav political organizations have usually been effective in fulfilling their roles within the legislative system and process. The political organizations have neither abused nor neglected the use of their powers and capabilities within the legislative domain. They have maintained a careful balance of activity that has permitted the Yugoslav legislatures on the federal and republic levels to survive, to develop, and to prosper.

The social-political organizations are involved in a wide array of activities that affect the legislative process. These include nominations and elections, agenda-setting, direct representation, and external pressure and oversight. For each activity, the political organizations have developed a set of institutions to insure proper functioning and development. For each activity, there

is also room for improved performance, and since 1974 the general trend has been in that direction.

The basic relationship between the political organizations and the federal and republic legislative assemblies is complex. This complexity is simultaneously the relationship's strongest and weakest feature. On the one hand, the systemic complexity serves to keep the process from becoming more efficient and effective, and, on the other hand, the complexity may help to preserve the system by making it increasingly difficult for a single organization to abuse its power and dominate the legislative assembly. Thus we can conclude that the prospects for the future development and survival of the Yugoslav legislative system are quite promising.

8 Political Organizations and Local Public Policies and Decision-Making

Introduction

The actual role, behavior, and performance of Yugoslavia's political organizations can probably best be appraised by examining their activities at the local level. Among Western scholars, most studies of socialist countries have focused on the role of the national Party apparatus in determining policy and maintaining control over the political system.¹ These studies also usually adopt a centralist, almost monolithic, view of the Party and other political organization structures in Communist states. In these works, local variation is either denied or assumed to have negligible policy consequences,² and, as a result, comparative Communist system research on local government is relatively sparse and tends to be dominated by discussions of structural, rather than behavioral, characteristics.

In retrospect, a centralist research orientation was perfectly acceptable in view of the Stalinist experience and the highly disciplined and centralist nature of the Party apparatus and national front organizations that existed throughout the Communist world. In contemporary Yugoslavia, however, the decentralism in decision-making and politics has given greater importance to local government and local politics.

Another incentive for examining how the political organizations affect local government and policy processes in Yugoslavia is the existence of variation of local social, economic, and political capabilities. Although in legal terms, all Yugoslav communes have equal rights, duties, and responsibilities,³ the communes are different in nearly every other characteristic. Thus, some communes have the capability to fulfill their duties and responsibilities more easily than others. This inequality also implies that the political systems of communes will vary, depending upon the socioeconomic resources of the community,⁴ and that the demands shouldered by the political organizations will vary as well.⁵

Table 8.1 Measures of distribution of per capita national income of communes by republic, 1973 (in thousands of new dinars)

<i>Republic</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Coefficient of variability</i>
Yugoslavia (total)	84.5	1.4	9.4	7.3	.787
Bosnia-Herzegovina	19.0	2.1	6.0	3.2	.533
Montenegro	27.9	2.1	8.3	5.6	.675
Croatia	28.9	3.1	10.2	5.0	.490
Macedonia	10.8	3.2	6.5	2.6	.400
Slovenia	84.5	4.1	19.0	11.2	.589
Serbia proper	72.4	2.0	8.5	7.7	.905
Vojvodina	20.1	2.9	10.2	6.3	.618

Source: Computed from data in Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1974* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1974).

In this chapter, we measure variation in local public policies and examine the roles and behavior of the Yugoslav political organizations in local government and politics. The expectations of the organizations are outlined, and the methods and procedures for engaging in local decision-making and politics are described. Finally, we evaluate the success with which the organizations fulfill their tasks, and we identify the circumstances that can account for variation in local sociopolitical performance.

Variation in Performance

As discussed earlier in chapter one, communal governments are responsible for a wide range of public services, including housing, health, education, roads, utilities, planning, and transportation. A determination of the importance of the local activities of the political organizations, however, depends upon prior determination that local governments exhibit some variation in their decisions, and that local policy variation is not completely attributable to economic and social inequalities.

In spite of moves toward consolidation, large inequalities still exist among communes' ability to provide basic local services.⁶ As is evident from the distribution of per capita national income (see table 8.1), communes vary in their capability to provide public services.

As per capita national income increases, the pool of financial resources available for funding public services rises correspondingly. The coefficients of variability scores listed in table 8.1 are interesting because they indicate, for each republic, considerable dispersion or inequality in the distribution of

Table 8.2 Distribution of commune per capita expenditures for education by republic, 1973 (in thousands of new dinars)

<i>Republic</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Coefficient of variability</i>
Yugoslavia (total)	36.56	.95	2.93	2.58	.879
Bosnia-Herzegovina	11.49	1.43	2.44	1.13	.463
Montenegro	5.02	2.12	3.03	.72	.236
Croatia	9.17	.95	2.95	1.22	.413
Macedonia	5.04	1.52	2.17	.69	.318
Slovenia	36.56	2.60	5.34	5.58	1.046
Serbia proper	20.17	.95	2.52	2.42	.962
Vojvodina	8.88	1.39	2.67	1.14	.427
Kosovo	4.83	1.72	2.31	.70	.301

Source: See table 8.1.

per capita national income within the republic.⁷ The ratio between the highest and lowest per capita income of communes in a republic also indicates the degree of advantage that a developed republic has in providing quality social services.

We can test the conclusion that essential public services are not equally provided across communes simply by examining their expenditures for public health and education. Health and education expenditures are rough indicators of public expenditures due to differences in the standard of living among communes, which affect personnel costs, and in the amount of capital investment for construction of hospitals or schools, which affects total outlays. Nevertheless, wide dispersion should indicate that there is inequality in the basic services provided by the communes. Table 8.2 summarizes the results for educational expenditures.

In Yugoslavia as a whole, there is considerable dispersion among communes in per capita educational expenditures ($V = .787$). In fact, the dispersion in communal educational expenditures is higher than the dispersion in communal per capita national income ($V = .879$ for education vs. $V = .787$ for per capita for per capita national income). The per capita education expenditure is much higher in Slovenia ($V = 1.046$) and Serbia ($V = .962$) than in the other republics. The dispersion is relatively low in Kosovo ($V = .301$), Macedonia ($V = .318$), and Montenegro ($V = .236$), all of which are relatively underdeveloped republics. This seems to indicate that there is more equality among the poorer, less-developed regions that must generally spend less on primary social services.

Communal expenditures in public health reinforce some of the trends found in communal educational expenditures. As can be seen from table 8.3,

the dispersion in communal health expenditures, even within individual republics, is inordinately high, ranging from $V = 2.626$ for Serbia to $V = .765$ for Vojvodina. Communal health expenditures do not share, however, the dispersion pattern of communal educational expenditures in that the more underdeveloped republics do not clearly have the smallest overall dispersions in health expenditure distribution.

While it may be apparent that the capabilities of communes to acquire and to deliver public services are unequal, and that public services are not provided equally across all communes, it cannot be implied without further evidence that the ability to pay for public services is the only factor involved in explaining the amount of public services provided. A simple correlation analysis between the per capita wealth of a community and expenditures of the commune for health and education can illustrate this point.⁸

Table 8.4 summarizes the results of such an analysis. Correlation coefficients were obtained for all communes in Yugoslavia as a whole and by republic. Public health and communal educational expenditures were separately correlated with the per capita national income of the commune.

The results indicate that while a good deal of the variance in education expenditures can be explained by the per capita national income of the communes, a smaller amount of the variance in public health expenditures is explained by this variable. This may indicate that not only different noneconomic variables may have an impact on the distribution and appropriation of public funds, but that their impact may vary depending upon the policy considered.

Table 8.3 Distribution of commune per capita expenditures for public health by republic, 1973 (in thousands of new dinars)

<i>Republic</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Coefficient of variability</i>
Yugoslavia (total)	78.57	.15	2.82	5.112	1.815
Bosnia-Herzegovina	14.90	.15	1.89	1.945	1.028
Montenegro	14.39	.74	3.16	3.325	1.053
Croatia	18.12	.31	3.23	2.783	.862
Macedonia	6.98	.61	2.14	1.644	.768
Slovenia	60.05	.53	4.38	8.191	1.869
Serbia proper	78.57	.46	3.03	7.985	2.636
Vojvodina	8.40	.91	2.42	1.854	.765
Kosovo	3.84	.36	1.25	1.099	.879

Source: See table 8.1.

Table 8.4 Correlation coefficients, explained variance, and significance level of communal per capita national income correlated with per capita communal expenditures in public health and education

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Education</i>		<i>Level of significance</i>	<i>Health</i>		<i>Level of significance</i>
	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i> ²		<i>r</i>	<i>r</i> ²	
Yugoslavia	.76	.58	.000	.57	.32	.000
Bosnia-Herzegovina	.71	.50	.000	.57	.32	.000
Montenegro	.16	.02	.257	.32	.10	.123
Croatia	.70	.49	.000	.45	.21	.000
Macedonia	.66	.44	.000	.31	.09	.051
Slovenia	.75	.57	.000	.80	.64	.000
Serbia proper	.84	.71	.000	.48	.23	.000
Vojvodina	.78	.61	.000	.46	.21	.002
Kosovo	.83	.69	.000	.83	.69	.000

Source: James H. Seroka, "Local Sociopolitical Organizations and Public Policy Decision-Making in Yugoslavia," *Balkanistica* 2 (1975): 124.

A final point about the relationship between economic development and social welfare expenditures should be considered. It is possible that the relationship may vary depending upon the level of development of the commune. When the level of development is controlled, we find that the original relationship varies considerably. Table 8.5 illustrates these findings.

The relationship between the two variables becomes stronger as the level of economic development increases. In other words, economic development, while being a good predictor of communal expenditures at higher levels, loses all significance at lower levels of development.⁹ It is necessary, therefore, to identify some other variables that will effectively predict levels of communal expenditures at low levels of development, but that lose impact at higher levels.

The next section of the chapter will discuss how other factors, notably political organizations, can contribute toward an explanation of the remainder of the variance in public policy decision-making.

The Evolution of the Political Organization in the Local Policy Process

Political organizations can affect local decision-making at all four stages of the policy process.¹⁰ They can help to set the agenda, formulate policy options, implement policy decisions, and evaluate the success of the policy. In Yugoslavia, each organization's role at each of these stages may be different from the role attributed to any other organization, and each organization's role may change over time.

Adaptations in the role of the local political organizations over time are considered natural in the Yugoslav context. Jovan Dordevic, a noted Yugoslav legal scholar, for example, stated that “the commune is in constant mutation, and a theory about it cannot become or remain static.”¹¹ Local government and its constitutional participants, in other words, must change and adapt to changes in the larger social and political environment.

As was the case in chapter six, three periods can be roughly identified to separate one system of local government from another. Each period corresponds to the major constitutional transitions of postwar Yugoslavia. They are from 1946 to 1963, from 1963 to 1974, and from 1974 to today. This section outlines the dynamics of the periodic changes, and relates them to changes in the behavior and expectation of the political organizations.

State Centralism: 1946–63

For most of the first two decades following the war, local governments in Yugoslavia had a very restricted role. While these governments provided basic services, and, in many cases, were responsible for postwar reconstruction and growth, they lacked autonomy in selecting the public agenda and formulating policy options.¹² More disheartening, however, local governments during this period were compelled to surrender control over the execution of policy to centralized state agencies, but were often not relieved of responsibility when these programs failed.

Local political organizations largely suffered under a double handicap. They had little control over central policy-making, but they were held responsible and accountable for the course of policies at the local level. Even the transmission-belt concept created difficulties and was not direct at the local level. Although the local Party organization in principle was the originator of policy decisions at the local level, other organizations were primarily respon-

Table 8.5 Correlation coefficients, explained variance, *N*, and significance level of communal per capita national income with per capita communal expenditures in public health and education

<i>Level of development</i>	<i>Education</i>				<i>Health</i>			
	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i> ²	<i>Level of significance</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i> ²	<i>Level of significance</i>	<i>N</i>
Low	-.022	.01	.393	157	.283	.08	.000	139
Medium	.432	.19	.000	249	.190	.04	.002	234
High	.741	.55	.000	90	.533	.31	.000	89
Total	.750	.58	.000	496	.565	.32	.000	462

Source: See table 8.4.

Figure 8.1: General role of the local political organizations and other local groups over each stage of the local public policy process, 1946–63

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Policy stage</i>			
	<i>Initiation</i>	<i>Formulation</i>	<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Evaluation</i>
Communist Party	Weak	Moderate	Strong	Weak
Socialist Alliance	Very weak	Weak	Moderate	Very weak
Union	Very weak	Weak	Moderate	None
Youth League	Very weak	Very weak	Weak	None
Other groups	None	None	Strong	None
Other governmental	Dominant	Dominant	Dominant	Dominant

sible to their higher-level organizational units rather than to the local Party leadership. Thus, it happened that many local efforts among the political organizations were uncoordinated and occasionally counterproductive.¹⁴ Figure 8.1 outlines the general role performed by each of the major political organizations in each stage of the policy process during this period.¹⁵

The first period of socialist local government in Yugoslavia was characterized by strong centralization of authority. Decisions were made in republic capitals or Belgrade, and local officials could rarely influence the process. Local Socialist Alliance, union, and youth organizations were not involved in determining the agenda at all; these decisions had been made by the state central planners. Exceptions to this trend occurred, particularly involving some local Party officials who used their influence at higher Party forums to secure favorable treatment in the plan for their constituents, or for the investment of state resources in their local communities.

Policy formulation was also largely beyond the realm of responsibility for local officials and members of the political organizations during the first period. The local branches of the Party, Alliance, union, and youth movements lacked experience in developing proposals, judging the relative merits of proposals, and engaging in political compromise. This problem became evident later during the second period when officials had to be trained in the politics of decision-making.¹⁶

Implementation of policy was one policy stage where most of the political organizations had an important role. Although higher level officials and state ministries provided the goals for particular policy programs, and state authorities, in many cases, provided considerable direction in implementation,

the shortage of resources and the need to rely on indigenous resources following the break with the Cominform resulted in considerable discretion and control over policy implementation by the political organizations. One anomaly that resulted was that control over implementation generally polarized between two groups. In some local areas, local bureaucrats tended to dominate policy implementation, while in others the Party dominated that stage of the process.¹⁷ A net result from both extremes was the implementation of policy generally followed a conservative direction.¹⁸

Several problems began to manifest themselves in this situation. One was the problem that political, not economic or social, considerations dominated the formulation of the local agenda. A second was that the central agenda could not take into consideration local variation and local needs. A third problem was that organization officials found little incentive to identify social needs and increasingly faced the danger of withdrawing from their public. These points were all discussed at the Brioni Plenum in 1966 and led to the major reforms undertaken at that time.¹⁹

State domination of local policy processes also resulted in insufficient or inappropriate policy evaluation. Throughout the first period, no local organization had responsibility for evaluation.²⁰ This role was left to higher-level Party officials, who because of inclination or the burdens of office saw little need to review previously made decisions and tended to employ an incremental policy model.

In summary, the first period of state control of local policy activities from 1946 to 1963 filled a necessary role in helping to unite and to rebuild the nation under similar guidelines and toward joint objectives. Nevertheless, social developments during this period made continued adherence to the centralized model less likely without recourse to Soviet-style practices of governance and to the abandonment of economic self-management.

Communal Domination: 1963–74

Following the adoption of the 1963 Constitution, communal government received considerably more authority, a high degree of autonomy, and more control over the management of its affairs. While complete autonomy was not granted to the commune, politics and policy-making appeared to be centered at that governmental level. Minović's study of rural Serbian communes, for example, notes the relative freedom with which the agenda was set and policy formulated in these communes.²¹

Autonomy was not granted to communes at all stages of the policy process during the second period. A considerable part of the revenue of the commune, estimated at 90 percent, was outside local discretionary control, either fixed by republic or federal statute, or legally committed for long-term purposes (for example, loan repayment and capital building programs), or considered

Figure 8.2: Potential general role of the local political organizations and other local groups over each stage of the local public policy process, 1963–74

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Policy stage</i>			
	<i>Initiation</i>	<i>Formulation</i>	<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Evaluation</i>
Communist League	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Strong
Socialist Alliance	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Union	Weak	Weak	Moderate	Weak
Youth League	Very weak	Very weak	Very weak	None
Other groups	Variable	Variable	Variable	Weak
Other governmental	Weak	Weak	Moderate	Weak

to be an entitlement and not subject to change.²² In addition, as the period continued, more republic and federal regulations were promulgated, so that by 1970 the responsibilities of the communes were regulated by more than 1,500 rules and regulations.²³

The shift of political and policy emphasis to local government, while not complete, did result in changes in the roles and powers of the political organizations at the communal level. The communal committee of the League in Valjevo, Serbia, for example, noted in its annual report that the local organization was more independent, more likely to initiate policy, and had more influence with republic and federal League bodies than before.²⁴ Other organizations, primarily the Socialist Alliance, noted similar increases in their roles and responsibilities.²⁵ Figure 8.2 provides summary information about the general status of the political organizations during this period over each of the stages of the local policy process.

Unlike the prior period, it is very difficult to pinpoint a precise behavioral role for the political organizations in the commune. The reason for this difficulty is that during the period of communal domination, there was considerable variation in behavior across communes.²⁶ In some communes, political personalities dominated the policy process;²⁷ in others, the communal bureaucracy gained control;²⁸ in still others, a single faction exerted control and influence.²⁹ Some communes manifested widespread internal conflict; other communes were placid and static.³⁰ The withdrawal of central control, in short, left a vacuum that was filled differently in different communes.³¹

Policy initiation is one stage of the policy process in which, during the second period, local participants were granted considerable discretionary

authority. Economic development priorities, public services, utilities, road networks, and housing all became local responsibilities. Economic growth and future development of the commune also became local tasks. The problem, however, was that no institutional process was developed for articulating the policy agenda, and no formal role was given to any organization, including the political organizations, for determining that agenda. In some cases, as Nedkov and Mirčev note, political leaders played off one economic enterprise against another or they lobbied local higher-level officials for support against their political opponents.³² The net result was that no political organization consistently influenced the formation of the policy agenda.

The influence of the League during this period varied from domination to noninterference, depending upon the commune and the local political leadership.³³ In some cases, the League never even proposed a program of action, let alone committed itself to its adoption.³⁴

Local Socialist Alliance organizations also generally worked in a nondefined environment for policy initiation. Beginning in 1963, the Alliance needed to develop a system for integrating and coordinating the decision-making process.³⁵ Unfortunately, in many cases the Alliance failed to achieve this cooperative orientation,³⁶ and the republic- and federal-level bodies often stepped in with their own policy agenda.³⁷

The area of policy formulation is perhaps the stage of the policy process that brought about the most intense conflict and difficulties in communal government during this period. This area highlights the problem resulting from incorrectly assuming constant and excessively high levels of social development for all communes. In many areas, groups and individuals other than the political organizations dominated the decision-making process in the commune. Pusić, Tomić, and others discovered that this tendency was more pronounced in those communes that were less socially and economically developed.³⁸

Decision-making influence of the political organizations over the local policy formulation process was found to vary considerably across Yugoslavia

Table 8.6 Perceived influence of the Socialist Alliance in communes in Croatia by type of settlement, 1970 (in percentages)

<i>Influence of the Socialist Alliance</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Total</i>
Too much influence	2.7	3.5	3.0
Too little influence	13.1	21.1	16.0
As much as necessary	28.3	24.1	26.8
Don't know	46.0	38.0	43.1
No answer	9.9	13.3	11.2

Sources: Mladen Zvonarevic, *Javno Mnenje Stanovništva SR Hrvatske u Listopadu 1969* (Zagreb: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja, 1970), p. 80.

Strength of Influence




Figure 8.3: Influence of the sociopolitical organizations on selected important communal policies. *Source:* Janez Jerovsek, "Structure of Influence in the Commune," *Sociologija: Selected Articles 1959–1969* (Belgrade, 1970): 123–24.

in this period. Marinković, for example, noted that the influence of the Socialist Alliance in decision-making was generally much higher than in the pre-1963 period.³⁹ He and Tomić also found evidence to support the view that the Alliance's role was more pronounced and influential in the less-developed communes of the country.⁴⁰ Table 8.6 provides comparative data about the role of the Socialist Alliance in communal decision-making, controlling by type of settlement.

Generally speaking, political organizations and particularly the League were heavily involved in local decision-making. An analysis of participation effectiveness in Zagreb city government in 1969, for instance, discovered that a surprisingly large percentage (22.5) of all proposals prepared for consideration by the city assembly were prepared and submitted by the political organizations,⁴¹ and Kilibarda's study of policy proposals particularly noted the important role of the League.⁴² Nevertheless, the local political situation was often unclear, so that individuals such as the communal president often exercised more influence than the political organization,⁴³ and proposals made by the organizations were often rejected.⁴⁴ Figure 8.3 reproduces data from Jerovsek's study of Slovenian communes to illustrate these points.

The third policy stage over which local political organizations could exercise additional influence during the second period was policy implementation. Unlike the previous two stages, expectations regarding the involvement of political organizations over the implementation of policy decisions were considerably lower. The major change that the constitutional reforms instituted was to transfer responsibility for implementation from federal and republic administrative agencies to local administrative agencies and bureaucrats.

A major impact of the decentralization of implementation was to provide through the political organizations more involvement in policy implementation in the commune. Unfortunately, however, decentralization often did not lead to democratization. Instead, local administrators and other professionals often dominated implementation,⁴⁵ and the executive branch exercised considerably more influence than was intended by the constitution.⁴⁶

Two important reasons for the unintended concentration of power in local administrative agencies were the lack of institutional checks and balances at the local level and the granting of more functional responsibilities to the commune without commensurate increases in resources.⁴⁷ As a result, administrators, particularly in less-developed communes,⁴⁸ often felt compelled to bypass democratic procedural rules in the implementation of communal plans.⁴⁹

Policy evaluation was generally neglected during the period of communal domination. Communes tended to be more concerned about the quantity of services and less concerned about qualitative matters. Often, as in the case of city services in Belgrade, although public dissatisfaction may have been high, the communes did not have a program to remedy it.⁵⁰ Thus, in their drive to establish autonomy, communal leaders often neglected to pay attention to the need for evaluation,⁵¹ and when evaluative studies were conducted, little attention was given to their recommendations.⁵²

In summary, the second era in local government in Yugoslavia manifested a series of problems at each stage of the policy process. The most serious and fundamental weakness, however, was the lack of institutional controls, coordination, and direction by the political organizations over the policy process. As a result, communal policy-making was open, primarily in less-developed communes, to charges of "Caesarism," oligarchy, favoritism, and factionalism.⁵³ In short, reform directed toward better coordination, promotion of the general interests, and heightened citizen involvement became a necessity.

Contemporary Communal Government and the Political Organizations

Yugoslavia's constitutional framers in 1973 addressed themselves to many of the apparent weaknesses of the previous constitutional arrangements for



Figure 8.4: Procedural and institutional linkages of the sociopolitical organizations to the communal policy decision-making process

local government. Two primary goals of the new system were to provide some structure and procedural safeguards and to resolve the bitter factional infighting with an accompanying encouragement of more citizen involvement. To accomplish these goals, the political organizations received a new and central position in the policy process of the commune. The new system involved the adoption or enhancement of several procedural characteristics that would allow the political organizations to manage more effectively the public policy process in the commune.

These characteristics include the adoption of sociopolitical chambers in the communal assembly, strict limitations on executive power, implementation of the Tito Initiative, adoption of the delegate system, determination of agenda by the League of Communists, reorganization of the electoral process, and reform and enhancement of the system of policy boards (siz). Figure 8.4 outlines the interrelationship of these changes and identifies the central position of the political organizations in the system.

As discussed in chapter 6, reforms in the electoral system, the adoption of the delegate system, and adherence to the Tito Initiative implied the granting of a more significant role to the political organizations in the recruitment and selection of the political leadership. In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, the functions of the sociopolitical chambers in republic legislatures gave the political organizations a direct role in decision-making in the legislature.

The constitutional changes outlined in figure 8.4 were meant to have a qualitative as well as a quantitative impact on decision-making in the commune. First, the attention given to communal government in the constitution made it clear that the communal government was considered to be the foundation of Yugoslavia's political system.⁵⁴ Second, the decision-making

Figure 8.5: Proposed general influence of specific local political organizations and local groups over each stage of the public policy process of the commune in the current legal environment

Organization	Policy stage			
	Initiation	Formulation	Implementation	Evaluation
Communist League	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Strong
Socialist Alliance	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Moderate
Union	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Moderate
Youth League	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Combined	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Strong
Other groups	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Other governmental	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate

process was intended to be less anarchic and more rational, and to follow more closely common guidelines and principles.⁵⁵ Third, executive powers needed to be reduced,⁵⁶ and power within the communes needed to gravitate away from the executive and toward the communal assembly.⁵⁷ Fourth, the policy boards were expected to assume more planning functions⁵⁸ and to be more closely integrated into communal policy-making,⁵⁹ and fifth, the political organizations were to accept general coordination and management responsibility for the process as well as outcome of communal decision-making.⁶⁰

These qualitative changes also implied the adoption of a fresh approach to policy-making in the commune and a shift in responsibilities, particularly in favor of the local political organizations. Policy initiation was changed from the previously haphazard and unplanned process to one that integrated the neighborhood to articulate policy issues,⁶¹ but that relied heavily on the political organizations, notably the League of Communists, to put together a policy agenda.⁶² Policy formulation involved the joint participation of the policy boards and communal assembly,⁶³ with oversight responsibilities held by the political organizations.⁶⁴ Executive discretion was removed from this stage of the local policy process⁶⁵ and limited to policy implementation,⁶⁶ where the executive committee received an enhanced role.⁶⁷ Sociopolitical organization involvement at this stage of the policy process was largely indirect.

Policy evaluation receives more attention in the current governmental constitutional framework than it received in the previous system. The communal assembly is charged with oversight responsibilities and a much more enhanced question period,⁶⁸ and the policy boards receive many of the plan-

ning and more classical evaluative functions. The political organizations are generally indirectly involved through the actions of the delegates to the assemblies, but they can also be directly involved through the sociopolitical chambers.

Qualitative changes in the communal policy environments have also affected each political organization separately (see figure 8.5). As envisioned by the constitution and statutory changes since 1974, the League of Communists receives general responsibility for managing the policy initiation stage. The Socialist Alliance and the trade unions both share duties to enhance policy formulation within their respective spheres of influence. The Alliance is also committed to involvement with policy implementation, and all three organizations, but primarily the League, have a duty to evaluate the local policy process. Only the youth organization is not appreciably involved in the current policy arrangement.

Appraisal of the Political Organizations' **Current Performance**

The current system of local government has been in effect throughout Yugoslavia without major change for over a decade. The introduction of the new system was accompanied by considerable concern and doubts, but with high expectations that the factionalism and divisive conflicts within local governments would cease. On the whole, the expectations have been met; conflict has been reduced, and the ends of the constitutional changes have been achieved. This section identifies the roles played by the political organizations in terminating communal conflict. It also attempts to identify, describe, and analyze the means used by the organizations to achieve this objective.

Communal peace is apparently not the result of eliminating communal autonomy. Communes, if anything, enjoy a level of power and responsibility that compares favorably to the second constitutional period. While many communal actions are the result of federal or republic initiatives,⁶⁹ the majority are the result of local initiatives and local actors.⁷⁰ During this period, considerable attention has also been given to maintaining and strengthening the influence of the commune,⁷¹ and the commune's role was strongly reaffirmed as recently as the Eleventh Party Congress in 1978.⁷²

Occasionally, communes may feel that their authority is unnecessarily constrained by federal or republic governments, but public and official actions in support of communal autonomy are generally strong. This tendency is illustrated by the communal assembly in Paraćin, which publicly stated that the members felt compelled to accept the location of a new highway that they believed was not in the best interest of the commune, and considerable anger was expressed against this ostensible intergovernmental interference.⁷³ Shortly after this incident, however, it was revealed that no pressure was placed on the

Table 8.7 Correlation coefficients between political structural characteristics and statutory variables, 1974

<i>Communal statutory characteristics</i>	<i>Executive power</i>	<i>Bureaucratic power</i>	<i>Legislative power</i>
Number of administrative ordinances	-.614	-.343	.459
Number of special fund ordinances	-.714	-.450	.370
Housing code ordinances	-.506	-.395	.280
Health and social welfare ordinances	-.210*	-.142*	-.029*
Total laws and ordinances passed	-.510	-.239	.265
Total statutory acts justified solely by communal charter	-.670	-.354	.507

*Not significant at the .05 level.

Source: James H. Seroka, "Local Political Structures and Policy Outputs in the Yugoslav Commune," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 12 (Spring 1979): 72.

after this incident, however, it was revealed that no pressure was placed on the commune to accept the road, and that certain communal leaders used this as a pretense to divert public hostility from themselves.⁷⁴

The decline in communal hostility also does not imply that commune policies and commune politics are now standardized throughout the country. There are considerable differences in communal political structures as found in their charters,⁷⁵ and these differences reflect variation in the policy climate and communal policy outputs. A study conducted in Serbia, for example, constructed indices for formal executive power, administrative power, and legislative control based on an analysis of fifty-one communal charters.⁷⁶ The indices were found to be related significantly to communal decision-making characteristics such as professionalism and progressivism,⁷⁷ and, as noted in table 8.7, they were strongly related to communal policy outputs.

Commune-level maintenance of autonomy and the continuance of structural differentiation in the contemporary political period may imply that factors internal to the commune can be instrumental in the reduction in factionalism and conflict witnessed by most communes during the past decade. The local political organizations are likely candidates for this phenomenon, partly because their constitutional role in the commune has been so strongly enhanced. In this section, we examine the political organizations' roles and patterns of behavior to determine the extent of their influence in present-day, local-level, public policy-making.

Table 8.8 Nonadministrative issues discussed in the communal assemblies, percentages of issues introduced at the initiative of the republic or federation, percentages of issues introduced at the initiative of the political organizations by republic, 1974-75 and 1978-79*

<i>Republic</i>	<i>1974-75</i>			<i>1978-79</i>		
	<i>Total issues</i>	<i>% Republic or federal</i>	<i>% Political organizations</i>	<i>Total issues</i>	<i>% Republic or federal</i>	<i>% Political organizations</i>
Yugoslavia	10,931	9.3	16.4	15,044	13.5	17.5
Bosnia-						
Herzegovina	2,754	8.4	14.5	3,909	6.3	25.5
Montenegro	295	2.0	16.6	513	2.5	15.4
Croatia	2,002	11.6	16.0	2,706	12.8	16.6
Macedonia	545	3.9	12.7	500	10.0	15.6
Slovenia	1,284	11.1	21.7	1,687	25.4	14.5
Serbia proper	2,870	9.5	15.7	3,837	17.7	13.2
Kosovo	94	5.3	44.7	479	2.5	13.8
Vojvodina	1,087	9.6	16.2	1,413	17.8	16.8

*Other possible initiators include delegations from the work communities, neighborhoods, and policy boards.

Sources: 1974-75—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Skupština Opština: Sastav i Aktivnost 1975," *Statistički Bilten* 984 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, October 1976): 17-18. 1978-79—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Skupština Opština: Aktivnost od 1 VII, 1978 do 30 VI, 1979," *Statistički Bilten* 1189 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, June 1980): 13-14.

Policy Initiation

A major intent of the reform of Yugoslav local government in 1974 was to provide a more systematized process for policy initiation and to enhance the directive role for the political organizations. The available evidence indicates that this goal has been generally realized. Evidence from the agenda of communal assemblies, neighborhood councils, and policy boards all tend to support the claim that political organizations play an important role in local policy initiation.

Within communal assemblies, approximately 17 percent of all nonadministrative issues were initiated directly by the political organizations.⁷⁸ As table 8.8 demonstrates, this percentage remains above 12 percent in every republic during the 1974-75 and 1978-79 legislative years. Perhaps more revealing for comparative purposes is the fact that the percentage of issues initiated by the political organizations generally exceeds the percentage of issues initiated by the federal and republic governmental bodies. In addition, the reported percentages for the political organizations are understated because these figures do not include those cases in which an organization encouraged

a worker or neighborhood delegation to initiate a proposal on its behalf.

Political organization involvement over the introduction of general public issues in the commune also appears to be quite high. In 1974, 16 percent of all commune referenda originated with the political organizations. By 1979, 22 percent of all commune referenda were initiated at the insistence of the political organizations.⁷⁹

A major Croatian survey conducted in 1978 on the delegate system concluded that among all recognized actors in the process of agenda-setting, the political organizations were perceived to be the most influential. The communal administrators and politicians received second and third place, respectively, followed by delegates, delegations, and the general public.⁸⁰

Sociopolitical influence in initiating proposals varies by issue. For some issues, such as agriculture, criminal justice, and education, organizational involvement in initiation is minimal. For other issues, such as health, social welfare, finance, and normative questions, political organizational involvement in initiation can be quite high.⁸¹

While the improvement in the behavior of the political organizations with respect to policy initiation in communes is quite notable, the success does not imply the absence of weaknesses or deficiencies. A study conducted in Vojvodina in 1978, for example, noted that 75 percent of the neighborhood political organization chapters did not prepare a formal agenda for their delegations to the communal assembly,⁸² and that 63 percent of all delegations lacked an agenda.⁸³ Second, 47 percent of the respondents in the survey identified the communal executives and department heads as the most significant initiator of proposals.⁸⁴

A potentially even more serious deficiency in current communal organiza-

Table 8.9 Distribution of issues discussed by policy boards by initiator, 1975–79 (in percentages)

<i>Initiator</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1976</i>	<i>1977</i>	<i>1979</i>
Work delegations	45.0	38.7	41.8	43.8
Other governmental institutions	29.5	32.1	31.5	29.7
Neighborhood delegations	9.4	11.2	11.3	11.1
Sociopolitical organizations	16.1	17.9	15.5	15.4
Total issues introduced	13,002	22,495	23,324	34,835

Sources: 1979—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Samoupravne Interesne Zajednice: Aktivnost 1979," *Statistički Bilten* 1248 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, July 1981): 26. 1977—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Samoupravne Interesne Zajednice: Sastav i Aktivnost 1977," *Statistički Bilten* 1146 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, November 1979): 38. 1976—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Samoupravne Interesne Zajednice: Aktivnost 1976," *Statistički Bilten* 1064 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, December 1977): 19. 1975—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Samoupravne Interesne Zajednice: Sastav i Aktivnost 1975," *Statistički Bilten* 1040 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, August 1977): 46.

Table 8.10 Distribution of delegate perceptions of the most important group in initiating proposals in the organized neighborhoods in Croatia, Serbia, and Vojvodina, 1978 (in percentages)

Group	Croatia	Serbia	Vojvodina
Citizen meetings	20	28	23
Neighborhood councils	22	24	23
Political organizations	20	19	20
Neighborhood delegations	10	9	12
Delegates	7	3	—
Commune administrators	5	6	—
Informal groups	1	0	—
Don't know or no response	10	6	—

Sources: Croatia—Josip Županov, "Distribucija Utjecaja u Delegatskom Sistemu u Općini," *Naše Teme* 22 (June 1978): 1241. Serbia—Radivoje Marinković, "Položaj, Moć, i Uticaj Osnovnih Subjekata Delegatskog Sistema," in Radivoje Marinković, ed., *Delegatski Sistem: Funkcionisanje i Ostvarivanje* (Belgrade: Institut za Političke Studije, 1979), p. 320. Vojvodina—Sreta Stajić et al., *Socijalistički Savez Radnog Naroda Vojvodine i Najšira Politička Osnova Delegatskog Sistema* (Novi Sad: Pokrajinski Komitet Saveza Komunista Vojvodina, 1978), p. 127.

tion involvement in the agenda-setting process may be the lack of coordination between the organizations and the delegates. Seventy-nine percent of the Vojvodinan delegate sample identified coordination as a significant problem in determining the agenda.⁸⁵ This is compounded by poor communications as well as evidence that indicates that only 13 percent of the local organizational chapters invite all members of the delegation to attend their meetings, 29 percent invite only the delegates, and 33 percent do not invite any representatives to attend.⁸⁶ The urgency of this problem is reinforced by a Serbian study which found that only 45 percent of delegation members received all policy information originating from political organizations, and 18 percent of delegates felt compelled to extract this information personally from the organizations.⁸⁷

In spite of the problems and deficiencies, the overall conclusion from the available evidence tends to indicate that a major shift in the performance of the political organizations' role in agenda-setting has occurred compared to the pre-1974 period. While some problems exist, they are of much smaller dimensions than those which occurred in the earlier periods.

Policy boards also appear to receive considerable direction in policy initiation from the political organizations. Table 8.9 indicates that the political organizations consistently propose at least 15 percent of issues considered by the boards, and, although the influence of the organizations over the policy boards is less than over the commune governments, it is still meaningful and important.⁸⁸ In fact, considering the specialized nature of the policy boards (for example, utilities, employment, and

sports), the political organizations' direct involvement is higher than expected.

It is in the organized neighborhoods where the sociopolitical organizations have registered the sharpest increases in involvement in local agenda-setting. In Županov's 1978 Croatian study, nearly 20 percent of the respondents perceived the political organizations to be the most significant group in determining the agenda (see table 8.10),⁸⁹ and in the corresponding Serbian and Vojvodinan studies, 19 and 20 percent, respectively, identified the political organizations in the neighborhood as the most influential.⁹⁰ These figures compare quite favorably to the much more moderate role ascribed to the political organizations during the prior constitutional period.

Table 8.11 illustrates how important the political organizations have become in neighborhood policy initiation. By 1976, over 17 percent of all neighborhood referenda were initiated by the local political organizations, a figure more than two-thirds higher than registered in 1970. In other words, within neighborhoods, the policy initiation role of the political organizations is strong and has been growing stronger under the present constitutional arrangements.

In summary, compared to the 1963-74 period, local political organizations are much more involved in the process of determining the local policy agenda. These organizations have appeared to make a comeback in the communes, policy boards, and even the neighborhood assemblies. Perhaps more significantly, while the political organization influence has grown, the influence of individuals, politicians and informal groups over this stage of the policy process has withered and diminished.

Table 8.11 Distribution of neighborhood referenda issues by initiator, 1970-76 (in percentages)

<i>Initiator</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1972</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1976</i>
Neighborhood councils	85.4	83.5	77.9	80.3	71.5
Neighborhood delegations	—	—	—	0.5	1.3
Political organizations	10.6	11.2	13.7	13.2	17.3
Communal assembly	—	—	1.5	—	—
Total referenda	1,750	1,076	1,191	1,573	1,991

Sources: 1970—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice 1970: Sastav i Aktivnost," *Statistički Bilten* 724 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, February 1972): 11. 1972—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Aktivnost Mesnih Zajednica u 1972," *Statistički Bilten* 837 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, April 1974): 7. 1974—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice 1974: Sastav i Aktivnost," *Statistički Bilten* 901 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, January 1975): 10. 1975—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice, Aktivnost 1975," *Statistički Bilten* 1069 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, December 1977): 15. 1976—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice 1977: Sastav i Aktivnost," *Statistički Bilten* 1121 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, January 1979): 32.

Table 8.12 Distribution of initiators for nomination for local elected office as perceived by officeholders in Croatia, 1974 and 1978 (in percentages)

<i>Initiator*</i>	<i>1974 Delegation/ Delegate</i>			<i>1978 Delegation/ Delegate</i>		
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Commune</i>	<i>Policy</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Commune</i>	<i>Policy</i>
Informal groups	2.13	—	—	—	—	—
Constituents	8.51	—	—	7.14	—	—
Commune political organizations	25.53	45.95	47.62	7.14	50.00	50.00
Political organization chapters	34.04	27.03	33.33	57.04	—	23.53
Local political bodies	10.64	8.11	4.76	7.14	—	2.94
Commune electoral committees	8.51	2.70	9.52	—	—	23.53
Constituency electoral committees	2.13	13.51	4.76	50.00	—	—
Voter meetings	8.51	2.70	—	—	—	9.09

*Constituency is either a primary work unit or an organized neighborhood.

Source: Ivan Grdešić, *Neki Aspekti Izboru Delegata u Općinsku Skupštinu* (Zagreb: Institut za Političke Nauke, 1980), pp. 38–39.

Policy Formulation

There are several channels through which the political organizations can affect policy formulation. They can, as discussed in chapter 6, determine the course of political decision-making through the exercise of direction over the recruitment and selection of local leaders. They can directly influence policy through the sociopolitical chambers of the communal assemblies, and they can indirectly affect the course of political affairs by their support for a particular policy program.

As noted in chapters 6 and 7, the political organizations are heavily involved in the process of selection and recruitment of legislative members. Grdešić's study of recruitment of local delegates during the 1974 and 1978 elections in Croatia revealed that the political organizations in the commune or their neighborhood chapters are the groups to which the delegates ascribe credit for their candidatures (see table 8.12).⁹¹ No other organization or group even comes close to rivaling consistently the recruitment powers of the political organizations.

In addition to having primary influence in the selection of delegates, the political organizations, primarily the League of Communists, insure that their members are heavily represented in the local delegate bodies. Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, reported that 75 percent of all communal

delegates were members of the Party. By chamber, 67 percent of the membership of the chambers of associated work, 71 percent of the neighborhood chambers, and 96 percent of the sociopolitical chambers were members of the Party.⁹² In the same republic, 55 percent of all policy board delegates,⁹³ and 46 percent of all neighborhood officeholders held Party membership.⁹⁴ The earlier-cited research from Croatia also indicates that delegates with close ties to the political organizations also tend to participate more in local government activities, thereby suggesting a naturally higher level of involvement in the political organizations.⁹⁵

A second and more direct procedure through which the political organizations can influence local governments is through their involvement in the sociopolitical chambers of the communes. Research conducted in Serbia noted that delegates to the sociopolitical chambers in the communes are more heavily involved than other chambers, consider more questions, and more regularly attend session of their chamber than do members of the other chambers.⁹⁶

An examination of the workload of the communal sociopolitical chambers also indicates a relatively high degree of involvement of this chamber in almost every policy question considered by the communal assembly. Overall, as shown in table 8.13, nearly two-thirds of all communal assembly agenda items require the agreement and involvement of the sociopolitical chamber.

Table 8.13 Legislative involvement of the communal sociopolitical chamber by issue area, 1974-75 and 1978-79 (in percentages)

<i>Issues</i>	<i>1974-75</i>			<i>1978-79</i>		
	<i>Socio-political chamber alone</i>	<i>Socio-political chamber and other</i>	<i>Total agenda items</i>	<i>Socio-political chamber alone</i>	<i>Socio-political chamber and other</i>	<i>Total agenda items</i>
Total issues	9.1	56.3	99,668	8.8	56.5	103,146
Planning	7.8	61.7	4,128	8.0	64.6	5,342
Industry	4.6	54.9	3,604	5.9	50.4	3,476
Agriculture	3.3	48.3	5,378	2.7	41.4	4,802
Housing	3.8	39.6	12,620	3.0	38.1	12,827
Education	6.9	60.2	4,166	6.6	56.8	7,394
Health	5.7	55.5	4,792	5.1	56.8	4,742
Culture	8.2	53.8	4,151	—	—	—
Finance/budgeting	6.1	60.7	15,152	4.9	66.8	14,695
Personnel	11.7	61.3	3,015	11.9	62.6	3,372
Civil defense*	11.0	61.2	3,145	23.7	61.8	4,820
Criminal justice	25.4	59.6	2,694	—	—	—

*In 1978-79 the categories of civil defense and criminal justice were combined.

Sources: See table 8.8 (pp. 13 and 9, respectively, in 1974-75 and 1978-79 sources).

Only for issue areas involving agriculture and housing does sociopolitical chamber involvement fall under 50 percent, and for issue areas such as planning, budgeting, personnel and civil defense, sociopolitical chamber involvement occurs over two-thirds of the time.

The third and most direct process through which the political organizations can influence the formulation of policy is through direct involvement in the decision-making process. As expected, measurement of this concept is more problematic, and local variation makes it more difficult to present as clear an appraisal. In some local governments (for example, Sarajevo) praise has been given to the organizations for their role in policy formulation,⁹⁷ while in others (for example, Rakovica), the political organizations have been criticized for failures in this area.⁹⁸

In the commune assembly, influence over local policy formulation varies by commune and by organization. On the one hand, political leaders in Slovenia have noted a tendency for the League of Communists to dominate the policy formulation process and behave as a "government within a government."⁹⁹ On the other hand, the youth organization is generally acknowledged to lack clout for formulating decisions. This is documented by a poll of Serbian youth delegates which discovered that only 11 percent of the youth delegates perceived their influence to be notable and their presence in the local policy formulation process visible. Thirty-two percent acknowledged possessing no influence in communal policy-making at all.¹⁰⁰

Taken together, the influence of the political organizations on local policy is generally considered to be strong, but not dominant. It has also been found to be variable, depending upon the issue. In Serbia in 1978, 51 percent of polled communal delegates identified the decision-making influence of the political organizations to be significant; 26 classified them as average; and only 18 percent considered their role to be insignificant.¹⁰¹ An extension of the same study, however, also found that only 2 percent of the respondents considered the political organizations to have the most determining role in the formulation of decisions.¹⁰² In addition, over half of the delegates in Serbia acknowledged that they never consult political organization materials and position papers when debating policy issues,¹⁰³ and nearly two-thirds of Vojvodinan delegates admit that they never use such materials.¹⁰⁴

A Croatian study of a sample of communes suggests that political organization influence in the policy formulation process varies with the issue under consideration. Organization involvement in policy formulation was found to be insignificant for issues relating to agriculture and public building projects, but very pervasive for issues like health, social security, and budgeting.¹⁰⁵

Policy board delegates tend to register a less important role for the political organizations in the policy formulation process. Twenty-eight percent of Serbian policy board members in 1978 considered the political organizations to be insignificant in the formulation of policy, and 43 percent considered

these groups to be significant.¹⁰⁶ Policy board delegates also tend to ignore materials that they receive from the organizations,¹⁰⁷ and in Croatia, only 23 percent of board delegates even receive information from the political organizations relevant to their deliberations.¹⁰⁸ Again, as was the case for the commune assembly, the intensity of influence varies by subject matter, with issues such as planning receiving little attention from the organizations.¹⁰⁹

At the neighborhood level, there is a general acknowledgment that the political organizations are important, relatively much more so than in the commune assembly or policy board assemblies.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, improvement may be necessary. For example, in Croatia, representatives of the political organizations were acknowledged to attend regular meetings of the delegations in only 18 percent of the neighborhoods. Forty-two percent of the delegations claimed occasional attendance by the political organizations, and 32 percent stated that representatives from the political organizations rarely or never attended delegation meetings.¹¹¹

In summary, there has been an important change in the involvement of the political organizations in policy formulation since the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. These organizations are much more involved in local politics and the communal policy boards and neighborhoods levels than before. Their influence over the selection of delegates is high; their sociopolitical chambers in the communal assemblies are important to the policy process, and their overall role in policy formulation is generally extensive. Nevertheless, the political organizations do not dominate decision-making, although they contribute substantively to it. In addition, the role of the organizations varies by local government, by organization, and by issue. The present system, in short, cannot be characterized by the concepts and procedures applied to the Soviet Union and other East European states.

Policy Implementation

One of the most problematic areas in local public administration in contemporary Yugoslavia is the struggle between the need to curtail executive power and the need for professional and efficient administration of policies. The political organizations have been in the forefront of this struggle, and they have developed a general orientation to the problem that involves rapid turnover of executive members,¹¹² controls on executive powers,¹¹³ separation of policy formulation and implementation,¹¹⁴ and limitations on executive power by maintaining a balance between professionals and executive novices.¹¹⁵

The concern about executive power appears warranted.¹¹⁶ Twenty-seven percent of delegates polled in Vojvodina characterized the communal executive as the dominant factor in decision-making,¹¹⁷ and 31 percent of delegates in Serbia agreed.¹¹⁸ Professionals have dominated the commune executives in many Croatian communes,¹¹⁹ and many local department heads serve

Table 8.14 Comparative influence of potential decision-makers in local public policy decision-making in Croatian communes, 1978 (in percentages and average scores)

Decision-maker	Perceived influence percentages						
	Average scores	Dominant	Significant	Some	Little	None	Don't know
Citizens and workers	3.2	16.8	17.7	29.9	22.7	4.3	8.6
Elected delegations	3.2	12.2	22.2	35.1	18.6	3.3	8.7
Delegates	3.3	12.9	24.3	34.3	16.5	3.9	8.1
Political organizations	4.0	30.8	36.4	20.1	4.1	0.6	8.0
Administrators	3.8	22.4	40.3	18.3	7.0	1.7	10.4
Others*	3.8	23.7	36.2	16.0	7.2	5.1	11.8

*Includes informal groups, individual leaders, politicians, etc.

Sources: Branko Caratan, "Savez Komunistu u Samoupravljanu," *Socijalizam* 21 (March 1978): 28, and Josip Županov, "Distribucija Utjecaja u Delegatskom Sistemu u Općini," *Naše Teme* 22 (June 1978): 1247.

on the executive councils and dominate their proceedings.¹²⁰ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, only 4.7 percent of all commune executive board members have education corresponding to a worker, and only 7.8 percent are not professionals, directors, or administrators by occupation.¹²¹

Although nearly all members of the local executive councils are Party members, the direct influence of the political organizations in executive decision-making is weak. Approximately only 2 percent of all executive agenda items were initiated by the political organizations, and the extent of involvement by issue never reached 4 percent.¹²² Sociopolitical organizations, in other words, have little direct access to local implementation. There seems to be a sharp division between policy implementation and the two earlier stages of the policy process.

Overall Influence Over the Policy Process

A more accurate picture of political organizational involvement over the local policy process can probably be obtained by examining the total policy process (that is, general influence over local decision-making) and the behavior of each organization in that process. Surveys of elected delegates conducted in Serbia and Croatia in the latter part of the 1970s indicate that the organizations in the neighborhood and communes possess more influence over these policy processes than any other institution, group, or agency. In the policy

boards, the influence of the organizations is strong but is counterbalanced by other groups and associations.¹²³

A Croatian survey employed a five point scale (1 = weak; 5 = dominant) to measure and to compare the relative influence of various local decision-makers over the total local policy process. The results demonstrate that the political organizations are perceived to be more influential in local government than any other factor. Table 8.14 lists the results.

The results in table 8.14 seem to indicate that the influence of the political organizations over the entire process is at least an additive function of their influence over each stage of the policy process. While another decision-maker may possess more influence at a particular stage, such as policy implementation, no decision-maker rivals the range of

Table 8.15 Evaluation of the activity of the League of Communists, Socialist Alliance, Youth Organization, and Veterans' Association in the organized neighborhoods in Croatia, Serbia, and Vojvodina, 1978

Evaluation	Croatia	Serbia	Vojvodina
<i>League of Communists</i>			
Good	29.3	51	42
Satisfactory	36.5	27	
Weak	11.7	6	
Don't know	22.5	16	28
<i>Socialist Alliance</i>			
Good	23.8	45	37
Satisfactory	36.9	31	22
Weak	17.4	9	15
Don't know	21.8	14	26
<i>Socialist Youth League</i>			
Good	15.8	33	
Satisfactory	27.4	29	
Weak	26.8	19	
Don't know	30.0	20	
<i>War Veterans' Association</i>			
Good	28.5	44	36
Satisfactory	24.5	21	
Weak	9.3	6	
Don't know	37.7	29	

Sources: Croatia—Branko Caratan, "Savez Komunista u Samoupravljanu," *Socijalizam* 21 (March 1978): 19. Serbia—Radivoje Marinković, "Položaj, Moć, i Uticaj Osnovnih Subjekata Delegatskog Sistema," in Radivoje Marinković, ed., *Delegatski Sistem: Funkcionisanje i Ostvarivanje* (Belgrade: Institut za Političke Studije, 1979), p. 382. Vojvodina—Sreta Stajić, ed., *Socijalistički Savez Radnog Naroda Vojvodine i Najšira Politička Osnova Delegatskog Sistema* (Novi Sad: Pokrajinski Komitet Savez Komunista Vojvodina, December 1978), pp. 138–39.

local policy influence options that the political organizations possess.

One of the major reasons for the overall strong local policy influence of the political organizations is the high degree of organizational penetration at the local level. When we examine the organizational strength of each of the organizations (excluding the trade unions) at the neighborhood level, we find that it is extremely rare for a neighborhood to fail to have at least one organization chapter functioning within its territory. Eighty-five percent of neighborhoods possess a Communist Party chapter, 97 percent maintain a Socialist Alliance organization, 90 percent have a youth league chapter, and 80 percent of neighborhoods have a war veterans' post organization. The cumulative effect is that the influence of these organizations is likely to be pervasive, particularly at the local level.¹²⁴

There is some variation in the strength of political organizations by the type of community. General local policy influence of the political organizations has been found to be somewhat weaker in less-developed and more rural areas, compared to more-developed and heavily urbanized communities.¹²⁵ In organizational terms, the political organizations are weaker in mixed and rural communities compared to urban communities, and, with the exception of the Youth League, the political organizations have a greater proportion of the neighborhoods organized in urban areas than they do in rural or mixed communities.¹²⁶

The potential for influence of each political organization over the local policy process is not equal. The League of Communists is in a pivotal position to influence local affairs through its influence over the agenda process.¹²⁷ The Socialist Alliance is also well positioned due to its involvement in the selection of delegates and its more extensive organizational network in the neighborhoods. We would expect, therefore, that the influence of these two organizations would be particularly great. We would also expect that the absence of a clear role and concrete responsibilities in local policy-making would hamper the general influence of the youth league, and that there would be some overlap between the appraisals given to the Socialist Alliance and the Veterans' Association. Table 8.15 lists local elected delegate appraisals of these organizations, and the results confirm our conjectures.

As table 8.15 demonstrates, the appraisal of each of the political organizations is generally satisfactory or positive. Although the delegates vary in their estimation of specific political organization behavior by republic and province, they agree about the general trend. The League of Communists receives first place, followed by the Alliance and Veterans' Association, and they conclude with an assessment that the youth league is in need of improvement.

In conclusion, the general evaluation of the political organizations' success in determining the substance and direction of local public policies is quite high. Although some problems exist, these organizations have appeared

to avoid the excesses of the two previous constitutional periods. In contemporary Yugoslavia, the political organizations neither dominate the local policy process, nor have they withdrawn from it. It appears that a proper balance has generally been achieved.

Concluding Comments

Our review of the theoretical positions, activities, and behavior of the Yugoslav political organizations presents a picture distinctly different from the totalitarian model that is applied to other socialist states. None of the organizations studied, nor their interactions or policy behavior, seem to support the assumptions of that model, that political behavior outside the League of Communists is irrelevant, that a small oligarchy within the League makes all decisions, or even that the League dominates the other organizations. Each of the organizations demonstrates some autonomy, strengths, and weaknesses. Each organization negotiates and bargains with the others, and each organization displays considerable variation within its ranks in the quality and quantity of the performance of its duties.

A second theme illustrated throughout this book is that the Yugoslav political organizations have changed dramatically over time and are continuing this process today. These organizations are in an almost constant state of reform, and the changes are concentrated in four distinct areas.

One important area of change is the continual reexamination and redefinition of the individual, interactive, and collective roles of these organizations. Over time, the functions and purposes of the organizations have become increasingly refined, pluralist, and distant from the Soviet-Stalinist example. Each succeeding reform makes reversion toward Stalinism or other totalitarian systems less likely. Each succeeding reform has also widened the base of political participation and made it more meaningful.

Changes in the roles of the organizations have also created problems. It is now more difficult for the political organizations to influence policy than was the case in the past. Increased effort must be spent on negotiations, coordination, and consolidation. There must also be increased emphasis on the definition and promotion of the general community interest as well as general and specific social objectives.

A second area of change concerns the relationship of society to the membership, and the relationship of the political organizations' members to their leaders. Each organization is concerned about the need to keep the membership and leadership processes open, socialist, and continually receptive to change. Much of the internal activities of each of the organizations studied appears to be directed toward these goals, and while there has been variable success in achieving these goals, the commitment is serious and long-term.

Sociopolitical organizational interaction is the third area of dynamic change highlighted by this book. Interactions and interrelationships among the organizations are increasingly constrained by conflicting trends toward pluralism and a heightened need for concensus, discipline, and cooperation. Currently, interactions among the political organizations are insufficiently defined, extraordinarily complex, and excessively variable throughout the country. It is expected that reforms and changes in the nature of these interactions will remain an important theme throughout the 1980s.

The final area of change identified by this book concerns changes in political involvement in the public policy process. The behavior and activities of each organization in the policy process vary by issue, level of government, and stage of policy process. Our analysis reveals that the policy process is open and participative. It also indicates that the policy process is not manipulated or controlled, and that the process enhances and reflects a strong pluralist bias.

Notes

Chapter 1

- 1 For an extended discussion of the importance of this conference, see April Carter, *Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
- 2 Miloško Drulović, *Samoupravna Demokracija* (Belgrade: Beogradski Izdavački i Grafički Zavod, 1972), argues that self-management in Yugoslavia was inevitable and not directly caused by the Stalin conflict.
- 3 Eduard Kardelj, "Ekspozice u Saveznoj Skupštini Povodom Zakon o Narodnim Odborima," in Eduard Kardelj, *Izdavačka Dela, Knjiga 1* (Belgrade: Kultura, 1960).
- 4 Josip Broz Tito, *Izdavačka Dela, Knjiga 5* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1950), p. 220.
- 5 Eduard Kardelj, *Pravci Razvoja Političkog Sistema Socijalističkog Samoupravljanja* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1977).
- 6 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Organi Jugoslavija i Drugi Organi u Organizacijama Udruženog Rada 1979," in *Statistički Bilten* 1322 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, October, 1982): 15–19.
- 7 See table 1 in appendix.
- 8 Ibid., p. 51. Gender, age, and Party membership data are also available by specific committee types.
- 9 Dušan Sekulić, "Direktorsko biti ili ne biti," *N.I.N.*, 27 May 1984, pp. 8–10.
- 10 Neca Jovanov, *Radnički Strajkovi u SFRJ* (Belgrade: Zapis, 1979), p. 137.
- 11 A good example of this research is Krsto S. Kilibarda, *Rad i Samoupravljanje* (Belgrade: Privredni Pregled, 1973).
- 12 Centar Republičkog Veća Saveza Sindikata Slovenije za Istraživanje Samoupravljanja, *Razvoj i Mogućnosti Samoupravljanja* (Ljubljana: Republička Veća Saveza Sindikata Slovenije, October 1976), pp. 61–63.
- 13 Jovanov, *Radnički Strajkovi*, p. 161.
- 14 See Kardelj, *Pravci Razvoja*, p. 159.
- 15 See Jim Seroka, "The Limitation of Aggregate Budgetary Analysis of Communist States: The Case of Yugoslavia," *Politics* 2 (April 1982): 20–26, on the application of this problem to the federal budget process.
- 16 Accusations were made that this occurred during the foreign currency law debate in the Federal Assembly in 1984. Šćepan Rabrenović, "Granica Izdržljivosti," *N.I.N.*, 1 January 1984, pp. 8–9.
- 17 Redakcija, "Materijal," *N.I.N.*, 8 April 1984, p. 9.

- 18 See table 2 in appendix.
- 19 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1983* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1983), p. 108.
- 20 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednica, Sastav i Aktivnost, 1977," *Statistički Bilten* 1219 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, January 1979), p. 12.
- 21 See table 3 in appendix.
- 22 In 1980, 25 percent of organized neighborhoods (60 percent of urban units) employed full-time personnel for MZ activities. Nearly six thousand individuals were employed in this capacity. Ibid., p. 8.
- 23 Savezni Zavod, *Statistički Bilten* 1219, p. 12.
- 24 Ibid., p. 11.
- 25 See table 4 in appendix.
- 26 Savezni Zavod, *Statistički Bilten* 1219, p. 32.
- 27 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice 1977: Sastav i Aktivnost," *Statistički Bilten* 1121 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, January 1979), p. 11.
- 28 Savezni Zavod, *Statistički Godišnjak 1983*, pp. 612–21. Figures based on the 1981 census.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid. Two communes from each republic and province were selected with similar income per capita and with locations near the mean level of income for that republic or province. The intent was to demonstrate how communes that were economically similar could vary in their public policies.
- 31 For additional evidence and details on self-management prosecutors, see Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Društveni Pravobranioци Samoupravljanje i Sastav Organa i Aktivnost u 1980," *Statistički Bilten* 1300 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1982). For details on the operation of the communal court system, see Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Učenioci Krivični Delatnosti: 1979," *Statistički Bilten* 1323 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, October 1982).
- 32 Republički Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak Bosne i Hercegovine, 1981* (Sarajevo: Republički Zavod za Statistiku, 1981), p. 48.
- 33 Ibid., p. 50.
- 34 Gradski Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak Beograda, 1982* (Belgrade: Gradski Zavod za Statistiku, 1982), p. 28.
- 35 See table 5 in appendix.
- 36 The membership size of the republic and provincial assemblies varies as follows: Bosnia-Herzegovina (320), Montenegro (165), Croatia (356), Macedonia (250), Slovenia (50), Serbia (340), Kosovo (190), Vojvodina (245). Ibid., p. 207.
- 37 Communal assembly distributions were almost exactly reversed.
- 38 Republički Zavod, *Statistički Godišnjak Bosne*, and Zavod SR Slovenije Statistiko, *Statistični Letopis SR Slovenije 1983* (Ljubljana: Zavod SR Slovenije za Statistiko, 1983).
- 39 In 1981, the Slovenian delegation to the Federal Assembly threatened to call for a no-confidence vote of the government. For details, see Šćepan Rabranović, "Odgovornosti s.l.v.-a i Delegata," *N.I.N.*, 16 December 1981, pp. 12–14.
- 40 See Ljubiša Korac, *Organizacija Federacije u Socijalističkoj Jugoslavije* (Zagreb: Globus, 1981); and Milan Matić, "Koordinativne Izvršne i Upravne Funkcije u Društveno-Političkom Sistemu Jugoslavije," in Jovan Đorđević, ed., *Društveno Politički Sistem SFRJ* (Belgrade: Radnička Štampa, 1975), pp. 283–313, for more details.
- 41 Jovanović, "Izbore za Skupštine" (1983).
- 42 The literal translation, "self-managed interests of the community," is awkward in English and "policy board" captures the spirit of the institution.
- 43 See Stevan Mijučić, *Samoupravne Interesne Zajednice* (Belgrade: Savremena Administracija, 1973), for a detailed description of the objectives.
- 44 Excellent charts and descriptions can be found in Jakov Vidović, ed., *Samoupravno Interesno*

Organizovanje (Zagreb: Grafički Zavod Hrvatske, 1977).

- 45 Republički Zavod, *Statistički Godišnjak Bosne*, p. 50.
- 46 Milan Cvitković, "Samoupravne Interesne Zajednice Odgoja i Osnovnog Obrazovanja," in Vidović, *Samoupravno Interesno Organizovanje*, p. 160.
- 47 "Kako Otkloniti Velike Razlike u Usmerenom Obrazovanju," *Politika*, 22 February 1984, p. 7.

Chapter 2

- 1 For a comparative discussion from a Yugoslav perspective, see Jove Goričar, "Promjene u Političkoj Strukturi Jugoslavije i Saveza Komunisti," in Anton Fiamengo, ed., *Komunisti i Samoupravljanje* (Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1967), pp. 305–12.
- 2 Jure Bilić makes the argument that self-management was not the result of the dispute with Stalin. Social and economic changes were of great importance in the change of the role of the League of Communists. See Jure Bilić, "Savez Komunisti Jugoslavije i Revolucionarni Razvoj Samoupravnog Socijalističkog Društva," in Ivo Čečić, ed., *SKJ i Socijalistička Revolucija Jugoslavije* (Čakovec: Zrinski, 1973), pp. 13–14.
- 3 Eduard Kardelj, "Address to a meeting of the Inter-Communal Conference of the League of Communists for Hercegovina, Mostar, September 18, 1972," quoted and translated in "Eduard Kardelj on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," *Yugoslav Survey* 23 (May 1982): 26.
- 4 For empirical evidence on this point, see Radoš Smiljković, *Savez Komunisti Avangarda Pretvaranja Samoupravljanja i Osnovni Društveni Odnos SR Srbije* (Belgrade: Institut za Političke Studije, 1973).
- 5 For an in-depth treatment of this thesis, see Najdan Pašić, *Klase i Politika* (Belgrade: Rad, 1974).
- 6 Mijalko Todorović, "Razvoj skj u Revolucionarnom Avangardu Novog Tipa," in Veljko Vlahović, ed., *Naš Put* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1969), pp. 255–68; and Jovan Đorđević, "Savez Komunisti i Problem Njegovog Demokratizma i Centralizma," *Arhiv Za Pravne i Društvene Nauke* 84 (January–March 1968).
- 7 See the argument made by Vidoje Žarković, "skj u Borbi za Socijalističke Samoupravljanje," *Socijalizam* 37 (May 1984): 623–44.
- 8 Milja Komatina, "O Shvatanja Suštine i Ostvarivanju Demokratskog Centralizma u skj," *Socijalizam* 35 (April 1982): 602–19.
- 9 Eduard Kardelj, *Notes on Yugoslav Social Criticism* (Belgrade: Kultura, 1966). Translated in "Eduard Kardelj on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," *Yugoslav Survey* 23 (May 1982): 35–36.
- 10 Josip Broz Tito, from a conversation with the Sarajevo sociopolitical activists, quoted and translated in "President Tito on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," *Yugoslav Survey* 19 (February 1978): 24–25.
- 11 Atif Purivatra, "Principi Izgradnje i Funkionisanje skj," *Opređenja* 11 (February 1980): 211–22.
- 12 Radoljub Čolaković et al., *Pregled Istorije Saveza Komunisti Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Institut za Izučavanje Radničkog Pokreta, 1963).
- 13 Štipe Šušar, "skj i Njegova Klasno-Socijalno Osnova," *Socijalizam* 33 (February 1980): 155.
- 14 Ibid., p. 156.
- 15 Ibid., p. 158.
- 16 Bilić, "Savez Komunisti Jugoslavije."
- 17 Jovan Đorđević, "Demokratizacija Saveza Komunisti i Političke Strukture Društva," in Anton Fiamengo, ed., *Komunisti i Samoupravljanje* (Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1967), pp. 239–53.
- 18 See table 6 in appendix.
- 19 See table 7 in appendix.

- 20 See table 8 in appendix.
- 21 Krsto Kilibarda, *Samoupravljanje i Savez Komunista* (Belgrade: Sociološki Institut, 1966).
- 22 Đzinić, *O Savezu Komunista*, pp. 17–22.
- 23 Kilibarda, *Samoupravljanje*.
- 24 Firduz Đzinić, *Odnos Građana Prema Savezu Komunista i Mišljenja O Njegovoj Reorganizaciji* (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1967), pp. 20–21.
- 25 Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, *Platform Za Priprema Stavova i Odluka Desetog Kongresa* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1973), p. 100.
- 26 Josip Broz Tito, “Završna Reč i Referat Josipa Broza Tita na Desetom Kongresu,” in *Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, Dokumenti Deseti Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1974), p. 58.
- 27 Josip Broz Tito, from a speech to the Federal Assembly, 23 April 1973, translated and reprinted in “President Tito on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,” *Yugoslav Survey* 19 (February 1978): 26.
- 28 Smiljković, *Savez Komunista Avangarda*, and Vlado Svetanović and Nedo Miljanović, “Uticaj Pojedinih Struktura Članstva u Organizaciju Saveza Komunista,” *Opređenje* 2 (February 1974): 61–80.
- 29 Budislav Šoškić, “Suština i Način Ostvarivanja Vodeće Uloge skj,” *Socijalizam* 22 (September 1979): 3–31.
- 30 Najdan Pašić, “Teorijski Osnovi Razvoja Socijalističkog Samoupravljanja i Razgraničenja sa Etatizmom,” *Socijalizam* 26 (April 1983): 493–511.
- 31 Vladimir Goati, *Uloga Saveza Komunista u Savremenim Uslovima* (Belgrade: Srboštampa, 1972).
- 32 Vladimir Goati, *Perspektive Političke Avangarde* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1972).
- 33 See: Radoš Smiljković, *SKJ u Procesu Konstituisanja Samoupravljanja* (Belgrade: HronoMetar, 1969).
- 34 Josip Broz Tito, *Dokument: XI Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1978).
- 35 Josip Broz Tito, from a speech before the Trade Union Association, 18 December 1971, translated and reprinted in “President Tito on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,” *Yugoslav Survey* 19 (February 1978): 29–30; and *Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, “Zadaci Saveza Komunista u Ostvarivanju i Daljem Razvoju Političkog Sistema Socijalističkog Samoupravljanja,” XI Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1978), p. 139.
- 36 Čazim Sadiković, “Uz Ustavno Utvrđivanje Pozicije Saveza Komunista,” *Opređenje* 2 (February 1974): 15–26.
- 37 *Ustav Socijalističke Republike SFRJ* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1974), p. 10.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 See: Radoš Smiljković, *Ustav i Platforma SKJ o Samoupravljanju* (Belgrade: Radnička Štampa, 1974).
- 40 Summarized by the authors from *Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, XII Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1982), pp. 79–146.
- 41 Budislav Šoškić, “Položaj i Uloga Saveza Komunista u Sistemu Socijalističkog Samoupravljanja,” in Jovan Đorđević and Najdan Pašić, eds., *Teorija i Praksa Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: Radnička Štampa, 1972), pp. 439–41.
- 42 *Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, “Statut Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije,” in XII Kongres Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1982), pp. 187–200.
- 43 Milenko Marković, “Neka Teorijska i Idejno-Politička Pitanja Demokratskog Centralizma u skj,” *Socijalizam* 25 (April 1982): 561–85.
- 44 *Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, Program i Statut SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1982), p. 181.
- 45 See Zoran Raičević, “Neka Organizacijsko Pitanje i Načela Demokratskog Centralizma,” *Socijalizam* 21 (March 1978): 82–100, for a development of this point.
- 46 Mitja Ribičić, speech at the third session of the central committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 24 September 1982.
- 47 Marković, “Neka Teorijska”; Fuad Muhić, “Demokratski Centralizam u Teoriji i Praksi

skj," *Socijalizam* 25 (April 1982): 86–101, also makes this point.

- 48 See the argument made by Đoko Toži, "Demokratski Centralizam u skj i Njegovo Jedinstvo," *Opređenje* 15 (March 1984): 126.
- 49 See the report of the discussion held by the Marxist Center of the Central Committee of the skj of Montenegro in "Prepreka Jedinstvu," *Politika*, 19 October 1984, p. 8.
- 50 Centralni Komitet skj, *Predlog Zaključaka Centralnog Komiteta SKJ o Ostvarivanju Vodeće Uloge SKJ i Jačanju Njegovog Idejnog i Akcionog Jedinstva* (Belgrade: Komunist, 10 July 1984).
- 51 See the discussion in "Demokratizam sa Završnicom," *Politika*, 21 October 1984, p. 5.
- 52 See the speech of Mitja Ribičić before the "Josip Broz Tito Political School of the skj" at Kumrovac on 13 September 1982.
- 53 Savez Komunist Jugoslavije, "Statut."
- 54 Bečir Mačić, "O Idejno Političkoj Diferencijaciji u Savezu Komunist," *Naše Teme* 20 (March 1976): 346–60.
- 55 A fuller report can be found in Milan Milošević, "Končareva Ostavka," *N.I.N.*, 26 September 1982, pp. 10–11.
- 56 For documentation, see Centralni Komitet skj, "Zaklucci skj o Kolektivnom Radu i Odgovornosti," *Opređenje* 10 (July 1979): 151–58.
- 57 Predsedništvo CK skj, "Zaklucci Predsedništva CK skj o Zadacima Saveza Komunist u Ostvarivanju Inicijative Druga Tita o Unapređivanju Kolektivnog Rada, Odgovornosti, i Daljoj Demokratizaciji Društveno-Političkih Odnosa," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* 23 (June 1979): 229–33.
- 58 For an example, see "Ocena Dvogodišnjeg Rada," *Politika*, 16 April 1984, p. 6.
- 59 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ 1984* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1984), p. 111.
- 60 Savez Komunist Jugoslavije, "Izveštaj o Radu CK skj Između Jedanaestog i Dvanaestog Kongresa skj," in *XII Kongres SKJ—Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1982), p. xv.
- 61 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice 1977: Sastav i Aktivnost," *Statistički Bilten* 1121 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, January 1979): 11.
- 62 See table 9 in appendix.
- 63 "The Eleventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," *Yugoslav Survey* 19 (August 1978): 5–6.
- 64 Calculations made by comparing the lists of names from the 1978 and 1982 newly elected central committees.
- 65 "Raspraviti Idejne Razlike," *Politika*, 18 October 1984, p. 6.
- 66 Savez Komunist Jugoslavije, "Statut," p. 215.
- 67 Ibid., pp. 215–16.
- 68 See table 10 in appendix.
- 69 See: Stevan Nikšić, "Vrh na Novi Način," *N.I.N.*, 26 November 1978: pp. 10–12.
- 70 Between the Ninth and Tenth Congresses, the Presidency had sixteen different commissions that met over 150 times. Between the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses, there were over 280 sessions of the commissions. Savez Komunist Jugoslavije, *Deveti Kongres SKJ Stenografske Beleške I* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1974), p. 140; and Savez Komunist Jugoslavije, *Jedanaesti Kongres SKJ Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1978), p. 278. For a listing of discussion topics, see Pero Vujnić, "Tematika Sednica Foruma i Organa Saveza Komunist," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* 22 (May 1978): 177–78.
- 71 Vujnić, "Tematika Sednica," pp. 178–79.
- 72 Ibid., pp. 177–78.
- 73 Size can vary dramatically. Croatia's congresses since 1948 have ranged from 1,069 to 557 delegates, with no trend over time.
- 74 The ratio varies by republic and province. In Croatia, in 1982, the formula was one delegate per commune, plus an additional delegate for every four hundred skj members

- over the minimum of four hundred in the commune. *Vjesnik*, 14 April 1982.
- 75 *Politika*, from congress reports.
- 76 For more details, see *Socijalizam* 25 (May 1982): 761–838.
- 77 See table 11 in appendix.
- 78 Croatia's central committee was 97 in 1982, 131 in 1978, 95 in 1974, 65 in 1968, 113 in 1965, 97 in 1959, 61 in 1954, and 57 in 1948. *Vjesnik*, 13 April 1982.
- 79 See table 12 in appendix.
- 80 Vujnić, "Tematika Sednica," pp. 179–90.
- 81 "Jačanje Odgovornosti za Sprovođenje Zaključaka," *Komunist*, 3 February 1984, pp. 3–4.
- 82 "Za Duh Demokratskog Centralizma—Odlučno Otklanjanje Formalizma," *Komunist* 24 January 1977, p. 11.
- 83 "Ocena Dvogodišnjeg Rada," *Politika*, 16 April 1984, p. 6.
- 84 "Kako da Savez Komunista Postane Uporište Političkih i Drugih Interesa Radnika," *Komunist*, 28 September 1979, pp. 12, 17; and "Kako Prevazići 'Komitetsko Delovanje,'" *Komunist*, 11 December 1981, p. 7.
- 85 "Pomoć Posle Svega," *Komunist*, 21 August 1981, p. 11.
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Chapter 3

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- 61 "Kako biti u Vreli Života," *Politika*, 29 January 1984, p. 5.
- 62 Based on a poll conducted in Slovenia and reported in "Svi Komunisti—Aktivisti SSRN," *Borba*, 3 June 1975, p. 12.
- 63 Tko Sučeljava Vjernike i Nevjernike," *Komunist*, 1 June 1984, p. 21.
- 64 Cited in the commentary of Republička Konferencija SSRN Srbije, *Sedma Sednica*, p. 188.
- 65 This percentage would be higher if nondelegate conferences were included. Such conferences constitute 45 percent of the total.
- 66 See the discussion of Nada Kovačević in Republička Konferencija SSRN Srbije, *Sedma Sednica*, p. 83.
- 67 Based on information found in *ibid.*, pp. 209–33.
- 68 The percentages of incumbents are somewhat lower than usual because many commune conferences have increased their membership.
- 69 A major reason such data are lacking is the nearly constant change in the membership of offices as delegates from allied organizations leave office, thereby affecting their seats in the Federal Conference.
- 70 Dragan Milojević, president of the SSRN Serbia, stated that the widening of the membership base of the SSRN is a positive tendency, but there is a contrary impact because "tendencies toward factionalism and the narrowing of the membership base" occur. "These occurrences are expressed by the election of delegates for the intercommunal and republic conferences, where only a tiny minority are not members of the League of Communists. The SSRN must deal with this problem." Cited in Republička Konferencija SSRN Srbije, *Sedma Sednica*, p. 22.
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- 76 Representative examples can be found in "Tragamo za Najboljim Rešenjima," *Politika*, 14 April 1984, p. 6; and "Uvek biti u Vrelu Života," *Politika*, 9 April 1984, p. 6.
- 77 Full details can be found in Radivoje Marinković, "Položaj, Moć, i Uticaj Osnovnih Subjekata Delegatskog Sistema," in Radivoje Marinković, ed., *Delegatski Sistem: Funkcionisanje i Ostvarivanje* (Belgrade: Institut za Političke Studije, 1979), p. 328.
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- 81 "Uvek biti u Vrelu Života," *Politika*, 9 April 1984, p. 6.
- 82 Interesting details about a two-day conference that discussed this and other matters can be found in "Umesto Fronta Narodnih Masa—Organizacija Foruma," *Komunist*, 3 February 1984, p. 10.
- 83 This is twice the percentage of the nearest other category and nearly three times the sports coverage. See Savezni Zavod, *Statistički Godišnjak*, p. 376.
- 84 Ibid., p. 100.
- 85 Ibid., p. 380.
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- 87 Ibid., pp. 181–88.
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Chapter 4

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- 30 See table 28 in appendix.
- 31 Maleš, *IX Kongres*, pp. 15–16.
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- 33 The commission reports were particularly critical. See *Vjesnik*, 13 November 1982, pp. 4–5.
- 34 "Tematika Sednica Veća Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije i Konferencija i Veća Saveza Sindikata Republika i Autonomnih Pokrajina," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* 26 (October 1982): 335–37, for the program of each full meeting of the Federal Chamber of the ssj.
- 35 *Ibid.*
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- 37 The process of selection varies across republics and provinces.
- 38 See Article 62 of the charter of the Trade Union Association, 1982.
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- 41 Defined here only as under thirty years of age.
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- 44 See *Politika* during November 1984. "Samoupravljanju Nema Alternative," *Politika*, 19 November 1974, p. 6, is an example.
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- 50 Dorde Lazić, "Neka Pitanja Organizacije i Kadrovske Strukture Saveza Sindikata," in Vladan Vasiljević, ed., *Savez Sindikata Razvoju Samoupravljanja i Političkog Sistema* (Belgrade: Veće Savez Sindikata Jugoslavije, 1982), pp. 292–93.
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- 52 The number and title vary by republic, ranging from six in Serbia to nineteen in Slovenia. See Mirko Persen, ed., *Almanah 'Stvarnost' 1975–1976* (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1975).
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- 58 *Statut Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Savez Sindikata Jugoslavije, 1982), Article 24.
- 59 *Pravila Osnovne Organizacije Sindikata "Mašine" Petoletka* (Trstenik: Petoletka, 1982), Article 43.
- 60 Savez Sindikata Jugoslavije, *Statut*, Article 1.
- 61 "IX Kongresa Saveza Sindikata Slovenije," *Politika*, 26 October 1978, p. 6.
- 62 Lazić, "Neka Pitanja," pp. 292–93.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 287.
- 64 The categories of workers, ranked by skill, are as follows: very highly educated (16-plus years of education), higher educated (14-plus years), highly skilled workers (13 years), middle-educated workers (12 years), lower-educated workers (11 years), skilled workers (11 years), semiskilled workers (9 years), unskilled workers (6 years or less).
- 65 The formula for the index of inequality is the absolute value of the difference between the leadership percentage minus the population percentage, divided by the population percentage. Interpretation is simple. Numbers in excess of one demonstrate the percentage of favoritism of a particular leadership group. Scores smaller than 1.00 indicate underrepresentation in the leadership for the population category.
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- 67 Veća Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije, *O Osnovnim Organizacijama Saveza Sindikata 1981* (Belgrade: Savez Sindikata Jugoslavije, 1982).
- 68 Lazić, "Neka Pitanja," pp. 260–61.
- 69 Maleš, *IX Kongres*, p. 163.
- 70 *Ibid.*, pp. 163–65.
- 71 See table 29 in appendix.
- 72 See table 30 in appendix.
- 73 *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- 74 See table 31 in appendix.
- 75 See table 32 in appendix.
- 76 The decentralization of the economy in 1971 virtually ended funding for all national surveys by the sociopolitical organization. Since 1971, survey research has been funded on the republic/provincial levels at the discretion of the governing bodies of the organization. Thus, less survey research is conducted, less is made available to the public, and very few results are generalizable to the entire nation.
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- 91 Božidar Tadić, "Aktulena Pitanja Ostvarivanja Samoupravljanja u Udruženom Radu i Zadaci Saveza Sindikata," in Vasilejević, *Savez Sindikata*, p. 87.

Chapter 5

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- 29 Zdravko Leković, *Omladina i Savez Komunista* (Belgrade: Privredni Pregled, 1972), p. 20.
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- 34 *Politika*, 17 February 1982, p. 6; and *Politika*, 5 December 1982, p. 7.
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Chapter 6

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Chapter 7

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Chapter 8

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- 121 Republički Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Godišnjak*, p. 48.
- 122 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Bilten* 984, 1169 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku).
- 123 Marinković, *Delegatski Sistem*; Županov, "Struktura Utjecaja"; Caratan, "Savez Komunista."
- 124 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice 1977: Sastav i Aktivnost," *Statistički Bilten* 1121 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, January 1979): 11.
- 125 Kirinčić, "Ostvarivanje Delegatskog Sistema," pp. 87–112.

126 Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Mesne Zajednice 1977."

127 The League of Communists has paid some attention to this issue. See "Zadaci Koji Traže Nove Oblike Organizovanja," *Politika*, 13 January 1978, p. 6, and "Veća Odgovornost Saveza Komunistu u Društvenom Životu Opštine," *Komunist*, 14 March 1980, p. 8.

Appendix

Table 1 Educational-occupational distribution of worker councils and executive council members, 1979 (in percentages)

Education/skill	Worker's council	Executive council
College plus	6	7
Some college	6	8
Technical-clerical	20	24
Clerical	4	4
Highly skilled workers	14	16
Skilled workers	33	29
Semiskilled workers	10	7
Unskilled workers	7	4

Source: Ibid.

Table 2 Population distribution of organized neighborhoods by type of area, 1980

Size	Urban	Rural	Mixed	Total
0–500	37	2,799	183	3,019
500–999	53	2,162	313	2,529
1,000–1,499	88	1,081	272	1,441
1,500–1,999	122	666	212	1,000
2,000–2,499	117	346	141	604
2,500–2,999	143	183	111	437
3,000–3,999	253	246	134	633
4,000–4,999	320	213	120	653
5,000–5,999	120	50	37	207
6,000–6,999	114	25	32	171
7,000 and over	400	43	86	529
Total	1,767	7,814	1,641	11,222

Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, “Mesne Zajednice: Sastav i Aktivnost, 1980,” *Statistički Bilten* 1317 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, September 1982), p. 9.

Table 3 Totals and percentages (in parentheses) of organized neighborhoods with commissions by type of commission and neighborhood, 1980

Commission	Type			
	Urban	Rural	Mixed	Total
With commissions	1,625 (92)	5,138 (66)	1,310 (80)	8,073 (72)
Consumer councils	1,608 (91)	4,172 (53)	1,279 (78)	7,059 (63)
Neighborhood courts	1,723 (98)	7,321 (94)	1,547 (94)	10,591 (94)
Complaint commissions	439 (25)	1,134 (15)	399 (24)	1,972 (18)
Total neighborhoods	1,767 (100)	7,814 (100)	1,641 (100)	11,222 (100)

Source: Savezni Zavod, *Statistički Bilten* 1317, p. 10

Table 4 Percentages of age and gender distribution of neighborhood council members by type of neighborhood for Yugoslavia total, Slovenia, and Macedonia, 1980

Republic	Women	Youths
Yugoslavia		
Urban	20	12
Rural	6	13
Mixed	13	14
Total	11	13
Slovenia		
Urban	27	10
Rural	15	14
Mixed	19	11
Total	19	12
Macedonia		
Urban	12	11
Rural	1	10
Mixed	8	12
Total	4	10

Source: Savezni Zavod, *Statistički Bilten* 1317, p. 29

Table 5 Educational background of communal assembly delegates, 1982 (in percentages)

Republic	BA +	Education level			
		Some higher	Middle school	Primary education	Less than primary
Yugoslavia	16.7	16.7	42.4	15.4	8.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	16.0	18.6	44.8	13.8	6.8
Montenegro	20.5	18.5	41.8	12.4	5.4
Croatia	18.1	16.3	45.6	13.2	6.8
Macedonia	26.0	16.3	33.3	17.7	6.5
Slovenia	17.7	26.1	48.8	6.5	0.9
Serbia total	14.2	15.1	40.9	17.9	11.9
Serbia proper	14.9	15.2	39.1	17.2	13.6
Vojvodina	11.8	13.0	47.0	18.4	9.8
Kosovo	15.0	19.6	37.0	20.6	7.8

Source: Milan Jovanović, "Izbori za Skupštine Društveno-Političkih Zajednica u 1982," *Jugoslovenski Pregled* 27 (1983): 208.

Table 6 Percentages of respondents who followed the Seventh Party Congress by level of sociopolitical involvement

Political Involvement	Followed	Didn't follow
Inactive citizens	61.1	36.8
Active in social organizations	80.8	19.2
Active in sociopolitical organizations	89.3	10.7
Elected in sociopolitical organizations	88.9	11.1
Elected in economic organizations	94.9	5.1
Higher-level officials	100.0	0

Source: Firdus Đzinić, *Jugoslovensko Javno Mnenje i VIII Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1965), p. 18.

Table 7 Motives for Membership in the SKJ, Čačak region, 1963

Motive	Blue-collar worker	White-collar worker
Ideological and political adherence to self-management	107	12
Advancement at work	48	4
To enjoy the reputation of membership	104	11
Desire to be politically active	87	11
Total	346	38

Source: Miroslav Kovaksica, "Politika Prijema u SKJ u Čačku," in Miroslav Pečujlić, *Studija iz Političke Sociologije: Socijalna Struktura i Promene Političkih Institucija* (Belgrade: Visoka Škola Političkih Nauka, 1965), p. 96.

Table 8 How do you evaluate the influence of communists on the work of the institutions of self-management in your work organization?

Group	Very strong	Strong	Average	Weak	Don't know	Number
Total sample	10.9	27.9	36.1	13.0	12.1	868
SKJ members	12.7	30.5	42.9	11.5	2.4	259
Non-skj members	10.6	26.2	33.6	13.3	16.3	539
Unskilled workers	11.3	26.1	31.1	12.3	19.2	318
Skilled workers	11.6	28.8	38.4	13.0	8.2	292
Highly educated	10.0	30.1	39.8	13.8	6.3	239

Source: Firdus Đžinić, *Savezu Komunisti i Predstojećem Kongresu* (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1964), pp. 42-43.

Table 9 Distribution of delegates to the Twelfth National SKJ Congress by republic

Republic	Members	Number of delegates	Additional delegates	Total delegates	Number at Eleventh Congress
Bosnia-Herzegovina	366,192	198	60	258	318
Montenegro	78,042	39	60	99	118
Croatia	364,822	182	60	242	340
Macedonia	147,930	75	60	135	166
Slovenia	132,408	66	60	126	160
Serbia proper	618,218	309	60	369	522
Kosovo	95,968	48	40	88	114
Vojvodina	234,017	117	40	157	219
Yugoslav National Army	114,962	58	30	88	123
Federal employees	15,885	8		8	12
Total	2,198,144	1,100	470	1,570	2,092

Source: *Komunist*, 2 October 1981, p. 13.

Table 10 Rotation schedule of the president of the Presidency and secretary of the Central Committee, 1982-90

Year	President	Secretary
1982-83	Slovenia	Bosnia-Herzegovina
1983-84	Serbia	Bosnia-Herzegovina
1984-85	Kosovo	Macedonia
1985-86	Montenegro	Macedonia
1986-87	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbia
1987-88	Vojvodina	Serbia
1988-89	Macedonia	Kosovo
1989-90	Croatia	Kosovo

Source: *Politika*, 18 February 1982, p. 8.

Table 11 Distribution of favorable voting percentages for republic central committee members, 1982

Republic	High	Low
Bosnia-Herzegovina	99	98
Croatia	99	96
Macedonia	99	96
Slovenia	98	93
Serbia	99	90
Vojvodina	99	96

Source: Politika congress reportage.

Table 12 Comparative sizes of republic central committees, statutory commissions, and supervisory commissions, 1982

Republic	Central Committee	Statutory commission	Supervisory commission
Bosnia-Herzegovina	133	37	23
Montenegro	55	11	7
Croatia	97	21	9
Macedonia	105	25	11
Slovenia	95	16	8
Serbia	149	29	15
Kosovo	95	15	11
Vojvodina	113	21	15

Table 13 Percentages of total population and employed population who are members of the SKJ by republic, 1976

Republic	Population	Employed
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5.5	23.7
Montenegro	9.5	32.3
Croatia	5.8	16.4
Macedonia	5.3	19.0
Slovenia	5.1	10.7
Serbia proper	7.5	21.2
Kosovo	4.5	30.1
Vojvodina	8.2	25.2
Yugoslavia total	6.7	21.6

Source: Gojko Stanić, "Kadrovski ili Masovni Savez Komunisti—Stvarna ili Izmišljena Dilema," *Socijalizam* 21 (March 1978): 116.

Table 14 Age structure of the Central Committee of the SKJ, age structure of the SKJ membership, and index of inequality,* 1978 and 1982

Age	1978			1982		
	% of Central Committee	% of SKJ	Index of inequality	% of Central Committee	% of SKJ	Index of inequality
16-27	1	33	.03	1.2	31	.04
28-35	5	22.8	.22	—	27	—
36-45	18	22	.82	—	19.9	—
46+	76	22.2	3.42	76	22.1	3.44

*Index of inequality is the result of the division of the percentage of the Central Committee by the percentage of the SKJ membership.

Source: Central Committee distributions and index calculated by the authors. Percentage distribution of the SKJ membership provided by Stanić, "Članstvo," p. 150.

Table 15 Percentage agreement with written statements reflecting ideological issues before and after Party school program in Croatia, 1979

Ideological value	Before	After	Difference
Self-management	93	93	0
Peaceful coexistence	94	95	1
Nationalism	34	24	-10
Bureaucratism	40	29	-11
Technocratism	25	19	-6
Liberalism	50	38	-12
Anarchism	45	38	-7
State socialism	68	60	-8
Unitarism	81	73	-8
Ultraleftism	65	48	-17

Source: Jovan Mirić and Ivan Šiber, "Političko Obrazovanje i Idejno Opredjeljenje," *Naše Teme* 23 (November 1979): 1892.

Table 16 Comparative dues structure between Croatia and Bosnia, 1978 (in dinars)

Income	Croatia	Bosnia
0-1,000	1	1
1,500	7	3
2,500	30	20
4,000	70	55
8,000	200	160

Source: Nadzorna Komisija SKJ "Izveštaj o Radu," pp. 297-98.

Table 17 Percentages of leaders in governmental institutions in Serbia and Croatia who are SKJ members, 1978

Institution	Croatia	Serbia
Delegation members	55.58	—
Delegates	67.45	75
Communal executives	—	97
Higher governmental levels	91.57	97 +

Sources: Croatia—Branko Caratan, “Savez Komunista u Samoupravljanju,” in Prvoslav Ralić and Čedomir Strbac, eds., *Savez Komunista i Samoupravljanje* (Belgrade: Marksistički Centar CK SK Srbije, 1979), p. 64. Serbia—Vasović, *Svest i Angažovanje Komunista*, p. 196.

Table 18 Public perceptions of the performance of the sociopolitical organizations in the OOUR in Croatia, 1978.

Appraisal	SKJ	SSJ	SSOJ
Good	30	25	15
Average	38	37	26
Weak	17	30	34
Don't know	15	8	25

Source: Miroslav Vujević, “Delegatski Sistem u Osnovnim Organizacijama Udruženog Rada,” in Ivan Šiber and Zdravko Tomac, eds., *Teorija i Praksa Delegatskog Sistema* (Zagreb: Zagreb, 1979), p. 82.

Table 19 Public appraisal of the work of the sociopolitical organizations in Croatian organized neighborhoods, 1978

Appraisal	SKJ	SSRNJ	SSOJ
Good	29.32	23.85	15.75
Average	36.49	36.89	27.40
Poor	11.65	17.42	26.84
Dont' know	22.54	21.84	30.01

Source: Caratan, “Savez Komunista u Samoupravljanju,” p. 187.

Table 20 Correlation coefficients between social-demographic characteristics and participation at voter meetings in neighborhoods in Croatia, 1978

Characteristic	Correlation
Sex (female)	-.269
Age	.328
Position in the OOUR	.300
Position in the delegate system	-.155
Membership in the SKJ	.280
Office in the SKJ	.323
Office in the Socialist Alliance	.400

Source: Ivan Šiber, "Struktura Potreba i Angaziranost u Delegatskim Procesima," in Šiber and Tomac, *Teorija i Praksa*, p. 122.

Table 21 Membership and elected office in the League of Communists and political knowledge in Croatia, 1978 (in percentages)

Position	Knowledge		
	Neighborhood delegation	Delegation for sociopolitical chamber	General score
Nonmembers	63	40	68
Member without office	68	49	88
Office in neighborhood	83	65	93
Office in OOUR	70	56	91
Higher political office	67	77	97

Source: Ivan Šiber, *Delegatski Sistem i Izborni Procesi* (Zagreb: Institut za Političke Nauke, 1979), p. 169.

Table 22 Members' perceived level of capability of chapter for involvement in Serbia, 1980

Perceived capability	Percentages
Unprepared	1
Weak preparation	4.8
Average preparation	25.49
High preparation	68.58

Source: Marksistički Centar SK Srbije, *Svest i Angažovanje Komunisti* (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1980), p. 208.

Table 23 Membership and elected office in the League of Communists and participation in electoral processes in Croatia, 1978

Position	Score*
Not a SKJ member	3.13
Member of the SKJ	3.20
Office in the neighborhood	5.30
Office in the OOUR	5.45
Higher office	6.37

*Key: 0–1 = none; 1–4 = little; 5–8 = much; 9–12 = extreme. *Source:* Šiber, *Delegatski Sistem*, p. 133.

Table 24 Length of membership in the League and level of activity, 1981 (in percentages)

Year of admittance to SKJ	Little	Average	Great	Sample
Before 1945	32	51	17	3
1945–50	31	33	36	10
1951–60	21	34	45	15
1961–70	27	32	41	20
1970 and later	55	28	17	52
Total	41	31	28	100

Source: Reprinted in Teodor Anđelić, “Grupni Portret Partije,” *N.I.N.*, 26 April 1981, p. 14.

Table 25 Do you attend meetings that the Socialist Alliance organizes? (Croatia, 1966)

Always or often	22%
Rarely or never	48%
No answer	30%

Source: Mladen Zvonarević, *Javno Mnjenje Građana SR Hrvatske o Samoupravljanju* (Zagreb: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja, 1967).

Table 26 Attendance at public meetings by religious orientation in Croatia, 1969

Religious orientation	Often or regularly	Sometimes	Never
Church identifier	17.5	40.0	40.9
Believer (no church ID)	39.5	47.2	13.3
No opinion	30.6	48.6	19.5
Atheist	51.7	37.4	10.9

Source: Stefica Bahtijarević and Branko Bošnjak, *Socijalističko Društvo Crkva i Religija* (Zagreb: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja, 1969), p. 101.

Table 27 Religious orientation among the youth in Zagreb, 1969 and 1983 (in percentages)

Orientation	1969	1983
Religious	40	26
Undecided	23	22
Not religious	21	23
Atheist	15	29

Source: "Korijeni Aktualizacije Religioznosti," *Komunist*, 25 May 1984, p. 20. Also, see Stevan Nikšić, "Bog 1984 u Beogradu," *N.I.N.*, 9 September 1984, pp. 16-19, for Belgrade data.

Table 28 Delegates to the Ninth Congress of the ssj by republic and type of selection agency

Republic/ Province	Total	Commune	Republic	Pension Association	Disabled Association
Bosnia-					
Herzegovina	177	139	32	4	2
Montenegro	62	24	32	4	2
Croatia	216	178	32	4	2
Macedonia	91	53	32	4	2
Slovenia	132	94	32	4	2
Serbia	228	190	32	4	2
Kosovo	58	28	24	4	2
Vojvodina	101	71	24	4	2
Yugoslav Army	10				
Total	1075	777	240	32	16

Table 29 Results from the question: In your opinion, who should receive greater credit for the prosperity of your work organization?

Group	Percentages
Self-management bodies	15.7
Leadership bodies	38.1
Director	9.1
Professional work staff	28.2
League of Communists' chapter	2.1
Trade union local	0.6

Source: Krsto S. Kilibarda, *Rad i Samoupravljanje* (Belgrade: Privredni Pregled, 1973), p. 123.

Table 30 Average influence scores by leaders and nonleaders by sex from the question: How would you evaluate the influence of the following groups on personnel policy and the election of leadership personnel in the firm?

Group	Average Response		Nonleaders
	Men	Women	
Workers' council	3.53	3.17	3.60
Management committees	3.87	3.79	3.63
Enterprise leadership	4.46	4.50	4.17
Shop leadership	3.37	3.17	3.53
Workers	2.33	2.21	2.45
League of Communists' chapter	2.92	2.86	3.54
Trade union local	2.29	1.43	2.80

Key: 1 = none, 2 = little, 3 = some, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong.

Source: Ibid., p. 119.

Table 31 Responses in percentages for 1967, 1969, and 1971 to the question: Is the union organization that you have still necessary or not?

Opinion	Year		
	1967	1969	1971
Very necessary	24.7	17.6	14.3
Somewhat necessary	37.5	34.3	34.0
Not much needed	11.4	20.0	23.5
Completely unnecessary	7.3	14.3	13.9
Don't know	19.1	13.7	14.3

Source: Bogdan Kavčič, *Radnici o Sindikatu* (Ljubljana: Center Republičkog Veća Saveza Sindikata Slovenije za Istraživanje Samoupravljanje, October 1982), pp. 105–6.

Table 32 Responses in percentages by occupational grouping to the question: Is the union, such as you have now, necessary or not?

Occupational group	Necessary	Not necessary	Don't know
Highly skilled and skilled	50	38	12
Semiskilled and unskilled	48	26	26
High and higher educated	35	50	15
White-collar middle	43	43	14
White-collar low	53	35	12

Source: Institut Društvenih Nauka, *Bilten Javnog Mnenja Broj 8* (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1970)

Table 33 Occupational composition of workers' council in Croatian OOURs, 1976 and 1979 (in percentages)

Category	1976	1979
Women	22	22
Youth	14	15
Membership in the League	29	30
Blue-collar workers	71	73
White-collar workers	29	27

Source: Ivan Jakopović, "Samoupravno Odlučivanje Radnika i Uloga Sindikata," *Naše Teme* 27 (October 1983): 1505.

Table 34 Type of school by parents' occupation, 1972

Type of school	Peasant	Occupation Worker	Administrative
Gymnasium	15.1	18.4	48.1
Vocational	22.0	41.7	17.6

Source: Vukašin Pavlović, "Socijalne Nejednakosti u Samoupravnom Društvu i Sindikalna Akcija," *Naše Teme* 21 (January 1977), p. 81.

Table 35 Youth representation on leadership institutions in policy boards (siz), 1975-81 (in percentages)

Institution	Year			
	1975	1977	1978	1981
Legislatures	11.3	8.3	11.1	8.8
Presidents	2.7	1.1	1.3	0.9
Executive council	9.2	6.2	10.7	9.3

Sources: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, *Statistički Bilten* 1040, 1146, 1163, 1324 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1975-81).

Table 36 Participation of youth in Serbia and Macedonia by participatory form (in percentages)

Participatory form	Serbia		Macedonia	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Membership in the SSOJ	67	33	74	26
Membership in the Party	24	76	27	73
Membership in self-management bodies	26	74	18	82
Attendance at meetings	81	19	65	35
Participation in meeting preparation	35	65	49	51
Participation in local work projects	48	52	47	53
Participation in federal SSOJ projects	5	95	6	94
Participation in local SSOJ projects	51	49	53	47

Source: Vladimir Goati and Dimitar Mirčev, "Omladina u Samoupravnim Procesima Danas," *Opredeljenje* 11 (February 1980): 107.

Table 37 Turnout for elections in Yugoslavia after the war (in percentages)

Year	Turnout	Year	Turnout
1946	88.7	1963	95.5
1950	91.9	1967	95.5
1953	89.4	1969	88.0
1958	94.1		

Source: Milan Benc, *Izborna Ponašanje Građana* (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1974), p. 65.

Table 38 Election turnout in prewar Yugoslavia (in percentages)

Year	Turnout	Year	Turnout
1920	64.4	1931	67.8
1923	73.7	1935	73.6
1925	76.7	1938	74.5
1927	68.7		

Source: Ibid., p. 68.

Table 39 Age and education structure of the Serbian assembly, 1953

Age	Percentage	Education	Percentage
Under 29	11.7	Less than 8 Years	68.7
30-39	59.5	12 Years	20.3
40-49	24.4	University	11.0
50-59	3.4		
Over 60	1.0		

Source: Republički Zavod za Statistiku S.R. Srbije, *Društveno-Ekonomski Razvoj Socijalistike Republike Srbije 1950-1971* (Belgrade: Republički Zavod za Statistiku, 1972), pp. 17-19.

Table 40 Educational background of the Serbian assembly members, 1953 to 1963 (in percentages)

Year	8 Years	12 Years	14 Years	University
1953	68.7	20.3	0.0	11.0
1958	55.2	34.2	0.3	10.3
1963	9.6	38.1	18.0	34.3

Source: Republički Zavod za Statistiku S.R. Srbije, *Društveno-Ekonomski Razvoj*, p. 19.

Table 41 Distribution of influence of election-related organizations, 1969 (in percentages)

Organization	
Individual leaders	16.6
League of Communists	14.7
Socialist Alliance	19.7
Candidate conferences	12.5
Coordinating committee	1.6
Voters	19.1
No answer	15.8

Source: Gošnik, "Kandidovanje," p. 137.

Table 42 Distribution of influence of election-related institutions, 1967 (in percentages)

Organization	
Individual leaders	7
League of Communists	17
Socialist Alliance	19
Voters	16
Don't know	41

Source: Pegan, "Učešće Birača," p. 129.

Table 43 Ratio of available positions to candidates for the federal and republic assemblies, 1963-69

Governmental unit	Year			
	1963	1965	1967	1969
Federal Assembly	1.005	1.163	2.187	1.692
Republic assemblies	1.009	1.512	2.389	1.975

Source: Computed from data provided by Sergije Pegan, "Socijalni Sastav Predstavničkih Tijela," in Firdus Džinić, ed., *Skupštinski Izbori 1969* (Belgrade: Centar za Istraživanje Javnog Mnenja, 1970), p. 150.

Table 44 Evaluation of knowledge about the election of delegates in Croatia, 1978 and 1982 (in percentages)

Evaluation	1978	1982
All details were clear to me	26	24
The general points were clear to me	52	54
Much is not clear to me	20	20
Nothing is clear to me	2	2

Source: Ivan Šiber, “Delegatski Izbori 1978–1982,” *Politička Misao* 19 (1982): 448.

Table 45 Presence of delegates at precandidacy and candidacy meetings by type of delegate in Croatia, 1978

Participation	Total	Work	Neighborhood	Sociopolitical organization
Not present for any meeting	15.60	12.0	8.6	26.0
Present only for the precandidacy	4.59	6.8	5.7	1.3
Present only for the candidacy	9.20	13.4	5.7	8.2
Present for both meetings	70.60	68.0	80.0	64.4

Source: Ivan Grdešić, *Neki Aspekti Izboru Delegata u Općinsku Skupštinu* (Zagreb: Institut za Političke Nauke, 1980), p. 51.

Table 46 Institutions participating in forming the program of the Zagreb city assembly, 1969

Organization	Proposals submitted	Percentages of totals
Working organizations	28	14.3
Sociopolitical organizations	44	22.5
Committees of the assembly	0	0.0
Neighborhoods and voter meetings	24	12.2
Communal administrative agencies	70	35.7
Other institutions	30	15.3
Total	196	100.0

Source: Skupština Grada Zagreba, *Aktuelna Pitanja Komunalnog Sistema u Gradu Zagrebu* (Zagreb: Veljača, 1971), p. 146.

Table 47 Evaluation of the work of city services given in March 1973 (in percentages)

Type of service	Weak	Sufficient	Good	Very good	Excellent	Don't know
Commune administration	7	13	42	14	3	18
City administration	3	10	36	20	12	19
Water services	6	12	38	28	12	4
Electricity	13	18	36	21	9	3
Sanitation	32	31	21	9	2	3
Mass transit	22	28	27	13	4	6
Housing	31	28	33	9	2	7

Source: Snežana Jakšimović, "Ocena Rada Gradskih Službi i Komunalnih Organizacija u Beogradu," *Javne Mnenje Beograda, Izveštaji i Studije* 90 (March 1973): 3.

Table 48 Correlation coefficients between political structural variables and political decision-making variables

Decision-making variable	Executive	Bureaucratic	Legislative
Bureaucratic dominance	-.034	-.404	.134
Professionalism	-.271	-.511	.421
Decentralism	-.406	-.524	.496
Progressivism—women	-.275	-.268	.304
Progressivism—youth	-.256	-.164	.228

Source: Ibid., p. 70.

Table 49 Initiator of communal referenda, 1974–75 and 1978–79

Initiator	1974–75	1978–79
Commune assembly	19.5	47.1
Work organizations	0.0	1.9
Neighborhood councils	61.8	24.8
Sociopolitical organizations	15.7	22.1
Other	2.6	1.9

Sources: 1974–75—Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, "Skupštine Opštine: Sastav i Aktivnost 1975," *Statistički Bilten* 984 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, October 1976): 27. 1978–79—"Skupštine Opštine: Aktivnost od 1 VII, 1978 do 30 VI 1979," *Statistički Bilten* 1189 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, June 1980): 15.

Table 50 Participation rate of the sociopolitical organizations in communal assembly initiation of proposals by problem area in Croatia, 1978

Issue area	Percentage participation
Formation of delegate system and normative issues	66.67
Financial management and budgeting	33.33
Health and social welfare	50.00
Education, culture, and knowledge	0.00
Agriculture	0.00
Planning	0.00
Criminal justice	0.00

Source: Ivan Grdešić, "Sadržaj Rada i Procesi Odlučivanja u Općinskim Skupštinama," in Ivan Šiber and Zdravko Tomac, eds., *Teorija i Praksa Delegatskog Sistema* (Zagreb: Zagreb, 1979), pp. 153–54.

Table 51 Serbian delegate answers in 1978 to the question, "Who has the determining influence on decisions in the assembly where you serve?" (in percentages)

Decision-makers	
Workers and citizens	17
Delegation	22
Delegates	15
Executive committee	25
Sociopolitical organization	2
Civil Service	4

Source: Mijat Damjanović, "Uloga Izvršnih i Upravnih Organa u Sistemu Delegatskog Odlučivanja," in Marinković, *Delegatski Sistem*, p. 221.

Table 52 Participation rate of the sociopolitical organizations in the formulation of policy by problem area in Croatia, 1978

Policy issue	Participation rate
Formation of the delegate system and normative issues	33.33
Budgeting and financial management	66.67
Health and social welfare	100.00
Education, culture, and knowledge	33.33
Criminal justice	00.00
Public building	00.00
Agriculture	00.00

Source: Grdešić, *Neki Aspekti Izbora*, pp. 153–54.

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Jim Seroka is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. Radoš Smiljković is Professor and Dean, the Faculty of Political Science, the University of Belgrade.

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